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THESIS ABSTRACT Ph.D. Thesis submitted by 
James Valentine i n June 1976 
at the University of Durham. 
'WORLD VIEW AND CLASS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND LITERATURE' 
The thesis i s concerned with engendering formal models i n the sociology 
of knowledge and l i t e r a t u r e that w i l l a id the analysis of the development 
of aspects of world view from cl a s s elements, and the expression of 
world views i n l i t e r a t u r e . After an introduction which reviews the 
general methodological approach, Part I examines theories i n the sociology 
of knowledge (including p r i n c i p a l l y those of Mannheim, Goldmann, Scheler 
Pareto, Parsons, and Berger and Luckmann) i n the l i g h t of an analytical 
substructurer-superstructure d i s t i n c t i o n , in order to establish the various 
possible modes of development of consciousness from meaningful action. 
Part I I develops a general model for one area of the sociology of knowledge: 
after refining the concepts of 'class' and 'world view', i t traces the 
ways i n which aspects of world view may develop from class elements. In 
Part I I I , the general model of the development of world view from class 
i s applied to the special case of l i t e r a r y world views. The l i t e r a r y role 
i s examined, both i n terms of authorship as a class role and in terms of 
the non^economic aspects of the author role. The l i t e r a r y act of author-
ship i s investigated through the predominant conceptichns of a r t as commu-
nication and expression, and the sociology of expression i s found to be 
an important adjunct to the sociology of knowledge. Where attempts are 
made to analyse the meanings ^expressed' in l i t e r a t u r e , i t i s suggested 
that various aspects of l i t e r a r y form require recognition. Part I I I 
concludes with an examination of methodological issues that emerge from 
a c r i t i q u e of Goldmann's sociology of li t e r a t u r e . I n Part IV, the formal 
models developed i n the e a r l i e r Parts are applied to the undertaking of 
two case studies, that focus upon Charlotte and Emily Brontfe and their 
novels. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL APPROACH 
(i) Background to the Study 
The theme for t h i s thesis emerged in the late 1960s from a concern 
with several issues i n the sociology of knowledge which seemed i n need 
of conceptual refinement and theoretical resolution. Most generally, 
there appeared to be no adequate model of how thought may be s o c i a l l y 
conditioned, p a r t i c u l a r l y on the microsociological l e v e l . More par-
t i c u l a r l y , the c r u c i a l role of cl a s s in.the s o c i a l conditioning of 
thought had been widely claimed, but again there lacked a suitable 
model that would indicate the microsociological connections between 
'class* and 'thought'. The aim was thus to develop a refined sociology 
of knowledge (Part I Qf the thesis)''", and to develop within t h i s per-
spective a general model of the ways i n which cl a s s may influence 
thought (Part I I ) , 
Although the general approach that was found to be most s a t i s -
factory, i . e . methodological individualism, led to a special consider-
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ation of Weber's concept of class (outlined i n Chapter 5 below) , the 
work Qf Mannheim and Goldmann^ was also of particular relevance, for 
both shared an i n t e r e s t i n the role of class in the development of 
'world views'-. The examination of the concept of *^world view' thus 
became pertinent, though i t s analysis went beyond the emphasis upon 
the cognitive content of perspectives on the world, to encompass a 
s o c i a l psychological i n t e r e s t i n cognitive s t y l e and structure (as 
discussed in Chapter 6 below) . The significance of the work of 
A condensed account of the approach developed was published 
i n Valentine, 1975. 
An early statement of the investigation into the relevance of 
Weber's concept of cl a s s for the sociology of knowledge i s to be 
found i n Valentine, 1972. 
A f i r s t attempt at a critique of Goldmann's theories i n the soci-
ology of knowledge and l i t e r a t u r e was made i n Valentine, 1970. 
Mannheim and Goldmann was not r e s t r i c t e d to the sociology of knowledge: 
Mannheim's emphasis on the world view expressed i n cultural documents, 
arid Goldmann's pa r t i c u l a r concern with l i t e r a r y documents, encouraged 
a link between the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of li t e r a t u r e , 
and prompted an investigation of l i t e r a t u r e as a special kind of cul-
t u r a l document, with implications for understanding the processes of 
expression and interpretation of world views i n novels (Part I I I ) . 
Throughout the research i t was clear that a case study in the soci-^ 
ology of knowledge and l i t e r a t u r e was necessaiy, both for the develop-
ment of the general concepts and hypotheses, and for the demonstration 
of t h e i r u t i l i t y i n concrete h i s t o r i c a l explanation. Studies of Charlotte 
and Emily Brontfe, with respect to both their l i v e s and l i t e r a r y works, 
were thus undertaken,''' Here i t i s important to point out that the order 
of presentation of the thesis was not the order of 'discovery': many 
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aspects of the formal models developed in Parts I - I I I (e,g.^ the emphasis 
on %ork situation'" and on ^ l i t e r a r y role contacts*) derived from the work 
on Charlotte and Emily BrontS reported in Part IV, Nevertheless, the 
theoretical and methodological points to be found i n the f i r s t three 
Parts cannot a l l be encompassed within the case studies of Charlotte and 
Emily BrontS, though these studies both aid and are aided by the develop-
ment of the formal models. These models however, with the i r broader 
relevance, must be seen as the p r i n c i p a l contribution of the thesis: 
they are designed to aid empirical analysis through the indication of 
what i s deemed worth taking into account i n investigations of the role 
of c l a s s i n the development of world views ^  and of the expression of 
Advantages and disadvantages of the selection of Charlotte and 
Emily BrontS for the empitical research are suggested i n the 
introduction to Part IV. 
One may either consider the thesis (in Parts I ' ^ I I I ) as developing 
throughout a general model for the sociology of knowledge and l i t e r -
ature, with p a r t i c u l a r reference to 'class', or else as providing a 
nianber of formal models of more r e s t r i c t e d scope <r e.g. of 'class' 
i n Chapter 5, of 'world view'' i n Chapter 6, of world view development 
i n r e l a t i o n to class i n Chapter 7, of the author role i n Chapter 8, etc. 
world views i n l i t e r a t u r e . Furthermore, the models are intended to 
prevent certain prevalent assumptions being made i n the adoption of 
theoretical frameworks i n the sociology of knowledge and li t e r a t u r e -
assumptions that are warranted, i f a t a l l , only i n s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i c a l 
contexts. 
Where satisfactory solutions to the problems which the thesis had 
to tackle could not be found i n the existing l i t e r a t u r e , i t was of 
course necessary to transcend existing theories either through the 
synthesis of perspectives from a variety of writers and disci p l i n e s 
Cdiscussions i n various parts of the thesis are drawn from philosophical, 
sociological, s o c i a l psychological, h i s t o r i c a l or l i t e r a r y contexts), 
or indeed at times through the formulation of new concepts (such as 
'promotions' and 'extensions') , However, despite the variety of per-
spectives considered, a consistent general methodological approach has 
been developed through the the s i s , forming the basis for the research. 
(jLi) The General Methodological Approach 
The general methodological approach that emerges through the inveS'-
tigation of themes i n the sociology of knowledge embraces methodological 
individualism, which i s further elaborated and j u s t i f i e d i n Chapter 7, 
More broadly the approach that i s developed i s consistent with that 
of Max Weber, i n h i s view of the scope and purpose of sociological 
knowledge and i n h i s aiccount of conceptualisation and explanation i n 
the s o c i a l sciences. At the most general l e v e l an attempt has been 
made to put forward formal 'general how' models that indicate, for the 
investigation of certain general problems, factors that are considered 
worthwhile taking into account,''" and the various possible interconnections 
Cf .Dray on the status of so-called 'laws' i n the s o c i a l sciences^ 
i , e , laws thati 
',.. merely summarize a trend, observed i n the particular 
cases, toward the is o l a t i o n of one sort of condition as/ 
between these factors,''" These models are i n f a c t conceptual schemes 
t h a t are developed under the guidance of c e r t a i n 'points of view': 
'In the method of i n v e s t i g a t i o n , the guiding 'point 
of view' i s of g r e a t importance f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n 
of the conceptual scheme which w i l l be used i n the 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n . ' (Weber, 1949: 84) 
The dominant 'point of view' i n the t h e s i s has o f course been t h a t of 
the c o n d i t i o n i n g of world view a s p e c t s through c l a s s f a c t o r s . Such 
g e n e r a l p o i n t s of view, or ' o r i e n t a t i o n s of our c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t ' 
(Weber, 1949! 6 4 ) , are not n e c e s s a r i l y i n themselves e v a l u a t i v e i d e a s , 
but, 'however i n d i r e c t l y ' - (Weber, 1949: 82); ' i n the l a s t a n a l y s i s ' 
(Weber, 1949t 111)^ must ' u l t i m a t e l y ' be r e l a t e d to v a l u e - i d e a s . (Weber, 
1949; 112) T h i s means t h a t any conceptual scheme t h a t we develop under 
the guidance of a g e n e r a l c o g n i t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n i s merely a 'conceptual 
game' (Weber, 1949: 92) u n l e s s i t a i d s i n the a n a l y s i s of the s i g n i f i c a n c e 
o f a p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n , T h i s l a t t e r i s e i t h e r considered 
to be e f f e c t i v e i n c o n d i t i o n i n g , or i s i t s e l f ^ a ' h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l ' 
t h a t i s r e l e v a n t to our v a l u e s . (Weber, 1949: 150) From t h i s d e r i v e s 
the importance of case s t u d i e s i n the t h e s i s i s evere doubt would be 
thrown upon the v a l u e of the g e n e r a l conceptual framework i f i t were 
found t o be of l i t t l e Tise i n e i t h e r the e x p o s i t i o n or explanation of 
value-rrelevant a s p e c t s of the novels of C h a r l o t t e and Emily Brontfe -
which does not mean, of course, t h a t the general conceptual framework 
i s claimed to explain^ a l l the p o s s i b l e valuer-relevant a s p e c t s , nor a l l 
the v a l u e s to which the novels themselves r e f e r , nor indeed only the 
asy 
especially.noteworthy. ... Such a law can be no more than suggestive 
i n the s e a r c h f o r the a c t u a l cause; i t merely reminds the h i s t o r i a n 
t h a t i t i s worth h i s w h i l e to be on the lookout f o r t h i s f a c t o r 
as a p o s s i b l e cause.' (1957! 108) 
The argument f o r 'general how' models i s elaborated below. Chapter 2, 
pp 63-64 
2 • 
The d i s t i n c t i o n between valuts-^vrelevance and value^r-reference i s 
e l a b o r a t e d below^ Chapter 11, p 274 
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economic a s p e c t s : the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the economic conditioning of 
' h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l s ' does not thereby imply the e v a l u a t i o n of the 
l a t t e r -
'•... f o r the sake o f t h e i r economic s i g n i f i c a n c e . ' 
(Weber, 1949: 151) 
Case s t u d i e s o f course i n v o l v e h i s t o r i c a l explanations tha:t are 
e i t h e r i n d i v i d u a l (as i n t h i s t h e s i s ) or c o l l e c t i v e : both kinds of 
h i s t o r i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n attempt to a t t a i n c l a r i t y and c e r t a i n t y , 
',,. but no matter how c l e a r an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as 
such appears to be from the p o i n t of view of meaning, 
i t cannot on t h i s account c l a i m to be the c a u s a l l y 
v a l i d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . On t h i s l e v e l i t must remain 
only a p e c u l i a r l y p l a u s i b l e hypothesis.' 
(Weber, 1947: 96-97) 
C a u s a l adequacy i s achieved through the comparative method (Weber, 1947: 
99)''', and through a pro c e s s o f ' a b s t r a c t i o n ' t h a t i n v o l v e s both i s o l a t i o n 
i n t o 'components'> and the a p p l i c a t i o n to these o f g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s , i . e . 
'general e m p i r i c a l r u l e s ' t h a t i n d i c a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y or p r o b a b i l i t y 
of the occurrence o f c e r t a i n e f f e c t s , (Weber, 1949: 173-5) These r u l e s 
are thus statements o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t may o b t a i n between c e r t a i n e l e -
ments? many such *may statements'' are included i n the formal models of 
the t h e s i s Ce,g,, the g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s on the i n f l u e n c e of the audience 
upon l i t e r a r y e x p r e s s i o n s , i n s e c t i o n ( i v ) o f Chapter 9 ) . These 'may 
statements' a r e not -r 
.. 'laws' i n the narrower e x a c t n a t u r a l s c i e n c e 
sense .,.' (Weber, 1949: 80),^ 
but r a t h e r r u l e s t h a t i n d i c a t e ' o b j e c t i v e p o s s i b i l i t y ' : thus i n any 
i n d i v i d u a l e x p l a n a t i o n a 'law' to which one has recourse may be merely -
S e v e r a l o f the explanations put forward i n the case s t u d i e s of 
C h a r l o t t e and Emily BrontS a t t a i n e d g r e a t e r adequacy through 
a comparative a n a l y s i s , e.g. of the i n f l u e n c e of work s i t u a t i o n 
upon the world view development of each s i s t e r . 
Dray's comments on s o - c a l l e d 'laws' i n the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s are 
once again r e l e v a n t here; see the footnote on p 6 above. 
•... a r e g u l a r l y r e c u r r e n t c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p of 
everyday experience ...' (Weber, 1949: 80) 
S c r i v e n has termed such gerieral r u l e s 'normic statements', and has 
i n d i c a t e d t h e i r c r u c i a l r o l e i n h i s t o r i c a l explanations. 'Normic s t a t e -
ments' are those g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s f o r which one i s unable to s p e c i f y a l l 
the c o n d i t i o n s : they -
are u s e f u l where the system of exceptions, 
although p e r f e c t l y comprehensible i n the sense 
t h a t one can l e a r n how to judge t h e i r r e l e v a n c e , 
i s exceedingly complex.' (1959: 466) 
F o r both i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e h i s t o r i c a l explanations, however, 
c a u s a l adequacy i s not s u f f i c i e n t : a r e l a t i o n s h i p remains an incompre-
e n s i b l e p r o b a b i l i t y i f adequacy i n r e s p e c t to meaning i s l a c k i n g . (Weber, 
1947: 99) Meaningful adequacy i s achieved through the ' r a t i o n a l under-
standing of motivation' (Weber, 1947: 95), which e n t a i l s a s o c i o l o g i c a l 
accoiait of motivated a c t i o n i n r a t i o n a l terms, as incorporated i n i d e a l -
t y p i c a l a c t o r models. 
'The i d e a l - t y p e of meaningful a c t i o n where the 
meaning i s f u l l y conscious and e x p l i c i t ...' 
(Weber, 1947: 112) , 
may w e l l be a marginal c a s e , but t h i s need not prevent the s o c i o l o g i s t 
from reasoning ^ 
"... as i f a c t i o n a c t u a l l y proceeded on the b a s i s 
of c l e a r l y s e l f - c o n s c i o u s meaning.' 
(Weber, 1947: 112) 
The f i n a l s e c t i o n of t h i s i n t r o d u c t o r y chapter develops f o r the 
a n a l y s i s of a c t i o n a conceptual framework t h a t i s b a s i c to a sociology 
of knowledge and l i t e r a t u r e t h a t c l a i m s to a t t a i n meaningful adequacy. 
( i i i ) A Conceptual Framework f o r the A n a l y s i s of A c t i o n 
T h i s s e c t i o n aims to c o n s t r u c t a schema which i n c l u d e s r a t i o n a l 
a c t i o n - o r i e n t a t i o n , i n terms of ends or v a l u e s , as w e l l as taking 
•'• The argimient f o r i d e a l - t y p i c a l a n a l y s i s i n terms of r a t i o n a l 
c o n s t r u c t s i s expoiinded i n d e t a i l below. Chapter 7, p 160 f f 
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accovint of 'sentimental action' and i t s potentially rational form 
in sociological explanation. Although traditional and other non-
l o g i c a l forms of motive-action relationship . are discussed for the sake 
of completeness, they play a r e l a t i v e l y minor role i n the thesis, which 
emphasises the construction of ra t i o n a l models."'' The action schema i s 
developed through a comparison of the work of Weber and Pareto, as 
suggested by Sahay (1972: Chapter 4), who also introduces the notion of 
2 
'sociological r a t i o n a l i t y ' that i s of considerable significance through-
out the thes i s . The comparison of Weber and Pareto conmiences with a 
study of Pareto's analysis of non-logical action. 
Pareto i s primarily concerned with one l i n k i n the general s o c i a l 
process, the l i n k between sentiment, b e l i e f and action. The fact that 
hi s analysis i s of a development from motivational force to s o c i a l act 
does not make his system psychologistic, as some c r i t i c s have maintained, 
as he does not claim for sentiments an ultimate status as f i n a l deter-
minants.^ His formulation i s indeed a 'general how' model, a picture 
of how certain general elements i n society relate; though h i s c l a s s i -
f i c a t i o n of residues does indicate certain common causes he believes 
to operate. 
Pareto i s p a r t i c u l a r l y interested in the explanation of action 
which does not follow from the rational pursuit of an end or value, but 
which involves an interpretation by the actor which i s in effect a 
r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . (Pareto, 1966: 184-5) I n Pareto's model of non-
l o g i c a l action, the emphasis i s upon the role of sentiments i n bringing 
about both the b e l i e f / r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n and the action. The key concept 
The role of these models i n sociological explanation i s discussed 
i n greater d e t a i l i n Chapter 7, pp 160-163 below. 
^ Sahay, 1972: 46ff, l 0 6 f f & 174-5. 
Sahay makes a si m i l a r point - 1972: 52. 
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i n h i s theory, however, i s t h a t of 'residue', thus c a l l e d s i n c e t h a t 
i s what remains when v a r i o u s a c t i o n s and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of a c t i o n are 
examined f o r t h e i r constant elements, b e l i e f s i n t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l i t y 
being then seen as ' d e r i v a t i o n s ' therefrom. (Pareto, 1966: 210 & 216) 
R e s i d u e s , as m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of sentiments, are capable of more o b j e c t i v e 
o b s e r v a t i o n than the sentiments which u n d e r l i e them (Pareto, 1966: 217): 
Sahay sees them as -
'... p e r s i s t e n t a s s o c i a t i o n s o f i d e a s , a c t s and 
things ... ' (1972: 81), 
and P a r e t o ' s own C l a s s I i n the C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of Residues i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
they r e f e r t o a s s o c i a t i o n s o f i d e a s , ideas and t h i n g s , or ideas and 
a c t i o n . (Pareto, 1966: 222) Pareto c e r t a i n l y grants them a s t a t u s more 
a k i n t o observables than are the sentiments manifested i n them. I t i s 
f o r t h i s reason t h a t we must r e j e c t B. Berger's view of r e s i d u e s as 
e q u i v a l e n t to p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l consciousness (1967: 272 ) : t h i s l a t t e r 
would i n c l u d e , i n a d d i t i o n to the mental a s s o c i a t i o n s o f i d e a and a c t i o n 
means and end, e t c . , many of the sentiments t h a t Pareto sees as mani-
f e s t e d i n such a s s o c i a t i o n s . Residues are c e r t a i n l y p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l 
(because assumed, and s u b j e c t to v a r i o u s t h e o r e t i c a l l e g i t i m a t i o n s = 
d e r i v a t i o n s ) , but they do not exhaust the f i e l d of p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l 
c onsciousness. Sentiments however may v a l i d l y be viewed as elements 
of p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l consciousness: they do not have to be seen e i t h e r as 
meaningless d r i v e s (as i n S c h e l e r ) or as conscious values - a sentiment 
may c o n t a i n c e r t a i n conceptual elements without being formulated i n t o 
a conscious value. 
W h i l s t Pareto i s r i g h t to work back from the observable to the 
meaningful i n the explanation o f a c t i o n , one may question whether 
r e s i d u e s r e a l l y h e l p i n t h i s : s i n c e the r e l a t i o n to sentiments i s not 
adequately defined, and s i n c e the r e s i d u e s are formulated on siich 
a h i gh l e v e l o f g e n e r a l i t y , they might appear to be mere a r b i t r a r y 
12 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . Finer points out that Pareto i s not interested in 
states of mind as such (1966: 36); and indeed t h i s i s revealed by the 
fact that Pareto does not go beyond the description of sentiments as 
being 'manifested' i n residues. I f the relationship i s l e f t as vagjie 
as t h i s , we have no reason to believe that residues, i . e . what i s found 
to be common to various non-logical actions, are related to 'highly 
permanent psychic states' (Finer, 1966: 38): they may each be related to 
manifold and varying psychic states, i n which case i t would seem that 
Pareto's residues would be unable to deal with the variety of meanings 
i n non-logical action. I t thus becomes clear that sentiments as deter-
minants of action and b e l i e f cannot be ignored or merely subsumed under 
th e i r 'manifestations' i n a limited number of residues. The interpre-
tation of an action as motivated by a sentiment i s as capable of objec-
t i v e v a l i d i t y as an interpretation which suggests that the action follows 
l o g i c a l l y from an end or value: without the rule of logic applying in 
the former case, however, the relation between sentiment and action must 
be validated either through subsumption under a different type of rule, 
pertaining for instance to normal occurrence i n the culture concerned; 
or through comparison with a rationalised ideal-type of sentiment-action 
relationship. Through th i s process one may explain the correlation of 
observables i n the residue. 
Having argued for a greater consideration of sentiments than i s 
advocated by Pareto, and yet for a retention of the role of residues 
at an intermediary l e v e l of analysis, one may ask what one i s to do i f 
unable to go beyond th i s intermediary stage, due to there being no 
obvious rule under which to subsume the residue (e.g. where i t i s not 
clear which of a variety of sentiments may plausibly explain the exis-
tence of the residue i n the si t u a t i o n ) . Here the true value of Pareto's 
concept of residues emerges: where i t i s not possible to trace a non-
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l o g i c a l action to sentiments, a principle governing t h i s action, a 
persistent tendency of human thought and action, may nevertheless be 
discovered, t h i s being what Pareto would term the residue. I t i s the 
fact that t h i s tendency (rather than another) i s present which may 
account for the occurrence of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r action or b e l i e f . In 
th i s way residues may be seen to have explanatory value, and thus are 
not necessarily limited to a capacity for l a b e l l i n g . 
I f we thus distingviish carefxilly between residue and sentiment, we 
see tJiat sentiment may i t s e l f be a motivation for action, whilst residue 
refers not to motivation but to a non-logical combination of observable 
elements of action or b e l i e f : an ' association-tendency'. The concept 
of residue may further be broadened to include not only the non-logical 
combination of observables, but also non-logical associations of motiva-
tion and action. I n t h i s way, i f i d e a l - t y p i c a l comparison reveals that 
an action i s not solely the r e s u l t of sentiments, an association-tendency 
may be invoked to account for the sentiment-action relationship. Pareto's 
notion of residvies as manifestations of sentiments i s thus c r i t i c i s e d , 
as i t confuses the pe r s i s t e n t tendencies of thought and conduct with 
motivation or meaning expressed. Certainly not a l l residues manifest 
sentiments (e.g. t r a d i t i o n a l actions do not always involve sentimental 
motivation); and, as Pareto would agree (1966: 217), not a l l sentiments 
are manifested i n residues: they may directly motivate thought and 
conduct without necessarily involving general himian or traditional 
association-tendencies. 
Our insistence on a careful d i s t i n c t i o n between residues and s e n t i -
ments, i n order to be able to gain a clearer view of their relationship 
and of the i r u t i l i t y for the explanation of action and b e l i e f , i s further 
j u s t i f i e d i f we study Pareto's C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of Residues. (Pareto, 1966: 
222-3) Residues Classes I and I I would seem to be concerned primarily 
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with association-tendencies, indicating the power of both general 
human combinations and tradition; w h i l s t Class I l i a seems to be actually 
the tendency to make associations at a l l , i . e . a human nature universal. 
The other Classes of Residues would appear to f a l l into the category of 
teentiments as explanations of action' - i.e. they are concerned with the 
emotional content of conduct and b e l i e f . 
I t i s interesting at th i s point to outline Weber's framework for 
the analysis of action, as th i s framework appears to be complementary 
to that of Pareto.''" Weber analyses action i n terms of i t s mode of 
orientation, and formulates four different types of action-orientation: 
end-rational, value-rational, affective and tr a d i t i o n a l . (1947: 115) 
The f i r s t three types are motivated by ends, values and emotions respec-
t i v e l y , where motive refers to a meaningful subjective source of action. 
(1947: 95-96) End- and value-motivated action are temed rational i n the 
ideal-type, since i f these are the sole subjective determinants of the 
action, then t h e i r relationship to the action must be rational (either 
i n terms of a l o g i c a l means-end relationship, or in terms of the logical 
coherence of the action with the value therein expressed), as otherwise 
elements of sentiment, tradition, etc., would be involved. The di s t i n c -
tion between end-rational and value-rational action, then, rests upon 
whether the orientation i s i n terms .of efficiency/instrumentality, or 
in terms of the l o g i c a l expression of an absolute value. However, as 
Parsons points out (Weber, 1947: 115 footnote), Weber's empirical analyses 
of value-oriented action retain the notion of value as an ultimate end, 
but not necessarily as absolute: consideration of consequences i n a s i t u -
ation of competing values i s thus not excluded. Purthemore, an orien-
tation akin to end-rationality may be maintained towards values, i n that 
certain values (e.g. salvation) may be capable of at le a s t subjective 
^ This point i s argued with force by Sahay, 1972: Chapter 4. 
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achievement b^ ^ action (as a means) rather than i n action (as expression) . 
Affective action, of course, does not derive rationally from a con-
scious end or value: i t may, however, be possible to formulate the 
'affects and states of feeling' (1947: 115) concerned i n terms of con-
scioiis ends or values and thus to assess their influence through the 
use of ideal-types: t h i s would be to apply 'sociological r a t i o n a l i t y ' 
to a non-logical motive-action connection. Where th i s connection obtains 
through tradition, however, Weber would term the action 'traditional', 
referring to the form of the action. An action may also be traditional 
through i t s motivational content, where the action i s oriented to t r a -
dition i t s e l f , tradition here being a specific sentiment or value for 
the actor. I n any case a behaviour must involve more than mere habit 
( i n the case of tradition) or mere reaction to stimulus (in the case of 
affective action) to be included as meaningful action. (Weber, 1947: 
116) Furthermore, one must remember that Weber i s concerned here with 
ideal-types of action: i n practice, for instance, an action prompted by 
a consciously formulated value may lack complete r a t i o n a l i t y through 
i t s modification by elements of tradition. The following table summar-
i s e s Weber's ideal-types of action: 
Type of Action Orientation Towards Motive-Action Connection 
end-rational end rational (means-end 
value-rational value l o g i c a l (expression) 
a f f e c t i v e sentiment non-logical 
t r a d i t i o n a l tradition t r a d i t i o n a l 
I t i s interesting to note that there i s a necessary relation between 
orientation and motive-faction connection i n a l l the types of action apart 
from the t r a d i t i o n a l . I f the connection i s rational means-end, the 
orientation must be towards an end; i f logical expression, the orien-
See Sahay, 1972: 46ff; and Weber, 1947: 112. 
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t a t i o n must be towards a value; i f the o r i e n t a t i o n i s towards a s e n t i -
ment, the connection must be n o n - l o g i c a l ; but i f t r a d i t i o n i s the motive, 
then i t may a c t as a sentiment o r v a l u e , and the connection be rion-
l o g i c a l or l o g i c a l w i thout n e c e s s a r i l y being t r a d i t i o n a l ; and i f the 
connection i s t r a d i t i o n a l , the t r a d i t i o n a l form of the a c t i o n may be 
maintained u n t h i n k i n g l y , and the motivation b e t m r e l a t e d to t r a d i t i o n . 
Thus f o r i n s t a n c e the a c t i o n might be sentimental w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l form. 
While o r i e n t a t i o n towards t r a d i t i o n w i l l f r e q u e n t l y be of s i g n i f i c a n c e i n 
maintaining t r a d i t i o n a l form, the l a t t e r i s n e v e r t h e l e s s d i s t i n c t 
from the former, and i t may be argued that t r a d i t i o n as a motive i s 
b e s t seen as a s p e c i f i c k i n d of sentiment or value, thus l e a v i n g three 
types of a c t i o n - o r i e n t a t i o n , and t r a d i t i o n as a p a r t i c u l a r type of 
n o n - l o g i c a l action-motive connection. 
We are now i n a p o s i t i o n to compare Weber's a n a l y s i s of a c t i o n with 
t h a t of Pareto. Pareto's twofold d i s t i n c t i o n between l o g i c a l and non-
l o g i c a l a c t i o n would correspond to e n d - r a t i o n a l a c t i o n on the one hand, 
w i t h the other three types of a c t i o n f a l l i n g i n t o the n o n - l o g i c a l c a t e -
gory on the other hand (Sahay, 1972: 103), l o g i c a l f o r Pareto here 
r e f e r r i n g to l o g i c o - e x p e r i m e n t a l . (Pareto, 1966: 169 & 184) Pareto 
does not, deny the p o s s i b i l i t y of v a l u e - r a t i o n a l a c t i o n , but i s s c e p t i c a l 
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of c l a i m s f o r i t s importance i n s o c i e t y : he would tend to look c a r e f u l l y 
a t the value to see i f i t was a r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n f o r an unstated r e s i d u e 
or sentiment. (1966: 185) As f o r a f f e c t i v e a c t i o n , Pareto i s not 
d i r e c t l y i n t e r e s t e d i n t h i s , except i n s o f a r as sentiments i n f l u e n c e 
a c t i o n i n d i r e c t l y through r e s i d u e s . Perhaps the most i n t e r e s t i n g com-
p a r i s o n here i s o f Weber's t r a d i t i o n a l a c t i o n with Pareto's r e s i d u e s . 
P a r e t o ' s concept of r e s i d u e s does not r e f e r only to t r a d i t i o n a l 
a s s o c i a t i o n s of conduct and b e l i e f , a c t i o n and motivation, e t c . , but 
a l s o to more general human a s s o c i a t i o n - t e n d e n c i e s . Furthermore, f o r 
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Pareto i t i s i r r e l e v a n t whether the motivation concerned i s connected 
with tradition or not, or even whether i t i s known. The difference in 
emphasis derives from Weber's in t e r e s t in the motivation for the action 
(thus h i s i n t e r e s t i n tradition as a motive); and Pareto's e x p l i c i t 
lack of i n t e r e s t i n the 'states of mind' behind the residues he finds: 
for him i t i s s u f f i c i e n t to reach the objectively observable residues 
(thvis h i s i n t e r e s t i n tradition as fact rather than i n related motives) . 
Thus i f we combine Weber and Pareto i n a typology of action-orien-
tations, we emerge with end-rational, value-rational and sentimental : 
action, Weber going beyond Pareto i n this l a s t type i n indicating not 
only the p o s s i b i l i t y of action a r i s i n g d i r e c t l y from meaningful senti-
ment, but also the p o s s i b i l i t y of applying sociological r a t i o n a l i t y to 
assess the influence of such sentiments. 'Traditional' orientation 
becomes subsvimed under sentiments or values; whilst the 'traditional 
form' in Weber's category of t r a d i t i o n a l action becomes part of a broader 
concept of 'association-tendencies' developed from Pareto's discussion 
of residues. Thus i f the action does not derive solely from end, value 
or sentiment, then one must take account of tra d i t i o n a l or general human 
association-Ttendencies i n thgiexplanation of the motive-action relation-
ship."^ 
(iv) Summary 
This, chapter has indicated the way in which the theme of the thesis 
developed, making i t c l e a r that the order of presentation of the thesis 
i s not the order i n which the research was undertaken. The mutual support 
of formal models and case studies was stressed, and indication was given 
•'• Similarly, i f one i s not able to ascertain the motivation, one may be 
able to invoke a residual category of ' action-tendency', which may be 
used (as Pareto uses residiaes) i n the explanation of aspects of a 
society. Since Pareto i s not d i r e c t l y interested i n the actor's mot-
ivation, he would not distinguish in his concept of residues between: 
a) the explanation of the form of an action (with known motivation) 
through association-tendency; and b) the explanation of aspects of a 
society through prevalent action-tendencies (without known motivation) 
i n that society. 
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of the scope of sociology, comprising formal models, 'normic state-
ments' and c o l l e c t i v e and individual h i s t o r i c a l explanations. The 
exposition of the general methodological approach, consistent with 
that of Max Weber, c l a r i f i e d the purpose of conceptual schemes developed 
imder the guidance of a general cognitive orientation, and emphasised 
the importance of both causal and meaningful adequacy in sociological 
explanation i n terms of action. F i n a l l y , a conceptual framework for the 
analysis of action was developed through a comparison of the work of 
Weber and Pareto. This framework, stressing the importance of sentiments, 
values, ends and means i n meaningfully adequate sociological explanation, 
indicated the significance of sociological r a t i o n a l i t y as a means of 
understanding non-logical connections of motive and action. 
P A R T I : SUBSTRUCTURE AND SUPERSTRUCTURE IN THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 
20 
INTRODUCTION TO PART I 
In the following three chapters we s h a l l examine theories i n the 
sociology of knowledge^ i n order to provide a foundation for our 
enquiry into the role of cla s s i n the conditioning of thought. Apart 
from gaining useful insights from these theories, we s h a l l attempt to 
show t h e i r limitations, which w i l l indicate the directions i n which the 
subsequent enquiry should be pursued. 
A study of theories i n the sociology of knowledge w i l l involve com-
paring them with respect tot the sort of thought they are concerned 
with| which aspects of society they are attempting to relate to thought; 
how, why and to what degree society comes, in thei r view, to influence 
thought. One of the ideas most commonly met with An the sociology of 
knowledge i s that of a substructure of socia l factors influencing i n some 
way a superstructure of ideas, thought, knowledge or whatever. The sub-
structure i s frequently so c a l l e d because i t i s considered to be a complex 
of factors more s t a t i c and more determinant thaii. the superstructure. The 
substructure/superstructure d i s t i n c t i o n may however be used profitably 
i n our examination of various theories i n the sociology of knowledge, i n 
order to reveal certain common or contrasting themes f for wherever one 
wishes to analyse the ef f e c t of one set of factors on another, t h i s 
dichotomy may Be used, without assuming I t to be more than a n a l y t i c a l , 
and without necessarily reifying the particular perspective on s o c i a l 
r e a l i t y by fixing the substructure/superstructure characterisation for 
a l l s o c i a l enquiry. 
Part I thus begins with an investigation of conceptions, of the sub-
structure i n the sociology of knowledge (Chapter 2); Chapter 3 concentrates 
on views of the superstructure • and Chapter 4 tackles some question con-r 
cerning the relationship between substructure and superstructure. Given 
G 
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the a n a l y t i c a l nature of the d i s t i n c t i o n between substructure and super-
structure, certain issues i n Chapters 3 and 4 are inevitably encountered 
e a r l i e r i n Chapter 2. 
Within the sociology of knowledge the substructure should not 
necessarily be taken to refer to the whole of society, but rather i t 
may refer to a p a r t i c u l a r set of s o c i a l factors, such as those assoc-
iated with the concept of c l a s s . I n the three chapters of Part I , 
we s h a l l of course deal with concepts of class and thought, but prin-
c i p a l l y within the theories of sociologists of knowledge. Concepts of 
c l a s s and thought w i l l be more thoroughly considered i n Part I I , where 
reference w i l l be made to theorists outside the f i e l d of the sociology 
of knowledge. I n Part I we are thus concerned with a general appraisal 
of the sociology of knowledge, though naturally our interest will'be 
directed towards those areas that are l i k e l y to prove most relevant to 
our subsequent enquiry into the development of thought i n relation to 
class factors. 
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CHAPTER 2; SUBSTRUCTURE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 
(i) Meaning i n the Substructure 
I n examining the characterisations of the substructure i n the 
sociology of knowledge, one of the f i r s t questions to arise i s the 
extent to which the id e n t i f i c a t i o n of the superstructure with 'knowledge' 
precludes the inclusion of meaning i n the substructure. As an example 
of one extreme standpoint on this matter. Max Scheler's theories 
spring to mind. For Scheler, the 'real' and the 'ideal' represent the 
substructure and superstructure, and the former partakes not at a l l of 
the l a t t e r : 
'The d i s t i n c t i o n between the two spheres i s not 
merely methodological but ontological. ' 
(Becker and Dahlke, 1942: 312) 
Scheler's 'real forces' consist of the fundamental drive structure 
('Triebstruktur') of society and i t s s o c i a l c o r o l l a r i e s , the i n s t i t u -
tions i n which the drive structure i s expressed. (Scheler, 1960: 19) 
These basic impulses are 'blind', and need the guiding help of ' s p i r i t ' , 
from which they s e l e c t the ideas (powerless i n themselves) which w i l l 
enable them to achieve t h e i r ends. (Scheler, 1960: 40) This, at least, 
i s ScheiLer's theory at i t s simplest, and i t i s this schema which has 
evoked the strong c r i t i c i s m s of his i d e a l / r e a l dichotomy: Stark for 
instance questions how a mindless movement can relate to eternal ideas; 
i f the fundamental drives are r e a l l y blind, then how can they s e l e c t 
the appropriate ideas? (1958: 264) 
Despite these rather crude formulations, Scheler i s concerned 
elsewhere to claim that the r e a l and the ideal are analytical elements 
of society, and that society cannot be taken as the r e a l concretely 
opposed to the i d e a l . This i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n the following passage: 
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"... knowledge of members of a group of each other and 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of thei r 'understanding' of each other 
i s not an element which i s added to a s o c i a l group, 
but co-constitutes the object 'human society'. 
Furthermore, there belongs to any 'group' a knowledge, 
however vague, of i t s own existence, as well as 
commonly recognised values and aims." (Scheler, 
1970b: 170) 
The very existence (Dasein) of society thus implies knowledge of some 
kind. This low-:level, common, taken-for-granted knowledge i s termed 
by Scheler the 'group-soul', expressed i n such as myth, folk-language, 
folk-song, folk-religion, custom, tradition, etc. (1970b: 172-3)^ and 
Whose lowest centre i s the r e l a t i v e natural world view (1970b: 177-8). 
But for Scheler the sociology of knowledge i s concerned with the group-
mind rather than the group-soul (1970b: 180), the former being concerned 
with more conscious and abstract expressions of i n t e l l e c t : Scheler 
indeed gives a l i s t of forms of knowledge of increasing a r t i f i c i a l i t y 
(and hence more abstracted from the group-soul) ending i n s c i e n t i f i c and 
technical knowledge. (1970b: 178-9) 
Scheler's emphasis on the r e a l and seemingly non-meaningful drives 
as the p r i n c i p a l forces i n h i s model of society and knowledge might lead 
one to accuse him of lacking an adequate conception of meaningful motiv-
ation. Scheler can to some extent be defended against t h i s c r i t i c i s m 
by pointing to h i s concepts of group-soul and re l a t i v e natural world-
view, which are c l e a r l y part of the substructure as compared with a 
superstructure of more ' a r t i f i c i a l ' knowledge; and indeed i n his analysis 
of the role of the e l i t e i n influencing society's knowledge, his emphasis 
on the role of the 'herrschende soziale Interessenperspektive' (ruling 
s o c i a l i n t e r e s t perspective), which seems to be a r e l a t i v e l y conscious 
manifestation of the drive structure of society, and on the prevailing 
c u l t u r a l ethos (another term for group-soul?) i n which the int e r e s t 
perspective i s reflected (Staude, 1967: 177), indicate Scheler's recog-
nition of a more complex relationship of meaning and motivation than his 
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cruder formulations on the blind power of the s o c i a l drive structure 
would imply. 
When reviewing Scheler's work, Mannheim notes that Scheler's dis-
t i n c t i o n between the 'ideal' and 're a l ' factors i n the situation i s very 
s i m i l a r to Marx's d i s t i n c t i o n between the superstructure and substructure, 
except that for the former the svibstructure consists of psychological 
factors (drives) rather than socio-economic ones . (1952: 156-7) Mannheim 
i s concerned to point out that many factors c l a s s i f i e d as 'real' by 
Scheler and by certain variants of Marxism, are by no means completely 
devoid of meaning and purely 'material'. He gives as an example the 
economy: 
'... the physiology of the hunger drive belongs to 
mere 'nature', but ... t h i s physiological substratum 
constitutes an element of the h i s t o r i c process only i n 
so f a r as i t enters into mental configurations, for 
example by assuming the form of an ecbnomic order or 
some other i n s t i t u t i o n a l form. ... The (hunger) drive 
as such remains e s s e n t i a l l y unchanged over time, whereas 
economic i n s t i t u t i o n s undergo constant changes, and 
history i s exclusively interested i n these i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
changes. That excess over and above the physiological 
substratum which alone transforms the drive into a 
h i s t o r i c a l factor i s already 'mind'. I t i s , therefore, 
not enough to say that economy would not e x i s t without . 
mind; i t should be added that i t i s this mental element 
which makes economy out of mere drive-satisfaction. I f , 
then, we constantly lower the l i m i t of the 'natural' by 
refining our d i s t i n c t i o n s , so that the 'economic' turns 
out to be 'mental' rather than 'material', then we must 
recognise two 'mental' spheres, the mutual relationship of 
which i s that of substructure and superstructure. The 
question w i l l then be how one sphere affects the other 
i n the t o t a l process ...' 
(Mannheim, 1952: 162-3) 
While we endorse Mannheim's emphasis on the mental aspects of the sub-
structure, and though i t i s clear that seme of the formulations of Scheler 
and Marx lend themselves to naive m a t e r i a l i s t interpretations, we have 
nevertheless already seen how Scheler, where more careful and concrete, 
i s able to take account of meaningful elements i n the siabstruqture. To 
what extent i s Mannheim's critique applicable to Marx? 
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In places, Marx c l e a r l y writes i n such a way as to warrant c r i t -
icism for naive materialism. His famous statement in the Preface to 
a Contribution to the Critique of P o l i t i c a l Economy posits the mode of 
production of material l i f e , including the material powers of production 
and t h e i r corresponding s o c i a l relations of production, as constituting 
the substructure, w h i l s t upon th i s foundation a r i s e s the corresponding 
ideological superstructure. Yet Marx's i m p l i c i t sociology of knowledge 
has attracted many interpretations, even of single sentences such as-
' I t i s not the consciousness of men that determines 
th e i r being, but, on the contrary, their s o c i a l being 
determines t h e i r conscioiosness. ' 
(1956: 51) 
Neisser has c r i t i c i s e d Marx for f a i l i n g to recognise that knowledge 
i t s e l f i s contained as a presupposition i n the s o c i a l factors that affect 
and possibly determine knowledge, the obvious example being the involve-
ment of technology i n the development of the material factors of 
production. (1965: 27) But Avineri suggests that Marx's distinction 
between a svibstructure of ' s o c i a l being' and a superstructure of 'con-
sciousness' i s not a d i s t i n c t i o n between material and cognitive factors, 
'... but between conscious hvunan a c t i v i t y , aimed at the 
creation and preservation of the conditions of human 
l i f e , and hman consciousness, which furnishes reasons, 
rationalisations and modes of legitimization ^ uld moral 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the s p e c i f i c forms that a c t i v i t y takes.' 
(1968: 76) 
To be f a i r to Marx, the 'ideological superstructure' i s aptly called 
ideological: Marx i s not concerned to show that consciousness i n i t s 
broadest sense i s substructurally determined and powerless; but, l i k e 
Pareto, he i s a cynic where grand moral motives and explanations of 
action are put forward. When Marx says, most broadly, that s o c i a l being 
determines consciousness, i t thus seems l i k e l y that he means that a 
p a r t i c u l a r type of s o c i a l being including consciousness ( i . e . the mode 
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of production of material l i f e ) determines''' the r e s t of s o c i a l being 
and more removed ideological consciousness. 
I t therefore appears that even Marx and Scheler, who are often 
thought of as representing an extreme view of a non-meaningful substruc-
ture, may be found to pos i t a substnicture involving consciousness, and 
thus escape Mannheim's c r i t i c i s m . Mannheim i s not the only theorist to 
emphasise the meaningful nature of the substructure, however: Stark 
puts forward a svibstructure of meaningful interaction (1958: 253) ; and 
i n similar vein, but at greater length, Berger and Luckmann (1967) describe 
the base s o c i a l r e a l i t y as the 'everyday commonsense world', following 
Schutz. Berger and Luckmann indeed have a wider conception of the sociology 
of knowledge than i s usual, so wide i n fac t that i t appears to encompass : 
the whole f i e l d of meaningful s o c i a l action. Although they do not use 
the terms, i f 'substructure' and 'superstructure' were used they would refer 
to the everyday commonsense world including everyday pragmatic knowledge 
(substructure) (1967: 56) and the various abstractions from and l e g i t i -
mations of t h i s world (superstructure), (1967: 110-122) However, Berger 
and Luckmann are concerned to point out the varioiis differentiations of 
the socio-meaningful world, i n terms of shared role-typd>logies (1967: 91), 
'finite provinces of meaning' (1967: 39), etc.; and differentiation by 
knowledge (including the s o c i a l organisation of theoretical experts) (1967: I34ff.) 
and by power (including the power to impose definitions of r e a l i t y ) 
(1967: 139ff) i s given prominence i n accovinting for the superstructure. 
Thus although a shared and harmonious base r e a l i t y of a commonsense world 
i s the foundation for abstractions and legitimations, aspects of s o c i a l 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n (whose elements are by definition not shared equally by 
•'• Sayer, however, suggests that Marxian substructure should be 
seen as a n a l y t i c a l rather than substantive: the mode of pro-
duction has only a methodological primacy for Marx, as i t s 
actual primacy cannot be assimied a p r i o r i . (Saygar,. 1975: Chap. 1) 
27 
the whole society, even though knowledge of the differentiation may be 
shared) and mental differentiation (' f i n i t e provinces of meaning') must 
cl e a r l y enter into the svibstn^cture. For Berger and Luckmann, therefore, 
knowledge i s very much a part of the siobstructure, both i n terms of the 
meaning involved i n everyday s o c i a l l i f e and more circumscribed enclaves 
of meaning, and i n terms of the organisation of knowledge i n society. 
I t i s to be hoped that the above discussion has rendered untenable 
the b e l i e f that the sociology of knowledge i s concerned with the 
relationship between a material siabstriic ture and a superstructure of 
meaning. A meaningful substructure, however, may s t i l l lack reference 
to individual goals and experiences: abstract ideas may simply be said to 
r e f l e c t a broad s o c i a l r e a l i t y . Most theorists however include motiva-
ti o n a l elements i n t h e i r analyses: motivation i s seen as influencing the 
content or adoption of ideas, or merely as acting on a substructure 
devoid of motivational elements. Scheler, for instance, emphasises the 
'drive structure' of society (in p a r t i c u l a r that of the e l i t e ) and i t s 
expression in a correlated s o c i a l structure, as the 'real factors' which 
determine the adoption of ideas (Becker and Dahlke, 1942: 317). Although, 
as we pointed out e a r l i e r , Scheler sees the drive structure as manifested 
consciously i n the ruling s o c i a l i n t e r e s t perspective, (Scheler, 1970b: 
175), there i s no analysis of the process by which the drives become 
conscious, and the drives themselves are certainly blind meaningless 
forces. Scheler's 'Triebstruktur' appears to operate with considerable 
uniformity throughout a given society, and without reference to the 
meanings of p a r t i c u l a r actors. An emphasis on motivational elements thus 
does not guarantee an analysis of meaning; nor does i t guarantee that 
the analysis can be readily applied to the case of an individual i n a 
situation. For a schema which places j u s t as much emphasis on motivational 
elements, but which avoids Scheler's cruder formulations, we must return 
to the work of Pareto. 
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( i i ) Motivational Elements i n the S\3bstructure: Pareto 
For a meaningful analysis of the individual i n the situation, the 
sociology of knowledge requires an adequate conception of action i n the 
svibstructure, and, as we have seen i n Chapter 1, Pareto's analysis of 
non-logical action would indicate the place of motivational elements 
within such a conception: h i s concepts of residues and sentiments have 
worthwhile implications for the study of action and motivation, and 
hence for the specification of the svibstructure i n the sociology of 
knowledge. In h i s concern with b e l i e f s and interpretations non-logically 
related to the action they purport to explain, Pareto contributes to the 
analysis of the superstructure and of the substructure-superstructure 
relationship. 
I t i s indeed Pareto, perhaps more than any other theorist, who 
emphasises the non-logical aspects of action and b e l i e f . I t i s true 
that he stresses the importance of interests, the rational pursuit of 
concrete ends (1966: 260) ; but most of his research i s devoted to the 
influence of residues and sentiments. His viewpoint i s embodied i n the 
very concept 'derivation', which refers to a rationalisation purporting 
to account for an action, while both i t and the action derive from some 
prior residue or sentiment. According to Pareto, although most action 
i s non-logical, man has an innate desire to give his action a semblance 
of logic, and t h i s he does i n the interpretations of action which are in 
fact r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s . (1966: 210) Most of man's b e l i e f s (and thus most 
of the superstructure for Pareto) are derivations of th i s kind, the sub-
structure consisting of actions and t h e i r sources (primarily residues and 
sentiments) and s o c i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , especially with respect to r e s i -
dues (the residues of the e l i t e are of particular significance). 
(1966: 260-263) 
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Pareto advocates a threefold analysis of theories/ideas/beliefs. 
(1966: 169-70) F i r s t the theory i s examined according to i t s objective 
truth status. I f the objective analysis reveals non-logicality, then a 
si±)jective analysis becomes necessary: i . e . , we must explain how the 
individual has come to formulate or accept the theory. This w i l l 
involve establishing the prior residue or sentiment which the derivation 
expresses, or the residue or sentimental action which i t rationalises, and 
then investigating why t h i s expression/rationalisation was chosen rather 
than another. Pareto's t h i r d mode of analysis, according to the theory's 
u t i l i t y , indicates an important class of reasons for the adoption of one 
derivation rather than another, i . e . i t s u t i l i t y for the actor's subjective 
ends. This u t i l i t y may consist of i t s effectiveness i n expressing/ 
r a t i o n a l i s i n g the residue/sentiment/sentimental action, or i n serving 
other unrelated ends of the actor. This l a t t e r p o s s i b i l i t y leads one to 
^ make a similar observation that there may be more sentiments involved i n 
the adoption of an idea than i n the existence of the residue or senti'-
mental action i t attempts to ra t i o n a l i s e : i . e . , sentiments are involved 
i n the rationalisation i t s e l f , both i n the very need to rationalise and in 
the sentiments the r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n appeals to, which may well d i f f e r from 
those involved i n the action i t r a t i o n a l i s e s . Thus through his observation 
that a single residue/sentiment may lead to a multitude of different 
derivations (1966: 187) , Pareto opens the way for the use of the concepts 
of residue, sentiment and u t i l i t y i n the explanation of why any particular 
derivation of the many possible i s adopted. Furthermore, a derivation 
whose origin was i n the expression or rationalisation of a residue, for 
instance, may outlive i t s o r i g i n a l function through i t s u t i l i t y i n supporting 
quite unrelated ends. 
Through h i s threefold method of analysis of ideas, then, Pareto 
teaches us to avoid taking b e l i e f s at their face value, since they may 
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be merely expressions or rationalisations of more basic residues, etc., 
or may be remnants of the past persisting for their e x t r i n s i c v a l i d i t y : 
his concepts of sentiments, residues and u t i l i t y c l e arly aid i n the expla-
nation of the formulation, acceptance and persistence of such ideas. 
Residues, as we have seen i n Chapter I,''' may act not only as an inter-
mediaty stage (of analysis of observables) in the explanation of ideas, 
but also as a conditioning factor i n th e i r own right. ' U t i l i t y ' , whilst 
indicating important sources of the adoption and maintenance of deriva-
tions, must nofc however be thought to operate i n a vacuimi: the principle 
of u t i l i t y works within a context, such as the audience for the derivation, 
the d i f f e r e n t i a l ' a v a i l a b i l i t y ' of various derivations to the actor, and 
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the generally accepted modes of expression/rationalisation. 
Scheler and Pareto are both concerned with the role of motivational 
elements i n the adoption of ideas. We have seen, however, i n th i s section 
and i n Chapter 1, how Pareto goes beyond Scheler in the complex analysis 
of the relations between motivation, action and beli e f ; how his theory 
does not'suffer from the philosophical premise that renders Scheler's 
drives blind and meaningless; and how his analysis i s applicable to the 
individual i n the situati o n . Nevertheless Pareto's theory would benefit 
from a f u l l e r treatment of the relationship between the actor's motiva-
tion and h i s conditions of action, h i s so c i a l situation, etc., so that for 
instance f u l l account would be taken of the s o c i a l context within which 
the p r i n c i p l e of u t i l i t y operates. Scheler of course attempts to relate 
psychological and s o c i a l factors i n his conception of the drive structure 
See above, pp 12-13 
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This point i s developed i n Chapter 9, p 216 below, Pareto i s not, 
however, unaware of conventions i n rationalisation: 'Logical 
interpretations assume the forms which are most commonly current 
in the epoch i n which they are evolved.' (1966: 187) 
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and i t s s o c i a l c o r r o l l a r i e s ; but t h i s i s to correlate rather than to 
rel a t e . Many theorists have attemped to relate situation and motive 
through the concept of in t e r e s t s , a concept which Scheler and Pareto 
both emphasise rather than explore. Pareto's concern with r a t i o n a l i -
sations and u t i l i t y , however, reveals the importance he places upon 
interests i n the sense of conscious subjective ends which theories may 
ra t i o n a l i s e i n an acceptable manner (e.g. appealing to sentiments) or 
usefully promote. His primary concern, however, i s with sentiments and 
residues, arid i t i s to other theorists, and i n pa r t i c u l a r to Mannheim, 
that we must turn for a f u l l e r treatment of the role of interests i n the 
sociology of knowledge. 
( i i i ) Motivational Elements i n the Substructure: Mannheim 
Mannheim's attempts to rel a t e motivation and s o c i a l situation form 
part of his i n t e r e s t i n the relationship between so c i a l s t r a t a and their 
thought. The most frequently found formulation of t h i s relationship in 
Mannheim i s that each group, being involved i n the s o c i a l structure i n a 
different way, w i l l come to see only those aspects of the s o c i a l world 
with which i t i s concerned: t h i s may be called the perspective of the 
group. Similarly, since each individual i s involved i n the group's activi'^ 
t i e s i n a different manner, each w i l l have his own perspective, his own 
view of the common world of the group. (1936: 26) I t i s on t h i s basis 
that Mannheim builds up various motivational theories of the s o c i a l 
determination of thought. The one associated most closely with the 
'perspective' relationship between thought and society i s the pragmatic 
view of 'knowledge': 
' — not every possible aspect of the world comes 
within the purview of the members of a group, but 
only those out of which d i f f i c u l t i e s and problems for 
the group a r i s e . ' (1936: 26) 
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Here cognition i s seen as an instrument with which to deal with certain 
problems: a group shares certain goals and thus must come to solutions 
as to how to r e a l i s e them. The a c t i v i t y which implements a goal requires 
a minimimi of knowledge es s e n t i a l to carrying out th i s a c t i v i t y . This 
knowledge i s therefore pragmatically determined, and i s at the same time 
a perspective on the world. 
I t can ea s i l y be seen that Mannheim's conception of the perspective 
of a group being pragmatically determined i s only meaningful i f we see 
the 'problem' (which necessitates the knowledge) as deriving from the 
goals or 'subjective i n t e r e s t s ' of the group i n question: without such 
in t e r e s t s the group would have no such problems to solve. Thus 'inter-
ests' i n th i s sense are at the very heart of Mannheim's sociology of 
knowledge. Such in d i r e c t determination by interests, however, must not 
be confused with the case of di r e c t ' interestedness', as where an in d i -
vidual or group consciously adopts or formulates an i n t e l l e c t u a l stand-
point because i t i s i n accordance with h i s / i t s perceived interes t s . (1952: 
183) This, then, i s the second type of relationship which Mannheim postu-
lates between s o c i a l s t r a t a and th e i r thought, and th i s type Mannheim sees 
as being of l i t t l e i n t e r e s t to the sociology of knowledge, since i t comes 
more within the sphere of ideology i n the narrow sense of conscious mis-
representation. (1936: 238-9) 
To contrast with t h i s second type, Mannheim formulates a thi r d type 
of relationship, 'committedness', which i s essentially a more complex 
version of the f i r s t type, and which may be seen as a link between his 
notion of perspective and the concepts of ideology and Utopia:''' 
This point i s elaborated below (Chapter 4,jp 94-95) i n the context 
of a discussion of Mannheim's emphasis on a h i s t o r i c a l perspective 
in the sociology of knowledge. 
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' — those who seek a c e r t a i n economic order a l s o seek 
the i n t e l l e c t u a l outlook c o r r e l a t e d with i t . When a 
group i s d i r e c t l y i n t e r e s t e d i n an economic system, then 
i t i s a l s o i n d i r e c t l y 'committed' to the other i n t e l l e c t u a l , 
a r t i s t i c , p h i l o s p h i c a l , e t c . forms corresponding to t h a t 
economic system. Thus i n d i r e c t 'committedness' to c e r t a i n 
mental forms i s the most ccmprehensive category i n the f i e l d 
o f the s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n i n g of i d e a s . ' 
(1952: 183-4) 
T h i s t h i r d type of r e l a t i o n s h i p , then, may be seen as i n v o l v i n g a group 
r e a l i s i n g t h a t a c e r t a i n system of a c t i o n s i s n e c e s s a r y to achieve i t s 
g o a l s , and (unconsciously) adopting a system of thought which corresponds 
to t h i s system of a c t i o n s . (We use the term 'system of a c t i o n s ' i n t e n -
t i o n a l l y , i n order to l e a v e open the e x a c t nature of the a c t i v i t i e s which 
the group sees as a c h i e v i n g i t s g o a l s : the 'system of a c t i o n s ' may then 
be anything from merely one or two r e l a t i v e l y u n r e l a t e d a c t i v i t i e s to a 
whole economic or s o c i a l system). The group thus becomes committed both 
to the system o f a c t i o n s and to the corresponding i d e a s . 
F u r t h e r complexity i n the r e l a t i o n s of a group's i n t e r e s t s , a c t i o n s 
and i d e a s i s r e v e a l e d by the Marxian concept of i d e o l o g i c a l power. 
W h i l s t Mannheim does not d e a l e x p l i c i t l y with t h i s , he does a t times 
w r i t e o f a dominant Weltanschauung and the 'Weltanschauung of an epoch' -
e.g. 1952: 33f^;and-
'... i t may happen ... t h a t one o f these c u r r e n t s 
(which d i v i d e every epoch) achieves dominance and 
r e l e g a t e s the o t h e r s to the s t a t u s of under-currents." 
(1952: 181) 
Mannheim does not c l a r i f y the r o l e o f i n t e r e s t s o r commitment i n s i t u a -
t i o n s of i d e o l o g i c a l domination; but we can i n f e r t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l 
power enables one to impose one's own Weltanschauung on others and to 
provide f o r them c e r t a i n l e g i t i m a t i o n s , which may, f o r i n s t a n c e , c o r r e s -
pond to an a c t i v i t y which one wishes them to perform. One may even be 
able to persuade them t h a t t h i s a c t i v i t y (which i s i n one's own s u b j e c -
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t i v e i n t e r e s t ) i s i n t h e i r own i n t e r e s t . One may be conscious/uncon-
sciovis of promoting the i d e a s and l e g i t i m a t i o n s corresponding to a 
d e s i r e d system of a c t i o n s to be enacted by another group; and one may be 
conscious/unconscious t h a t such promotion s e r v e s one's own i n t e r e s t s . 
Consciousness of t h i s second type would c o n s t i t u t e d i r e c t determination 
o f i d e a s by i n t e r e s t s , w h i l e both of the other p o s s i b i l i t i e s we d i s -
t i n g u i s h (consciousness or otherwise of promoting i d e a s which, although 
one i s unconscious of the f a c t , promote's one's own i n t e r e s t ^ are more 
adequately accounted f o r by the concept of 'commitment'. 
We have seen how i n d i r e c t determination of ideas by i n t e r e s t s i s 
i m p l i e d i n the pragmatism i n v o l v e d i n the 'perspective' and 'commitment' 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between s o c i a l s t r a t a and t h e i r thought. Some t h e o r i s t s 
however p o s i t a s o c i a l determination of the i n t e r e s t s themselves, i n 
which i n t e r e s t s d e r i v e a u t o m a t i c a l l y from s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n . To c l a r i f y 
our p o s i t i o n on t h i s i s s u e , i t i s necessary to consider which f a c t o r s 
c o ndition a group's p e r c e p t i o n of i t s i n t e r e s t s . Of course, ' i n t e r e s t s ' 
i s i t s e l f an ambiguous concept: i t may r e f e r to an a c t o r ' s concrete ends, 
or more narrowly to what w i l l be of 'benefit' to the a c t o r , e i t h e r i n 
the a c t o r ' s or someone e l s e ' s view. I n i t s a s s o c i a t i o n with the a c t o r ' s 
p e r s p e c t i v e and commitment, as i n Mannheim's work, ' i n t e r e s t s ' i s used 
more broadly to i n c l u d e v a l u e s and sentiments as w e l l as ends. As f o r 
the determination of i n t e r e s t s , we do not b e l i e v e i t i s p o s s i b l e to 
formulate a general a h i s t o r i c a l theory to account f o r i n t e r e s t formation, 
and thus we deny the v a l i d i t y o f conceptions of ' o b j e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s ' and 
hence of f a l s e ' consciousness.''" Mannheim does not f r e e h i m s e l f e n t i r e l y of 
the charge t h a t he s u b s c r i b e s to a notion of o b j e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s , though 
he n e i t h e r e x p l i c i t l y accepts nor r e j e c t s t h i s notion: 
For d i s c u s s i o n of a view of f a l s e consciousness l e s s c l o s e l y 
l i n k e d to a concept of 'true i n t e r e s t s ' , see the c r i t i q u e of 
Goldmann's conception of consciousness, p 48 below. 
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one may only i n f e r i t from v a r i o u s passages i n h i s w r i t i n g s , e.g.: 
'A group whose c l a s s p o s i t i o n i s more or l e s s d e f i n -
i t e l y f i x e d a l r e a d y has i t s p o l i t i c a l viewpoint decided 
f o r i t . ' (1936: 143) 
At any r a t e , i t i s important to c l a r i f y our own p o s i t i o n on o b j e c t i v e 
i n t e r e s t s and f a l s e consciousness^ whatever stand Mannheim takes on t h i s 
matter. 
The concept o f ' f a l s e consciousness', i n s o f a r as i t does not merely 
e n t a i l one's own judgements of how people ought to t h i n k , i n v o l v e s a 
theory o f the i n t e r e s t s which would ' n a t u r a l l y ' develop from a c e r t a i n 
s o c i a l p o s i t i o n ; y e t t h i s i m p l i e s some k i n d o f v i n i v e r s a l theory o f himian 
motivation, such as ' i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l always attempt to obtain and main-
t a i n a p o s i t i o n o f economic power, as long as the formation of t h e i r i n t e r -
e s t s i n such p o s i t i o n s i s not prevented through i d e o l o g i c a l manipulation'. 
Such a statement i s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y i n t h r e e r e s p e c t s : -
a) I n s o f a r as the theory can be r e f u t e d by e m p i r i c a l evidence, we 
must note t h a t i t i s an o v e r g e n e r a l i s a t i o n , s i n c e i t cannot, f o r i n s t a n c e , 
account f o r i n d i v i d u a l s having economic power and g i v i n g i t up i n order 
to s a t i s f y another need (e.g., i n becoming a monk). 
b) The theory does not d i f f e r e n t i a t e between the d e s i r e f o r economic 
power as an end i n i t s e l f and as a means of f u l f i l l i n g other ends. I t 
i s l a r g e l y as a means towards other ends t h a t economic power i s sought, 
s i n c e i t i s a form of power t h a t has g r e a t f l e x i b i l i t y of a p p l i c a t i o n . 
Moreover, the theoiry f a i l s to recognise t h a t c e r t a i n ends can be 
a t t a i n e d without a c h i e v i n g a p o s i t i o n of great economic power, and 
might even be hindered by a c h i e v i n g such a p o s i t i o n . 
c) The theory does not d i f f e r e n t i a t e between d i f f e r e n t means of 
o b t a i n i n g economic power. I n c e r t a i n v e r s i o n s of Marxism,"'" a member 
For example, see the d i s c u s s i o n of Goldmann, p 43 below 
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of the p r o l e t a r i a t i s considered to be s u f f e r i n g from f a l s e conscious-
ness i f he i s not conscious of h i s shared economic p o s i t i o n w i t h the 
r e s t o f the p r o l e t a r i a t and i f he does not f e e l a d e s i r e to s t r i v e i n 
common w i t h the p r o l e t a r i a t f o r g r e a t e r economic power. Y e t the worker 
may p o s s e s s another means of obta i n i n g economic power: upward s o c i a l 
m o b i l i t y out of the p r o l e t a r i a t r a t h e r than with the p r o l e t a r i a t . I f 
t h i s i s the worker's aim, the theory of f a l s e c o n s c i o u s n e s s w o u l d f i n d 
i t d i f f i c u l t t o l a b e l i t e i t h e r t r u e or f a l s e consciousness, s i n c e only 
one form o f t r u e consciousness i s allowed f o r the working c l a s s : y e t the 
notion of f a l s e consciousness, i n s o f a r as i t i m p l i e s more than j u s t a 
value-judgement, must be based on an assumed u n i v e r s a l human motivation 
f o r econonic power, according to which a motivation towards i n d i v i d u a l 
upward s o c i a l m o b i l i t y on the p a r t of the worker would be considered to 
be one form of t r u e consciousness. 
There are three p o s s i b l e reasons why a Marxist conception of f a l s e 
consciousness f a i l s to s t a nd up to t h i s t h i r d c r i t i c i s m : 
1) The p o s s i b i l i t y (of r e a l i s t i c i n d i v i d u a l ambition i n the p r o l e t a r i a t ) 
i s thought to be i n s i g n i f i c a n t ; s o c i a l m o b i l i t y i s considered to be a 
r a r e l y a v a i l a b l e option. 
2) The p o s s i b i l i t y i s thought to be i r r e l e v a n t because i n d i v i d u a l s are 
considered only i n terms of t h e i r c l a s s membership and r o l e i n the c l a s s 
s t r u g g l e . 
3) The notion of f a l s e consciousness i s only a value-judgement a f t e r 
a l l . 
Whichever o f these reasons apply, we should contend t h a t the con-
cept o f f a l s e consciousness i s misleading i n sociology, e i t h e r because 
o f i t s value-assumptions of because of the inadequacies a s s o c i a t e d w i t h 
i t i f . i t i m p l i e s , more than a value-judgement, atheory of u n i v e r s a l himian 
t 
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m o t i v a t i o n . I f we wish to g i v e an o b j e c t i v e account o f the f a c t o r s 
c o n d i t i o n i n g the s v i b j e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s of an i n d i v i d u a l or group, we 
should look f o r a l l the f a c t o r s i n the concrete h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n 
which i n f l u e n c e d the formation o f the i n t e r e s t s , r a t h e r than making 
assumptions a s s o c i a t e d w i t h conceptions as to what c o n s t i t u t e s 'true' 
o r ' f a l s e ' consciousness. 
I n 'Essays on the Sociology o f Knowledge", 'Ideology and Utopia' 
and the l a t e r 'Essays on the Sociology of C u l t u r e ' , ^ Mannheim l a p s e s 
a t times i n t o a m e c h a n i s t i c , o v e r - d e t e r m i n i s t i c p o i n t o f view, i n which, 
f o r i n s t a n c e , he i m p l i e s the e x i s t e n c e o f the o b j e c t i v e I n t e r e s t s o f a 
group. The o v e r - d e t e r m i n i s t i c a t t i t u d e i s , however, f a r l e s s apparent 
i n 'Essays on the Sociology of C u l t u r e ' , as i s seen by h i s emphasis on 
the a l t e r n a t i v e s f o r i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n present i n a given s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n : 
'(One malady) i s the temptation t o h y p o s t a t i z e ex post 
f a c t o the i n n e r n e c e s s i t y o f a p a s t turn of events 
without p r i o r examination of the a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n s 
which were p o t e n t i a l i n one phase or another of the 
development.' (1956: 87) 
'The term ' p o s i t i o n a l o r i e n t a t i o n ' must not be construed 
d e t e r m i n i s t i c d l l y , s i n c e a given p o s i t i o n permits more 
than one type o f r e a c t i o n . ' (1956: 107) 
Although these admirable statements do not prevent him from making over-
d e t e r m i n i s t i c a s s e r t i o n s about what i n t e l l e c t u a l s w i l l do i n given s i t u a -
t i o n s (see 1956: P a r t Two), th e r e i s c l e a r l y a trend i n Mannheim's l a t e r 
w r i t i n g s to accept t h a t the r e l a t i o n s between an i n d i v i d u a l ' s s i t u a t i o n , 
motives, a c t i o n s and i d e a s a r e more complex than envisaged i n a mechanistic 
s o c i a l determinism: a s i t u a t i o n allows various a l t e r n a t i v e courses of 
a c t i o n , and the consciousness the i n d i v i d u a l b r ings to the s i t u a t i o n 
cannot be t r e a t e d as epiphenomenal. C o n t r a s t t h i s approach with the 
f o l l o w i n g m e c h a n i s t i c statement from 'Ideology and Utopia': 
•'" These essays were w r i t t e n i n the e a r l y 1930s, and are thus the 
l a t e s t of Mannheim's w r i t i n g s t h a t we consider, w i t h the exception 
of P a r t One of the E n g l i s h v e r s i o n of 'Ideology and Utopia', 
w r i t t e n f o r p u b l i c a t i o n i n 1936. 
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'... those who p a r t i c i p a t e d i r e c t l y i n the process of 
production - the worker and the entrepreneur - being 
bound to a p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s and mode of l i f e , have 
t h e i r outlooks and a c t i v i t i e s d i r e c t l y and e x c l u s i v e l y 
determined by t h e i r s p e c i f i c s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s ...' 
(1936: 140) 
Whether or not Mannheim sees consciousness as determined by s o c i a l 
s i t u a t i o n , he would c e r t a i n l y i n c l u d e meaningful elements i n a svibstruc-
t u r e of a c t i o n . We have a l r e a d y pointed out, i n r e l a t i o n to the t h e o r i e s 
of Max Scheler,''' t h a t Mannheim sees the s u b s t r u c t u r e i n the sociology 
of knowledge as meaningful. We may i n f e r from Mannheim's work t h a t he 
would i n c l u d e i n t h e s u b s t r u c t u r e not only the s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n and con-
d i t i o n s of a c t i o n , but a l s o those a s p e c t s of consciousness necessary f o r 
a c t i o n : si±)jective i n t e r e s t s and e s s e n t i a l knowledge. 
Conceptions o f the s u b s t r u c t u r e i n terms of consciousness and s o c i a l 
s i t u a t i o n w i l l v ary according to the models of s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e t h a t 
u n d e r l i e t h e o r i e s i n the s o c i o l o g y of knowledge. An important element of 
these models i s the supposed r e l a t i o n s h i p between the i n d i v i d u a l and the 
group or between th e consciousness o f each. I n Mannheim's work, one p o i n t 
a t which t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s explored i s where he i n v e s t i g a t e s the o r i g i n s 
o f the thought which corresponds to the group's d e s i r e d system of a c t i o n s . 
Mannheim suggests the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a Utopia may o r i g i n a t e as the wish-
f a n t a s y of a s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l , but he n e v e r t h e l e s s a t t r i b u t e s t h i s to the 
group which l a t e r adopts the corresponding system as i t s aim. As he 
h i m s e l f p o i n t s out: 
•This i n v o l v e s the assumption t h a t the ex p o s t f a c t o 
acceptance o f the new view by c e r t a i n s t r a t a only l a y s 
bare the impulse and the s o c i a l r o o t s of the outlook 
i n which the forerunner a l r e a d y p a r t i c i p a t e d unconsciously, 
and from which he drew the g e n e r a l tendency of h i s other-
wise i n d i s p u t a b l y i n d i v i d u a l accomplishment.' 
(1936: 186) 
•'• See above, p 24 
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Only i f t h i s assumption i s made can the a t t r i b u t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
w i s h - f a n t a s y to the group s e r v e as an explanation of the gene s i s of 
the w i s h - f a n t a s y i t s e l f . Mannheim f a i l s to recognise t h a t any one 
wish - f a n t a s y may correspond to more than one type of s o c i a l system; and 
t h a t the f u n c t i o n o f the wish-fantasy f o r the i n d i v i d u a l and l a t e r for 
the group may be very d i f f e r e n t , and t h a t therefore the meaning may have 
changed.''' 
T h i s i l l u s t r a t i o n marks one pole (approaching a p o s i t i o n of group 
re a l i s m ) o f Mannheim's somewhat c o n t r a d i c t o r y conception of the r e l a t i o n -
s h i p between the i n d i v i d u a l and the group i n terms of 'knowledge'. At 
the beginning o f t h i s s e c t i o n we made the point, which may be taken as 
the other pole, t h a t Mannheim considered t h a t each i n d i v i d u a l was involved 
i n the group's a c t i v i t i e s i n a d i f f e r e n t manner, and thus each had h i s 
own p e r s p e c t i v e , h i s own view o f the common world of the group: 
'... knowledge i s from the very beginning a co-operative 
p r o c e s s of group l i f e , i n which everyone unfolds h i s 
knowledge w i t h i n the framework of a common f a t e , a common 
a c t i v i t y , and the overcoming of common d i f f i c u l t i e s ( i n 
which, however, each has a d i f f e r e n t s h a r e ) . ' 
(1936: 26, my emphasis) 
Even where Mannheim e x p l i c i t l y r e j e c t s a p o s i t i o n o f group r e a l i s m , he 
emphasises the importance of the group f o r an understanding of the 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s thought: 
'Only the i n d i v i d u a l i s capable o f thinking ... Never-
t h e l e s s i t would be f a l s e to deduce from t h i s t h a t a l l 
the i d e a s and sentiments which motivate an i n d i v i d u a l 
have t h e i r o r i g i n i n him alone, and can be adequately 
e x p l a i n e d s o l e l y on the b a s i s of h i s own l i f e - e x p e r i e n c e . 
... i t i s not men i n g e n e r a l who think, or even i s o l a t e d 
i n d i v i d u a l s who do the t h i n k i n g , but men i n c e r t a i n 
groups who have developed a p a r t i c u l a r s t y l e of thought i n 
an endless s e r i e s o f responses to c e r t a i n t y p i c a l s i t u a -
t i o n s c h a r a c t e r i s i n g t h e i r common p o s i t i o n . ... Every 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t h e r e f o r e i n a two-fold sense pre-determined 
by the f a c t of growing up i n a s o c i e t y : on the one hand he 
f i n d s a ready-made s i t u a t i o n and on the other he f i n d s i n 
t h a t s i t u a t i o n pre-formed p a t t e r n s of thought and of 
conduct.' (1936: 2-3) 
1 One of Mannheim's e a r l i e r arguments, th a t change of f u n c t i o n b r i n g s 
change of meaning (1952: 187), a c t s a g a i n s t h i s standpoint here. 
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T h i s emphasis, on the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the group f o r the development of 
an i n d i v i d u a l ' s consciousness, i s v a l i d : yet Mannheim n e g l e c t s to point 
out (even where he allows f o r the i n f l u e n c e o f i n d i v i d u a l s ) t h a t 
each i n d i v i d u a l may be i n v o l v e d i n more than one group, and t h a t the 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s thought i s thus not merely a p a r t , a t b e s t modified, of 
a s i n g l e group's thought: i t i s the r e s u l t of h i s i n t e r a c t i o n with 
v a r i o u s groups, some of which may have g r e a t e r i n f l u e n c e upon him than 
o t h e r s , and a l s o of the v a r i o u s a t t i t u d e s he has b u i l t up, which may 
modify h i s i n t e r a c t i o n s and l e a d to a more ready acceptance of c e r t a i n 
i d e a s than of ot h e r s . 
We have seeni.dn Mannheim tendencies towards a crude Marxist c o n f l a -
t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l and group consciousness, and of s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n and 
i n t e r e s t . These tendencies are brought together i n the interdependence 
of the concepts o f c l a s s and world view i n Goldmann, who pr e s e n t s perhaps 
t h e f u l l e s t and most s o p h i s t i c a t e d M a r x i s t account o f the sociology of 
knowledge^ and t o the e x p o s i t i o n and c r i t i q u e of which we now turn. 
( i v ) S i t u a t i o n and Consciousness; Goldmann^s Sociology of Knowledge 
I t i s worth looking f i r s t a t Goldmann's conception o f consciousness, 
as t h i s r e v e a l s many of the assumptions upon which h i s sociology of 
knowledge i s based. I n a paper given to the Fourth World Congress of 
Sociology ("Conscience Reele e t Conscience P o s s i b l e , Conscience Ade-
quate e t Fausse Conscience') Goldmann defines consciousness as: 
"... a c e r t a i n a s p e c t of a l l human behaviour i n v o l v i n g 
the d i v i s i o n of labour', (1959: 3 ) , 
thus e l i m i n a t i n g any p u r e l y i n d i v i d u a l f a c t s of consciousness. Indeed 
he r a i s e s the important q u e s t i o n o f the s u b j e c t of consciousness, and comes 
to the somewhat ambiguous c o n c l u s i o n t h a t i t i s ; 
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'... n e i t h e r the i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l nor j u s t the 
group, but an extremely v a r i a b l e s t r u c t u r e com-
p r i s i n g a t the same time the i n d i v i d u a l and the 
group or a c e r t a i n number of groups'. 
(1959: 4) 
Goldmann maintains t h a t every s o c i a l f a c t i s i n e s s e n t i a l r e s p e c t s a 
f a c t of consciousness, and t h a t every f a c t of consciousness should be 
s t u d i e d as p a r t of a wider t o t a l i t y than merely the o b j e c t i t s e l f of 
which the conscipusness i s an aspect: indeed such f a c t s must be seen 
w i t h i n the context of; 
'... the way i n which the members of d i f f e r e n t groups 
c o n s t i t u t i n g g l o b a l s o c i e t i e s t h i n k of the whole of 
s o c i a l l i f e , and the s t r u c t u r e of the group, or more 
e x a c t l y the groups, of which they are a p a r t ' . 
(1959: 5) 
Goldman thus seems to be advocating the i n s e r t i o n o f such f a c t s w i t h i n the 
world views of the groups concerned. Furthermore, Goldmann does not view 
groups and t h e i r world views as s t a t i c phenomena, but r a t h e r as e n t i t i e s 
developing i n h i s t o r y . (1959: 6-7) 
Goldmann's theory o f consciousness as presented i n t h i s paper i s thus 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s 'genetic s t r u c t u r a l i s m ' . (1967: 510-511) R e a l i t y i s , 
according to t h i s conception, made up of processes of s t r u c t u r a t i o n and 
d e s t r u c t u r a t i o n , the s t r u c t u r e s concerned being 'essences", somewhat 
s i m i l a r to Max Weber's i d e a l - t y p e s . However Goldmann d i f f e r s from Weber 
i n c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t behind the methodological c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n s of the 
'essences' l i e the a c t u a l essences, which are hypothesised as r e a l e l e -
ments combining and c o n f l i c t i n g to b r i n g about r e a l i t y . They are thus 
never v i s i b l e i n t h e i r pure form, but only, as i t were, d i l u t e d . I t i s 
the t a s k of the s o c i o l o g i s t to b r i n g to l i g h t these essences and to t r a c e 
the course of t h e i r development and d e c l i n e . I t i s w i t h i n t h i s framework 
t h a t Goldmann conceives of the "maximum p o t e n t i a l consciousness' of a 
group, which r e f e r s to the extreme r e a l i s a t i o n of a tendency common to the 
thought and emotions of the members of a s o c i a l group, the 'awareness' 
( = a c t u a l i s a t i p n ? ) of t h i s tendency v a r y i n g from i n d i v i d u a l to i n d i v i d u a l . 
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(1964: 18) ( I t i s perhaps i n the l i g h t of g e n e t i c s t r u c t u r a l i s m t h a t 
the sociology of l i t e r a t u r e so appeals to Goldmann, g r e a t l i t e r a r y works 
being f o r him the extreme coherent r e a l i s a t i o n of the tendency of the 
world view of a s o c i a l c l a s s , t h e s o c i a l c l a s s i t s e l f of course being 
an essence which p l a y s a dynamic r o l e i n the process of s t r u c t u r a t i o n 
and d e s t r u c t u r a t i o n . ) 
A f t e r the d e f i n i t i o n of consciouness, Goldmann proceeds to the a n a l -
y s i s t hereof, i n which he d i s t i n g u i s h e s between conscience r e e l l e and 
conscience p o s s i b l e , as r e f e r r i n g to: a) the a c t u a l consciousness of a 
group as i t e x i s t s a t a c e r t a i n moment i n h i s t o r y ; and b) the most 
"adequate" consciousness p o s s i b l e f o r a given group without the group 
thereby changing i t s nature, (1959: 6) By 'adequacy" o f consciousness, 
Goldmann i s r e f e r r i n g to the degree of f a i t h f u l n e s s t d r e a l i t y o f the 
group "s p i c t u r e o f the world. He d i s t i n g u i s h e s v a rious elements i n the 
consciousness o f a group - those which are t r a n s i t o r y , those which are 
s t a b l e , and those which are " e s s e n t i a l " or b a s i c to the group, without 
which the group would cease t o e x i s t o r would become another group. (1959: 6) 
Thus the p o s s i b l e consciousness of a group i s the most adequate conscious-
ness o f which the group i s capable w i t h i n the framework of i t s b a s i c con-
s c i o u s n e s s . 
I t i s i m p l i c i t i n Goldmann's account t h a t the c a u s a l determination of 
the a c t u a l i s a t i o n o f p o s s i b l e consciousness ife not problematic^ thus 
l e a v i n g f o r the s o c i o l o g i s t the ta s k of accovinting f o r those elements of 
a c t u a l consciousness which are not explained by re f e r e n c e to tendencies 
towards the 'conscience p o s s i b l e " . He advocates the c o n s t r u c t i o n of not 
only a typology o f 'consciences p o s s i b l e s ' based upon t h e i r content a t 
the h i s t o r i c a l moment of attainment of maximum adequacy, but a l s o a typ-
See below. Chapter 11, p 252 
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ology o f s t r u c t u r a l modes of a c t u a l inadequacy ranging from secondary, 
p e r i p h e r a l d i s t o r t i o n s to f a l s e consciousness and even, i n the most 
extreme c a s e s , bad f a i t h . (1959: 7-8) 
. Goldmann's t h e o r e t i c a l formulations of p o s s i b l e consciousness seem 
to r e f e r to the contents of the world view having maximum adequacy of 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of r e a l i t y ; y e t the examples he g i v e s of d e v i a t i o n s from 
the tendency towards p o s s i b l e consciousness ( f o r i n s t a n c e , the d e s i r e of 
a worker to climb the s o c i a l ladder r a t h e r than maintain s o l i d a r i t y with 
f e l l o w workers) r e f e r to v a l u e s r a t h e r than knowledge, to the c o r r e c t 
a t t i t u d e towards the world r a t h e r than the c o r r e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i t . 
Goldmann thus cannot c l a i m o b j e c t i v i t y f o r h i s use of 'conscience p o s s i b l e ' 
t h e r e a r e many p o s s i b l e v a l u e - s t a n d p o i n t s appropriate to a c e r t a i n s o c i a l 
p o s i t i o n , and only through value-judgement would i t be p o s s i b l e to desig-
nate the most appropriate. However, even i f Goldmann were to remain 
w i t h i n the l i m i t s of h i s t h e o r e t i c a l formulation^ t h i s would be to ignore 
Mannheim's i n s i g h t t h a t the t r u t h i s s o c i a l l y determined to the extent 
t h a t t h e r e are s o c i a l f o r c e s c o n t r i b u t i n g towards our adequate perception 
o f r e a l i t y j u s t as t h e r e are those which i n c l i n e us towards i l l u s i o n s . 
Goldmann moreover does not allow f o r the f a c t t h a t there may be present 
w i t h i n one group two e q u a l l y v a l i d p e r s p e c t i v e s upon r e a l i t y , and thus two 
e q u a l l y adequate 'consciences p o s s i b l e s ' . He could incorporate t h i s 
Mannheimian conception w i t h i n h i s own t h e o r e t i c a l framework only i f he 
a s s e r t e d t h a t the s y n t h e s i s of the two p e r s p e c t i v e s (and t h e r e f o r e a 
f u l l e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of r e a l i t y ) was the highest p o s s i b l e consciousness, 
or t h a t the more than temporary e x i s t e n c e of one of these p e r s p e c t i v e s 
on any l a r g e s c a l e would be incompatible with the continued e x i s t e n c e of 
the group. The f i r s t o f those two p o s s i b l e a s s e r t i o n s i n f a c t r e v e a l s 
the dubious s t a t u s o f the notion of p o s s i b l e consciousness, i n t h a t i t 
would be d i f f i c u l t to put a l i m i t upon the number of p o s s i b l e p e r s p e c t i v e s 
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upon r e a l i t y t h a t could be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n the s y n t h e s i s i n g world view 
o f a group. D e t a i l e d , r e f i n e d and wide-ranging t r u t h i s not necessar-
i l y incompatible with t h e e x i s t e n c e o f almost any s o c i a l group, and 
hence i t becomes i m p o s s i b l e to put a l i m i t to the p o s s i b l e consciousness 
o f a group, e s p e c i a l l y when one c o n s i d e r s t h a t the s o c i o l o g i s t himself 
has a p e r s p e c t i v e upon r e a l i t y , and t h a t nobody can ever know what i s 
the 'whole t r u t h ' . The l i m i t s of the p o s s i b l e consciousness of a group 
must r a t h e r l i e i n the sphere of knowledge together with values ('values' 
being used i n a broad sense, thus i n c l u d i n g a l s o ends and sentiments) . 
Knowledge can be incompatible w i t h the e x i s t e n c e of a s o c i a l group only 
i f t h i s knowledge r e v e a l s f a c t s t h a t are r e l e v a n t to value i n such a way 
t h a t : a) the v a l u e s a r e seen to be based on f a l s e premises and/or are 
u n a t t a i n a b l e ; b) the v a l u e s are seen to be a t t a i n a b l e through means 
other than those p r e v i o u s l y u t i l i s e d ; or c) new values are able/encour-
aged to a r i s e . Under such c o n d i t i o n s the group's behaviour may be a l t e r e d 
i n such a r a d i c a l way as to n e c e s s i t a t e i t s designation as a d i f f e r e n t 
group. 
The other way t h a t Goldmann could deal w i t h the problem of a group 
having two p e r s p e c t i v e s i s , as p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d , to contend t h a t the 
more than temporary e x i s t e n c e of one of these p e r s p e c t i v e s on any l a r g e 
s c a l e would be incompatible w i t h the continued e x i s t e n c e of the group. 
I n r e l a t i o n t o the above remarks i t can be seen t h a t t h i s w i l l only be 
t r u e , a) i n s o f a r as the p e r s p e c t i v e i s r e l e v a n t i n one of the three 
ways we have o u t l i n e d ; or b) i n s o f a r as the p e r s p e c t i v e c o n t r a d i c t s the 
b a s i c consciousness (excluding values) e s s e n t i a l to the maintenance of 
the group. Thus i f s o c i e t y i s seen as a h i e r a r c h y of s t a t u s groups 
r a t h e r than as a dichotomy of c l a s s e s , then i t w i l l be impossible f o r a 
group formed, on the b a s i s of common c l a s s p o s i t i o n to continue to e x i s t 
(assuming t h a t the s t a t u s d i v i s i o n s do not c o i n c i d e w i t h the c l a s s 
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dichotomy). Such b a s i c consciousness does not of i t s e l f imply v a l u e s , 
though i t c e r t a i n l y excludes those v a l u e - p o s i t i o n s which r e q u i r e a 
d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e . And of course what maintains a s o c i a l group i s 
not b a s i c consciousness but v a l u e s , which however are c o n c r e t e l y ( i n 
t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r behaviour) unable to s u r v i v e a change i n b a s i c 
consciousness. 
The above c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the v a l i d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the p l a c e of 
knowledge and v a l u e s i n the notion of "conscience p o s s i b l e " r e f e r s only 
to the maximimi p o t e n t i a l consciousness of the group, and i t a l s o i m p l i e s 
t h a t t h i s group, even before i t has r e a l i s e d i t s p o s s i b l e consciousness, 
i s conscious of i t s e l f as a /group. I f we diverge frcan Goldmann's point 
of view, and contend t h a t the s u b j e c t of conscioiasness cannot be deter-
mined a p r i o r i , and i f we thus do not e l i m i n a t e the i n d i v i d u a l from 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n , then we may see t h a t maximum p o t e n t i a l consciousness may 
be d i f f e r e n t f o r the i n d i v i d u a l and f o r the group. For the i n d i v i d u a l 
we may d e l i n e a t e a b a s i c consciousness without which he would be unable 
to remain i n h i s s o c i a l p o s i t i o n , According to t h i s p o s i t i o n and i t s 
b a s i c consciousness, v a r i o u s p e r s p e c t i v e s , value-standpoints, e t c . , may 
be adequate, i n the sense t h a t they represent d i r e c t responses to s o c i a l 
l o c a t i o n r a t h e r than being imposed from outside, as through i d e o l o g i c a l 
manipulation. Thus the value o f Goldmann's conception becomes c l e a r : 
although there are determining f a c t o r s involved i n the i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
p a r t i c u l a r response to a s o c i a l l o c a t i o n , n e v e r t h e l e s s these are of a 
d i f f e r e n t k i n d from those which account for the other elements of h i s 
'conscience r e e l e ' , s i n c e these l a t t e r elements d e r i v e r a t h e r from 
another i n d i v i d u a l or group i n the s o c i e t y (or i n the p a s t ) and are 
adequate t o t h e i r s o c i a l l o c a t i o n . 
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To speak o f the maximimi p o t e n t i a l consciousness o f a group i s not 
as s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . C l e a r l y what p a s s e s as "adequate response' may be 
narrowed, e s p e c i a l l y i f maximimi p o t e n t i a l consciousness here i n c l u d e s 
the group's consciousness o f i t s e l f as a group. There are s e v e r a l 
p o s s i b l e d e f i n i t i o n s o f 'group' Where: a) The 'group' concerned may be 
merely a category c r e a t e d by the s o c i o l o g i s t , b) The d e f i n i t i o n of 
'group' may i n c l u d e the a d d i t i o n a l p r e r e q u i s i t e t h a t , on the b a s i s of 
the elements common to those w i t h i n t h i s category, responses i n terms of 
values and p e r s p e c t i v e s are the same, p o s s i b l y leading to c o l l e c t i v e 
behaviour, c) The group may be deemed to e x i s t only where 'group 
behaviour' i s p r e s e n t , i . e . where the behaviour of each i n d i v i d u a l i n 
the category a f f e c t s the behaviour o f others, c) i s thus a group 
because o f mutually e f f e c t i v e behaviour; w h i l s t b) i s a group due to 
common 'value- and p e r s p e c t i v e t r e s p o n s e s to what i s h e l d i n common. B a s i c 
consciousness might thus be seen e i t h e r as: a) th a t which i s necessary 
f o r the i n d i v i d u a l s i n the category to remain i n t h a t category; or b) 
t h a t which i s n e c e s s a r y f o r i n d i v i d u a l s to maintain common p e r s p e c t i v e s ; 
o r c) t h a t which i s n e c e s s a r y f o r i n d i v i d u a l s to continue group 
behaviour. Maximvim p o t e n t i a l consciousness from the p o i n t of view of 
a) would be the b a s i c consciousness o f the group i n b) , or possibly; 
i t c o u l d be i n a d d i t i o n the maximum p o t e n t i a l consciousness of b) , 
which would be consciousness o f i t s e l f as a group. Maximum p o t e n t i a l 
consciousness f o r c) would i n v o l v e each i n d i v i d u a l ' s adequately 
responding i n terms of va l u e s and p e r s p e c t i v e s on the b a s i s of h i s group 
behaviour and only on t h i s b a s i s ; f u r t h e r , common values and p e r s p e c t i v e s ; 
s t i l l f u r t h e r , group consciousness (presumably the maximum p o t e n t i a l 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s ) . The concept of b a s i c consciousness w i t h r e s p e c t to b) 
may account f o r why a group f a i l s to a r i s e , namely because the responses 
to, e.g., s o c i a l l o c a t i o n are too v a r i o u s . 
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The above a n a l y s i s i n d i c a t e s t h a t , i n d e s c r i b i n g the maximvim poten-
t i a l c o n sciousnsss o f a c l a s s f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e o r i s t s should be c a r e f u l 
to s p e c i f y whether they are concerned w i t h c l a s s as a group of type 
a) , b) or c) ,, or which combination of the three, so t h a t ambiguity and 
unstated assimiptions are avoided. 
I n accounting f o r the v a r i o u s f a c t o r s i n the a c t u a l consciousness of 
a group, one may a l s o be d e a l i n g w i t h those f a c t o r s which prevent the 
group from a t t a i n i n g maximum p o t e n t i a l consciousness: f o r i n s t a n c e , 
i d e o l o g i c a l i n f l u e n c e from o u t s i d e the group may hinder the development 
of group-consciousness. The notion of p o s s i b l e consciousness with i t s 
c r i t e r i o n o f adequacy i s an a i d i n d i s c o v e r i n g those elements which are 
l i k e l y to a r i s e from the nature of the group (or category) i t s e l f , as 
opposed to those which a r e due to other f a c t o r s , such as propoganda from 
another group. I n p r a c t i c e , however, d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the employment of the 
concept o f ' p o s s i b l e consciousness' are more apparent, s i n c e the choice 
o f one adequate response r a t h e r than another may be due to i d e o l o g i c a l 
i n f l u e n c e ; and of course groups or the common elements of c a t e g o r i e s may 
a r i s e through the a c t i o n s of other i n d i v i d u a l s or groups i n the s o c i e t y , 
thus b e l y i n g the assumption of autonomous group f o m a t i o n underlying the 
above statements. 
F i n a l l y , i f we look a t the notion of f a l s e consciousness, then we may 
see how Goldmann's f a i l u r e t o d e a l w i t h the maximum p o t e n t i a l conscious-
ness o f an i n d i v i d u a l i n a s o c i a l p o s i t i o n leads him to make unwarranted 
assumptions about the s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y nature of tendencies towards 
maximum p o t e n t i a l consciousness i n a group. Goldmann, who does not define 
f a l s e consciousness, n e v e r t h e l e s s i m p l i e s t h a t i t i s i n a sense the opposite 
of p o s s i b l e consciousness, the l a t t e r being the most adequate consciousness 
p o s s i b l e without the d e s t r u c t i o n o f the group (or r a t h e r i t s b a s i c 
c o nsciousness), w h i l e the former being inadequate consciousness without 
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n e c e s s a r i l y implying the d e s t r u c t i o n of b a s i c consciousness. Within t h i s 
conception, ' f a l s e consciousness' could s t i l l have three meanings: 
a) "^untrue' consciousness, or mi s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of r e a l i t y ; b) conscious-
ness which i s not c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the 'true' i n t e r e s t s of the group'''; 
c) consciousness which i s not an adequate response to s o c i a l l o c a t i o n 
but r a t h e r a r i s e s from ' e x t e r n a l ' f o r c e s . Type a) implying a funda-
mental d i f f e r e n c e between the s o c i a l determination of t r u t h and falser-
hoodj we should r e j e c t i n favour of a study of d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s (more 
or l e s s adequate) on r e a l i t y . Furthermore, i t must be remembered t h a t f a l s e -
hood, l i k e t t u t h , is- r e l a t i v e ; and t h a t i n any case Goldmann i s more concerned 
w i t h consciousness i n c l u d i n g r a t h e r than excluding v a l u e s . Type b) we 
r e j e c t , adopting t h e Mannheimian conception o f s e v e r a l adequate responses 
t o a given s o c i a l l o c a t i o n . Within the t h i r d conception of f a l s e conscious-
ness, then, i t can be seen t h a t , i f indeed one even wishes to use the 
concept of f a l s e consciousness i n r e f e r r i n g to a group,, i t must neverthe-
l e s s mean'.something d i f f e r e n t from the f a l s e consciousness of an i n d i v i d u a l . 
For what i s an adequate response of the i n d i v i d u a l to h i s s o c i a l l o c a t i o n 
may be q u i t e c o n t r a r y t o the maximum p o t e n t i a l consciousness of the group, 
and hence inadequate from the p o i n t o f view o f the group. Goldmann i s 
unable to grasp t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , as he l i m i t s h i m s e l f to the group i n h i s 
usage of 'conscience p o s s i b l e ' . Hence he sees the tendency of the conscious-
ness of the i n d i v i d u a l s i n a group towards the maximum p o t e n t i a l conscious-
ness of t h a t group as a s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y f o r c e , whereas i n f a c t i t i s only 
one p o s s i b i l i t y amongst many, owing to the a l t e r n a t i v e p o s s i b l e adequate 
responses of each i n d i v i d u a l to h i s l o c a t i o n . I n a sense one may see the 
adequate responses o f the i n d i v i d u a l to h i s s o c i a l p o s i t i o n as s e l f -
explanatory, but an a n a l y s i s of other elements i n the s i t u a t i o n i s nec-
e s s a r y to accoiant f o r any tendency towards the maximum p o t e n t i a l conscious-
•'• A c r i t i q u e of t h i s predominant conception of f a l s e consciousness 
i s presented i n the s e c t i o n on K a r l Mannheim, p 34ff above. 
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ness of the group of which he i s a member. 
We have thus seen that Goldmann's conceptions of possible, actual, 
adequate, f a l s e and basic consciousness may be useful for an analysis of 
which elements of consciousness are responses by the individual to his 
s o c i a l position and which are 'externally' determined, as through ideo-
lo g i c a l influence; but that his approach suffers from many fal s e assump-
tions, mainly due to h i s subsxomption of the consciousness of the individual 
in the consciousness of the group. 
Despite the emphasis on group consciousness that we find i n Goldmann's 
1959 paper, he denies elsewhere the p o s s i b i l i t y of supra-individual 
consciousness: 
'Collective consciousness, c l a s s consciousness for example, 
i s only the t o t a l i t y of states of individual consciousness 
and of thei r tendencies resulting from the mutual influence 
of men upon each other and th e i r effects upon nature'-. 
(1969: 127) 
These tendencies would appear, however, i n the light of Goldmann's genetic 
structuralism, (1967; 510ff), to have a l i f e of t h e i r own in similar form 
to supra-individual consciousness. Whether or not Goldmann subscribes 
i n practice to th i s l a t t e r conception, there i s no doubt of his emphasis 
on the s o c i a l nature of thought. He points out that the individual could 
not possibly create h i s own mental structures, h i s experience being too 
br i e f and too limited. 'Mental structures' are social phenomena and: 
'... can only be the r e s u l t of the conjoint a c t i v i t y of 
a large number of individuals who find themselves i n a 
sim i l a r situation, that i s to say,, who constitute a 
privileged s o c i a l group, these individuals having, for 
a lengthy period and i n an intensive way, lived through 
a s e r i e s of problems and having endeavoured to find a 
si g n i f i c a n t solution for them.' 
(1967: 495) 
This statement further reveals Goldmann's view that a l l thought i s prag-
matic i n the broadest sense: indeed he asserts that: 
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"... a l l human behaviour .., can be translated by the 
research worker i n terms of the existence of a p r a c t i c a l 
problem and of an attempt to solve that problem. 
(1967: 494) 
Goldmann's pragmatism and emphasis on the s o c i a l nature of thought 
are combined i n h i s predominant i n t e r e s t i n the role of class i n the 
s o c i a l determination of thought. The reason why s o c i a l class i s the most 
important group for the sociologist of knowledge or l i t e r a t u r e to study, 
according to Goldmann, i s that the problems that have been uppemost in 
men's minds throughout history have been economic, whether simply becavise 
of the w i l l to survive or, for those who gain through exploitation, the 
desire to maintain or increase t h e i r wealth, (1964: 16^17; & 1969: 87-88) 
Goldmann nevertheless i s unable to establish the overriding h i s t o r i c a l 
importance of economic problems compared with other needs and motivations. 
His conception i s p a r t i c u l a r l y weak i n relation to those whose economic 
power has granted them much le i s u r e : many such individuals w i l l be able to 
divorce themselves f a i r l y r a d i c a l l y from the l i f e of economic a c t i v i t y and 
in t e r e s t s . I t i s however true that Goldmann, when dealing with the indi'^-
vidual, i s able to arrive at an unmechanistic conception similar to that of 
Mannheim, when the l a t t e r views s o c i a l locations as potential bases for 
various reactions: 
'Undoubtedly the thinking of an individual can be influx, • 
enced i n many ways by the environment with which he has 
been i n immediate contact; however, this influence can 
produce different effe c t s : as an adaptation but also a 
reaction of refu s a l or rebellion, or even as a systhesis 
of ideas met with i n one environment with others coming 
from elsewhere, e t c ' (Goldmann, 1969: 59) 
Goldmann thus attempts a solution to t h i s problem (of how i t i s that the 
thought of some individuals seems r e l a t i v e l y \inaffected by s o c i a l class 
behaviour and interests) by a n a l y t i c a l l y separating the individual and 
the group: 
',,. an individual can doubtless separate his ideas and 
i n t e l l e c t u a l aspirations from his daily l i f e ; the same 
i s not true of s o c i a l groups, for as far as they are 
concerned, the i r ideas and behaviour are rigorously 
and closely related.' (1964: 17) 
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Goldmann does not explain why t h i s should be so, and indeed the propo-
s i t i o n that a group's ideas and behaviour are necessarily related only 
holds i f the group i s i t s e l f defined i n terms of common behaviour, rather 
than for instance i n terms of the sharing of ideas. We should thus be 
led to a tautological proposition that the ideas of the individual as a 
member of the .group are bound to be based upon the group's behaviour, 
as the group i s defined b^. i t s common behaviour. 
Having assumed a necessary relationship between a group's ideas and 
behaviour, and having accounted for h i s emphasis on s o c i a l class in 
terms of the overriding h i s t o r i c a l importance of economic problems, Goldmann 
i s free to propose a necessary l i n k between socia l class and what he sees 
as the most Important tool for the analysis of consciousness i n history: 
"world view' , Goldmann defines world-view as: 
a convenient term for the whole complex of ideas, 
aspirations and feelings which l i n k s together the 
members of a s o c i a l group (a group which, i n most 
cases, assumes the existence of a soci a l class) and 
which opposes them to members of other soci a l groups.' 
(1964: 17) 
He sees the world view as an ideal-type, a necessary methodological tool 
for understanding complex h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y : 
' I t i s not an immediate, empirical fact, but a concep-
t u a l working hypothesis indispensable to an under-
standing of the way i n which individuals actually 
express the i r ideas.' (1964: 15) 
'... an extrapolation made by the historian for the 
purposes of convenience; nevertheless i t does 
extrapolate a tendency which r e a l l y exists among 
the members of a certain s o c i a l group, who a l l attain 
t h i s c l a s s consciousness i n a more or less coherent 
manner.' (1964: 17) 
I n these quotations i t can be seen how readily Goldmann .relates world 
views to s o c i a l classes, more so for instance than Mannheim, who has fewer 
presuppositions. Goldmann sees s o c i a l classes as constituting the i n f r a -
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structure of world views, at l e a s t from the seventeenth century onwards 
(1964: 99), and i n another place since the end of antiquity. (1969: 102) 
A coherent world view such as i s expressed in philosophical and a r t i s t i c 
works represents the maximum potential consciousness of the group, usually 
a s o c i a l c l a s s . (1964: 17) Conversely, 
'The maximimi potential consciousness of a s o c i a l class 
always constitutes a psychologically coherent world 
view which may be expressed on the plane of religion, 
philosophy, l i t e r a t u r e or a r t . ' 
(1969: 103) 
Although Goldmann seems to be positing an h i s t o r i c a l relationship 
between c l a s s and world view, i n practice his definitions of class and 
world view and h i s methodology for t h e i r discovery presuppose their r e l a -
tionship, Goldmann's definition of s o c i a l class i s unusual i n that i t 
includes not only: a) ' i t s function i n production' ; but also b) ' i t s 
relations with the members of other classes'; and even c) ' i t s potential 
consciousness which i s a world-view', (1969: 111) I f b) and c) are not 
implied already i n a) (and i f they were then i t would be unnecessary to 
include them i n the definition) ^  then the question of how far function i n 
production determines i n t e r - c l a s s relations and (more p a r t i c u l a r l y of 
int e r e s t to us) world -view^ i s l e f t open. To i l l u s t r a t e the problems 
caused by his definition, Goldmann describes h i s d i f f i c u l t y i n deciding 
i f the 'noblesse de robe'' did or did not constitute a s o c i a l class (1969: 
111), He states that h i s discovery of the iDansenist world view as 
expressed by the works of Pascal and Racine led him to decide i n favour 
of an affirmative answer. Yet Goldmann seems to be guilty of c i r c u l a r i t y 
of argument. I f classes are defined as having world vie\s$, then of course 
i t w i l l be found Cas Goldmann states) that a l l classes have world views. 
I f a world i s not found, then the c l a s s i s not a cl a s s . Similarly i t seems 
that i f Goldmann finds a world view, he w i l l have to find a class to which 
i t corresponds - of which i t i s the expression - as otherwise he would 
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probably say that i t was not a world view. What he w i l l do i n practice 
i s thus to work from both ends u n t i l they meet, naturally causing subtle 
changes along the way i n the description of the s o c i a l c l a s s and the con-
ception of the world view., 
In another pl^ce Goldmann's conception of s o c i a l c l a s s i s s t i l l further 
narrowed: 
'... not a l l groups b^sed on economic interests necess-. 
a r i l y constitute s o c i a l classes. I n order for a group 
to become a c l a s s , i t s interests must be directed^ in the 
case of a 'revolutionary' c l a s s , towards a complete trans-
formation of the s o c i a l structure or, i f i t i s a 'reac-
tionary' c l a s s , towards maintaining the present s o c i a l 
structure unchanged.' (1964: 17) 
Thus Goldmann e f f e c t i v e l y reduces the number of s o c i a l classes to two, a l l 
others presimiably being r e c l a s s i f i e d as economic interest groups. One 
feels that Goldmann i s straining too hard to f i t s o c i a l r e a l i t y into a 
crude Marxist schema, which can afford to ignore the problems of the r e l a -
tions between classes and t h e i r world views, i n t e r e s t s , class conscious-
ness , opposition and c o n f l i c t by enveloping a l l these elements i n the very 
defi n i t i o n of s o c i a l c l a s s i t s e l f . 
Corresponding to h i s narrowed definition of s o c i a l c l a s s , Goldmann 
has a highly r e s t r i c t i v e conception of world view, which perhaps accounts 
for h i s conviction that there are only a limited number of world views 
available throughout history. (1964: 20; & 1969: 131) Goldmann i s not 
consistent i n dealing with the notion of world view, but i n 'The Human 
Sciences and Philosophy' he sees world views as being applicable only to 
the perspectives of s o c i a l classes which are dominant or r i s i n g , and not 
to other s o c i a l groups or declining classes: for these the term 'ideology' 
i s applicable, since i t conveys the notion of the p a r t i a l rather than 
t o t a l character^of the perspectives involved. (1969: 103) Thus 'reformism' 
i s an important ideological phenomenon, but not a world view, Goldmann 
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referring to the fact that there i s no reformist ethic, aesthetic or 
epistemology. (1969: 153) This narrow conception of world view confines 
analysis to very broad formal aspects of thought and feeling, and hence 
ignores the more p a r t i c u l a r aspects, which presumably would be subsumed 
under 'ideology'. Yet Goldmann's own studies are not so constricted: 
perspectives that are included by him as world views are nonetheless 
examined i n their s p e c i f i c i t y . Moreover i t seems that i f the thought of 
another group (not a class) had the same broad formal characteristics and 
yet different p a r t i c u l a r aspects, Goldmann would see the perspective of 
t h i s group as ideological rather than as constituting a world view. This 
inconsistency, accountable by the fac t that Goldmann presupposes that only 
classes have world views, i s c l e a r l y unsatisfactory. Furthermore, Goldmann's 
assvmption that declining classes and other groups are unable to formulate 
a t o t a l vision of the world which has a meaning peculiar to them i s highly 
disputable. 
Much of Goldmann's work on the sociology of knowledge clearly involves 
a conception of the substructure i n terms of s o c i a l differentiation. I n 
t h i s conception he i s concerned with groups rather than individuals, with 
classes as the most s i g n i f i c a n t groups, with the struggle for power between 
dominant and r i s i n g c l a s s e s , and with the 'false consciousness' which may 
a r i s e from the ideological power of the dominant c l a s s . We now turn to 
the question of how f a r Goldmann's conception of the nature of the s o c i a l 
structure i s reflected i n the work of other sociologists of knowledge. 
(v) S o c i a l Differentiation i n the Substructure 
There are of course many who share Goldmann's views on the over-
riding importance of cl a s s i n the s o c i a l structural conditioning of 
thought. Others however are vinwilling to grant class a p r i o r i s i g n i f i -
cance, or may make contradictory statements on the subject. Mannheim, for 
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instance, eschews dogmatism i n h i s l a t e r work, but in his e a r l i e r writings 
he c l e a r l y assigns the greatest importance to class i n the analysis of 
s o c i a l structure: where he distinguishes between the mental substructure 
and superstructure,"'' 'mind-in-the-substrucfeure' i s seen as: 
'... involving primarily the conditions of production, 
together with a l l the concomitant s o c i a l relationships-' 
(1952: 163) 
Lefort agrees on the importance of c l a s s , but argues against a r e a l i s t 
and mechanistic view of the relationship between class and ideology, 
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and stresses, as does Mannheim, that an ideology must be seen i n i t s 
meaningful and h i s t o r i c a l context, (1956: 301) He notes that an ideology 
which i s i n some way useful for a cla s s does not necessarily originate 
from that class"^; that an ideology may have multiple sources; and that a 
single c l a s s may express i t s e l f i n manifold ways, (1956: 299) 
Dahrendorf looks at the question of class on a leve l closer to the 
individual. He takes a quotation from Marx's Preface to the F i r s t 
Edition of Capital: 
'But I am concerned here with the persons only, i n so far 
as they are personifications of economic categories, 
c a r r i e r s of certain c l a s s relations and interest s . Less' 
than any other one can my point of view, which compre-
hejnds the development of the economic formation of society 
as a process of natural history, make the individual 
responsible for conditions, the creature of which he 
remains socially, however much he may r i s e above them 
subjectively.' (Dahrendorf, 1956: 293) 
Dahrendorf's crit i q u e i s directed at Marx's concentration on class posi-
tion to the detriment of other possible sources of interest. He broadens 
Marx's idea into a conception of 'interest expectations' that are thought 
to be attached to certain status-roles and to relate the status-roles 
either p o s i t i v e l y or negatively to the major institutions of society. 
See above, p 24 
2 
See below. Chapter 4, jp 94-95 
This point i s consistent with Pareto's emphasis on the u t i l i t y 
of ideas: see above, p 29 
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(1956: 294) Although 'interest expectations' are inherent i n some status-
roOes , they w i l l not necessarily be generalised through the personality. 
(1956: 294) Dahrendorf thus envisages the p o s s i b i l i t y of compartmental-
is a t i o n : he does not however seem to see the p o s s i b i l i t y of role distance -
i . e . that one may play the role for an u l t e r i o r purpose without sharing 
the inherent 'interest expectation". One might also argue that the role 
may be played sincerely but without any developed sense of one"s interest; 
Dahrendorf himself notes that the predominant concept of "interest" 
implies a r t i c u l a t i o n and commitment, and thus he introduces the idea of 
"latent i n t e r e s t s ' to refer to loose, unformulated but common orientations 
of quasi-groups. (1956 : 292-3) Despite Dahrendorf's care i n the use of 
the term "interest", i t may nonetheless be preferable to abandon the con-
cept of "interest expectation" i n favour of a term such as "orientation", 
which c a r r i e s l e s s implication of rat i o n a l i t y and deliberation. 
Although Dahrendorf points to wider potential sources of interest 
(thus concurring with our view of c l a s s as one possible a n a l y t i c a l substruc-
ture i n the sociology of knowledge), and indicates the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
compartmentalisation (with i t s e f f e c t of limiting the influence of one 
interest-source on an individual"s t o t a l thought), he nevertheless seems 
to have remained with Marx at the l e v e l of social categories, thus begging 
the question of how far any individual "s consciousness i s circumscribed 
by h i s s o c i a l roles. Dahrendorf"s' s t r u c t u r a l i s t conception of s o c i a l 
role hampers h i s otherwise interesting attempt to develop a refined con-
ception of the relationship between cla s s and consciousness. 
Although sociologists of knowledge have tended to discuss the sub-
structure p r i n c i p a l l y i n terms of c l a s s , there has also been some con-
sideration of s o c i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n terms of e l i t e s and masses. Both 
The "orientation" attached to status-role might then bear compar-
ison with "basic consciousness" as conceived by Goldmann: see 
above, p 42 
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S c h e l e r and Pareto, f o r i n s t a n c e , see the c u l t u r e o f the e l i t e as the 
most important source of the c u l t u r e o f s o c i e t y as a whole; though of 
course f o r S c h e l e r i t i s the 'drive s t r u c t u r e ' of the e l i t e t h a t i s the 
p r i n c i p a l determinant (Staude, 1967: 177), w h i l s t Pareto r e l a t e s the e l i t e ' s 
i d e a s to t h e i r ' r e s i d u e s ' . (1966: 247-250; & 260-265) E l i t e and c l a s s 
a n a l y s i s a re of course not n e c e s s a r i l y incompatible: f o r Marx, Goldmann, 
and f o r Mannheim i n p l a c e s , the i d e a s of the dominant c l a s s permeate the 
whole of the s o c i e t y ' s c u l t u r e . 
Whether one makes an a n a l y s i s i n terms of c l a s s or of e l i t e , i t i s 
c l e a r t h a t power i s a c r u c i a l v a r i a b l e i n the s o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n of 
c u l t u r e . I n the f i r s t p l a c e power, as Berger and Luckmann show (1967: 
139ff) , may i n v o l v e the a b i l i t y to impose one.'s d e f i n i t i o n o f r e a l i t y upon 
o t h e r s . More s p e c i f i c a l l y i t may decide which of v a r i o u s contending ideas 
became c u r r e n t i n s o c i e t y a t l a r g e , even though the ideas may not have been 
formulated by any o f the power groups themselves. Thus although t h e o r i e s 
may be concocted and may compete i n 'a s o r t of s o c i e t a l vacuum', when these 
t h e o r i e s ' r i v a l r y takes p l a c e on a broader s o c i a l stage, when groups take 
over the t h e o r i e s w i t h which -Uiey have a f f i n i t y , then ' e x t r a - t h e o r e t i c a l 
i n t e r e s t s ' , r e s p e c t i v e power, w i l l decide the outcome, (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967: 137-8) The r e l a t i o n s h i p between ' c u l t u r a l experts' and 
those w i t h broader s o c i a l power i s v a r i a b l e , as Berger and Luckmann show 
(1967: 138ff)-and indeed as Mannheim i n h i s w r i t i n g s on i n t e l l e c t u a l s had 
p r e v i o u s l y i n d i c a t e d (1956: 1 2 1 f f ) , Berger and Luckmann i n f a c t take a 
p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t i n t h e - s o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n of 'knowledge' i n terms of 
t h e o r e t i c a l experts (1967: 1 3 4 f f ) , and more g e n e r a l l y i n terms of s o c i a l 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n by i n t e r e s t i n and a c c e s s to s o c i a l knowledge (1967: 
102-105) 
Cf Madge's p r e v i o u s l y suggested i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the ' s o c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e of s o c i a l e i d o s ' . (Madge, 1964) 
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Despite the i r concern with the s o c i a l organisation of knowledge^ 
ideological power, etc. (elements which would belong to the substructure 
i n our conception) , the p r i n c i p a l characterisation of what we should cAll 
the sxibstructure remains for Berger and Luckmann that of a r e l a t i v e l y 
undifferentiated 'take-for-granted' r e a l i t y , a Schutzlan intersiobjective 
world of everyday r e a l i t y (1967: 37), not only shared by individuals but 
also integrated into a coherent and consistent whole through s o c i a l l y 
shared biographical r e f l e c t i o n (1967; 81ff): the picture i s strangely 
reminiscent of Parsons i n i t s harmony, consensus and integration. This 
i s hardly surprising i f we consider two principal assumptions of Berger 
and Luckmann: "intersubjectivity" and individual struggles for consistency."'' 
Obviously, i f the individual s t r i v e s for consistency i n an intersubjective 
world, a consistent s o c i a l world must resu l t . Although group c o n f l i c t i s 
envisaged as a p o s s i b i l i t y , power and s o c i a l differentiation by knowledge 
are considered normally to function to maintain everyday r e a l i t y and to 
legitimate i t on ever more encompassing levels. (1967: 112ff) Such high 
l e v e l integration i s p a r t i c u l a r l y useful where discrepant meanings are 
actualised within everyday l i f e (1967: 116), as otherwise presumably the 
2 
intersubjective world would be threatened. This highly integrated s o c i a l 
model i s somewhat modified when Berger and Luckmann apply i t to h i s t o r i c a l 
situations; yet, even when applied to 'modern p l u r a l i s t i c societies', the 
basic intersub j e c t i v e everyday r e a l i t y remains with l i t t l e challenge from 
pa r t i c u l a r coexisting r e a l i t i e s : 
An emphasis on individual struggles for consistency i s apparent 
throughout Chapter 1; "Internalization of Reality', i n Part 
Three of Berger and Luckmann. 
2 
We s h a l l explore the role of legitimations i n Berger and Luckmann's 
work more f u l l y below, i n relation to the superstructure as seen 
from thei r perspective: see below, Chapter 3, p 74 f f 
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' I t i s important to bear i n mind that most modern socie-
t i e s are p l u r a l i s t i c . This means that they have a shared 
core universe taken for granted as such, and different 
p a r t i a l universes coexisting i n a state of mutual 
accommodation. The l a t t e r probably have some ideological 
functions, but outright c o n f l i c t between ideologies has 
been replaced by varying degrees of tolerance or even 
cooperation,' (1967: 142) 
The 'universes of meaning' mentioned i n t h i s quotation have a s i g n i -
ficant place i n Berger and Luckmann's work: universes of meaning, l i k e 
group consciousness, re l a t e meanings to one another on a supra-individual 
l e v e l . Berger and Luckmann make th i s notion plausible through the i r 
assumption of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , which dispels doubts that would a r i s e 
from the recognition of potentially conflicting interpretations of such 
universes. Universes of meaning are linked to individual consciousness 
through role analysis. (1967: 96) I t i s through roles that i n s t i t u t i o n s 
are embodied i n individual experience, and in general Berger and Luckmann 
seem to see this process as presenting l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y : 
'In the ccaranon stock of knowledge there are standards of 
role performance that are accessible to a l l members of 
a society, or at l e a s t to those who are potential per-
formers of the roles i n question.' 
(1967: 91) 
Once again one sees a p a r a l l e l with Parsons: with the exception of 'unsuc-
c e s s f u l s o c i a l i s a t i o n ' , the individual's knowledge (including knowledge 
of expected behaviour) seems too d i r e c t l y and unambiguously taken from 
a clear and common stock. Although role distance i s mentioned (1967: 
162) , role c o n f l i c t and f l e x i b i l i t y or ambiguity of role definition are 
treated as exceptional: one generally knows exactly what one has to do 
and readily agrees to do i t . 
P a r a l l e l to the harmonious picture of society, Berger and Luckmann 
present an image of the individual with a coherent and consistent view 
of the world. This i s achieved partly through the Meadian concept of 
the 'generalised other'; 
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'The formation within consciousness of the generalised 
other ... implies the in t e r n a l i s a t i o n of society as 
such and of the objective r e a l i t y established therein, 
and, at the same time, the subjective establishment 
of a coherent and continuous identity.' 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 153) 
Unsuccessful s o c i a l i s a t i o n may r e s u l t from heterogeneity i n the s o c i a l -
i s i n g personnel; but t h i s i s seen as unlikely, since: 
"... individuals .., s u f f i c i e n t l y cohesive as a group 
to take on the task of primary s o c i a l i s a t i o n are 
lik&ly to have concocted some sort of common world 
between them." (1967: 188-9) 
Yet i t i s not obvious that t h i s i s generally the case: to begin with, 
each s o c i a l i s i n g person may himself lack a consistent and coherent view 
of the world, l e t alone being able to agree on one with another person. 
What l i n k s the primary s o c i a l i s i n g personnel may f a l l f ar short of a common 
world. 
Beyond primary s o c i a l i s a t i o n Berger and Luckmann envisage the possi-
b i l i t y of r o l e - s p e c i f i c knowledge (1967: 95), that Implies an incomplete 
sharing of the everyday world: indeed they suggest that i f at this stage 
discrepant role-worlds are available, there w i l l be an increase i n con-
sciousness of world-relativity. (1967: 192) Such an eventuality would 
seem to counter t h e i r arguments as to the "taken-for-granted" nature of 
everyday l i f e , and indicates that at times they should make i t clear that 
t h e i r i d e a l - t y p i c a l model of coherent and harmonious s o c i a l r e a l i t y i s 
an i d e a l type. Certainly, as we have noted, when they look more closely 
at h i s t o r i c a l types they allow for the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e l a t i v e l y autono-
mous sub-universes of meaning, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n a condition of pluralism: 
though even here they areoonceroed with the "problem" of overall meaning-
f u l integration. (1967: 102-3) 
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Corresponding to the r e l a t i v e l y autonomous universes of meaning that 
groups i n a society may come to develop, Berger and Luckmann posit 'finite 
provinces of meaning'•*" (fomd even i n r e l a t i v e l y undifferentiated s o c i e t i e s ) : 
'.... enclaves within the paramount r e a l i t y marked by 
circumscribed meanings and modes of experience.' 
(1967: 39) , 
including for instance religious or aesthetic experience, realms from which 
one always returns to the 'paramount r e a l i t y of everyday l i f e ' . (1967: 40) 
These f i n i t e provinces of meaning are the counterpart of Berger and Luck-
mann 's shared and integrated everyday r e a l i t y : Berger and Luckmann draw 
the dividing li n e between these different r e a l i t i e s (e.g, religious exper-
ience and everyday l i f e ) very sharply, perhaps because i f the competing 
perspectives of f i n i t e r e a l i t i e s were seen as capable of interfusing with 
everyday r e a l i t y , bringing with them the necessary 'leaping' from one 
perspective to another, then everyday r e a l i t y could no longer appear so 
highly integrated, and differing perspectives on everyday r e a l i t y would 
be l i e i t s i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . I n a similar fashion, role-^distance may 
ward off a threat, from sub-universes of role-^specific knowledge, to the 
core shared everyday r e a l i t y . Through role-distance the individual: 
'... establishes distance between his t o t a l s e l f and i t s 
r e a l i t y on the one hand, and the rol e - s p e c i f i c p a r t i a l 
s e l f and i t s r e a l i t y on the other.' 
(1967: 162) 
Concerning s o c i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n the substructure, Berger and 
Luckmann would thus seem to present an undifferentiated, intersiobjective, 
paramount r e a l i t y of everyday l i f e , with differentiated meaningful spheres 
sharply divided therefrom and thus providing l i t t l e challenge thereto. 
Although s o c i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n terms of power may resul t i n competing 
ideologies, the emphasis i s upon power as used to organise knowledge for 
Here, as elsewhere i n thei r argument, Berger and Luckmann are 
indebted to Schutz. See also the footnote on p 188 of 
Chapter 8 below. 
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the purpose of integration. This model of a highly integrated sub-
structure predominates i n the e a r l i e r part of their book; though i n later 
h i s t o r i c a l sections, and i n p a r t i c u l a r in relation to "society as subjec-
t i v e r e a l i t y " , Berger and Luckmann give more room to individual variations 
and exceptions. 
From th i s section on s o c i a l differentiation i n the substructure i t 
thus emerges that characterisations of the s o c i a l structure frequently 
r e s t upon unexamined presuppositions, so that general models of how 
society works are often idealr^typical models of limited a p p l i c a b i l i t y . 
I n terms of the sociology of knowledge t h i s means that the possible sources 
of ideas,etc. and the potential modes of relationship between superstruc-
ture and substructure are severely r e s t r i c t e d , and a narrowed sociology 
of knowledge ensues. 
(vi) Narrow Perspectives on the Sociology of Knowledge 
I n the examination of how the substructure i s conceived by sociolog-
i s t s of knowledge, we have seen the importance of meaning and motive as 
well as s o c i a l s t r u c t u r a l elements. An important question though i s how 
narrow i s the conception of substructural consciousness and s o c i a l struc-
tiare and t h e i r interrelationship. We have seen how the relationship 
between situation and consciousness i s frequently presupposed, through 
concepts such as objective interests and false consciousness, thus giving 
a r e s t r i c t e d and often mono-deterministic account of the relationship. 
We have s i m i l a r l y found characterisations of the s o c i a l structure to be 
narrow i n their exclusion of alternative possible s o c i a l structural 
types: witness for instance the mutual contradiction of Goldmann's and 
Berger and Luckmann's versions of s o c i a l r e a l i t y , and their consequent 
yiew of the nature and role of the superstructure. Likewise with con-
sciousness i n the sijbstructure, we have found many theorists to r e l e -
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gate individual consciousness to unimportant deviations from the theme, 
whether the theme i s group or cl a s s consciousness, or intersubjective 
everyday l i f e . As for motivational elements, i n t e r e s t s , which may them-
selves imply too much r a t i o n a l i t y and deliberation, may be further 
narrowed to those related to economic power. Even Scheler's drives are 
r e s t r i c t e d to three types (blood-ties, power drives and economic motiva-
tion) each of which he sees as predominating ait a different stage of 
c i v i l i s a t i o n . (Staude, 1967: 174-5) At least Scheler recognises that 
there are various sources and forms of organisation of power, and that 
one source or organisational form should not be assmed to be the 
archetype. 
A narrow conception of the substructure not only implies a r e s t r i c t e d 
sociology of knowledge, but frequently also a model in which one part of 
society determines the r e s t of society and i t s more abstract ideas: this 
i s the case with Scheler, whose three successively predominant drives and 
resulting s o c i a l conditions determine the adoption of ideas; and with 
certain formulations of Marx, i n which (as noted above) i t i s claimed that 
a p a r t i c u l a r type of s o c i a l being including consciousness ( i . e . the mode 
of production of material l i f e ) determines the re s t of. s o c i a l being and 
more removed ideological consciovisness. Here we have a r e s t r i c t e d 
sociology of knowledge not only i n the negative sense of the exclusion 
of potential variables, but also i n the positive sense of asserting a 
predominant deterministic relationship governing society and i t s con-
sciousness. 
Whilst suggestions that one should take accoimt of particular elements 
i n and relations between the s i J b s t r u c t u r e and superstructure may be useful, 
one cannot but note that such suggestions are frequently presented as 
general models of universal a p p l i c a b i l i t y . Yet the only v a l i d models of 
this l a t t e r type are formal rather than substantive, 'general how' models 
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rather than indications of determining principles. The difference between 
the models i s largely a matter of breadth: the 'general how' model indi-
cates variables (and t h e i r potential interrelationships) that are found 
to be important to take into account for the investigation of certain 
general problems; whilst siabstantive models r e s t r i c t the nimber of v a r i -
ables considered and more narrowly specify their interrelationships. 
Substantive models may be useful as ideal types, but cannot be assumed 
to be of imiversal a p p l i c a b i l i t y . A model considering ideological power, 
for instance, may be formal; a model tracing ideologies to a dominant 
cl a s s , however, i s substantive,''" This i s not to say that class cannot be 
seen in terms of a formal'model i n the sociology of knowledge: indeed to 
see class i n these terms w i l l be an aim of Part I I of t h i s thesis. 
( v i i ) Conclusion 
In our examination of the substructure i n the sociology of knowledge, 
we have established the necessity for the Inclusion of meaning and motive 
i n the substructure, without assuming their relationship to situation and 
action, and without subsuming the consciousness of the actor in the con-
sciousness of the group: i t i s here especially that we take issue with 
Goldmann's sociology of knowledge. Our comparison of Weber and Pareto i n 
Chapter 1, and our further examination of Pareto's theories in this 
chapter, have yielded a more complex conception of motivation i n relation 
to action and b e l i e f than the otheiitfise predominant notion of determina-
tion by interests would suggest. And through Mannheim we may develop 
various ideas which allow a l e s s deterministic relationship between s i t u a -
tion and consciousness (as i n the ideas of commitment, and of alternative 
1 Sayer points out that a Marxist point of view (in particular as 
set out i n 'The German Ideology") does not necessarily imply 
universal substantive models: Sayer would r e j e c t a l l attempts 
to generalise a p a r t i c u l a r base/superstructure model to a l l 
s o c i e t i e s . (1975: Chapter 1) 
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responses to s o c i a l location). More generally our emphasis on formal 
models i n the sociology of knowledge argues against a l l those who present 
a fixed substantive notion of the substructure. 
The substructure i n the sociology of knowledge may thus be conceived 
i n formal methodological i n d i v i d u a l i s t terms as action and situation and 
the consciousness d i r e c t l y involved therein i n th e i r s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l 
context, the involvement of consciousness being i n the form of expression 
i n or motivation towards action, or of the essential knowledge/basic 
consciousness necessary to perform the action or maintain/alter the situa-
tion, or of direct experience of or s p e c i f i c responses to the action/ 
situation. Such a description of the substructure reveals our interest 
i n the development of ideas i n r e l a t i o n to action/situation and di r e c t l y 
involved consciousness, rather than i n the adoption of ideas merely 
through communication/persuasion as through ideological power. Further-
more, although account i s taken of the so c i o - h i s t o r i c a l context, i t i s 
nonetheless contended that relations between situation, action and con-
sciousness are f r u i t f u l l y analysed i n methodological i n d i v i d u a l i s t 
terms. 
Having thus broadly delineated the substructure, l e t us proceed to 
the analysis of the superstructure. 
The methodological i n d i v i d u a l i s t approach i s outlined more f u l l y 
below. Chapter 7, p 148.ff 
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CHAPTER 3; SUPERSTRUCTURE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 
(i) Introduction 
Our discussion of the svibstructure i n the sociology of knowledge 
has necessarily involved some presuppositions as to the nature of the 
superstructure: i n th i s section we s h a l l bring these presuppositions 
mose c l e a r l y to l i g h t i n the direct analysis of various CQncef>tionSoOf 
the superstructure. 
Prom the s t a r t i t i s clear that some conceptions of the superstruc-
ture w i l l be untenable i n terms of the approach that we developed in 
Chapter 2 concerning the svibstructure. Dahlke for instance states that 
there are three main spheres whose interrelations may be researched: 
r e a l factors, the theoretical contemplative and the ideal-normative 
spheres (1940 : 86).. The sphere of rea l factors here seems devoid of 
meaningful elements, and Mannheim's critique of Scheler's meaningless 
substructure thus becomes applicable."^ Stark attemt>ts to overcome the 
re a l - i d e a l dichotomy by proposing that the svibstructure i s the ongoing 
process of s o c i a l interaction, which presupposes an a l r e a ^ existent mental 
universe; and the superstructure to be the forms of thought and action 
which gain subsequent independence of the ongoing process of s o c i a l l i f e 
through c r y s t a l l i s a t i o n (Stark, 1958: 244). Stark thus includes both 
thought and action i n the svOastructure and superstructure; and i t i s of 
par t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t to us here, that he includes action i n the superstructure, 
due to h i s i n a b i l i t y to conceive of abstract thought without an associated 
action-pattern: he sees ideas as emerging under guiding values, and valvies 
as never purely ideas but as c a l l s to a definite mode of action. (Stark, 
1958: 272) We should want to agree with Stark in his conception of a 
See Chapter 2, p 24 above. 
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meaningful substructure, but to r e j e c t h i s conception of the superstruc-
ture, which, i f adopted, would deny the existence of the sociology of 
knowledge and replace i t with a sociology of c r y s t a l l i s e d action/thought 
forms. The whole point of the sociology of knowledge as we see i t i s 
to r e l a t e action/situation and d i r e c t l y involved consciousness to more 
removed consciovisness, and both Dahlke/Scheler and Stark deny this in 
th e i r own way. Berger and Luckmann would deny i t i n principle i f not in 
practice, i . e . what they would c a l l the sociology of knowledge would be 
much broader than our conception, would involve the study of everyday 
meajiings i n s o c i a l l i f e (1967; 27), and would thus become p r a c t i c a l l y 
synonymous with the whole f i e l d of interpretive sociologyI I n practice 
however much of th e i r work involves the relations between meaningful 
s o c i a l interaction and more removed 'knowledge'. 
I f we accept that the substructure i s meaningful, then the basic prob-
lem i n the definition of the superstructure i s that of establishing on 
what basis the ideas therein are to be differentiated from those involved 
in the substructure. We have provisionally indicated that the different-
i a t i o n should be based upon the degree of removal from action (or at least 
from a certain type of action the influence of which one i s attempting 
to a s c e r t a i n ) . The knowledge i n the superstructure may be less d i r e c t l y 
related to action because i t i s 'subsequent' i n some way ( i . e . i t i s 
developed from action-involved consciousness); or because i t i s somehow 
'di s t i n c t ' ^ for instance through being more abstract. I t might even be 
independent to some extent, though i f i t i s posited as entirely inde-
pendent i t cannot of coiarse be influenced by the substructure. 
I f superstruetural knowledge i s les s d i r e c t l y related to action, 
i t i s nevertheless clear that few sociologists of knowledge include a l l 
such 'knowledge' i n the superstructure - or at le a s t various elements are 
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emphasised more than others. At various points i n t h i s chapter we s h a l l 
witness the way i n which emphasis on selected elements of 'knowledge' 
produces a narrowed conception of the superstructure. For example, we 
have already seen how Goldmann narrows h i s investigation to thought 
defined i n terms of world view. Which i t s e l f i s related by definition 
to class,''" I f t h i s were to.be the only available conception of 'world 
view',, then the concept would be of l i t t l e use in the sociology of know-
ledge, and would unduly narrow the potential supers true t u r a l knowledge to 
be examined. For a l e s s r e s t r i c t e d usage of the world view concept, we 
must turn once more to Mannheim's work. 
( i i ) Mannheim's Conceipt of 'Weltanschauung'. 
In an early work, Mannheim defines the task of the sociology of 
knowledge as being that of outlining the various i n t e l l e c t u a l standpoints 
which characterise an epoch, and of tracing their origin and development 
in r e l a t i o n to the changing s o c i a l structure, (1952: ISOff) The f i r s t 
stage i n this process i s the formulation of the standpoints or 'Weltan-
schauungen' (world views) of the epoch i n question, and inevitably involves 
the interpretation of i t s 'cultural products'. Here Mannheim differen-
t i a t e s between the objective, expressive and documentary meanings of a 
c u l t u r a l product. (1952: 44) The 'objective' i s that meaning which can be 
discovered without going beyond the object i t s e l f to the intentions of i t s 
creator: no knowledge of the psyche of the creator i s necessary to grasp 
t h i s meaning. A l l that i s necessary i s acquaintance with the system (e.g. 
the theory of music - harmony, counterpoint, etc.) i n terms of which the 
objective meaning of t h i s object may be understood. (1952: 45-46) 
''Expressive' meaning, on the other hand, requires a detailed knowledge of 
the creator of the products, so that one i s able to in f e r correctly what 
meanings he intended by i t . (1952; 46) 
•'" See above. Chapter 2, p 51 f f 
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I t i s however 'documentary' meaning which i s the most important of 
the three types of meaning for Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, since 
i t i s from the documentary meanings of cultural objectifications that he 
creates the Weltanschauung of an epoch. Here the cultural o b j e c t i f i c a -
tion (or an aspect of i t ) points to something beyond i t s e l f , to a global 
outlook that i s t o t a l l y contained i n none of i t s s p e c i f i c manifesta-
tions, though each c u l t u r a l product gives 'evidence' of t h i s outlook 
(1952: 57 & 73-74) Mannheim notes that these generalisations from cul-
t u r a l o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n s have at various times been called the 'art motive' 
(Riegl), 'economic ethos' (Sombart), 'Weltanschauung' (Dilthey and others), 
' s p i r i t ' (Max Weber and others) , according to the purposes which they have 
served. (1952: 58) 
Having introduced the concept of documentary meaning, Mannheim goes 
on to show that i f we concentrate on the abstract theoretical aspects of 
a Weltanschauung we s h a l l be ignoring many important contents (of cul-
t u r a l products) that are not capable of being adequately designated by 
concepts derived from a 'theoretical f i e l d ' , such as philosophy. (1952: 
75) He attempts to show how concepts derived from 'a-theoretical f i e l d s ' 
(such as the p l a s t i c arts) can elucidate far better the pre-theoretical 
meaning, which i s grasped i n the 'immediate givenness' of cultural 
products, and which i s the v i t a l component of the Weltanschauung. (1952: 
64 & 77) Although we must describe the Weltanschauung i n theoretical 
terms, nevertheless we may make use of pre-theoretical documentary 
meaning. (1952: 71) Concepts may be transposed from one f i e l d to another, 
a necessary step i f we intend to give some idea of a common background 
behind a l l o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n s : and We may even have to resort to 'siobli-
mating' a concept, that i s to use a term which origin a l l y refers only 
to objective meaning, to designate the doctunentary meaning associated 
with the objective one, (1952; 79) 
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This then i s the method of conceptual construction that Mannheim 
suggests we use i n the formulation of Weltanschauungen. Yet i t i s s t i l l 
not clear precisely what he regards the Weltanschauung to be. Id i t 
meant to be an ideal-type construct, and hence merely a methodological 
instrument, or does i t possess some kind of ontological r e a l i t y ? An 
answer to this question may be found i n a footnote (1952: 59) , where 
Mannheim implies that whereas one can have an ontological and immediate 
experience of the s\3bject of expressive interpretation, this i s not 
possible for the svibject of documentajry interpretation, the Weltanschau-
ling? he points out that Hegel and Lukacs postulate i t as a metaphysical 
subject rather than as a methodological device, implying that he himself 
takes the opposite point of view. I n practice, however, Mannheim's 
standpoint i s more ambiguous. For instance i n one place (1952: 62) he 
suggests that every c u l t u r a l o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of an epoch should be 
examined and i t s documentary meaning established, and i n this manner 
the Weltanschauung of the epoch i s to be constructed, t h i s Weltanschauung, 
however, being a coherent and consistent t o t a l i t y . Yet i t i s very un-
l i k e l y that the subject of documentary interpretation of a l l the cultural 
products of an epoch (or even a stratum in that epoch) would be coherent 
and consistent unless i n ideal''typical form; and i f i t i s supposed to be 
an ideal-type, then i s not Mannheim assuming the congruence of ideal-
type and r e a l i t y i f he finds the manifestations of only this Weltanschauung 
i n the documentary interpretation of the diverse cultural o b j e c t i f i c a -
tions? Mannheim could resolve t h i s dilemma only i f he was to equate 
documentary interpretation with distinguishing i n each cultural produce-, 
the manifestations of an i d e a l - t y p i c a l , consistent, coherent global 
outlook, rather than constructing t h i s ideal-type from the documentary 
meanings he distinguishes i n the various c u l t u r a l objectifications. 
I n effect, we are able to c l a r i f y Mannheim's procedure through a 
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jioxtaposition of his sometimes confused and contradictory accounts of 
i t . A c u l t u r a l product, or aspect of i t , i s taken and interpreted for 
i t s potential documentary meaning, which i s then v e r i f i e d , modified, 
or discounted by an analysis of whether the c u l t u r a l objectifications 
of the epoch (or group) may be seen as supplying the same documentary 
meaning. We thus derive the i n i t i a l , hypothetical, ideal-typical 
Weltanschauung from one or two c u l t u r a l objectifications, and t h i s then 
guides our quest for documentary meaning in the other c u l t u r a l products 
of the epoch. This procedure may c l e a r l y r e s u l t i n conflicting inter-
pretations, but not every documentary interpretation has the same claim 
to be accepted: f i r s t l y , c u l t u r a l products -
'... always unmistakably impose or exclude certain 
interpretations, so that we do have a certain control'. 
(1952; 62); 
and secondly, the most adequate interpretation of an epoch i s the one 
which -
'.., shows the greatest richness, the greatest 
substantial a f f i n i t y with the object.' 
(1952: 62) 
The Mannheimian process of Weltanschauung construction c l e a r l y 
r esults i n a coherent and consistent ideal-type, which reveals his 
f a i l u r e to distinguish between the i m p l i c i t assumptions behind the 
acts, expressions and thoughts of an individual or group, and the 
logicail integration of these assumptions into a coherent, consistent 
system of thought. In so far as the Weltanschauung concept i s employed 
in the f i r s t of these two senses,then we w i l l not necessarily find 
consistency and coherence, and indeed we may formulate an ideal-type 
without the f u l l r e a l i s a t i o n of these qualities,''" a p o s s i b i l i t y which 
Mannheim does not recognise. Insofar as we employ the term i n the 
"'" See for instance the discussion of a 'rag-bag' world view i n 
Chapter 6, p 144 below. 
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the second sense, i t s u t i l i t y as a concept aiding the analysis of 
the way an individual or group actually thinks i s in doubt. The 
extent to which the thought of an individual, group or epoch i s 
systematised cannot be presupposed. Certainly the characterisation 
of the thought of an individual or group, whether or not i n teims of 
Weltanschauung, implies some degree of consistency i n the sense of 
regularity (rather than complete randomness or chaps), and indeed some 
degree of l o g i c a l consistency can be expected according to the drives 
towards personal and interpersonal consistency variously hypothesised by 
Parsons (1951: 16-17) and Berger and Luckmann (1967: 81f f ) . Neverthe-
l e s s such drives must not be assimied to operate unimpeded and to be f u l l y 
r e a l i s e d : regularity there may be, but that does not presuppose or imply 
f u l l l o g i c a l consistency and coherence. 
The u t i l i t y of Mannheim's idea l type of consistent Weltanschauung 
would be les s problematic i f he were not so keen to apply i t to a whole 
epoch. (1952: 62) In h i s l a t e r writings, however, he i s able to avoid 
the trap of assuming that a l l the documentary meanings of a society or 
epoch w i l l be adequately comprehended i n one such Weltanschauung. He 
i s careful to point out that, even where one Weltanschauung dominates 
an epoch, others remain as under-currents. (1952: 181)''" This fact 
may be of v i t a l importance i n the development of a particular Weltan-
schauung, and Mannheim shows th i s to be the case i n his analysis of 
conservative thought i n 'Ideology and Utopia': t h i s thought developed 
systematically only as a response to Weltanschauungen which challenged 
2 
the i m p l i c i t assumptions of the ruling class of the time. 
"*" This reference i s to 'The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge', 
published o r i g i n a l l y i n 1925, two years after 'On the Inter-
pretation of Weltanschauung", which we have used as the 
p r i n c i p a l reference for t h i s section. 
2 See below, p 78 • 
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From t h i s analysis of Mannheim's conception of Weltanschauung, we 
emerge with a concept of world view as an ideal-type, perhaps conceived 
as too consistent and coherent, but not necessarily r e s t r i c t e d to 
abstract thought, nor necessarily covering the whole of society. World view 
elements may be action-involved,"^ though of course to be considered as 
part of the superstructure they would have to be i n some way subsequent 
to or d i s t i n c t from the substructural action i n any particular investiga-
tion. Mannheim's conception of world view i s c l e a r l y not so r e s t r i c t i v e 
as Goldmann's; but perhaps for t h i s very reason i t pays the penalty of 
being a rather loose construction of i l l - d e f i n e d elements. We s h a l l 
examine the concept of world view i n greater depth i n Chapter 6, but at 
t h i s point we must explore the work of other sociologists of knowledge 
for more s p e c i f i c suggestions as to the nature of the superstructure. 
( i l l ) . Berger and Luckmann's Conception of the Superstructure 
On comparing Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann one i s immediately 
struck by the common emphasis on consistency i n the superstructure -
though with Berger and Luckmann there i s perhaps an even greater tendency 
to see consistency as applying to the thought of the whole society, and 
indeed to i t s actual thought rather than to an ideal-type thereof. Con-
sistency i s moreover an aspect of the siibstructure for Berger and Luckmann, 
as we saw in Chapter 2; on the individual le v e l a comprehensive and con-'-, 
s i s t e n t view of the world i s attained through the internalisation of the 
generalised other; whilst on the s o c i a l level there i s a s t r a i n to 
consistency through mutual biographical reflection, tending towards a 
f u l l y integrated common-sense r e a l i t y of everyday l i f e . We also noted 
however that despite the 'natural' strai n s to consistency, integration of 
meaning within a segmented society remains a 'problem': 
This i s implied i n the very concept of documentary meaning, where 
action i s included amongst the docimients for world view inter-
pretation. 
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'The segmentation of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l order and the 
concomitant distribution of knowledge w i l l lead to 
the problem of providing integrative meanings that 
w i l l encompass the society and provide an overall 
context of objective sense for the individual's 
fragmented s o c i a l experience and knowledge. Fur-
thermore, there w i l l be not only the problem of 
overall meaningful integration, but also a problem 
of legitimating the i n s t i t u t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s of one 
type of actor v i s - a - v i s other types. ... multipli'-
cation of perspectives greatly increases the problem 
of establishing a stable symbolic canopy for the 
entire society.' (1967: 102-3) 
I t i s t h i s problem of integration T which Berger and Lucfcmann claim 
a r i s e s on the two l e v e l s of necessai^ legitimation (of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
order and of the individual biography) , and from the exigencies of 
s o c i a l i s a t i o n (the need to j u s t i f y the i n s t i t u t i o n a l order to a new 
generation) - which directs Berger and Luckmann's in t e r e s t i n knowledge 
less d i r e c t l y action-involved: the superstructure for them thus consists 
p r i n c i p a l l y of legitimations; and i t s emerging only i n response to the 
problem of integration i s consistent with their pragmatic view of con-
sciousness."'" They claim moreover that to be convincing the legitimations 
must be consistent and comprehensive (1967: 79): they must uphold the 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l order, which i n turn i s a shield against the terror of 
chaos. (1967: 119)^ 
According to Berger and Luckmann there are various levels of l e g i t -
imation, ranging from those d i r e c t l y involved with everyday action to 
those of a more abstract theoretical nature, culminating in 'symbolic 
universes' , which refer to r e a l i t i e s other than those of everday exper-
ience and provide: 
1 See below. Chapter 4, p 90 
This sounds somewhat l i k e conservative special pleading: that the 
terror of chaos w i l l ensue without a firm i n s t i t u t i o n a l order 
upheld by convincing legitimators. I t i s reminiscent of the 
choice presented by the German cinema after the F i r s t World War, 
between chaos/anarchy and tyranny. See Kracauer, 1947: 72-74 
& passim. 
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' ... a comprehensive integration of a l l discrete i n s t i t -
utional processes. The entire society now makes sense.' 
(1967: 121) 
Such legitimations may themselves be subject to second-order legitimations 
i f they become problematic. (1967; 123) The more abstract legitimations 
are normally the responsibility of s p e c i a l i s t legitimators, whose typical 
motivating purpose i s integration (1967: l l O ) , and who tend to have 
l o g i c a l aspirations (1967: 89) though Berger and Luckmann's emphasis 
on consistency might appear to grant such aspirations to everyone. 
The question that most c l e a r l y emerges from an analysis of Berger 
and Luckmann's model i s to what extent integration i s necessary, and 
indeed necessary for what or for whom. Berger and Luckmann are probably 
right to point to a tendency towards integration, based on mutual 
re f l e c t i o n , but how f a r t h i s r e f l e c t i o n goes and how far lack of inte^-
gration can be tolerated are important variables, which do not seem to 
be questioned i n Berger and Luckmann's extreme Integrationist model. 
I n t h e i r emphasis upon legitimations, Berger and Luckmann have 
certain l y indicated an important area of the superstructure. Their 
contribution would be of greater value, however, i f they did not assvune 
the role of legitimations be that of coherent and consistent integrators 
of the t o t a l society. A broader conception of the superstructure with 
fewer presuppositions might have been offered i f legitimations had been 
seen i n the context of a Mannheimian-type Weltanschauung concept; but 
Berger and Luckmann's concept of Weltanschauung i s much narrower, 
referring to the theoretical interpretations of the world rationally 
constructed by a few. (1967; 26-27) 
The a f f i n i t y of some of Berger and Luckmann's ideas with the 
theories of Talcott Parsons has already been noted, and we turn now 
to a review of Parsons' sociology of knowledge. 
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(iv) Parsons' Conception of the Superstructure 
Although Parsons notes the important role that empirical knowledge 
plays i n r a t i o n a l action (1938: 24), and shows an interest i n the 
sociology of science (1970: 289ff), his principle concern i n the 
sociology of culture i s with non-empirical ideas. He sees such ideas -
'... i n relation to the t e l e o l o g i c a l problem of orien-
tation of the actor, the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of selection of 
ends to pursue.' (1938: 29) 
The aspect of selection i s seen where ideas delimit the actor's potential 
ends/values; where they may further be responsible for the creation of 
ends/values; and where they may define the means to the achievement of 
the ends/valus. (1938: 29'-30) The aspect of j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s seen where 
ideas act as legitimations for the actor's ends/values. (1938: 25) I t i s 
notable that Parsons' legitimations are not seen i n relation to an 
action one wishes to perform or has performed, but rather j u s t i f y the 
ends/values that lead to the action. The picture i s of an actor in 
r a t i o n a l pursuit of ends/values and using ideas to j u s t i f y h is ends -
which would contrast with Pareto's l e s s rational actor, l e s s conscious 
of h i s motives, attempting to put a logical gloss on h i s a c t i v i t y . C. 
Madge would appear to be more sympathetic to the Paretian vieWy When he 
points out that ideologies are used more frequently to legitimate 
s o c i a l structures than to legitimate values. (1964: 104) Parsons' main 
in t e r e s t however i s not i n the legitimation of values, but i n t h e i r 
selection. Values are the central component of his concept of culture, 
and Parsons emphasises the role of culture i n the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
of values i n society. (1970 : 284ff; & 19i51: 990) The s o c i a l system 
consists of roles and norms patterned through culture, and the picture of 
harmony (which was encountered i n Berger and Luckmann) i s ensured through 
Parsons' conception of culture being shared, i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d , internalised. 
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and predominantly normative.Furthermore there are stated to be 
'strains to consistency' i n each of the personality, s o c i a l and cu l -
tuxal systems, (1951: 16-17) and, though i t i s agreed that c o n f l i c t 
might a r i s e between the separate s t r a i n s , there i s l i t t l e provision in 
Parsons' model for anything but f u l l integration. 
Despite the obvious f a u l t s i n Parsons' system, h i s model may be of 
use i n supplying an extreme ideal-type of s o c i a l integration^ and in 
i t s analysis of some of the ways i n which ideas may influence action. 
Parsons also provides an interesting differentiation of superstructural 
elements, which we s h a l l review i n Section ( v i i i ) of th i s chapter. But 
in his general characterisation of the superstructure, Parsons contributes 
l i t t l e to the sociology of knowledge as we see i t , as the conditioning of 
ideas through s o c i a l action i s not apparent i n h i s work: ideas appear to 
be autonomous elements patterning a substructure of which they remain 
independent. This perspective i s apparent even i n his more recent work 
on evolution, i n which culture assumes a predominant and r e l a t i v e l y 
autonomous controlling role. (1966: especially 113-^4) . 
(v) Culture and Society; The Theme of U t i l i t y 
I n Parsons' work the (autonomous, normative and institutionalised) 
nature of culture i s c l e a r l y related to i t s role i n society. This point 
applies equally to the very different system of Max Scheler. Scheler's 
i s very much a sociology of knowledge, and his sharp distinction between 
the ideal and the r e a l may have arisen partly from an attempt to protect 
knowledge from the dangers of relativism. The r e l a t i v e l y autonomous 
knowledge and culture of Scheler and Parsons contrast with the elements 
of the superstructure emphasised by most sociologists of knowledge: these 
elements tend to be those upon which substructural elements have the grea-
t e s t influence, as i s perhaps to be expected where t h i s influence i s 
precisely the object of int e r e s t . 
See especially Parsons, 1951: Chapter 8. 
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The predominant theme i n the characterisation of the superstruc-
ture by sociologists of knowledge i s that of u t i l i t y : i . e . , what i s 
stressed i s that which i s i n some way useful i n relation to the substruc- : 
ture. This perspective i s p a r t i c u l a r l y apparent i n the pragmatic con- | 
ception of knowledge. Here we may introduce a distinction between material 
pragmatism and i d e a l pragmatism. This relates to the idea that groups 
are 'committed' to certain i n t e l l e c t u a l standpoints: as Mannheim points 
out, 
"... i t i s not only i n t e r e s t s that combat interests, but 
world postulates compete with world postulates."-
(1952: 185) 
We have already seen, i n relation to Mannheim's work,"'" how some knowledge 
i s developed as a response to the need to perform certain actions to solve : 
problems deriving from the subjective interests of a group i n a given s i t -
uation: a certain amount of knowledge i s essential i n order to carry out ; 
such a c t i v i t i e s . This type of knowledge we may c a l l materially pragmatic. 
Ide a l l y pragmatic knowledge, on the other hand, develops when the goals 
and values of a group are challenged, thus requiring legitimations of a | 
higher degree. This d i s t i n c t i o n may be i l l u s t r a t e d by an example from 
Mannheim's own work. Conservative thought, Mannheim points out i s 
o r i g i n a l l y the sort of knowledge giving p r a c t i c a l control: i t i s mater-
i a l l y pragmatic knowledge. However, 
' .. . the counter-attack of opposing classes and their 
tendency to break through the l i m i t s of the existing 
order causes the conservative mentality to question the 
basis of i t s own dominance, and necessarily brings about 
among the conservatives historical-philosophical r e f l e c -
tions concerning themselves. Thus there arises a 
counter-Utopia which serves as a means of self-orienta-
tion and defence.' (1936: 207) 
Thus opposing ideas r a i s e the problem for conservatives of legitimising 
the status quo,, something which otherwise they would not have needed to do: 
"'" See above, Chapter 2, p 32 
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' ... hman beings do not theorize about the actual s i t u a -
tions in which they l i v e as long as they are well adjusted 
to them. They tend, under such conditions of existence, 
to regard the environment as part of a natural world-order 
which, consequently, presents no problems.' 
(1936: 206) 
The legitimations which the conservatives: are forced to develop are thus 
i d e a l l y pragmatic. 
A situation i n which we might see a development of materially and 
ide a l l y pragmatic knowledge would be the case i n which a certain 'system 
of actions' i s no longer feasible, and thus the goals which were realised 
i n t h i s system must now be otherwise attained. This w i l l mean the devel-
opment of another system and the essential knowledge (materially prag-
matic) associated with i t and, since the old legitimations may now no 
longer apply, i t may be necessary to formulate new legitimations for 
th i s system (ideally pragmatic). 
Thus, in the pragmatic conception of consciousness, 'knowledge' i s 
seen as developing as a response to either material or ideal problems. 
Materially pragmatic knowledge appears to form^ part of the substructure, 
due to i t s dir e c t relationship with action. Ideally pragmatic knowledge, 
w i l l consist largely of legitimations, which we have found to be stressed 
by both Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann, and which indeed have been the 
most widely emphasised element of the superstructure: p r a c t i c a l l y every 
sociologist of knowledge has been concerned with legitimations i n one 
form or another, though what i s considered to be legitimated varies 
considerably. Pareto's derivations, for instance, might j u s t i f y the 
actions of an individual, group or a whole s o c i a l system; whilst 
Marxists s t r e s s the role of ideologies i n rationalising the interests 
of classes; and Berger and Luckmann and Parsons give emphasis to l e g i t -
imations which integrate the whole society. The substantive models thus 
tend to have too narrow a view of the s o c i a l role of legitimations; as 
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so often, we find that ideal-types which offer suggestions concerning 
s o c i a l processes are presented as general models of universal applic-
a b i l i t y . 
Pareto, i n addition to going beyond other theorists i n his less 
r e s t r i c t e d conception of the potential role of legitimations, carries 
the principle of u t i l i t y further i n his analysis of theories under the 
'aspect of u t i l i t y ' . (1966: 170) One of the conclusions of such an 
analysis i s that ideas may be adopted for their u t i l i t y i n engendering 
or strengthening ( i . e . i n promoting) certain sentiments and attitudes: 
such u t i l i t a r i a n adoptions we s h a l l c a l l "promotions". Promotions may be 
related to ideological power and manipulation when the sentiments and 
attitudes affected belong to those one wishes to influence; but where 
one"s i n t e r e s t i s i n the development of ideas i n relation to actio n / s i t -
uation and d i r e c t l y involved consciousness, one, i s l i k e l y to be more 
concerned with the case where the sentiments/attitudes influenced are 
those of the adopting person himself. Here promotions may provide or 
strengthen motivation towards, or combat motivation against, an action 
one wishes to or has to perform; rather in the same way as 'vocabularies 
of motive' may be necessary to provide legitimate accounts of motivation 
before the action. (Mills, 1972: 396) 
At f i r s t sight i t would appear that promotions and vocabularies of 
motive cannot be part of superstruetural consciousness, since the l a t t e r 
seems to carry the implication of being i n some way 'subsequent' to the 
action i n the substructure ( i . e . , developed from action-involved con-
sciousness); or of being somehow 'distinct', for instance through being 
more abstract. Neither promotions nor vocabularies of motive are nec-
e s s a r i l y siobsequent to the action concerned,"'" and i t i s arguable whether 
•'" Nonetheless, i f these concepts are to f a l l within our sphere of 
int e r e s t , they must at l e a s t be subsequent i n the sense of being 
influenced by the action process (including the necessity or desire 
to act) , even though they need not necessarily be subsequent to the 
completed action. I f we were concerned with superstructural/ 
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they are d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d w i t h a c t i o n or are i n some way d i s t i n c t from 
i t . The q u e s t i o n whether they have a p l a c e i n the s u p e r s t r u c t u r e would 
puppearto depend on a d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i o n : i . e . , the degree to which they 
f u n c t i o n more widely i n the a c t o r ' s consciousness than merely i n r e l a t i o n 
t o the a c t i o n concerned. 
( v i ) 'Width' as a C r i t e r i o n of S u p e r s t r u c t u r a l Consciousness 
Our c r i t e r i o n f o r the i n c l u s i o n o f an element i n the s u p e r s t r u c t u r e 
i s thus t h a t i t i n v o l v e s a wider a r e a of the a c t o r ' s consciousness than 
t h a t d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to the s u b s t r u c t u r a l a c t i o n / s i t u a t i o n . T h i s means 
t h a t v o c a b u l a r i e s of motive, promotions and even m a t e r i a l l y pragmatic 
knowledge, though p o t e n t i a l l y p a r t of the substructure through d i r e c t 
action-involvement, may a l s o be considered p a r t of the s u p e r s t r u c t u r e i f 
of wider s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the a c t o r ' s consciousness. 
To summarise our co n c l u s i o n s so f a r on the elements of the super-
s t r u c t u r e , we should say t h a t they i n c l u d e , where of wider s i g n i f i c a n c e 
than merely i n r e l a t i o n to the s u b s t r u c t u r a l a c t i o n : a) pragmatic 
knowledge, b) l e g i t i m a t i o n s (whether pre- or p o s t - a c t i o n and i n c l u d i n g 
v o c a b u l a r i e s of motive), and c) promotions. These th r e e elements 
r e f l e c t the theme of u t i l i t y i n c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n s of the s u p e r s t r u c t u r e : 
they a r e u t i l i t a r i a n developments of wider consciousness through m a t e r i a l 
pragmatism (pragmatic knowledge, p r e - a c t i o n l e g i t i m a t i o n s and promotions 
nec e s s a r y to c a r r y out the a c t i o n ) and i d e a l pragmatism ( l e g i t i m a t i o n s 
a f t e r the e v e n t ) . A f o u r t h element must however be included, u n r e l a t e d 
to u t i l i t y : d) extensions of the consciousness involved i n the sub-
s t r u c t u r e . Such extensions may be so widened from the o r i g i n a l conscious-
ness as t o form broad p e r s p e c t i v e s on r e a l i t y as i n Mannheim's concept of 
s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l / 
consciousness uninfluenced by the a c t i o n p r o c e s s , we should be 
broadening our p r e s e n t i n t e r e s t to i n c l u d e the independent 
i n f l u e n c e of i d e a s upon a c t i o n . 
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Weltanschauung. Whether or not they develop i n t o world views, such 
e x t e n s i o n s form a n e c e s s a r y element of the s u p e r s t r u c t u r e i f : a) 
the s u p e r s t r u c t u r e i s d e f i n e d i n t e r n s of the wider development of 
consciousness from t h a t i n v o l v e d i n the s \ i b s t r u c t u r a l a c t i o n / s i t u a t i o n ; 
and b) such a development i s not assiomed to be n e c e s s a r i l y u t i l i t a r i a n . 
A spects o f the consciousness of the other three ( u t i l i t a r i a n ) elements of 
the s u p e r s t r u c t u r e may o f course a l s o be extended. 
Having d e l i n e a t e d the g e n e r a l elements of the s u p e r s t r u c t u r e , we 
s h a l l i n the next two s u b s e c t i o n s look a t f u r t h e r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s of 
the s u p e r s t r u c t u r e suggested by the t h e o r i s t s most concerned with the 
'knowledge' p a r t of the s o c i o l o g y of knowledge: S c h e l e r and Parsons. 
( v i i ) F u r t h e r D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s o f the Superstructure: S c h e l e r 
Perhaps S c h e l e r ' s p r i n c i p a l v a l u e as a s o c i o l o g i s t of knowledge l i e s 
i n h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between the conditioned and autonomous aspects of 
knowledge. S c h e l e r ' s s o c i o l o g y of knowledge aims to d i s c o v e r which aspects 
of knowledge remain independent of s o c i a l conditioning, which aspects we 
should concentrate on i n our s e a r c h f o r s o c i a l i n f l u e n c e , and what r e l a -
t i o n s e x i s t between the conditioned and autonomous aspects of knowledge. 
(1970a: 163) 
S c h e l e r c o n s i d e r s t h a t what i s s o c i a l l y conditioned, or more pre-
c i s e l y co-determined by the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e and the preceding i n t e l l - . 
e c t u a l h i s t o r y (Staude, 1967; 165), i s the p e r s p e c t i v e on r e a l i t y , i n 
terms of both form of cognition"*" ( i . e . the way i n which the knowledge i s 
sought and organised) and content ( i . e . the o b j e c t s of knowledge: what 
the knowing i s d i r e c t e d towards). ( S c h e l e r , 1970b: 175) The a c t u a l content 
of knowledge however, and the essence of the more g e n e r a l forms of 
C f . Goldmann's concept of ' s i g n i f i c a n t c a t e g o r i a l s t r u c t u r e s ' -
1967: 495. 
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knowledge (1970a: 164), remain unconditioned. These l a t t e r , perhaps 
b e t t e r c a l l e d b a s i c modes of knowledge to avoid confusion w i t h forms of 
c o g n i t i o n , are o f a d e f i n i t e c h a r a c t e r independent of e x t r i n s i c f a c t o r s , 
though t h e i r a c t u a l i s a t i o n may be s o c i a l l y determined. S c h e l e r l i s t s 
seven modes o f knowledge of i n c r e a s i n g ' a r t i f i c i a l i t y ' , from myth to 
technology (1970: 178-9), and emphasises i n p a r t i c u l a r the three modes 
of 'higher' knowing: r e l i g i o n , metaphysics and s c i e n c e . (1970b: 180ff) 
As an I n d i c a t i o n o f the autonomy of the l a t t e r he shows t h a t the form of 
t h e i r s o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n depends i n p a r t upon t h e i r i n t r i n s i c nature: 
t h i s i s one of the most i m p r e s s i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of h i s sociology. (1970a: 
165-9) I n s i m i l a r f a s h i o n C a s s i r e r c l a i m s i n t r i n s i c d i s t i n c t i o n s between 
the v a r i o u s c u l t u r a l powers of man: language, a r t , r e l i g i o n , s c i e n c e . 
'These cannot be reduced to a common denominator. 
They tend i n d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s and obey 
d i f f e r e n t p r i n c i p l e s . ' 
( C a s s i r e r , 1970: 252) 
As s t a t e d above, S c h e l e r a l s o c l a i m s autonomy f o r the 'content' of 
knowledge, by which he means the a c t u a l knowledge r e v e a l e d through one's 
p e r s p e c t i v e , and the v a l i d i t y of t h i s knowledge (1970b: 175) W h i l s t to 
d i s p u t e t h i s c l a i m would mean f a l l i n g , i n t o the t r a p of r e l a t i v i s m , the 
major l i m i t a t i o n of S c h e l e r ' s sociology of knowledge i s here d i s c l o s e d , 
i . e . t h a t i t i s a sociology of knowledge i n a r e l a t i v e l y narrow sense. 
The f o l l o w i n g quotation i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s s t i l l f u r t h e r : 
'After a l l , the s o c i o l o g y of knowledge has f o r i t s 
s u b j e c t not only the s o c i o l o g y of knowledge of t r u t h 
b u t a l s o the s o c i o l o g y o f s o c i a l d e l u s i o n , of super-
s t i t i o n , o f the s o c i o l o g i c a l l y conditioned e r r o r s and 
forms of deception.' (1970b: 178) 
T h i s quotation shows S c h e l e r ' s l i t e r a l reading of the sociology of knowledge, 
s i n c e he does not mention i d e a l elements to which the c a t e g o r i e s of t r u t h 
and e r r o r are i n a p p l i c a b l e , e.g. concepts of value or a p p r e c i a t i o n . T h i s 
may be p a r t l y due to S c h e l e r ' s metaphysics which, l i k e R i c k e r t ' s , i n c l u d e s 
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an absolute order of u n v e r s a l l y v a l i d h i e r a r c h i c a l values (Dahlke, 1940: 
74), to which concepts of v e r i t y are thus a p p l i c a b l e . I f we r e j e c t t h i s 
metaphysics (which would f o r i n s t a n c e apply standards of t r u t h and 
falsehood to a d i s c i p l i n e l i k e e t h i c s ) we may f i n d concepts of o b j e c t i v e 
v a l i d i t y to be i r r e l e v a n t to, f o r i n s t a n c e , normative i d e a s ; and the 
content of some s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l consciousness to be f a r l e s s autonomous 
than S c h e l e r suggests, u n l e s s we l i m i t o u r s e l v e s as he does to the 
a n a l y s i s o f t r u t h content. 
I n svmmary, d e s p i t e i t s l i m i t a t i o n s S c h e l e r ' s work provides some 
u s e f u l and i n t e r e s t i n g d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s of consciousness: the d i s t i n c -
t i o n between the form and o b j e c t s of cognition; the i n t r i n s i c a n a l y s i s of 
b a s i c modes of 'knowing'; the a n t i - r e l a t i v i s t i c emphasis on the independent 
t r u t h - c o n t e n t of knowledge. 
( v i i i ) F u r t h e r D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s .of the S u p e r s t r u c t u r e : Parsons 
Parsons c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of i d e a s i s r e l a t e d to h i s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of 
a c t i o n - i n v o l v e d consciousness, as o u t l i n e d most f u l l y i n Chapter 1 of 
'The S o c i a l System'. Here he d i s t i n g u i s h e s between two types of o r i e n -
t a t i o n of the a c t o r ; m o t i v a t i o n a l - and v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n , and, w i t h i n 
t h e s e two types, t h r e e b a s i c 'modes' of o r i e n t a t i o n . The three modes 
of m o t i v a t i o n a l - o r i e n t a t i o n a r e the c o g n i t i v e , c a t h e c t i c and e v a l u a t i v e 
(1951: 7 ) , the f i r s t concerning the d e f i n i t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n according 
to the a c t o r ' s i n t e r e s t s ; the second having r e l e v a n c e f o r the ' g r a t i f i -
c a t i o n - d e p r i v a t i o n balance of h i s p e r s o n a l i t y ' ; and the t h i r d being a 
p r o c e s s of s e l e c t i o n amongst the a l t e r n a t i v e p o s s i b l e a c t u a l o r i e n t a t i o n s 
according to c r i t e r i a or 'values'. T h i s t h i r d mode of m o t i v a t i o n a l -
o r i e n t a t i o n i s a l s o i t s e l f the other major type of o r i e n t a t i o n , and i s 
again subdivided i n t o t h r e e modes (1951: 13): c o g n i t i v e (concerning the 
v a l i d i t y o f c o g n i t i v e judgements), a p p r e c i a t i v e (where normative c r i t e r i a 
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are a p p l i e d to c a t h e c t i c a t t i t u d e s and o b j e c t s ) , and moral (concerning 
the a p p l i c a t i o n o f standards, f o r the i n t e g r a t i o n o f c o g n i t i v e and cath-
e c t i c i n t e r e s t s ) . 
I f we look c l o s e l y a t Parsons' d i s t i n c t i o n s , the term 'motivational-
o r i e n t a t i o n ' would seem i n a p p r o p r i a t e : s i n c e one intends a c t i o n towards 
o b j e c t s , a l l a c t i o n - o r i e n t a t i o n to object-ego r e l a t i o n s must by d e f i n -
i t i o n i n some sense by 'motivational' (and i f t h i s were not the case, 
and ' m o t i v a t i o n a l ' were to be more narrowly defined, i t would not then 
anyway be s u i t a b l e f o r the g e n e r a l d e s i g n a t i o n of the b a s i c modes of 
o r i e n t a t i o n to o b j e c t s ) , We should r e p l a c e t h i s term by 'modes of 
a c t i o n - o r i e n t a t i o n to o b j e c t s ' ( o b j e c t s i n r e l a t i o n or intended r e l a t i o n 
t o the a c t o r ) . 
I t i s a l s o c l e a r t h a t e v a l u a t i v e c r i t e r i a can be a p p l i e d to a l l the 
types o f judgement made i n the b a s i c modes of a c t i o n - o r i e n t a t i o n to 
o b j e c t s , and t h a t the use of such c r i t e r i a t h e r e f o r e does not i t s e l f 
c o n s t i t u t e a b a s i c mode of a c t i o n - o r i e n t a t i o n . There does however appear 
to be a t h i r d p o s s i b l e b a s i c mode of a c t i o n - o r i e n t a t i o n beyond the cog-
n i t i v e and c a t h e c t i c , namely the moral,''' And j u s t as c o g n i t i v e and cath-
e c t i c standards may be a p p l i e d t o the c o g n i t i v e and c a t h e c t i c o r i e n t a t i o n -
judgements, so may moral standards be ap p l i e d to moral o r i e n t a t i o n -
judgements (standards of good and bad may be ap p l i e d i n the judgements 
as to whether the supposed a c t i o n - r e l a t i o n o f the o b j e c t to ego i s good 
or bad) . 
The p r o c e s s of e v a l u a t i o n according to value c r i t e r i a i s c l e a r l y 
a r a t i o n a l one, and as such cannot be seen as the only or even as a 
neces s a r y determinant of the a c t o r ' s orientation-judgements. Parsons 
would do w e l l here to look a t Pareto's account of n o n - l o g i c a l a c t i o n . 
•'' Note t h a t , i n c o n t r a s t to Parsons' usage, t h i s concept has no 
necessary emphasis on i n t e g r a t i o n . 
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While an orientation-judgement must be conscious f o r us to i n c l u d e 
i t under 'modes of a c t i o n - o r i e n t a t i o n to o b j e c t s ' ( s i n c e by the term 
' a c t i o n ' we exclude behaviour of the stimulus-response and l e s s conscious 
h a b i t u a l types) , the determinants of the judgement may be more or l e s s 
c o n s c i o u s , though of course the a c t o r may have conscious e v a l u a t i v e 
c r i t e r i a even i f they do not come i n t o play i n determining h i s judge-
ments. Thus i t would be p o s s i b l e to examine the degree of r a t i o n a l 
connection between the conscious e v a l u a t i v e c r i t e r i a and the judgements 
made, and the degree of c o n s i s t e n c y and coherence between the various 
conscious e v a l u a t i v e c r i t e r i a . Furthermore standards of one type (e.g. 
of t r u t h ) may a f f e c t i n d i v i d u a l orientation-judgements of another type 
(e.g. m o r a l ) ; and of course i n a s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n i n which a l l the 
types of orientation-judgement are involved, a l l three s p e c i f i c judge-
ments may be mutually determinant. 
There remains the q u e s t i o n as to the u t i l i t y of Parsons' d i s t i n c -
t i o n s . I t seems to be f r e q u e n t l y impossible i n p r a c t i c e , and indeed of 
d o u b t f u l v a l u e , to d i s t i n g u i s h c a t h e c t i c and moral a c t i o n - o r i e n t a t i o n s , 
to s e p a r a t e the c a t h e c t i c and moral reasons f o r s t r i v i n g a f t e r c e r t a i n 
ends. I t i s o f t e n the case t h a t an a c t i o n or i t s intended r e s u l t i s of 
'value' to the a c t o r i n a broad sense i n c l u d i n g the moral and the 
c a t h e c t i c . I t may t h e r e f o r e be p r e f e r a b l e to subsume c a t h e c t i c and moral 
judgements i n v o l v e d i n a c t i o n - o r i e n t a t i o n under the concept of e v a l u a t i o n s 
( d i s t i n c t from Parsons' use of the term) , thus l e a v i n g a d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the c o g n i t i o n s and e v a l u a t i o n s involved i n a c t i o n (e.g. as i n 
the pragmatic knowledge of the means to one' s ends and the e v a l u a t i v e 
o r d e r i n g of these means). 
I t i s perhaps noteworthy t h a t , i n h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of i d e a s . 
Parsons h i m s e l f concentrates on the c o g n i t i v e (or ' e x i s t e n t i a l ' ) -
e v a l u a t i o n a l (or 'normative') d i s t i n c t i o n . I n 'The Role of Ideas i n 
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S o c i a l Action' he also mentions imaginative ideas, but as indices of 
sentiments and attitudes rather than themselves playing a positive 
role. (1938: 21) I n Chapter 9 of 'The Social System' he conducts a 
separate analysis of expressive symbol systems, which he sees i n terms 
of the communication of affect, with 'pure a r t ' being t o t a l l y expressive 
and hence non-evaluative. (1951: 410-411)''' These separate analyses 
allow him to base h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of ideas on the p r i n c i p a l exist-
ential-evaluational d i s t i n c t i o n , with a subdivision of empirical-non-
empirical. FoTir categories of b e l i e f s are thus created: empirical 
e x i s t e n t i a l (science and equivalents), non-empiirical e x i s t e n t i a l 
(philosophy), empirical evaluational (ideology), and non-empirical eval-
uational (religious ideas). (1951: 331) This categorisation seems unsat-
isfa c t o r y : for instance, cannot philosophical b e l i e f systems have evalua-
tion a l aspects, and why are religious ideas not joined i n the non-empirical 
evaluational category by other types of moral b e l i e f system? Parsons' 
categorisation contradicts even his own e a r l i e r description of Weber's 
studies of r e l i g i o n as dealing with non-empirical e x i s t e n t i a l ideas. 
(1938: 28) This i s perhaps the best i l l u s t r a t i o n of the f a c t that, 
whilst the cognitive and evaluative components of action-orientations 
may be capable of a n a l y t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n , to distinguish between e x i s t -
e n t i a l and evaluative b e l i e f systems may prove impossible in practice. 
Si m i l a r l y Dahlke's sharp div i s i o n between two of his spheres for research, 
the t h e o r e t i c a l contemplative and the ideal normative, i s untenable. 
(Dahlke, 1940: 86) Berger and Luckmann make a similar cognitive-normative 
d i s t i n c t i o n with respect to legitimations, and claim that: 
'... 'knowledge' precedes 'values' i n the legitima-
tion of i n s t i t u t i o n s . ' (1967: 111) 
But Madge points out that s o c i a l b e l i e f s are generally cognitive and 
evaluative, and indeed finds the normative - nonnormative distinction 
Parsons' view of a r t thus contrasts with the more value-oriented 
conceptions of a r t that are reviewed i n Chapter 11 - See below, 
p 272 
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l a r g e l y i r r e l e v a n t . (1964; 103) Parsons should perhaps have taken 
a h i n t from the f o l l o w i n g statement he h i m s e l f makes i n Chapter 1 of 
'The S o c i a l System': 
'There must, t h e r e f o r e , i n an a c t i o n system, be a para-
mount focus of e v a l u a t i v e standards which are n e i t h e r 
c o g n i t i v e as such nor a p p r e c i a t i v e as such, but i n v o l v e 
a s y n t h e s i s of both a s p e c t s . I t has seemed appropriate 
to c a l l these moral standards'. 
(1951: 13-14) 
W h i l s t we should d i s p u t e t h a t the moral c o n s t i t u t e s a s y n t h e s i s of the 
c o g n i t i v e and a p p r e c i a t i v e , Parsons i s c l e a r l y c l o s e here to the recog-
n i t i o n t h a t the c o g n i t i v e and e v a l u a t i v e may be fused i n the same concept, 
l e t alone the same b e l i e f system. 
( i x ) C o nclusion 
I n t h i s chapter we have explored conceptions of the s u p e r s t r u c t u r e 
i n the sociology of knowledge, i n terms both of the b a s i c c o n s t i t u t i v e 
elements suggested by v a r i o u s t h e o r i s t s , and of some f u r t h e r d i f f e r e n -
t i a t i o n s of i t s a s p e c t s . The broadest conception of the s u p e r s t r u c t u r e 
was found to be the Mannheimian notion of 'Weltanschauung', a concept 
t h a t we s h a l l explore f u r t h e r i n Chapter 6. Other views of the super-
s t r u c t u r e are more l i m i t e d : Berger and Luckmann i n d i c a t e the importance 
of l e g i t i m a t i o n s , but over-emphasise i n t e g r a t i o n . Parsons shares t h i s 
preoccupation w i t h i n t e g r a t i o n , and, l i k e S c h e l e r , grants a considerable 
autonomy to c u l t u r a l elements. Most t h e o r i s t s however s t r e s s the l e s s 
autonomous, u t i l i t a r i a n r o l e of ideas i n r e l a t i o n to a c t i o n . T h i s u t i l i -
t a r i a n i s m i s p a r t i c u l a r l y evident i n the pragmatic conception of knowledge, 
i n r e l a t i o n to which we d i s t i n g u i s h e d between m a t e r i a l and i d e a l prag-
matism. Taking 'width' (of f u n c t i o n i n g i n the a c t o r ' s consciousness) as 
a c r i t e r i o n of s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l consciousness, we d i s t i n g u i s h e d three 
p r i n c i p a l u t i l i t a r i a n elements of the s u p e r s t r u c t u r e : pragmatic knowledge. 
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l e g i t i m a t i o n s (pre- or p o s t - a c t i o n ) , and promotions - and one non-
u t i l i t a r i a n element: extensions. F i n a l l y , we looked, a t f u r t h e r d i f f e r -
e n t i a t i o n s of the s u p e r s t r u c t u r e i n the work of S c h e l e r and Parsons -
the two t h e o r i s t s most concerned w i t h the sociology of knowledge. 
S c h e l e r was seen t o d i s t i n g u i s h s e v e r a l i n t e r e s t i n g aspects of 'knowledge' 
(defined i n a r a t h e r s t r i c t s e n s e ) , i n c l u d i n g f o r i n s t a n c e 'forms of cog-
n i t i o n ' , a concept t h a t we s h a l l c o n s i d e r f u r t h e r i n a s e c t i o n on 'concepts 
of consciousness form' i n Chapter 6."'" Parsons' d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of ideas 
was deemed l e s s u s e f u l , though the d i s t i n c t i o n between c o g n i t i v e and 
e v a l u a t i v e a s p e c t s of a c t i o n i s found to be u s e f u l a t s e v e r a l p o i n t s i n 
t h i s t h e s i s . 
Having i n d i c a t e d i n t h i s chapter an a n a l y t i c a l conception of the 
s u p e r s t r u c t u r e i n the soc i o l o g y of knowledge, we are now able to look 
more d i r e c t l y a t suggested r e l a t i o n s between s u b s t r u c t u r e and s u p e r s t r u c -
t u r e . 
•"" See below, p 136 . f f 
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CHAPTER 4: RELATIONS BETWEEN SUBSTRUCTURE AND SUPERSTRUCTURE 
Why the Substructure Influences the Superstructure 
Some of the approaches to be discussed i n t h i s chapter have been 
dealt with at l e a s t i n rudimentary form i n Chapters 2 and 3. This i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the case with respect to the question why the svibstruc-
ture influences the superstructure: the very concepts used to describe 
superstructural elements, legitimations for instance, imply the moti-
vation that gives r i s e to them. The superstructural elements that we 
distinguished i n Chapter 3 thus reveal two major types of explanation 
of t h e i r existence: a) . i n terms of utility/pragmatism; b) . i n terms 
of 'extensions' of substructural consciousness. 
We have noted the prevalence of the pragmatic theory of the super-
structure, i n which consciousness i s seen to develop i f of use in 
resolving the actor's problems. To a laxge extent the work of Marx, 
Pareto, Goldmann, Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann i s imbued with this 
perspective. Dahlke however i s c r i t i c a l of what he c a l l s the pragmatic 
bias i n the sociology of knowledge, as i t tends to derogate contemplative 
or theoretical thinking. (1940: 85) This c r i t i c i s m certainly applies 
where there i s overriding concern for materially pragmatic knowledge, 
i . e . where i t i s considered that knowledge i s oriented i n i t s content 
to the achievement of the actor's ends, and w i l l only be developed i f i t 
f a i l s i t s role i n t h i s achievement, or i f the actor develops new ends, 
and thus new problems, which require new knowledge: 
'Typically, I have l i t t l e i n t e r e s t in going beyond 
t h i s pragmatically necessary knowledge as long as 
the problems can indeed be mastered thereby. ... 
The v a l i d i t y of my knowledge of everyday l i f e i s 
taken for granted by myself and by others u n t i l 
further notice> that i s , u n t i l a problem arises 
that cannot be solved i n terms of i t . ' 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 57-8) 
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However, the notion of the pragmatic fovindation of knowledge may be 
s o broad as to c l a i m merely t h a t knowledge i s not j u s t p i c k e d up or 
r e t a i n e d f o r no reason, but i s gained i n t e n t i o n a l l y , a process which 
can be r e a d i l y t r a n s l a t e d i n t o the language of problems. T h i s may be 
extended to cover i n t e l l e c t u a l problems (thus perhaps t a k i n g the s t i n g 
from Dahlke's c r i t i c i s m ) , but such an approach would go beyond the kind 
of u t i l i t a r i a n e x p l a n a t i o n s p r e v a l e n t i n the sociology of knowledge, 
s i n c e such e x p l a n a t i o n s , when seen i n terms of an i n t e r e s t i n 
i n t e l l e c t u a l ideas, confine the i n t e r e s t to those ideas t h a t are of 
f a i r l y s t r i c t l y d e f i n e d use to the a c t o r . Dahlke would wish i t to be 
agreed t h a t such u t i l i t a r i a n i n t e r e s t may be extended to areas of non-
u t i l i t a r i a n knowledge, o r indeed t h a t a n o n - u t i l i t a r i a n i n t e r e s t i n 
'knowledge f o r i t s own sake', i . e . i n t e l l e c t u a l c u r i o s i t y , i s p o s s i b l e . 
Dahlke's view could of course be subsumed under the broad pragmatic 
conception of knowledge, y e t even t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e could be r e j e c t e d as 
too narrow on the grounds t h a t knowledge may j u s t be p i c k e d up and r e t a i n e d 
out of h a b i t , without i t s being u s e f u l even i n the broadest sense. S i m i -
l a r l y , knowledge may be a c q u i r e d not through the i n t r i n s i c pragmatic 
a s p e c t s o f i t s content, but f o r i t s e x t r i n s i c , e.g. s t a t u s , a s p e c t s . 
Thus even the broad pragmatic notion of knowledge must not be assumed 
always to apply, though i t i s indeed worth applying t h i s r a t i o n a l model 
as a hypothesis i n each case. 
The broad pragmatic conception of knowledge does a t l e a s t provide 
the framework f o r a m o t i v a t i o n a l explanation. The m o t i v a t i o n a l bases 
f o r 'extensions' a r e l e s s c l e a r , p a r t l y because extensions d e s c r i b e a 
p r o c e s s of consciousness development r a t h e r than e x p l a i n i n g i t . T h i s 
p r o c e s s c o n s i s t s of the a p p l i c a t i o n of a s u b s t r u c t u r a l 'perspective' 
( i n c l u d i n g c o g n i t i v e c a t e g o r i e s and i n t e r e s t s , e v a l u a t i o n s etc.) to a 
wider a r e a , and the s e l e c t i o n of those ideas which are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h , 
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or which embody, t h i s perspective. The reasons for such extensions 
are usually l e f t i m p l i c i t i n theoretical accounts, but they appear to 
be based upon the p r i o r i t y of the substructural action/situation for 
the actor, either i n the sense that the action/situation i s particularly 
s a l i e n t for the actor (e.g. where an action i s frequently undertaken, 
or there i s strong motivation towards i t ) , or i n the sense that the 
action/situation i s temporally prior i n the l i f e of the actor. The 
perspective i s thus extended through being frequently, particulairly 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y or previously actualised by the actor. None of these 
modes of extension implies a dire c t motivational explanation for the 
extension of consciousness as i n the pragmatic model, though the broad 
pragmatic motion of intentionally acquired 'knowledge' cou]4 appear i n 
the extension model as the non-utilitarian extension of a svibstructural 
i n t e r e s t . 
I t i s interesting at this point to note how the concept of ' commit-
ment', developed above,may account not only for u t i l i t a r i a n developments 
of consciousness, such as legitimations aid promotions, but also for 
extensions that derive from actions of particular salience for the 
actor's ends. The concept of 'commitment' thus offers one particular 
motivational explanation (without implying direct motivational causation) 
of both u t i l i t a r i a n and non-utilitarian developments of consciousness: 
though but one explanation, i t may prove to be a very useful one. 
The non - u t i l i t a r i a n accoimt of the superstructure i n terms of 
extensions has an a f f i n i t y with the 'reflection' theory of knowledge, 
accofcding to which, i n i t s simplest form, the superstructure r e f l e c t s 
the substructure. I n i t s most naive form, the reflection theory has no 
relation to the extension model, as i t recognises no consciousness i n the 
•'" See above. Chapter 2, p 32 f f 
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ST±istructure. In Scheler's 'Durkheimian sociological correspond-
ence theory of knowledge' (Dahlke, 1940: 73) however, the extension 
model i s c l e a r l y used, i f hot by name. Scheler claims that the struc-
ture of a society may be reflected i n the forms of cognition of that 
society (Staude, 1967: 172): t h i s i s due to the temporal p r i o r i t y or 
'genetic precedence' of knowledge of society, such knowledge becoming 
extended into general forms of knowing of wider application. (Sdheler, 
1970b:170-176) Scheler further specifies this process i n 'Recht und 
Unrecht des Soziologismus', where he states -
"... dass das erste Substrat der Anwendung des 
Formenapparatus von Denken, Schauen, Werten, 
Lieben und der zugehBrigen Triebstruktur nicht 
die Natur i s t , sondern die Gesellschaft, so dass 
s i c h die Organisations form der Gesellschaft stets 
auch spiegeln muss i n dem ganzen Weltbild.' 
(1960: 426) 
So primary s o c i a l consciousness i s extended because socife^:y i s the f i r s t 
object of application of cognitive forms, so that i t s foms are taken as 
being the forms of 'the world'. 
Both u t i l i t a r i a n and extension models of the development of super-
s t r u c t u r a l consciousness refer to a meaningful svibstructure and to a 
causal sijbstructure-superstructure relationship i n which the substructure 
i s a necessary condition. That the substructure i s meaningful, that 
one's pr i n c i p a l concern therein may be with an element of ®5nsciousness, 
does not disqualify i t s status as a precondition. 
As for the direction bf causality, our interest i n the socidlogy of 
knowledge does not cover influence i n the opposite direction, as i n 
the effects of ideas upon action, except insofar as the determining 
properties of the idea i n relation to the substructure are a reason for 
i t s adoption (as i n the case of promotions). Similarly, we are not 
d i r e c t l y interested i n the s o c i a l organisation of 'knowledge', ideological 
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power, etc., as such. I f then our interest l i e s i n the development 
of ^"^knowledge' i n relation to action/situation and directly involved 
consciousness, to what extent i s the relation direct and unidirectional? 
( i i ) How Direct and Ehidirectional i s the Influence? 
I t i s Mannheim who shows most cl e a r l y that the relationship between 
substructure and superstructure cannot be taken as direct and without 
context. He points out that as 'facts' are.discovered by the exponents 
of one Weltanschauung, the opposing groups have to develop t h e i r 
Weltanschauung i n order to account for these facts within th e i r own 
frame of reference. (1952: 148 & 173) Mannheim shows here the necessity 
of a structural perspective, i n which we analyse the Weltanschauungen 
as developing not as the isolated responses of different groups, but as 
mutually affecting each other, i n th i s case through ideal p;fagmatism. 
One might add that i n a sim i l a r fashion the consciousness that an actor 
develops from a s p e c i f i c action/situation may be influenced i n i t s 
development by other elements i n the actor's world view, especially i f 
he tends to be consistent. The st r u c t u r a l perspective may thus apply to 
the individual as well as to society. 
Mannheim also stresses the necessity of a h i s t o r i c a l perspective, 
i n relation to both the goals and ideas of a group. In the case of 
goals, and i n relation to the concept of 'commitment', one must not 
assume that the only factor determining the thought of a group i s the 
system of actions whidi w i l l achieve i t s goals: one can see from Mannheim's 
work that the thought, of the group w i l l vary according to whether i t s 
desired system of actions i s already existent, existed i n the past, or 
may e x i s t i n the future. Thus the group's ideas do not derive from the 
Ideal pragmatism was discussed above in connection with Mannheim's 
work, on the development of conservative thought: see Chapter 3, pp 78-79 
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desired system, of actions alone, divorced from i t s temporal relation-
ship to the group i n question. I t i s for this reason that Mannheim 
places such emphasis on the qioestion of whether a group i s directed 
towards maintenance of i t s surrounding s o c i a l world or towards 
changing i t (1936: 3 ) , and thus on the concepts of ideology and Utopia. 
Where the emphasis i s on the h i s t o r i c a l peispective on ideas 
themselves, we may note Mannheim's point that i t i s false to regard 
a Weltanscihauung as being created by a s o c i a l group out of nothing: 
past i n t e l l e c t u a l standpoints and theories are taken up by a group, 
but the function of these ideological remnants i s changed simply by 
being applied to a different situation by, a differently situated gjfoup, 
and thus as the function i s changed so i s the meaning. (1952: 187) 
The argument that the ideas of a.group should not be assamed to 
stand i n a straightforward relationship to the group's a c t i v i t i e s i s 
developed by Pareto i n his concept of utility"*" - a concept which may 
help to account for the persistence of otherwise outdated ideas. An 
instance of th i s i s given by Berger and Luckmann, who point out that 
an ideology may p e r s i s t merely through i t s capacity to serve as a focus 
of unity for a group, irrespective of i t s actual content: 
'Frequently an ideology i s taken on by a group because 
of s p e c i f i c theoretical elements that are conducive 
to i t s i n t e r e s t s . ... I t would be erroneous, however, 
to imagine that the relationship between an interest 
group and i t s ideology i s always so log i c a l . Every 
group engaged i n s o c i a l c o n f l i c t requires s o l i d a r i t y . 
Ideologies generate s o l i d a r i t y . The choice of a par-
t i c u l a r ideology i s not necessarily based on i t s i n t r i n -
s i c t h e o r e t i c a l elements, but may stem from a chance 
encounter. ... There may be large elements in an ideology 
that bear no p a r t i c u l a r relationship to the legitimated 
i n t e r e s t s , but that are vigorously affirmed by the 
'car r i e r ' group simply because i t has committed i t s e l f 
to the ideology.' (1967: 141-2) 
•*" See above. Chapter 2, p 29 
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We can thus r e j e c t the conception of a necessarily direct and 
contextless relationship between substructure and superstructure. 
And i f we look closely at the elements of the superstructure, we must 
also r e j e c t any notion of necessary unidirectionality i n the relation-
ship: w h i l s t i n the extension model i t does seem that consciousness 
develops i n one direction, i f we look at promotions and pre-action 
legitimations we remember that elements of the superstructure may be 
adopted pre c i s e l y because of t h e i r influence upon substructural action. 
( i i i ) The Begree of Influence 
One of the most important aspects of how the svibstructure and 
superstructure relate i s the degree of substructural influence. We 
have already indicated that the svibstructure i s a necessary rather than 
a s u f f i c i e n t condition for the development of any p a r t i c u l a r super-
s t r u c t u r a l consciousness. This view seems generally shared by socio-
(hogists of knowledge: Marx, for instance, writes of limits upon and 
conditions for the development of ideas Stark sees modes of action as 
permissive of several different mental modes, though determination i s 
operative since the mental modes must be able to coexist with the con-
2 
temporary modes of action (1958: 253-4); and Scheler,as we have seen, 
envisages s o c i a l conditions permitting and blocking the development of 
ideas. According to these views, then,the causal relationship may be as 
weak as the following: t h i s p a r t i c u l a r substructure i s one which meets 
some of the necessary conditions for the development of t h i s particular 
superstructure; and, viewed from the other end, this p articular super-
structure i s one of a f i n i t e set of possible developments from t h i s par-
t i c u l a r s\jbstructure. In more p a r t i c u l a r terms we can see that, for 
For example, see Marx on A r i s t o t l e - 1972: 30-31. 
2 
See above. Chapter 2, p 22 
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instance, extensions may develop in varioiis but limited ways; that 
cognitions engendered i n the siibstructure are selective i n the acqiai-
s i t i o n of further knowledge; and that any particular legitimation may 
be one of a f i n i t e nuiriber th^t w i l l j u s t i f y an action. 
Apart from the question of how necessarily the superstructure i s a 
r e s u l t of the substructure, the question of the degree of si±)Structural 
influence also fefers to how much of the superstructure i s determined, 
how t o t a l i s the determination. The degree of s o c i a l determination of 
thought i n t h i s sense i s often ignored, e.g. by Mannheim as i s seen 
especially c l e a r l y in h i s notion of the 'total conception of ideology': 
'... the t o t a l conception c a l l s into question (an 
individual's) t o t a l Weltanschauimg (including his 
conceptual apparatus), , and attempts to understand 
these concepts as an outgrowth of the c o l l e c t i v e 
l i f e of which he partakes. ... the entire mind i s 
to be seen as ideological ... the s o c i a l situation 
... even penetrates to the noological meanings.' 
(Mannheim, 1936: 50 &::68-69) 
Thus Mannheim does not allow for different degrees of s o c i a l deter-
mination for different types of thought, and the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
r e l a t i v e autonomy for various types of thought. I t i s here that he i s 
c r i t i c i s e d by von Schelting (1934),^ who points to the relative autonon^ 
of, for instance, logic compared with p o l i t i c a l views. 
In rejecting the 'total conception of ideology' we must r e c a l l 
Scheler's work on the various autonomous aspects of the superstructure, 
e.g. the character of the basic modes of knowing and the trfith-content 
of ideas. Ideas may however be considered to be independent in w&ys-
other than these universally autonomous aspects: an idea may be seen as 
i n some sense pre-existent (independent through i t s existing before the 
influence of the substructure), and merely chosen through substructural 
A useful discussion of von Schelting's comparison of Mannheim 
and Weber i s to be found i n Sahay, 1971. 
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influence. "Ehis conception, i n which the selection i s believed to be 
determined rather than the idea i t s e l f , i s the basis of the theory of 
elective a f f i n i t y . 
(iv) The Theory of E l e c t i v e A f f i n i t y 
The foremost esiponent of the theory of elective a f f i n i t y i s Max 
Scheler. One of the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the analysis of his work, however, 
i s to decide exactly what kind of 'pre-existence' he grants to ideas, 
and what effect t h e i r selection has upon them. We are variously 
informed that ideas depend upon substructural factors for t h e i r effec-
tiveness, acceptance, r e a l i s a t i o n or actualisation. Becker and Dahlke 
for instance seem to confuse r e a l i s a t i o n and effectiveness i n t h e i r 
interpretation of Scheler: 
'... an idea does not have an inherent power to become 
objective i n the world ... In order to be effective i n 
l i f e , i t must be bound up with some int e r e s t , drive, or 
tendency, and thereby acquire power and indirect 
influence.' (1942: 313, my emphasis) 
Staude, however, claims ttiat Sdieler's Realfaktoren determine the s e l -
ection of which mind-contents w i l l be actualised at any place and time. 
(1967: 157-8) The difference i n views probably r e f l e c t s Scheler's own 
ambiguity: on the one hand ideas e x i s t i n a supratemporal sphere of 
ultimate v a l i d i t y , and are merely actualised when selected by the 
appropriate substructural conditions; on the other hand, those ideas 
entertained already by a few i n t e l l e c t u a l s w i l l not exert any influence 
on society at large unless i n some way linked with the basic drives of 
the society. Many writers (Marx, Weber and Pareto, for instance) have 
i n fact stressed t h i s l a s t point, that the 'effectiveness' of ideas i s 
dependent upon s o c i a l factors. To be effective, i . e . to have influence 
upon s o c i a l action, ideas must f i r s t be accepted, and i t i s implied that 
they w i l l not be accepted/adopted unless they have an 'affinity" with 
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the substructural cognitions/evaluations of those concerned. As for 
how the ideas themselves are engendered, Weber would seem to see the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of independent genesis, (Staude, 1967: 163-4) i . e . cultural 
development through i n t e l l e c t u a l c u r i o s i t y and the l i k e : w hilst Scheler 
would emphasise the p o s s i b i l i t y of s o c i a l influence upon genesis, i . e . 
i n the selection from the ultimate store (Staude, 1967: 165); and 
others would claim that ideas may develop entirely within the sphere 
of s o c i a l determination. Assuming that to accept the second position 
would not imply f u l l acceptance of Scheler's metaphysics of the 'absolute 
natural Weltanschauving' (Staude, 1967; 155), and that to accept the t h i r d 
position would not imply a m a t e r i a l i s t determinism, we should not want 
to r e j e c t any of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s suggested by these three perspectives: 
we should only want to r e j e c t the one extreme view that there can be no 
development from the substructure i t s e l f (which would mean rejecting the 
notion of extensions) , and the other extreme of t o t a l s o c i a l determin-
ation of the superstructure. 
I f we enquire as to the degree of consciousness of the selection 
process i n Scheler's model, we find two apparently contradictory answers: 
on the one hand Scheler grants to individuals the a b i l i t y to se l e c t 
from the ultimate store of ideas those that have an a f f i n i t y with t h e i r 
i n t e r e s t s ; on the other hand, b l i n d impulses appear to choose which ideas 
w i l l be actualised. (Dahlke, 1940:74) These two perspectives may be made 
compatible i f we see the r e a l conditions of society as a whole, as deter-
mined by the Triebstruktur, as delimiting the potential actualisation of 
ideas, partly through t h e i r co-determination (with previous i n t e l l e c t u a l 
history) of the forms of cognition; and the prevailing interests of the 
e l i t e as deciding which of the potential ideas s h a l l be actualised, 
through [^election of the objects of cognition. 
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In a l l t h i s description of the process of selection, the power 
of ideas themselves appears to be negligible. Scheler however i n s i s t s 
that ideas are capable of guiding and directing (Leitung und Lenkung) 
the b l i n d impulses. (Scheler, 1960 : 40) Thus an idea may bevput forward 
which i s able to channel the energy of some non-specific drive and to 
direct i t i n the manner prescribed by the idea. With more s p e c i f i c 
impulses ideas can only hinder or encourage. Throughout h i s descrip-
tion of the power of ideas, however, ideas are seen i n substantive 
terms as diseiribodied beings, with s t r i c t l y limited power and yet desiring 
influence. I t i s not clear whether an idea attempts to find a suitable 
drive to bring i t s e l f to f r u i t i o n , or whether the idea i s elected by 
the drive with or without the intention of using the guiding and 
directing power of the idea. I f the former i s the case, then the idea 
must e x i s t already: but i n what form? Scheler's disembodied ideas and 
blind impulses seem metaphysical worlds apart; but i f we take hdis less 
extreme component?, namely the prevailing interests of the e l i t e and 
the ideas engendered through c u l t u r a l development, then, i n terms of 
Scheler's conception of elective a f f i n i t y and the limited power of mind, 
only those ideas w i l l be sustained which have relevance for the achieve-
ment of the aims of the e l i t e , and these ideas further specify (channel) 
the aims and encourage t h e i r achievement. Scheler might even agree that 
the existing ideas of the e l i t e may hinder the achievement of t h e i r ends, 
though t h i s would seem to counter h i s argument that only those ideas 
are selected or maintained that have an a f f i n i t y with the e l i t e ' s 
i n t e r e s t s . The implication would appear to be that the e l i t e may not 
simply be able to s e l e c t ideas d i r e c t l y from the range of the potential, 
but that they must make do with selecting from the range actually 
presented by the c u l t u r a l development, and that t h i s range may indeed 
not give free rein to the drives and interests concerned. Whether Scheler 
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sees ideas as capable of developing on their own, without selection by the 
'real ' forces of society, i s unclear: Cassirer certainly thinks not, 
and thus c r i t i c i s e s Scheler on t h i s point for f a i l i n g to acknowledge 
the 'fomative' power of ' S p i r i t ' (Cassirer, 1949: 868-9), as in the 
development of ideas through i n t e l l e c t u a l curiosity. But neither 
Sdi e l e r nor C a s s i r e r seem w i l l i n g to grant s p i r i t 'effective' power, 
as i n a concept of s p i r i t u a l motivation, or the creation of interests 
by ideas: i n the recognition of t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y Weber reveals his 
l e s s r e s t r i c t e d conception of the power of ideas, though he would 
r i g h t l y r e j e c t some of Scheler's extreme claims for the autonomy of 
mind/spirit, p a r t i c u i a t l y i n the sphere of values. 
One of the aspects of the theory of elective a f f i n i t y that i s 
frequently ignored i s the question of the nature of the a f f i n i t y , i . e . 
why the ideas are selected. I t seems that here again one may apply the 
correspondence or u t i l i t a r i a n models: those ideas w i l l be selected 
a) which 'correspond' to the substructural consciousness, i . e . which 
are consistent with, or which embody, this consciousness; o r b ) which 
perform a useful fianction i n r e l a t i o n to the substructure, e.g. i n 
supplying legitimations or i n strengthening the motivation towards a 
necessary action. Once again one must be careful to avoid the implica-
tion that the whole idea i s related i n this way to the substructure: i n 
general an idea i s selected because aspects thereof have an a f f i n i t y 
with the substructure: other aspects of the idea are either ignored, 
or adopted as part of the package. This may r e s u l t i n the interesting 
phenomenon of the independent e f f e c t of those aspects for which the 
idea was not selected. This view of the process of elective a f f i n i t y 
goes beyond that of Stark, who sees the process as one of gradual mutual 
adjustment (1958: 265), hence underrating the potential r a d i c a l influence 
of ideas with t h e i r imintended consequences. The theory of elective 
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a f f i n i t y should certainly not be seen as postulating a necessary 
consistency between action and ideas. Madge's version of the u t i l i -
tarian model of e l e c t i v e a f f i n i t y constitutes a worthy caution to 
those who find consistency and r a t i o n a l i t y wherever they look: he states 
that most commonly individuals have an 'opportunistic' orientation 
towards ideas, i n the sense that -
'... i n situations where an idea i s needed, the i n d i -
vidual w i l l take whatever i s offered, but on another 
occasion w i l l take another idea without awareness of 
inconsistency.' (Madge, 1964: 127) 
(v) Conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined descriptions and explanations of the 
substructure-superstructure relationship, and have found once more that the assump-
tions and implications of most models are over-restrictive, whilst often 
supplying useful views of possible modes of relationship. Through the 
comparison and critique of variovis theories we have thus arrived at a 
more adequate conception of the compleScifcies, siibtleties and possible 
variations in sitostructure-superstructure relationships. We d i s t i n -
guished between u t i l i t a r i a n and extension modes of development of 
superstructural consciousness, and emphasised the structural and 
h i s t o r i c a l context of the development and persistence of ideas. We 
suggested that the relationship between substructure and superstructure 
i s not necessarily u n d i r e c t i o n i l , as witnessed i n certain of the elements 
of the superstructure suggested i n Chaptet 3 (promotions and pre-action 
legitimations) . We noted that a particular substructure i s generally seen 
as a necessary rather than a s u f f i c i e n t condition for the development of 
a p a r t i c u l a r superstructure, and that the degree of influence of sub-
structure on superstructure may thus be limited - and indeed i s limited 
s t i l l further i f we abandon the assumption of 'total' determination. 
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F i n a l l y we looked at an important model of substructure-superstructure 
r e l a t i o n s , that allows for the r e l a t i v e autonomy of ideas: the theory 
of elective a f f i n i t y . 
Having completed our exploration of general conceptions of si±)-
structure and superstructure i n the sociology of knowledge, we may now 
progress i n Part I I to the investigation, of the potential relations 
between a p a r t i c u l a r a n a l y t i c a l siibstruct\are ('class*) and superstructure 
('world view'). 
P A R T I I ; CLASS AND WORLD VIEW AS SUBSTRUCTURE AND 
SUPERSTRUCTURE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OP KNOWLEDGE 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART I I 
I n Part I we developed an a n a l y t i c a l substructure-superstructure 
d i s t i n c t i o n for the sociology of knowledge. This distinction w i l l now 
be applied i n Part I I to our p a r t i c u l a r area of in t e r e s t i n the sociology 
of knowledge: the development of consciousness from class elements. 
In Chapter 5 an attempt i s made to advance a refined conception of 
c l a s s . Starting with Weber's concept of class, we elaborate the 
p r i n c i p a l elements of situation, action and consciousness that must be 
distinguished when viewing cl a s s as a substructuae of thought. 
In Chapter 6, "world view* i s taken as potentially the widest and 
l e a s t constricting conception of superstructure though certain defin-
i t i o n s of world view are rejected for their r e s t r i c t i v e assumptions. 
The concept of world view i s refined, not through assuming ideal-
t y p i c a l consistency and coherence, but through developing concepts 
that encourage consideration of i t s meaningful, s t y l i s t i c and structural 
properties, 
I n Chapter 7, a formal model i s elaborated for the analysis of 
world view developments from c l a s s elements. This model i s conceived 
i n terms of i d e a l - t y p i c a l actors, yet, despite i t s methodological 
individualism, i s able to take account of s o c i a l groups and s o c i a l 
systems. More p a r t i c u l a r l y , Chapter 7 distinguishes types of 'class 
contact', and 'points of development' of world view from class; applies 
the concepts of consciousness, that were put forward i n Chapters 3 and 
6^  to the investigation of the development of world view; and (as i n 
Chapter 4) emphasises the st r u c t u r a l and h i s t o r i c a l context of world 
view developments, 
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CHAPTER 5: THE SUBSTRUCTURE AS 'CLASS' 
(i) Introduction 
In the introduction to Part I i t was mentioned that the substruc-
ture should not necessarily be taken to refer to the whole of society, 
but rather i t may refer to a p a r t i c u l a r set of s o c i a l factors, such as 
those associated with the concept of 'class'. In t h i s chapter we s h a l l 
look at class as a substructure of thought, largely i n the l i g h t of the 
investigations i n Chapter 2. From the approach so far i t would seem that 
the Weberian conception of c l a s s would be the most suitable for our pur-r 
poses, and we s h a l l thus commence with a detailed analysis of this concep-
tion, which w i l l then be broadened into a view of class that i s adequate 
for the furtherance of the kind of sociology of knowledge proposed i n Part 
I . 
( i i ) Weber's Concept of Class 
Weber states h i s basic conception of class most concisely i n the 
following statement: 
'We may speak of a 'class' when (1) a number of people 
have i n common a s p e c i f i c causal component of their 
l i f e chances, i n so far as (2) t h i s component i s repre-
sented exclusively by economic interests i n the possess-
ion of goods and opportionities for income, and (3) i s 
represented \mder the conditions of the commodity or 
labour markets.' (1948: 181) 
This statement must, however, be considerably amplified for a f u l l under-
standing of i t s subtleties and implications, and for any necessary additions 
or modifications to be made. 
A. 'a s p e c i f i c causal component of their l i f e chances'. 
The term ' l i f e chances' i s highly unspecific, i t s vagueness being 
increased by defining i t partly i n terms of 'personal l i f e experiences'. 
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(1948: 181) I t seems probable, however that Weber preferred such an 
ambiguous term to a s p e c i f i c reference, for instance to the individ-
ual's f i n a n c i a l situation. For Weber, class isolates conditions of the 
actions that determine or constitute one's l i f e chances: i . e . class 
factors condition not only how much money the actor obtains, but how he 
has to gain i t , and the extent of his security and prospects. Weber i s 
not concerned with a further specification of ' l i f e chances', as his 
int e r e s t i s i n certain conditions of economic action, rather than i n the 
economic action i t s e l f or i t s r e s u l t s . I n th i s way Weber distinguishes 
himself from those who would include aspects of work, f i n a n c i a l situation 
etc. i n thei r conception of c l a s s . 
Weber certain l y sees c l a s s as 'conditioning' rather than deter-
mining : 
'.. . the kind of chance i n the market i s the decisive moment 
which presents a common condition for the individual's fate.' 
(1948: 182, my emphasis) 
This concern with the conditions of action i s paralleled i n Marx, where 
he writes of the connection of the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l structure with 
production: 
'The s o c i a l structure and the State are continually 
evolving out of the life-process of definite individ-
uals, but of individuals, not as they appear i n thei r 
own or other people's imagination, but as they r e a l l y 
are; i . e . as they operate, produce materially, and hence 
as they work under definite material l i m i t s , presuppos-: 
i t i o n s and conditions independent of their w i l l . ' 
(1965: 36-37) 
Class, then, for Weber i s not i n i t s e l f an ideal-type, but rather an 
aspect of economic action, i n so far as i t isolates a certain set of 
relevant conditions for such action. I n order for class situation to 
condition l i f e chances, however, two further factors are necessary, 
involving: 
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a) the economic cognition and motivation of the actor: he may be more 
or less aware of h i s market p o t e n t i a l i t i e s , and more or les s keen in the 
disposal of his goods and s k i l l s , and thus he may make mare or less e f f i c i e n t 
use of the goods and s k i l l s of which he takes account for market action; 
b) l i m i t s , for instance of a status, p o l i t i c a l or legal kind, to the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of h i s disposal of goods and services. Only when class i s 
combined with r e l a t i v e l y high economic motivation and a market r e l a t i v e l y 
free from such l i m i t s as we have mentioned i s i t possible for class 
position to act as a determinant of l i f e chances to any s i g n i f i c a n t 
degree. Although cl a s s situation i s only an aspect of economic action, 
an i d e a l - t y p i c a l situation could be conceived (where the pure effects of 
class would be most strongly apparent) i n which the only conditions r e l e -
vant to the actor's economic action were those isolated by the concept of 
cl a s s . 
B. 'economic interests i n the possession of goods and opportunities 
for income'. 
1) 'goods and opportunities for income' - elsewhere"*" called goods and 
s k i l l s / s e r v i c e s . 
I t i s impossible to know what goods and s k i l l s an individual has 
objectively. I n the case of s k i l l s t h i s i s for two reasons: a) since 
one may have a s k i l l without having a formal qu a l i f i c a t i o n , how would one 
find out what s k i l l s an individual has? and b) even i f one was able 
to determine an individual's s k i l l s the individual would not necessarily 
wish to make economic use of these s k i l l s . This i s different from being 
apathetic about the s k i l l s one considers in one's market actions, as 
here i t i s rather that the individual does not even consider these s k i l l s 
See Weber, 1947: 424ff. 
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i n h i s market a c t i o n s , F o r instance he may decide to spend a greater 
or l e s s e r amount of time on market actions, and hence exchange more or 
l e s s of h i s services for income. Similarly to decide what goods an 
individual has w i l l not help us to determine which goods w i l l enter into 
an assessment of h i s class position; Weber himself implies that an indir' 
vidual may reserve some of h i s property for status purposes (1948? 192'r3) , 
and such property w i l l thus not become immediately effective through market 
exchange i n conditioning h i s l i f e chances. Goods and s k i l l s per se are 
thus not determinant of an individual's class position, and can only become 
such when taken into account by the individual for the purpose of exchange 
for income on the market. This pdint i s an elaboration of one aspect of 
Weber's emphasis on the actor's subjective interests i n his economic action. 
2) 'economic i n t e r e s t s ' . 
I n addition to i t s place i n Weber's concise statement of his concep-
tion of c l a s s that we have quoted above^ the notion of 'economic interests' 
appears in two other related contexts: 
'According to our terminology, the factor that creates 
'class' i s unambiguously economic interest, and indeed, 
only those interests involved i n the existence of the 
'market'.' (1948: 183) 
" C l a s s e s ' are groups of people who, from the standpoint 
of s p e c i f i c i nterests, have the same economic position.' 
(1948: 405, my emphasis) 
The only interpretation that seems to f i t a l l of these statements 
adequately i s that goods and s k i l l s (even i f we specify only those of 
1 Of course, even i f we can establish an individual's goods and s k i l l s , 
and ascertain that he considers! them in h i s market action, t h i s 
does not imply that he i s free to make his goods and s k i l l s effec-
t i v e through market exchange. One of the conditions of the market 
i s the s o c i a l recognition of certain goods and s k i l l s as v a l i d for 
exchange; and where the market i s not ideal-typically 'free', 
any p a r t i c u l a r individual may not have his 'objective' goods and 
s k i l l s recognised, or r e s t r i c t i o n s may be imposed on their exchange. 
Limits on the free operation of the market are discussed below, p 113 
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which the individual takes economic accoiant) per se cannot t e l l one an 
individual's class position: but, by assviming an i n t e r e s t i n optimali-
sation of income on the market, one can differentiate class positions 
according to the kind and value (in terms of the market conditions) of 
goods and s k i l l s the individual has at his disposal, and of course, as 
we have already pointed out, to have at one's disposal, or more s p e c i f i -
c a l l y to take into account i n one's market actions, i s not to assume that 
such goods and s k i l l s are exchanged most effectively. Since 'class 
position' indicates conditions of action, in order to is o l a t e these con-
ditions of action from the action i t s e l f , we must keep the motivation 
constant. Hence i n order to differentiate class positions, horizontally 
by kind, v e r t i c a l l y by value/amount of goods and s k i l l s , we keep economic 
motivation constiant i n assuming Ideal-typical economic motivation. Such 
id e a l - t y p i c a l motivation allows us to see the effects of class position 
most strongly, enabling us more cl e a r l y to differentiate the various 
positions. 'Economic i n t e r e s t s ' i n this context thus refers to the market 
int e r e s t s (interests i n the means of economic advancement in the context 
of the market) that make one's goods and s k i l l s relevant in determining 
(as conditions) one's l i f e chances. This then i s an elaboration of a 
second aspect of Weber's emphasis on interests i n economic action. 
Assuming id e a l - t y p i c a l economic motivation, actors in the same class 
position of course share the same market interests: Weber refers to these 
as 'class i n t e r e s t s ' , w h i l s t noting the ambiguity of the concept. Empir-
i c a l l y i t i s ambiguous, since: 
'The cl a s s situation and other circumstances remaining 
the same, the direction i n which the individual worker, 
for instance, i s l i k e l y to pursue his interests may vary 
widely ...' (1948: 183) 
Thus within each class situation the actors may pursue their interests 
i n a variety of ways: e.g. by competing with others i n a similar position, 
by hoping to gain new goods or s k i l l s (e.g. through inheritance or education/ 
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training) , or by cooperating to j o i n t l y raise the market value of the 
goods or s k i l l s or to modify thei r distribution (e.g. redistribution of 
property, professionalisation). 
Theoretically the concept of 'class interests' i s problematic, since 
one should not necessarily assume i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c economic motivation: 
the actor may identify with a certain group (e.g. kin or community) and 
wish primarily for economic advance for them. The only solution to this 
i s to push i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c economic motivation to i t s l i m i t as a causal 
component, and investigate the various potential means of economic advance 
given i d e a l - t y p i c a l i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c economic motivation with reference to 
class position. One may then see the ide n t i f i c a t i o n and s o l i d a r i t y with 
certain groups as such means and the r e s u l t of such means. I f the concept 
of 'class i n t e r e s t s ' i s made theoretically pure i n this way, i t s status i s 
no longer problematic, as one does not assume such ideal-typical motivation 
in the r e a l s i t u a t i o n . The concept of 'class i n t e r e s t s ' i s thus j u s t i f i e d 
not i n terms of the 'real ' or 'true' interests of those sharing a class 
position, but rather i n terms of those actors sharing a similar s e t of 
potential means to i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c economic ends. I t i s for t h i s reason 
that i t i s not only the value/amount of goods and s k i l l s that i s r e l e -
vant, but also the kind (Weber, 1948: 182), since those with different 
types of goods and s k i l l s , even i f they are equivalent i n terms of present 
market value, w i l l have different potential means to economic advance: 
they may wish to r a i s e the market value of their own s k i l l s , for instance, 
and i n certain cases t h i s might be i n direct opposition to the desire of 
others (with different s k i l l s but of the same present value) to increase 
the value of thei r s k i l l s on the market. I t i s Interesting to note that 
Marx makes a si m i l a r d i s t i n c t i o n to Weber's between amount and kind of 
goods and s k i l l s when he asks what constitutes a class, and answers: 
'At f i r s t glance - the identity of revenues and sources 
of revenue.' (Marx, 1959: 863) 
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C. 'under the conditions of the commodity or labour markets' 
We have already seen how class situation i s defined in terms of 
conditions of market action. Weber emphasises throughout, in his con-
ception of c l a s s , the importance of the idea.of economic power i n terms 
of exchange relationships: 
'The communal action that brings forth class situations ... 
i s an action between members of different classes.' 
(1948: 185) 
Two examples of types of individuals who thus do not qualify for analysis 
i n terms of class position are: Robinson Crusoe (he i s not involved in 
exchange relationships - h i s economic power i s not determined by the value 
of his goods and s k i l l s on any market); and Marx's peasants: 
'The small-holding peasants fqrm a vast mass, the members 
of which l i v e i n similar conditions, but without entering 
into manifold relations with one another. Their mode of 
production i s o l a t e s them from one another instead of 
bringing them into mutual intercourse ... Each individual 
peasant family i s almost s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t ; i t i t s e l f d i rectly 
produces the major part of i t s consumption and thus acquires 
i t s means of l i f e more through exchange with nature than 
i n intercourse with society.' (Marx, 1963: 123-4) 
The notion of economic power in exchange relationships i s not, however, 
s u f f i c i e n t l y precise for the pure effects of class to be seen: for t h i s , 
such exchange relationships must i n certain important ways remain unlimited. 
The two possible relevant ways in which exchange relationships may be 
limited (the two modes i n which the market may be rendered le s s free) can 
be seen i f 'freedom of the market' i s defined in terms of: a) extent 
(lack of conventional or legal l i m i t s to possible exchange relationships. 
I t must be remembered that such l i m i t s may indeed lead to lack of demand, 
but the question here i s one of formal freedom, 'formal' being extended to 
include conventional) ; b) exchange rates (lack of determination of actual 
rate or control over fluctuation). 
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The market i s s t i l l 'formally free' however when limits on extent, 
or f i x i t y of exchange rates, derives from economic power inherent i n the 
market value of goods and services, as i n the setting up of monopolies 
or 'closed shops'. 
Why i s i t , though, that the market must be free for the pure effects 
of c l a s s to be seen? The answer to t h i s l i e s i n the fact that the notion 
of c l a s s implies a s p e c i f i c kind of connection between goods and services 
on the one hand and income on the other, this connection being in terms of 
the market value of these goods and services. Class position does not 
emerge where exchange rates are fixed by means other than economic power, 
since then any connection between goods/services and income would derive 
not from the value of the goods and services according to supply and demand, 
but rather from some other factor such as p o l i t i c a l power or status. A 
market that i s not formally free has limits on the market forces that 
constitute the conditions subsiamed under 'class', and thus one's class 
s i t u a t i o n i s correspondingly l e s s important as a deteminant of one's l i f e 
chances. 
'Each kind of cla s s situation ... w i l l become most c l e a r l y 
efficacious when a l l other determinants of reciprocal 
relations are, as far as possiblie, eliminated i n thei r 
significance.' (Weber, 1948: 185) 
I n a similar fashion, the pure effects of an actor's class position 
are not seen when the extent of the market i s limited by, for instance, 
status or p o l i t i c a l party membership: i n affecting the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
the disposal of goods and s k i l l s i n demand, such factors act, as we noted 
in section 'A', as barriers preventing class position from conditioning l i f e 
chances. 
1 We must note , however, that stat\is characteristics may i n 
certain cases b^ necessary s k i l l s for an occupation, e.g. 
in diplomatic c i r c l e s . 
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On the other hand i t i s a different matter when status or suchlike 
i s e s s e n t i a l i n order to obtain the qualifications necessary for a 
desired occupation: the concept of class i s applicable only after the 
goods and s k i l l s have been attained, and as long as one i s formally free 
to enter the occupation, then the pure effects of class position can s t i l l 
be seen: such would not be the case only i f qualifications were deliber-
ately limited to those of a p a r t i c u l a r status with a view to preventing 
others from entering the occupation. Needless;to say, the means by which 
an individual acquired his goods and s k i l l s i s nevertheless relevant for 
many an a l y t i c a l purposes. 
I t i s now clear why Weber excludes slaves from consideration as a 
c l a s s . 
'Those men whose fate i s not determined by the chance of 
using goods or services for themselves on the market, e.g. 
slaves, are not, however, a 'class' in the technical sense 
of the term. They are, rather, a 'status group'.' 
(1948: 183) 
Slavery i s excluded from consideration as a class situation because slaves, 
w h i l s t they may have varying degrees of s k i l l s , cannot exchange them for 
the benefit of income. They themselves are goods, belonging to an indi-
vidual, and of which he may despose for the sake of more or less income, 
depending on the s k i l l s of the slave i n question. I f the slave had s k i l l s 
that were valued because rare, i t would make no difference to the degree 
of h i s own economic power: i . e . he would s t i l l be economically powerless. 
Whereas i f the 'wage-slave', for instance, possessed rare s k i l l s he would 
have the choice whether to use them or not, and thus i n order to persuade 
him to use them for A's benefit, A would have to reward him, since the 
actor i s formally free not to use h i s s k i l l s . While i t i s thus true 
that neither slaves nor wage-slaves have economic power, i t i s for d i f f e r -
ent reasons: wage-slaves have no economic power because the s k i l l s they 
have to dispose of are, i n terms of the given rates of exchange on the 
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market, worthless; while slaves have no economic power because they do 
not have the power to dispose of the s k i l l s they have, however great 
these may be."*" Thus the reason why slaves do not constitute a class 
i s because market action i s not within t h e i r scope: for them the market 
has no extent. I t i s pre c i s e l y because of t h i s , of coxirse, that the 
economic interests of slaves are of a kind completely different from 
those of individuals i n cl a s s positions; and i t i s th i s that constitutes 
the major significance i n the contention that slaves are not a 'class'. 
Nevertheless i t i s c l e a r that the l i f e chances of slaves may vary 
widely; and, i n so f a r as we are interested i n r e l a t i v e income, security 
etc. per se, then we must go beyond cl a s s situation, and thus beyond a 
spec i a l set of conditions of economic action, to include within our frame 
of reference the various forms of economic action open to the actor, and 
the 'economic situation' that may not only set some of the conditions of 
economic action but may also ( l i k e ' l i f e chances') r e s u l t from economic 
action. 'Economic situation', c l e a r l y a more s p e c i f i c concept than ' l i f e 
chances', may be a n a l y t i c a l l y distinguished from economic action, and w i l l 
thus include r e l a t i v e income (and income-equivalents) and prospects of 
inccane (including economic security, for instance, and prospects of prom? 
otion). Economic action w i l l then constitute the various ways i n which 
actors may arrive at, maintain or advance from their economic situation. 
That the d i s t i n c t i o n between economic situation and economic action can 
only be anal y t i c a l i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the p o s s i b i l i t y of overtime: overtime 
i s a 'prospect of income' for the actor only i f the conditions of his 
economic action make t h i s means available to him, and i f he considers i t 
i n h i s economic action. 
This l a t t e r point i s an exaggeration, since the slave may perform 
his duties more adequately for better conditions, using t a c i t or 
informal bargaining. 
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Weber would be the f i r s t to admit that his conception of class 
i s narrow: indeed i t i s intentionally so, conceptualised for the spec-
i f i c conditions of market economies. For our purposes a broader con-
ception i s necessary, as we do not wish to r e s t r i c t our framework to the 
conditions prevailing i n a p a r t i c u l a r place or period. As indicated in 
the l a s t patagraph, our conception of c l a s s w i l l incorporate the more 
economic aspects of l i f e chances (economic situation) and the various 
conditions of economic action. What have we gained from the Weberian 
analysis, however, to incorporate i n a wider conception? Our p r i n c i p a l 
gain l i e s i n Weber's general approach to the problem: his methodological 
individualist''" analysis of c l a s s i n means-end terms avoids assvunptions 
regarding group or true i n t e r e s t s , and yet stresses the role of subjective 
interests i n economic action, so that c l a s s i s viewed in a conditioning 
rather than determining role, and the individual's cognitions and motiva-
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tions are not epiphenomenal or derivative but central to his action. 
In contrast with Goldmann, then, Weber regards c l a s s as a category of 
those sharing certain conditions of action. Weber would include only those 
cognitions and evaluations that are necessarily involved i n membership of 
th i s category:^ h i s concept of c l a s s would thus encompass neither common 
value- and perspective-responses to these conditions, nor mutually effective 
behaviour (apart from s t r i c t l y market relationships) . In the terms of 
See Chapter 7, p 148ff below^for a f u l l e r discussion of our reasons 
for the adoption of methodological individualism. 
This Weberian conception of c l a s s would be c r i t i c i s e d by Parkin for 
i t s consideration of 'individual attitudes and perceptions' as 
'independent variables'. Parkin suggests that we may generally account 
for attitude differences i n terms of 'distinctively structural factors' 
so that cognitive variations are seen as 'simply an artefact of v a r i a -
tions i n the s t r u c t u r a l location of the individuals concerned'. (1967: 
288-9) Needless to say, we do not concur with t h i s standpoint of 
s t r u c t u r a l deteminism. 
These cognitions and evaluations would constitute 'basic consciousness' 
in Goldmann's terms - see above. Chapter 2, p 42 
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Chapter 2,^ Weber's conception i s thus closer to that of a group type 
'a' than Goldmann's definition, whose presuppositions would embrace in 
'class' group ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s of types 'b' and 'c'. 
( i i i ) A Wider Conception of Class 
Although we wish to work with a broader conception of class than 
Weber's, we must retain Weber's careful analytical approach, rather than 
including within 'class' a wide undifferentiated assortment of variables. 
Equally we must avoid presuppositions as to the causal significance of 
various c l a s s variables: Ellwood, i n c r i t i c i s i n g the Marxist over-emphasis 
of the economic, suggests that economic elements may be seen as 'stimuli' 
('conditions' i n our terminology) which do not necessarily determine 
responses, especially where the responses l i e outside the economic sphere. 
(1911: 38-40) He does not, however, l e t this lead him to the conclusion 
2 
that the economic constitutes a f u l l y insulated province of meaning: on 
the contrary, one's responses i n one sphere may be extended into more general 
responses i n several spheres. Ellwood thus leads us to see that class as a 
substructure of thought may indeed consist of a r e l a t i v e l y autonomous 
province of meaning,^ but that superstructural consciousness may develop 
4 
therefrom i n the form of 'extensions'. This conception of class thus 
concurs with our persistent emphasis i n Chapter 2 upon an analytical sub-
structure that i s n&t assumed to be the base r e a l i t y . 
I f then we take, as an a n a l y t i c a l substructure, a conception of class 
that i s broader than Weber's, the relevant aspects thereof emerge through 
the recognition of three level s of analysis: the structure of economic 
•'" See above, p 46 
2 
Mary Douglas suggests that complete insulation i s 'very d i f f i c u l t 
and unlikely'. (1973: 225) 
^ For an elaboration of t h i s concept, see Chapter 8, p 188 below. 
^ The concept of 'extensions' was introduced in Chapter 3, p 81 
above. 
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s i t u a t i o n s , the p o s i t i o n i n the s t r u c t u r e , and the i n d i v i d u a l i n the 
p o s i t i o n . 
A. The s t r u c t u r e o f economic s i t u a t i o n s : t h e s t r u c t u r e may be c h a r a c t e r i s e d 
according to the f o l l o w i n g a s p e c t s : 
1) General s t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s - e.g., where d i s c r e t e p o s i t i o n s 
can be detected, the number o f these p o s i t i o n s and r e l a t i v e number of occu-
pants of each; and, where h i e r a r c h i c a l models are a p p l i c a b l e , the degree of 
i n c l i n e and r e l a t i v e s i z e o f i n t e r v a l s between l e v e l s i n the h i e r a r c h y . 
2) Means of attainment of and m o b i l i t y between economic s i t u a t i o n s . 
T h i s i n d i c a t e s the forms of power on which the s t r u c t u r e i s based. These 
forms o f power may a l s o impose:-
3) R e s t r i c t i o n s on the a v a i l a b i l i t y and u t i l i s a t i o n of means of economic 
a c t i o n . R e s t r i c t i o n s may be de j u r e or de f a c t o . The degree of freedom 
of the market would be i n c l u d e d here.''' 
4) Values t h a t economic s i t u a t i o n s a t t a i n (e.g. s t a t u s ) . T h i s aspect, 
w h i l s t i n d i c a t i n g the wider s i g n i f i c a n c e of economic power i n the s o c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e concerned, does not i n i t s e l f r e v e a l whether economic power i s 
2 
independent of or d e r i v a t i v e from the e x e r c i s e of other forms of power, 
as envisaged i n as p e c t s 2) and 3 ) . 
B. P o s i t i o n i n the s t r u c t u r e ; the a n a l y s i s of the s t r u c t u r e of economic 
s i t u a t i o n s i s by d e f i n i t i o n e s s e n t i a l j u s t to de s c r i b e any p a r t i c u l a r 
p o s i t i o n : each p o s i t i o n can be s p e c i f i e d only r e l a t i v e to others, and thus 
only i n terms of the g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Furthermore, the 
R e s t r i c t i o n s on the freedom of the market were d i s c u s s e d above, p 113 
2 Cf Weber, 1948: 180 - '... the emergence of economic power may be 
the consequence of power e x i s t i n g on other groiands. ' 
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analysis of an actor's economic situation in i t s structural context ( i . e . , 
according to the s t r u c t u r a l aspects outlined above) w i l l indicate 
potential group formations (based upon economic situation or action) in 
which this actor may become involved. 
Through adopting the Weberian emphasis on the conditioning rather 
than determining role of c l a s s , and on the role of subjective interests 
i n economic action, i t may be suggested that economic conditions can 
influence an individual's thought only i n working through his meanings 
and motives. I n considering the individual's consciousness involved in 
hi s economic situation and action, we may of course discover the 'basic 
consciousness'"'" simply by looking at the position in the structure; for 
the actual consciousness involved i n the individual's economic situation 
and action, however, we must examine:-
C. The individual in the position: Some cognitions and evaluations may, 
then, be necessary for the individual to be in the position at a l l , but 
i f we are to study the influence of his economic situation and action upon 
his thought, we cannot neglect the consciousness he brings to the situa-
tion (including h i s values and sentiments) which cannot be derived from 
an analysis of the position i t s e l f . Similarly i t may be claimed that any 
p a r t i c u l a r economic situation necessarily involves certain forms of 
experience; but the description of such experience may be i n f i n i t e unless 
seen i n relation to the individual's actual values amd sentiments. 
What then are the fundamental spheres of the individual's economic 
l i f e that must be taken into account? We have emphasised i n e a r l i e r 
chapters both situation and action i n the substructure, and in t h i s chapter 
we have been concerned with elements of economic action (such as means of 
Namely that consciousness without which the individual would not 
be able to remain i n the economic situation; see the section on 
Goldmann in Chapter 2, p a r t i c u l a r l y p 42 
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s o c i a l m o b i l i t y ) and economic s i t u a t i o n ( i n c l u d i n g s t r u c t u r a l p o s i t i o n 
and what i t a t t a i n s ) . We have however neglected the question of what 
economic a c t i o n a t t a i n s , except i n s o f a r as t h i s r e l a t e s to economic 
s i t u a t i o n . I n o t h e r words> an element we have overlooked c o n s i s t s of 
the non-economic f a c t o r s a t t a i n e d by or i n v o lved i n economic a c t i o n : 
t h i s we may c a l l the 'work s i t u a t i o n ' . The p r i n c i p a l elements i n our 
wider conception of ' c l a s s ' , then, i n c l u d e economic s i t u a t i o n (and what 
i t a t t a i n s ) , economic a c t i o n (and the conditions thereof, which may include 
one's p r e s e n t economic s i t u a t i o n ) and work s i t u a t i o n - elements which i n 
other s t u d i e s of c l a s s may be l o n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d . 
Through our a n a l y s i s and e l a b o r a t i o n of Weber's conception of c l a s s , 
we have thus a r r i v e d a t a framework which bears a strong resemblance to 
t h a t proposed by Lockwood i n h i s c r i t i q u e of the broad Marxian d e f i n i t i o n 
o f c l a s s . (1958: 13-16) Lockwood a n a l y s e s ' c l a s s p o s i t i o n * i n t o 'market 
s i t u a t i o n ' , 'work s i t u a t i o n ' and ' s t a t u s s i t u a t i o n ' . * Under 'market 
s i t u a t i o n ' he i n c l u d e s f a c t o r s (e.g. s i z e and source of income) t h a t we 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e i n t o economic s i t u a t i o n and the conditions of economic a c t i o n . 
We are not d i r e c t l y concerned with ' s t a t u s s i t u a t i o n ' , but recognise t h a t 
s t a t u s may be one of the most important q u a l i t i e s t h a t economic s i t u a t i o n 
a t t a i n s . The c l o s e s t resemblance between Lockwood's framework and our own 
l i e s e v i d e n t l y i n the concept of 'work s i t u a t i o n ' (coined by Lockwood) , 
though Lockwood r e s t r i c t s t h i s concept to -
'... the s e t of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n which the i n d i v i d u a l 
i s i n v o l v e d a t work by v i r t u e of h i s p o s i t i o n i n the 
d i v i s i o n of labour.' (1958: 15) 
Lockwood's emphasis upon s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the work s i t u a t i o n c l e a r l y 
d e r i v e s from h i s c e n t r a l concern w i t h the conditions of c l a s s consciousness: 
y e t i n p r a c t i c e he c o n s i d e r s a s p e c t s of work s i t u a t i o n t h a t are not i n 
themselves s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s - e.g., the developing s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n of 
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r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s (1958: 82-87), the growth of mechanisation (1958: 87-95) 
and the degree to which 'instrumental action i s at a premiiom'. (1958: 
205) . The broader concept of work situation that we have adopted clearly 
does not confine our analysis to s o c i a l relationships, but permits the 
consideration of the actor's experience and evaluation of various other 
non-economic aspects of h i s work. 
There now arises the question of how one's experience and evaluation 
of economic situation, economic action and work situation relate to the 
development of consciousness. 'Experience' here appears to be an umbrella 
term which, more precisely conceived, relates to the allowance or exclusion 
of certain kinds of consciousness by conditions that economic situation, 
action or work situation involve or produce (e.g. economic security, 'free-
lance' employment, mechanical labour) . Such a process of permission or 
exclusion i s c l e a r l y l e s s d i r e c t l y related to a means-end orientation, and 
i s thus closer to the 'perspective' rather than the 'commitment' approach 
suggested i n the section on Mannheim i n Chapter 2."*" An example of where 
the 'experience' approach i s p a r t i c u l a r l y applicable i s where economic 
action i s undertaken in an attitude of habit and resignation; or where 
one's concentration on the economic aspects of the action tends to blind 
one to the non-economic aspects involved - in such cases the development of 
consciousness may nonetheless occur through experience of the work s i t u -
ation . 
Whilst the development of consciousness through experience suggests 
a passive orientation to certain conditions (whether through the action 
being habitual, rather than sentimental or rational, or through i t s 
involving unintended consequences), a means-end analysis becomes appli-
cable when we begin to examine the actor's evaluation of his situation 
See above, p 31 f f 
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and action. I f we use a ra t i o n a l model (sentiments being sociologically 
rationalised to values"*") , then the actor's evaluations (in terms of his 
ends and values) may be seen to apply to both his actual and his possible 
economic situation and action and work situation: thus h i s present or an 
anticipated future economic situation may be his end, while the means 
thereto i s h i s economic action. We may therefore go beyond a model frozen 
2 
i n time to one which includes process: the economic 'career'' of the actor 
through time. In an analysis which takes account of the subjective (values 
and ends) and objective (economic situation and what i t attains, and con-
ditions of economic action) aspects of economic action, the actor's economic 
ends cannot be considered as given; they may develop as may his vdlues, 
through interrelations with the other components of h i s economic action. 
I n the f i r s t place i t i s clear that economic ends are l i k e l y to be chosen 
which seem feasible within the given conditions of the actor's economic 
action, But beyond t h i s , i f the ends are themselves means of actualising 
values then a process of elective a f f i n i t y may also take place between the 
ends and the values , where the values are those (other than the purely 
economic) which economic ends att a i n in the s o c i a l structure concerned 
Ce.g, status, opportunities for p o l i t i c a l power). Those values which are 
attainable through apparently feasible economic ends are more l i k e l y to be 
adopted by the actor, j u s t as the values which he brings to a situation of 
alternative means and ends w i l l guide selection amongst these alternatives, 
and may further lay greater or lesser emphasis on economic ends per se. 
I f the moral and cathectic standards of Parsons" action schema are combined 
into evaluative standards,^ the values used by the actor to select between 
alternative ends and means may be seen as conscious evaluative c r i t e r i a . 
On 'sociological r a t i o n a l i t y ' see above Chapter 1, p 15 
2 
This term i s here used i n the broad sense, as i n Goffman, 1972: 527. 3 As suggested i n Chapter 3, p 86 above. 
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j u s t as adequacy for attaining s p e c i f i c economic ends w i l l constitute 
for the rational actor the evaluative c r i t e r i a determining his judge-
ments as to the relevant aspects of the situation and the preferred course 
of action. The choice of means w i l l also be influenced by the actor's 
values, particuarly with respect to the non-economic aspects of the means, 
i . e . the work situation. From the opposite angle, the work situation may 
i t s e l f lead to the adoption of new values, as i n the case of a prestigious 
work situation leading to an emphasis by the actor upon status rather than 
fi n a n c i a l considerations, even i f there wa^ s l i t t l e choice i n the original 
decision to take up t h i s work. Over a long time-scale we s i m i l a r l y see that, 
through the achievement of a new economic situation, the individual's values 
may develop (in r e l a t i o n to what the new economic situation attains) possibly 
leading to further economic ends; and his ends may develop (in relation to 
the conditions of economic action brought about by his new economic situa-
tion) possibly leading to the adoption of values that are now attainable: 
i n short, a new economic situation may lead to the development of new ends 
and values through t h e i r becoming feasible together with the fact of their 
appeal to previously Tinformulised sentiments. Equally, of course, an 
altered s et of p o s s i b i l i t i e s may render previous ends or values unattain-
able. Clearly the individual may recognise that a new economic situation 
may a l t e r h i s conditions of economic action, and may s t r i v e for i t for 
t h i s reason, thus conceiving h i s action in terms of means to further means. 
(iv) Conclusion 
I n t h i s chapter we have examined the p o s s i b i l i t y of viewing ' cl a s s ' 
as an a n a l y t i c a l substructure in the sociology of knowledge. Despite our 
wish for a broader conception of class than Weber's, we took from Weber's 
conception the methodological i n d i v i d u a l i s t analysis of class i n means-
end terms (though not excluding the p o s s i b i l i t y of a more passive orien-
tation to economic and work conditions i n terms of 'experience'), the 
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central role that subjective factors play i n economic action, and the 
view of economic elements as conditioning rather than determining. We 
emphasised the importance of considering both the objective features of 
the structure of economic situations, and of any particular position in 
that structure, and the subjective non-rderivative elements that the 
examination of the individual i n the position reveals. We found that the 
p r i n c i p a l elements into which the concept class'• may be broken down are 
economic situation (and what i t a t t a i n s ) , economic action (and conditions 
thereof) and work situation. There i s no necessary implication of solidary 
group membership i n t h i s concept o f . ' c l a s s * , and, unlike 'class position?, 
there i s no exclusion (in favour of objective conditions) of i n t r i n s i c 
svibjective elements, and thus of economic action. F i n a l l y we have'shown, 
through the application of a rational model to the actor i n the situation, 
the potential development over time of the subjective and objective com-
ponents of his economic action, including thus h i s orientation not only 
to his actual circumstances but also towards those which are seen as possible, 
and.hence towards which he may be motivated. 
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CHAPTER 6; THE SUPERSTRUCTURE AS 'WORLD VIEW' 
(i) Conceptions of 'World View' 
The concept of 'world view' emerged as s i g n i f i c a n t i n the work of a 
number of writers studied in Part I . I t appears to be one of the broadest 
conceptions of consciousness and, given our emphasis on 'width' as a 
c r i t e r i o n of superstructural consciousness, i t seems pertinent to analyse 
the world view concept i n greater depth i n the attempt to delineate more 
adequately c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of consciousness in the superstructure. 
I n Part I we refrained from adopting Goldmann's narrow and ci r c u l a r 
conception of world view,"*" and Berger and Luckmann's notion of Weltan-
2 
schauung as the property of reason-oriented i n t e l l e c t u a l s . Mannheim's 
conception of Weltanschauung appeared more interesting: i t did not confine 
i t s e l f to abstract theoretical elements of consciousness, and yet gener-
a l l y managed to avoid the 'holism' that attempts to encompass the con-
sciousness of a whole society."^ Nevertheless, although an ideal-type 
concept, i t s 'rag-bag' of elements of consciousness seemed i l l - d e f i n e d , 
and i t appeared to preclude the formation of an ideal-type of less 
coherence and consistency. To what extent are these shortcomings char-
a c t e r i s t i c of 'Weltanschauung' as conceived by other writers? 
Von Wiesner offers a useful definition of 'Weltanschauung' that, he 
claims, finds universal agreement: 
'Was unter Weltanschauung zu verstehen i s t , wird a l l -
s e i t s vOllig tibereinstimmend defin i e r t a l s die Summe 
Oder auch a l s der Inbegriff a l l e r Ansichten und Meinungen, 
Behauptungen und Bekenntnisse, welche Uber Wesen und 
Bedeutung des Weltganzen mit Einschluss der Menschheit 





See above. Chapter 2, p. 51 f f . 
See above. Chapter 3, p 75 
See above, Chapter 3, p 73 
'What i s to be understood by Weltanschauung i s defined with complete 
agreement on a l l sides as the sum or indeed as the embodiment of a l l 
views and opinions, assertions and avowals which are expressed/ 
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This definition however provides us with two alternative ways of con-
ceiving of the relationship between elements that make up the Weltan-
schauung: 'Summe' or ' I n b e g r i f f . Whilst the former would imply the 
simple addition of elements of consciousness to form thus a 'rag-bag' 
Weltanschauung, the l a t t e r would suggest a closer connection between 
the elements of consciousness; a summary or sum t o t a l rather than a 
mere svrai. I n the 'Inbegriff' conception, the Weltanschauung i s variously 
embodied i n the manifold perspectives on the world, and i s thus a pre-
existent essence rather than merely a retrospective siamming up for the 
purpose of description. 
The l a t t e r conception of Weltanschauung, as a descriptive summa-
tion, i n fact gives way i n the l i t e r a t u r e to a predominant characterisa-
tion of Weltanschauung as a coherent t o t a l i t y . Frischeisen-*KOhler, con-
tributing with von Wiesner, Dilthey and others to a collection of readings 
on the svibject, emphasises the unity of Weltanschauung: 
"... die Beziehung auf die Einheit, welche das 
wesentliche Merkmal jeder Weltanschauung i s t ...' 
(1911: x ) ^ 
Dilthey could not be more cl e a r about his position with respect to the 
issue of Wei tans chauving as summation or t o t a l i t y : die Weltanschauungs-
gebilden -
'... sind nach der GesetzmSssigkeit i n den Tiefen 
der Struktur und der logischen Regelhaftigkeit 
nicht Aggregate, sondern Gebilde.' 
(1911: 15)2 
i . e . , Weltanschauungen are systematic constructions (:rather than mere 
aggregates) b u i l t up i n regular stages and through logic. The stages of 
expressed/ 
about the nature and meaning of the universe, including humanity'. 
^ "... the rela t i o n to unity, which i s the essential characteristic 
of every Weltanschauung ,,.' 
2 Weltanschauung constructions "... are, because of the conformity 
to law i n the depths of t h e i r structure and their lo g i c a l 
regularity, not aggregates, but systems.' 
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Weltanschauung construction occur i n the following sequence (1911: lOff) : 
through repeated and related life-experiences (Lebenserfahrungen) there 
arise 'Lebensstimmungen', that i s very general attitudes towards l i f e , 
such as ' l i v e for today', aimed existence, other-worldly orientation and, 
most widely, optimism and pessimism, Lebensstimmungen, which are per-
haps better translated as moods rather than as attitudes, have their 
cognitive corollary i n a "Weltbild', or image of the world. The Lebens-
stimmungen and the Weltbild constitute the lowest l e v e l for the construc-
tion of Weltanschauungen, which proceeds under the impetus of solving 
the 'riddle of l i f e ' (LebensrStsel) . I t i s indeed the attempt to offer 
a complete solution to the Lebensrfltsel, insofar as every Weltan-
schauiong does attempt t h i s (and Dilthey offers no alternative version 
of Weltanschauung construction), that necessitates for each Weltanschauung 
the same sequence of construction: 
'Alle Vfel tanschauungen enthalten, wenn s i e eine vollt-
stcbndige Auflbsung des LebensrStsels zu geben 
unternehmen, regelmfissig dieselbe Struktur. Diese 
Struktur i s t jedesmal ein Zusammenhang, i n welchem 
auf der Grundlage eines Weldbildes die Fragen nach 
Bedeutung und Sinn der Welt entschieden und heraus 
Ideal, hBchstes Gut, oberste GrundsStze fttr die 
LebensfUhrung ahgeleitet werden," ^ 
(1911s 11) 
r 
Dilthey conceives the second l e v e l i n the structure of Weltanschauung, 
building upon the Weltbild, as that of 'LebenswUrdigung' , i n which 
evaluation i s predominant. On the base of the f i r s t and second stages 
of cognition and evaluation, the t h i r d stage 'Willenszielen', more 
d i r e c t l y related to motivation and thus embodying p r a c t i c a l energy, 
'A l l Weltanschauungen, i f they attempt to provide a complete 
solution to the riddle of l i f e , regularly possess the same 
structure. This structure i s always a context i n which, on 
the basis of an image of the world, the questions about 
the meaning and significance of the world are resolved, and 
from these solutions the ideal, the highest good, the supreme 
principles for the conduct of l i f e are derived,' 
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i s completed through the p o s i t i n g of ends, the development of end-
r a t i o n a l i t y , and the encompassing of a l l previous elements w i t h i n an 
o v e r - r i d i n g value-order, which c o n s t i t u t e s an o v e r a l l normative l i f e -
p l a n . (1911: 13) 
De s p i t e the way i n which Weltanschauungen are fo r D i l t h e y rooted i n 
l i v e d experience, i t seems, both from the d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e i r h i g h l y 
l o g i c a l mode and r e s u l t of development and of t h e i r reason f o r develop-
ment (to a t t a i n a complete s o l u t i o n o f the LebengrStsel) , t h a t S c h e l e r 
was r i g h t i n d e s c r i b i n g them as "Bildungsweltanschauungen": a r t i f i c i a l 
i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s . (Staude, 1967: 154) Not only are D i l t h e y " s 
Weltanschauungen i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t , they appear to possess a high degree. 
of l o g i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n , without even being c h a r a c t e r i s e d as i d e a l - t y p e s . 
D i l t h e y , then, does not help us to develop a more u s e f u l concept of 
Weltanschauung than t h a t of Mannheim, and i t seems t h a t Berger and 
Luckmann have a t l e a s t one major h i s t o r i c a l precedent f o r t h e i r concep-
t i o n o f Weltanschauung. 
F o r J a s p e r s , as f o r D i l t h e y , 'Weltanschauung' r e f e r s to a t o t a l i t y : 
'Was i s t Weltanschauung? Etwas Ganzes und etwas 
U n i v e r s a l e s . ' (1922: 1 ) ^ 
J a s p e r s emphasises the s u b j e c t i v e and o b j e c t i v e aspects of Weltanschuung: 
o b j e c t i v e W e l t b i l d e r , when viewed from the p o i n t of view of the s u b j e c t , 
are seen as ' E i n s t e l l u n g e n ' , a t e m which r e f e r s to tendencies towards 
p a r t i c u l a r types of s u b j e c t - o b j e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p i n terms of the s u b j e c t ' s 
mode of c o g n i t i o n (e.g., r a t i o n a l , a e s t h e t i c , contemplative). (1922: 42) 
But an E i n s t e l l u n g and a W e l t b i l d c o n s t i t u t e only a b s t r a c t elements of a 
Weltanschauung, a t whose ce n t r e we f i n d the dynamic powers of the l i f e of 
'G e i s t ' i t s e l f . (1922: 43) Thus, although the h o l i s t i c nature of 
•'' 'What i s Weltanschauung? Something whole and something u n i v e r s a l . " 
129 
Weltanschauungen i s s t r e s s e d , w e are given the impression that the 
coherence involved i s f a r l e s s i n t e l l e c t u a l l y constructed, and th i s i s 
confirmed i n Jaspers" account of the potential manifestations of Weltan-
schauungen, e.g. i n s t y l e of l i f e , a r t , religion and p o l i t i c s . (1922: 44) 
I n a l l these versions of Weltanschauung we have discovered a pre-
dominant h o l i s t i c conception: can a study of the components suggested 
lead us to a more a n a l y t i c a l exposition? Jaspers' 'Weltbild' and 'Einst-
ellmng' remain on a very general l e v e l , and seem to be primarily cog-
n i t i v e , Dilthey presents on an equally general l e v e l , through his three 
l e v e l s of Weltanschauung construction, apparently sharply divided spheres 
of cognition, evaluation and motivation. I t may be that von Wiesner's 
l i s t ("Ansichten und Melnungen , Behauptungen und Bekenntnisse", 1911: 
173) i s the miost useful, i n that no necessary division between the cog-
n i t i v e and the evaluative i s posited and the terms used may apply to 
l e s s generalised components of consciousness. 
At t h i s point i t i s relevant to remind ourselves of the components 
of superstructural consciousness that emerged i n Chapter 3 through a study 
of sociologists of knowledge. 
( i i ) Non-holistic Conceptions of Superstructural Consciousness 
In Chapter 3, we distinguished four general elements of the super-
structure, each of wider significance than merely i n relation to svib-
s t r u c t u r a l action/situation: pragmatic knowledge, legitimations, pro-
2 
motions and extensions. I s there any tern, more s p e c i f i c than super-
structure, world view or consciousness, that would include these elements 
"'" '... die allgemeinen, weltanschaulichen Gestalten ..,' 
(1922: 44) 
^ See above. Chapter 3, section (vi) ,PP 81-^ 82 
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without relating them i n a h o l i s t i c manner? Berger and Luckmann's 
're l a t i v e l y autonomous sub-universes of meaning' (1967: 104) might at 
f i r s t seem useful i n not attempting to subsume the .consciousness of a 
whole society; but on closer inspection i t resembles the h o l i s t i c world 
view concept (though for a p a r t i c u l a r group within society), as coherence 
and consistency are s t i l l assumed. As for ' f i n i t e provinces of meaning'•*• 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 39), although they allow for non-integrated 
spheres of consciousness, the spheres, l i k e Dilthey's levels of Weltan-
schauung structure, are over-compartmentalised, both from one another 
and from 'everyday r e a l i t y ' . 
The sort of term we are looking for w i l l be without the metaphysical 
assimiptions of the Weltanschauving theorists or Berger and Luckmann. Among 
the concepts already encountered, that which f u l f i l s the requirements 
most closely i s 'perspective" , which we met within,Chapters 2 and 3 i n 
considering the work of Mannheim and Scheler, 'Perspective' i s in fact 
Mannheim's basic concept of par t i c u l a r consciousness, and i s developed 
i n h is sociology of knowledge i n rela t i o n to the processes of material 
2 
pragmatism, dir e c t i n t e r e s t determination and commitment. I t may be 
argued that 'perspective' i s an over-cognitive and i n s u f f i c i e n t l y eval-
3 
uative concept; though i t s use by Scheler, for whom values constitute 
a sphere of knowledge, indicates that i t may be used to include eval-
uations as well as cognitions. I t i s i n any case pertinent to i n v e s t i -
gate the u t i l i t y of various concepts that have similar meanings to 
'perspective'. 
The contrast between ' r e l a t i v e l y autonomous universes of 
meaning' and ' f i n i t e provinces of meaning' i s discussed in 
a footnote to Chapter 8, p 188 below, 
2 
See above. Chapter 2, p 32 and Chapter 3 p 78 
See above, Chapter 3 p 82 f f . 
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( i i i ) Perspectives, Attitudes and the Like 
McLeod and Chaffee have recently attempted to distinguish certain 
concepts which a l l refer to some l e v e l of conception of 'social r e a l i t y " . 
They themselves introduce the d i s t i n c t i o n between s o c i a l r e a l i t y : the 
person's frame of reference i n a s o c i a l situation; and s o c i a l r e a l i t y : 
the degree to which t h i s frame of reference i s shared amongst the members 
of the s o c i a l system, (1972; 52-54) They claim that Berger and Luckmann's 
usage of 's o c i a l r e a l i t y ' i s in. the f i r s t sense, whilst we should argue 
that Berger and Luckmann confuse the two senses, i n such a way that s o c i a l 
r e a l i t y consists of the shared frames of reference of individuals i n 
s o c i a l situations. Amongst the concepts with similar meaning to 'social 
r e a l i t y ' are: 'cognitive map', which i s reminiscent of 'Weltbild', and 
which they claim includes cognitions derived from non-social sources; 
'frame of reference', a mental set applying to a variety of different 
situations; 'perspective', which, as a general cognition of s o c i a l 
r e a l i t y , would seem to be a s o c i a l Weltbild, and share the holism of the 
Weltbild concept; and 'Weltanschauung', which, as a philosophy of tilhe 
world or l i f e , and perhaps positing fundamental values, would seem to 
be the only one of these concepts which i s not s t r i c t l y define'd i n 
cognitive terms. (1972: 56-58) Given their i n t e r e s t i n cognition, i t 
i s not surprising that McLeod and Chaffee do not introduce for compar-
ison the concept of 'attitude', which tends to have evaluative over-
tones. I t could however be argued that both 'frame of reference' and 
'perspective' could be defined s i m i l a r l y (especially i f one allows for 
narrow perspectives as well as those covering s o c i a l r e a l i t y more 
generally) and, unlike 'cognitive map' and indeed 'Weltbild', could 
possess evaluational aspects. 
Cooper and McGaugh iindertake a similar study of attitude and 
related concepts. That most relevant to our interest i s 'ideology'. 
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which comes very close to the conceptions that we have encomtered 
above: 
' . i . an individual's s o c i a l ideology presents a h o l i s t i c 
view of h i s self-perception and h i s perception of 
society. In a sense i t i s a generalized, global a t t i -
tude, v i r t u a l l y a 'philosophy of l i f e ' , though not 
formally structured'. (1966: 28) 
In i t s s t r e s s on holism, this definition approaches the ideal-type 
definition of world view, and indicates that 'attitude' may well be a 
more p a r t i c u l a r version thereof: a "part^world' view perhaps. I t i s 
s i g n i f i c a n t that another of the concepts discussed by Cooper and McGaugh 
i n r e l a t i o n to attitude i s 'value'; and, once again, i n their discussion 
of "value system', they approach the traditional concept of Weltan-
schauung (particularly that of Dilthey), and the notion of attitude as 
an element i n i t s organisation: 
"... a value system i s an individual's over-all l i f e aspir-
ation ... which on the one hand gives direction to h i s 
behaviour, and on the other hand i s a frame of reference 
by which the worth of stimulus objects may be judged. . ,. 
i t i s an elaborate and a r t i c u l a t e organisation of a t t i -
tudes.' (1966: 31) 
I t would thus appear that "attitude" i s worthy of particular study 
as a concpet s i m i l a r to 'perspective" i n i t s l e s s than t o t a l delinea-
tions of an individual"s consciousness, and i t s inclusion of both cog-
n i t i v e and evaluative aspects. This view as to the s i m i l a r i t y of 
attitude and perspective i s supported by Asch, who writes: 
'Language aptly refers to attitude as a perspective 
or a point-of-view, implying a certain unified way 
of looking at data.' (1966: 33) 
As for the q u a l i f i c a t i o n 'unified', Asch claims: 
'The study of attitudes must, i t would seem, make the 
minimum assumption that a given view i s r e l a t i v e l y 
unified, consisting of interdependent parts i n 
mutual relati o n . ' (1966: 33) 
Since attitudes or perspectives may apply over a f a r narrower area 
than "Weltanschauung", we cannot quarrel with Asch's prerequisite of 
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' r e l a t i v e l y unified', as, i f an attitude/perspective were to consist 
of several quite unrelated views, then one would presumably decide 
that these constituted several d i s t i n c t attitudes/perspectives. 
Asch's definition of attitude c l e a r l y refers to an element of con-
sciousness, without any necessary behavioural associations. This i s not 
so for some psychologists, however, whose behaviourism permeates their 
definitions of attitude, thus leading to assumed, rather than examined, 
relationships of consciousness and behaviour. Krech, Crutchfield and 
Ballachey, for example, define attitudes as: 
"... enduring systems of positive or negative evalua-
tions, emotional feelings, and pro or con action 
tendencies with respect to s o c i a l objects. ... In 
defining attitudes as systems, we are emphasizing 
the interrelatedness of the three attitude compon-
ents. When incorporated i n a system, these compon»-
ents become mutually interdependent. The cognitions 
of an individual about an object are influenced by 
hi s feelings and action tendencies toward that object. 
And a change i n h i s cognitions about the object w i l l 
tend to produce feelings and action tendencies towards 
i t . ' (1962: 139-140) 
Allport s i m i l a r l y states that; 
'Attitudes determine for each individual what he w i l l 
see and hear, what he w i l l think and what he w i l l do. 
(1966: 17, my emphasis); 
and Newcomb claims that: 
'... the ultimate referent of attitudes i s behaviour;' 
(1966: 23) 
In contrast, Thomas and Znaniecki define attitude i n terms of a 
state of mind towards a s o c i a l value (Allport, 1966: 19), thus providing 
a d e f i n i t i o n which concentrates on attitude as an element of conscious-
ness, though the definition does reveal the tendency to regard attitude 
as a type of regular evaluation. The relation of attitude to motivation 
i s brought out by Newcomb: 
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' .. . attitudes are generally both more persistent and more 
inclusive than motives, and a "motive' which i s described 
as both persistent and general i s indistinguishable from 
an attitude." (1966: 24) 
This quotation reveals the generality of attitudes, i n terms of both 
time and abstraction. 
The definition of attitude which we find most useful, however, i s 
provided by Krech and Crutchfield: 
'An attitude can be defined as an enduring organisation 
of motivational, emotional, perceptual, and cognitive 
processes with respect to some aspect of the individ-
ual's world.' (1948: 152, quoted by 
Newcomb, 1966: 23) 
We should want to modify t h i s definition only by making clear that i t 
i s r e l a t i v e l y enduring, and by adding 'evaluational' to the l i s t of 
processes. The definition does have d i s t i n c t advantages over others, 
i n that i t recognises the cognitive dimension of attitudes, and 
indeed i s e a s i l y related to the concepts of cognitions, evaluations and 
sentiments that we have used i n previous chapters. The definition also 
brings out that attitudes are both more inclusive and more enduring (thus 
more "general" i n both senses) than particular cognitions/evaluations, 
w h i l s t not f a l l i n g into the trap of holism: there i s no assumption 
(unlike McLeod and Chaffee's 'perspective') that an attitude covers 
the whole s o c i a l world - indeed the definition emphasises that only 
an aspect of the individual's world i s included. 
At t h i s point i t i s necessary to c l a r i f y why a general term such 
as attitude or per£i)ective i s of special value in our study. I t i s 
indeed for i t s very 'generality' ( i f t h i s can be obtained without the 
metaphysical assumptions at the foundation of the trad i t i o n a l concep-
ti o n of Weltanschauung), since: a) we seek a term that w i l l imply 
greater 'width' of coverage than merely substructural action/situation; 
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and b) we seek a term t h a t w i l l i n c l u d e the va r i o u s aspects of con-
s c i o u s n e s s t h a t have p r e v i o u s l y been d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , -since the d i s -
t i n c t i o n s between these aspects a r e not always r e l e v a n t or p o s s i b l e 
to maintain. C o g n i t i o n s , e v a l u a t i o n s and sentiments may of course 
themselves be used more or l e s s w idely, though i f a sentiment a p p l i e d 
merely to one p a r t i c u l a r temporal s i t u a t i o n , then one might wish to 
c a l l i t a f e e l i n g about t h a t s i t u a t i o n ; and the more broadly t h a t 
c o g n i t i o n s and e v a l u a t i o n s apply over time and over d i f f e r e n t s i t u a -
t i o n s , the more l i k e l y one i s t o s u b s t i t u t e 'frames of r e f e r e n c e ' or 
'p e r s p e c t i v e s ' f o r c o g n i t i o n s , and 'values' f o r e v a l u a t i o n s . A t t h i s 
l e v e l o f g e n e r a l i t y a sentiment may be seen as a non-^consciously-formu-
l a t e d v a l u e , though the degree of conscious formulation i s of course 
r e l a t i v e : the d i s t i n c t i o n thus may be d i f f i c u l t to operate. Cognitions 
and e v a l u a t i o n s may a l s o be d i f f i c u l t to d i f f e r e n t i a t e (as already noted 
i n r e l a t i o n to Parsons' a c t i o n schema)"'': a co g n i t i o n i s n e c e s s a r i l y 
2 
s e l e c t i v e , and an e v a l u a t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y subsumes co g n i t i o n s ; f u r t h e r -
more one i s not always able to d i f f e r e n t i a t e even the c o g n i t i v e and 
e v a l u a t i v e a s p e c t s of a phenomenon (e.g. God), I t i s u s e f u l thus to have 
a term, applying a t l e a s t a t the l e v e l o f extension over time, which 
w i l l i n c l u d e c o g n i t i o n s , e v a l u a t i o n s and sentiments, thus avoiding d i s -
t i n c t i o n s between the c o g n i t i v e and the e v a l u a t i v e , and between t h a t 
which i s and i s not c o n s c i o u s l y formulated. A g e n e r i c concept such as 
' a t t i t u d e ' or ' p e r s p e c t i v e ' i s t h e r e f o r e e s p e c i a l l y u s e f u l to us, as. i t 
i m p l i e s e x t e n s i o n over time and over d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s , allowing us 
to i n d i c a t e thereby the content aspect o f s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l consciousness, 
without i n t r o d u c i n g d i s t i n c t i o n s i r r e l e v a n t to our pr e s e n t purpose. 
See above, Chapter 3, pp 86':'87 
2 
That c o g n i t i v e s e l e c t i o n i s i n e v i t a b l e i s i n d i c a t e d by Weber's 
concept of 'value-relevance' - 1949: 21ff. 
136 
Should a choice be made, then, between the similar concepts of 
attitude and perspective? They do involve differences of emphasis: 
attitude, as we have seen, tends to stre s s the evaluative orientation, 
whilst perspective i s c l e a r l y conceived by some i n purely cognitive 
terms. Sim i l a r l y attitude tends to concentrate on the siibject's point 
of view, a "stance" the actor adopts towards r e a l i t y ; whilst perspective 
takes a view more from the standpoint of the object, a selection from 
r e a l i t y . Rather than search for a common concept, however, or select 
one and exclude the other, we s h a l l use the concepts f a i r l y i n t e r -
changeably to refer to organisations of superstruetural content. I t 
must be emphasised, however, that attitude and perspective do refer to 
content rather than to the formal aspects of superstructural conscious-
ness: they may include a l l the elements we differentiated as part of 
superstructural consciousness i n Chapter 3, from the more evaluative 
legitimations to the more cognitive pragmatic knowledge; but a l l these 
are elements of content, which indeed i s why i t i s useful to have a 
generic concept of content to contrast with the formal aspects of 
consciousness. Referring back to the Krech and Crutchfield definition 
of attitude, the 'enduring organisation' that i s mentioned i s an organ-
i s a t i o n of meaningful content, rather than an organisation of the formal 
properties of consciousness. I t i s to an examination of these formal 
properties that we now turn. 
(iv) Concepts of Consciousness Form 
In 'perspective' we claim that we have found a generic concept 
of consciousness content without the holism assmed in "world view/ 
perspective": thus an Anschauung without the Welt. But does 
"perspective" refer only to content? I n a section of Chapter 3, on 
Scheler's differentiations of the superstructure,"perspective" i s 
•'• See above. Chapter 3, section v i i . 
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seen i n terms of both objects of knowledge and forms of cognition. 
These 'forms', however, refer rather to the way i n which 'knowledge' 
i s attained and s o c i a l l y organised than to the way i n which the indi-
vidual holds h i s knowledge, Scheler's 'forms of cognition" thus refer 
more to aspects of knowledge than to aspects of the individual. The 
formal properties that we wish to contrast with perspective are the 
cha r a c t e r i s t i c s of cognitive structure that have recently aroused so 
much i n t e r e s t amongst psychologists. When however we look at studies 
of cognitive structure, we find some inconsistency or ambiguity i n 
the characterisations thereof. B i e r i et a l , for instance, associate 
cognitive structures closely with cognitive maps. They quote Handler"s 
(1962) account of cognitive structures ass 
"... rules of behaviour, maps or schemata l a i d down 
which connect various behaviours and environmental 
inputs." ( B i e r i et a l , 1970: 160); 
and themselves state that: 
" F i r s t , cognitive structures refer to organised 
systems whose properties are dependent upon the 
interrelations of the various elements i n a given 
system. Second, knowledge of cognitive struc-
tures implies that predictions can be made of the 
way i n which the person copes with his environ-
ment. " (1970: 160) 
These definitions seem to lack a cl e a r differentiation of aspects of 
form and content; they could for instance be eas i l y understood to refer 
to organisations of meaningful content, and thus perspectives, except 
perhaps for the emphasis on 'system properties'. 
Schroder, Driver and Streufert make a much clearer distinction 
between form and content: 
'The emphasis w i l l be upon how a person thinks or 
uses an attitude as a structure for processing new 
information, as opposed to an emphasis upon content, 
upon what a person thinks, what h i s attitudes are, 
and so forth.' (1970: 175) 
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This statement of course also supports our use of "attitude" as the 
organising concept of content. Further statements by Schroder, Driver 
and Streufert, however, introduce some ambiguity into the definitions. 
"Content variables" are said to be the set of f i l t e r s , such as a t t i -
tudes and needs, which s e l e c t certain kinds of information from the 
environment; w h i l s t "structural variables' act: 
' .. . l i k e a program or set of rules which combines 
these items of information i n s p e c i f i c ways.' 
(1970: 175)-
The authors do not r e a l i s e that such a "set of rules'• could refer to 
attitudes combining information i n terms of meaningful content, and 
that, i n order to emphasise the formal approach, definitions of cogni-
ti v e structure would have to s t r e s s either the formal properties of 
the combination or a combination of formal properties. Both B i e r i et a l 
and Schroder, Driver and Streufert, despite dealing predominantly with 
s t r u c t u r a l concepts, thus do not provide a clear d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
formal and content aspects of cognition. 
Scott, who otherwise provides a most interesting account of various 
st r u c t u r a l properties of cognition, s i m i l a r l y defines cognitive struc-
ture i n such a way that i t could be synonymous with attitude or per-
spective : 
'By cognitive structures I mean those whose elements 
consist of ideas consciously entertained by the person 
i n his phenomenal view of the world. ... The content 
of experience i s organised into structural assemblies 
from which any element of content derives i t s s i g n i f i -
cance. ' (1970: 145-6) 
He also uses 'cognitive s t y l e ' and "cognitive structure" f a i r l y inter-
changeably without providing a distinction of definition; though i f one 
makes a careful study of where he uses these concepts, 'style" tends to 
be used i n conjunction with such cognitive phenomena as precise thinking 
or dogmatism, and 'structure' i n relation to the differentiation, related-
ness and integration of cognitive elements. 
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Warr, Schroder and Blackman present as an example of the d i s t i n c -
tion between cognitive structure and content, the contrast between 
authoritarianism and dogmatism; 
'Authoritarianism i s f a i r l y c l e a r l y a 'content v a r i -
able' in that a person's degree of authoritarianism 
i s assessed i n terns of what he believes; a high F-
scale scorer i s someone who holds b e l i e f s , attitudes, 
values, etc. which have a specified content. Dogmatism 
on the other hand i s much more a 'structural variable'. 
This means that i t i s concerned with the organisation 
of b e l i e f - d i s b e l i e f systems of many kinds, rather 
than with the content of only a few systems. Dogmatic 
thinking i s necessarily manifested in terms of some 
content, and i n empirical practice we are of course 
not able to completely separate a system's content 
from i t s structure'. (1970; 334-5) 
Warr makes a s i m i l a r point:' 
'Authoritarianism i s measured i n terms of what a 
person thinks and wants, whereas dogmatism i s more 
a question of how he thinks and wants.' 
(1970: 10) 
Warr sees enquiries into the way a person thinks or wants, such as 
dogmatism, as concerned with variables of s t y l e . He defines 'cognitive 
style s "''• as: 
"... habitual ways or modes of dealing with information 
about oneself and on6"s environment which are to a 
large degree independent of the content of the inform-
ation being handled." (1970; 11) 
Warr also attempts to differentiate cognitive s t y l e and structure^ but 
the d i s t i n c t i o n remains somewhat nebulous: 
"A statement about cognitive structure i s a statement 
about some kind of enduring entity, whereas a state-
ment about cognitive s t y l e i s more a statement about 
regularly observed consistencies i n thinking.' 
(1970: 11-12) 
Schutz also refers to "cognitive s t y l e ' but describes them in 
terms of certain fixed and very general types, including abstract 
orientational elements, e.g. towards time and s e l f . Schutz's 
'cognitive s t y l e s ' refer as much to general meaningful content 
as to formal properties of consciousness. (1973: 230) 
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The only difference between s t y l e and structure here seems to be that 
'structure' i s more persistent and covers a wider area of the i n d i -
vidual's cognition. Certainly both s t y l e and structure, as Warr points 
out, are statements of 'how' rather than of "what". Warr therefore 
concludes that: 
""Cognitive s t y l e ' and 'cognitive structure" are thus 
overlapping terms; the difference l i e s in the f a c t 
that 'cognitive s t y l e ' r e f e r s to certain aspects of 
thought processes and "cognitive structure" refers to 
the system which mediates these processes." 
(1970: 12) 
"Width" , persistence and the notion of structure/system per se are 
not able to differentiate cognitive s t y l e , cognitive structure and 
attitude. I f we look at the way i n which both Scott and Warr actually 
use these terms, however, we may conclude that a l l , as Scott suggests, 
have cognitive phenomena as t h e i r elements, but that attitude refers 
to a coherence i n terms of the meaningful content of these elements, 
cognitive s t y l e refers to a coherence i n terms of th e i r formal proper-
t i e s , and cognitive structure refers to formal cha r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
relationships between their meaningful contents. Thus, as we have 
seen, authoritarianism may be seen as an attitude and dogmatism as a 
cognitive s t y l e ; or, to use a different example, cynicism may be seen 
as an attitude and scepticism as a cognitive s t y l e : one may or may not 
be s c e p t i c a l about cynical attributions of motive to 'those who seek 
p o l i t i c a l power: cynicism here refers to the content of certain ideas, 
scepticism to the manner i n which these ideas are considered. Cognitive 
structure may be described i n terms of such properties as compartment-
a l i s a t i o n and consistency, and i s thus c l e a r l y not interchangeable with 
cognitive s t y l e , even though both, and indeed attitude also, may be 
involved i n describing aspects of one particular cognitive ch a r a c t e r i s t i c . 
There may i n fact be a probable or necessary mutual exclusion or associ-
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ation of certain attitudes, cognitive styles and cognitive structures. 
Precise thinking, for instance, although at f i r s t sight a cognitive 
s t y l e , must also imply certain ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s of cognitive structure, 
such as: a clear d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of ideas from one another. Similarly 
a relationship may be posited between a cognitive structure which has 
the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a 'closed system' (Rokeach, 1954^ quoted by Warr, 
Schroder and Blackman, 1970; 335), and a dogmatic cognitive style; with 
the l a t t e r , a closed system i s more l i k e l y to develop (as i t i s easier 
to remain dogmatic i f one's various cognitions give support to each other 
i n the refutation of alternative perspectives) ; whilst to retain the 
system i n a closed state i t may be necessary to resort to dogmatic 
assertions from time to time. The very notion of a 'dogma', indeed, 
includes both these aspects. 
At t h i s point i t i s worth noting that attitude , cognitive s t y l e 
and cognitive structure may influence one another in a les s direct 
fashion. One may for instance have an emotional response to a type of 
cognitive structure, resulting i n the formation of particular cognitive 
s t y l e s and attitudes; an example of th i s would be the development of a 
dogmatic authoritarianism from the insecurity that may ar i s e from a 
consciously inconsistent cognitive structure. 
(v) Conclusion: The Generality of Cognitive Concepts 
To conclude t h i s chapter, we s h a l l look at the degree of generality 
of the concepts of consciousness that we have discussed. Warr warns 
against assuming that p a r t i c u l a r cognitive characteristics obtain 
throughout an individual's consciousness: such characteristics may be 
' trans'-situational' , but: 
' I t i s becoming apparent that cognitive styles extend 
over only a limited range of situations^ so that a 
measure of s t y l e or structure (and indeed of more 
content loaded personality dimensions) i s of res t r i c - r 
ted predictive value.' (1970: 14) 
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Scott i s even more e x p l i c i t : 
"... there i s l i t t l e empirical assurance at present 
of any generality of these s t r u c t u r a l properties 
across cognitive domains. Psychologists are used 
to assuming a functional unity within a person and 
within his cognitive processes." 
(1970: 155, my emphasis) 
Scott has doubts about using the individual as the unit of analysis, and 
thus about distinguishing "classes of people' by thei r types of cognitive 
structure: 
'At present, the appropriate unit of analysis i n the study 
of cognitive s t y l e s would seem to be not the t o t a l person, 
but a p a r t i c u l a r area of his functioning that i s associ-
ated with an i d e n t i f i a b l e event-domain,' 
(1970t 157) 
•We must thus conclude, on the generality of cognitive st y l e and 
structure, that, s i m i l a r l y to attitude, these concepts apply at a level 
of generality that implies extension over time and over different s i t u -
ations, without involving h o l i s t i c assiimptions. They may therefore be 
considered to delineate the formal aspects of superstructural conscious-
ness, j u s t as attitude refers to the meaningful content. 
Within the limits, of s p e c i f i c i t y and generality that we have sugg-
ested, attitudes, cognitive s t y l e s and cognitive structure may cover 
variable 'widths' of the individual's consciousness, as long as there 
i s present the necessary coherence of form or content to make the con-
cept applicable. I n the same way as attitude implies a greater gener-
a l i t y than cognition or evaluation, a more par t i c u l a r version of a 
cognitive s t y l e ( i . e . applying to s p e c i f i c situations or even unique 
occasions) may be c a l l e d a 'cognitive form": Warr would term this a 
"response s t y l e " , and although t h i s terminology would suggest a beha-
v i o u r i s t orientation, the force of the distinction (in terms of gener-
a l i t y ) holds: 
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"... the trans-situational assumption i s an important 
one for us to be able to distinguish a cognitive 
s t y l e frcan a response s t y l e . The l a t t e r i s usually 
viewed as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c way of responding to a 
p a r t i c u l a r kind of situation, for example a s p e c i f i c 
test-taking situation, and i s i n a sense a very 
p a r t i c u l a r i z e d cognitive s t y l e . ' 
(1970: 11) 
"Cognitive structure" has a greater v a r i a b i l i t y of application: i t s level 
of generality i s more a matter of the researcher"s choice, especially 
with attributes such as consistency: one may investigate the degree of 
consistency i n r e l a t i v e l y p a r t i c u l a r areas of the individual"s cognitive 
world, up to ( i f indeed t h i s would be of any use) that obtaining through 
his world view as a whole. Although 'cognitive structure' sounds as i f 
i t s normal use might be at the l e v e l of world vlew^ we have seen that 
both Scott and Warr have emphasised i t s greater u t i l i t y at the l e v e l of 
p a r t i c u l a r cognitive f i e l d s ; i t i s thus a concept whose le v e l of gener-
a l i t y i s more l i k e l y to be equivalent to that of attitude or cognitive 
s t y l e than of world view. 
How, then, are we to consider world view i n relation to attitude/ 
perspective, cognitive s t y l e and cognitive structure? I f an actual 
description of a p a r t i c u l a r world view i s offered, i t would of course 
have to be i n i d e a l - t y p i c a l form, due to i t s necessary s e l e c t i v i t y : 
t h i s s e l e c t i v i t y means that the suggested 'world view' i s not necess-
a r i l y the most general view (or the only possible formulation of the 
view) that the individual entertains of the world. Nor does one need 
to assume that the world view (actual or ideal-typical"*") possesses 
consistency. The function of "world view" as an ideal-type to describe 
the features of a broad perspective on the world, however, would seem 
to be better performed by "attitude" or "perspective", which, as has 
I t was suggested i n Chapter 3 (p 71 above) , i n relation to 
Mannheim"s sociology of knowledge, that even an ideal-^typical 
conception of Weltanschauung need not possess consistency. 
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been mentioned above, may operate also on this r e l a t i v e l y broad scale 
i f deemed to be useful. 
The concept of "world view" does however have special value as 
a t o t a l 'rag-bag'•'• concept of the individual's consciousness, without 
the assumptions of consistency and coherence that we noted i n the t r a -
d i t i o n a l conception of Weltanschauung, As a general, a l l - i n c l u s i v e 
concept, i t s p r i n c i p a l u t i l i t y w i l l be i n i t s capacity to refer to 
the whole of the individual's consciousness through a period of time, 
so that any interrelations between the attitudes, cognitive s t y l e s 
and cognitive structures of the individual are more l i k e l y to be 
revealed. A world view may thus be seen in terms of i t s meaningful, 
s t y l i s t i c and s t r u c t u r a l properties, the f i r s t two being usefully 
described i n terms of ideal-type concepts of attitudes/perspectives and 
cognitive s t y l e s , with st r u c t u r a l properties being covered by cognitive 
structure concepts. Since a s t r u c t u r a l property of the world view as a 
whole i s l i k e l y to be inconsistency, naturally we cannot assume either 
meaningful or s t y l i s t i c consistency through the world view. 
Having examined, i n t h i s chapter and the l a s t , the notions of sub-
structure and superstructure i n terms of an analysis of the concepts of 
'cla s s ' and 'world view', we are now i n a position to present a general 
model of the way i n which aspects of an individual's world view may 
develop from h i s c l a s s situation and action. 
•'" Such a conception was suggested at the beginning of this chapter 
to be one possible interpretation of von Wiesner's concept of 
Weltanschauung, the emphasis being placed upon the "Summe" 
rather than the "Inbegriff". 
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CHAPTER 7; A GENERAL MODEL OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORLD VIEW IN 
RELATION TO CLASS 
(i) Introduction 
I n the l a s t two chapters the concepts of 'class' and 'world view' 
have been examined separately, i n the light of the conclusions on 
'substructure' and 'superstructure' reached in Chapters 2 and 3, This 
chapter w i l l aim to bring together the concepts of 'class' and 'world 
view' i n a general model which, whilst deriving from the conclusions 
on the substructure-superstructure relationship reached i n Part 1, w i l l 
specify t h i s relationship i n accordance with our selected area of 
investigation. 
( i i ) Relevant Aspects Of 'Class' 
I n Chapter 5 we noted how economic conditions can influence an 
individual's thought only i n working through h i s meanings and motives.''' 
This statement can be seen i n the context of a more general sociological 
approach to economic conditions, which become sig n i f i c a n t for sociology 
only through the i r relations to values and especially to meaningful 
s o c i a l action. I f we look f i r s t l y at the 'structure of economic si t u a -
tions', for instance, i t i s clear that i f i t were a mere description of 
hierarchy i t would be sociologically irrelevant: even to c a l l this hier-
archy a structure implies a stronger connection between i t s . various 
l e v e l s than j u s t a h i e r a r c h i c a l ordering. These connections become 
apparent only when one i s aware of the interdependence of the actions 
bringing about the hierarchy, though the la t t e r may be described according 
to both i t s s t a t i c and dynamic features without any necessary reference 
to t h i s system of actions. The structure of economic situations, even 
See above. Chapter 5, p 119 
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i f analysed as a product of economic actions, would however be of no 
significance i n i t s e l f for the sociologist unless relevant to values. 
But even i f the investigator has no interest i n the structure of economic 
situations as such, t h i s structure or any particular position within i t may 
become relevant for him as an aim of previous economic action, as a present 
state relevant to the values of some s o c i a l actor(s) , or as a condition of 
future s o c i a l action. 
I n Chapter 5 we thus emphasised the necessity of including both objec-
t i v e and subjective aspects i n an analysis of classt we stressed the 
importance of examining the actual consciousness of the individual i n the 
position, as well as the basic consciousness associated with the position 
i n the structure. I n terms of a rational model of economic action, the 
consciousness of the actor was seen as involving his values and ends i n 
r e l a t i o n to h i s actual and possible economic situation, economic action 
and work situation (the princip a l elements of our wider conception of 
c l a s s ) . I t was noted that the values and ends might themselves develop 
i n r e l a t i o n to the objective components of the actor's economic action, 
and i t i s the purpose of t h i s chapter to explore other possible develop-
ments of consciousness therefrom,, as well as from economic and work s i t u -
ation. We are however interested only i n that consciousness which develops 
i n a d i r e c t relationship with economic situation, economic action and work 
situation: we are not,, e.g., concerned with the consciousness that derives 
from one's experience i n r o l e s that are determined by economic situation, 
except insofar as such consciousness relates to one '"s evaluation of what 
economic situation a t t a i n s . Thus jxist i f i c a t i o n s of a status-ridden 
society may be relevant, where these relate to one's enjoyment of the 
positions of status that derive from one*s economic situation; but our 
f i e l d of concern would not include, e.g.^the influence of one's experience 
as president of a charity i n making one more sympathetic towards that charity 
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The f a c t that we are concerned with the construction of a rational 
model of the development of an actor's world view in relation to his 
c l a s s must not lead us to neglect the system of economic situations and 
actions within which the actor operates. In Chapter 5 we mentioned that 
seeing the actor's economic situation and action in a structural context 
may reveal the potential group formations that would include him."*" I t may 
further be noted that the actor's orientation may be not only towards his 
position within the system of economic situations and actions but also 
towards the system i t s e l f j since the system as a whole may be seen as 
providing a wider set of conditions within which he operates, his economic 
action may be directed not only at maintaining or changing his position 
2 
i n the system, but at maintaining/changing the system i t s e l f . Thus there 
3 
i s a deliberate -vagueness at the core of the idea of 'commitment': 
commitment to a present or future 'system of actions' (whether individual 
Of gooietal) that w i l l achieve one's ends. Similarly with respect to what 
economic situation s o c i a l l y attains: one's orientation may be towards the 
wider system i n terms of which different positions i n a hierarchy of 
economic situations achieve d i f f e r e n t i a l non-^economic rewards, so that 
e.g. one jnay be committed to a certain system of relationships between 
class and status (as i n the above example of legitimation of a status-
ridden society), Clearly orientation towards broader system factors i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e l y to involve the actor in the cooperative formation of 
attitudes and actions, thus indicating that a methodological i n d i v i d u a l i s t 
model necessarily excludes neither system analysis nor. the examination of 
the action and consciousness of groups. 
See above. Chapter 5, p n g 
2 A p r i n c i p a l focus of the Marxian interest i n economic action i s 
upon such system orientations. 
See above. Chapter 2, p 33 
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( i l l ) Methodological Individualism 
At t h i s point i t i s helpful to expound our reasons for the adoption 
of methodological individualism i n the construction of the general model. 
We have already explored i n Chapter 2 some of the ideas of Mannheim and 
Goldmann on the relationship between individual and group consciousness. 
Clearly Goldmann i s right when he points out that the individual could not 
possibly create h i s own mental structures, his experience being too brief 
and too limited (1967; 495) ; and Mannheim i s correct i n pointing out the: 
mistake of believing: 
',., that a l l the ideas and sentiments which motivate 
an individual have thei r origin i n him alone, and can 
be adequately explained s o l e l y on the basis of h i s own 
life-experience,' (1936: 2) 
Yet both writers tend towards an equation of individual and group con-
sciousness; t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true for Goldmann, as we have seen for 
instance i n h i s f a i l u t e to deal with the 'maximum potential consciousness' 
of an individual i n a s o c i a l position, and h i s consequent fa l s e assump-
tions about the self-rrexplanatory nature of tendencies towards maximm 
potential consciousness i n a group.''' 
In order to avoid hypothesising the ontological primacy of one s o c i a l 
grouping rather than another (whether i n the general f i e l d of the sociology 
of knowledge, as with the siibsumption of an individual' s ideas i n the 
consciousness of a p a r t i c u l a r .group; or in the assumptions of group realism 
embed(Jed i n certain conceptions of s o c i a l c l a s s ) , a methodological i n d i -
v i d u a l i s t standpoint i s necessary. Such a standpoint i s i n lin e with the 
Weberian analysis of c l a s s and c l a s s position examined i n Chapter 5. 
Certain Marxist theorists have however tended to concentrate on 'class' 
as indicating a group (though i t may not be conscious of i t s e l f as such) 
with economic int e r e s t s i n common (for they share the same Income / income-
See above, Chapter 2, p 48 
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prospects / sources of income), and thus of potentially great importance 
as a combined force i n a situation of co n f l i c t with another such group 
with opposing i n t e r e s t s . The stre s s on the importance of 'interests' 
does of course receive support from our concentration on action oriented 
to economic ends, but we should leave open further p o s s i b i l i t i e s for the 
actor than to adopt, i f he has 'true consciousness', the economic ends 
posited for him by certain c l a s s theorists, and than to choose the par-
t i c u l a r means offered to him by those theorists as the most appropriate 
to achieve his ends. As noted above''", a worker with a goal of great econ-
omic advancement for himself may choose, amongst other means, to attempt to 
climb the 'legitimate' ladder out of h i s class, or may combine with other 
workers to attempt to change the basic conditions (such as the c r i t e r i a for 
distribution of incomes) affecting t h e i r common means of economic advance. 
We should wish to give neither of these alternatives a p r i o r i analytical 
importance over the other, even though one might prefer the worker to act 
i n combination with others, possibly on the basis of a more col l e c t i v e con-
ception of h i s ends: our preferences are however not the point. Furthermore 
there are ftany possible groupings the actor could j o i n or help create to 
promote h i s / t h e i r economic advancement, and a fixed notion of class, i n 
group terms Cunlike our conception as outlined i n Chapter 5) could only 
a r b i t r a r i l y delimit those who would f a l l within i t s bounds^ as the simi-
l a r i t y of incomes / prospects of income / sources of income i s a rel a t i v e 
concept, and the actor may combine with more s p e c i f i c or more inclusive 
groups as he believes appropriate for the achievement of his economic ends. 
I t i s of course true, however, that an analysis of an actor i n a 
situation w i l l be inadequate for an understanding of consciousnesS'=-
formatton -unless h i s relations with other actors are taken into account. 
Thus^ whilst methodological individualism directs our attention to the 
See above. Chapter 2, p 36 
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actor i n the situation, we are nevertheless led to analyse the groups 
with which he i s l i k e l y to come into contact, and the mutual construction 
of consciousness (on the basis of previous 'inherited' perspectives on 
the world) of the actors i n these groups. Our rejection of a Marxist 
view of class as a group having some kind of an a l y t i c a l p r i o r i t y over 
other possible economic'-ihterest groupings (which might themselves be 
termed ^'classes' by other writers) therefore does not preclude our 
examining the actor's participation i n groups (whose v i t a l significance 
i n a study of the construction of s o c i a l perspectives cannot be denied), 
but rather derives from our emphasis on the multiple p o s s i b i l i t i e s of 
action open to the actor, which are narrowed, not always i n ways we 
should prefer, by the conditions of h i s situation and his partly deriva-
t i v e , partly pre-^given, consciousness thereof. 
To s t a r t from a conception of an actor does not, therefore, e n t a i l 
a notion of an is o l a t e d individual subsequently injected into a group, 
but rather on the one hand avoids an a p r i o r i delineation of groups 
possessing.superior ontological status, and on the other hand similarly 
avoids, through the use of the term 'actor', any notions of human beings 
as 'individuals'^, with more or l e s s consistent 'fjersonalities' - notions 
adequate i f at a l l to s p e c i f i c s o c i a l systems, yet treated as supra-
h i s t o r i c a l , I n t h i s context we may legitimately deny that a methodolo-
g i c a l i n d i v i d u a l i s t standpoint necessarily assumes i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c 
economic motivationJ our aim i s rather that of analysing the s o c i a l 
conditioning of the potential means for economic advancement of an in d i -
vidual without specifying whether the actor conceives such economic 
advancement i n an i n d i v i d u a l i s t or c o l l e c t i v i s t manne?'. The way he 
conceives h i s economic advancement, i . e . whether his economic ends include 
See above. Chapter 5, p 111 
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others improving t h e i r economic situation, i s a further condition i n f l u -
encing h i s choice of means and may i t s e l f be explored for i t s origins. 
Certainly we r e j e c t the assimiption that the actor would only cooperate 
with others for economic advancement i f this were to his own greatest 
advantage for gaining h i s i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c economic ends. 
I t i s v i t a l to emphasise the point that methodological individualism 
i n terms of 'actor'- terminology''' i s an a n t i t h e t i c a l to theoretical or 
2 
p r a c t i c a l individualism as i t i s to group realism. The c r i t i c i s m s we 
have made of Berger and Luckmann^ concerning assvmiptions of both soci a l 
and individual consistency are indicative of our point of view on this 
matter: such consistency assumptions are to be avoided. S i m i l a r l y i n 
Chapter 6 we noted how the concepts of consciousness (such as attitudes 
and cognitive s t y l e s ) that we wished to use were of a certain l e v e l of 
generality that, while implying extension over time and over different 
4 
situations, did not assume ov e r a l l consistency. Along with Scott (1970: 
1571 we doubt the wisdom of using the individual as the unit of analysis -
a position which i s avoided by a methodological individualism whose theo-
r e t i c a l constructions build with 'actor' rather than 'individual' units. 
cf Weber's diacuasion of p a r t i c u l a r and hypothetical actors 
CWeber, 1947{ 89). 
Popper, i n s i m i l a r vein, r e j e c t s ''... the f a l s e b e l i e f that ... 
'methodological psychologism' i s a necessary corollary of a 
methodological individualism •? of the quite unassailable doctrine 
that we mus-|: try to -understand a l l c o l l e c t i v e phenomena as due to 
the actions, interactions, aims, hopes, and thoughts of individual 
men,•-•But we can be i n d i v i d u a l i s t s without accepting psychologism'. 
(Popper, 1961; 157) Compare also Weber's statement (which of course 
predates Popper *s)t '.,. for the subjective interpretation of action 
i n s ociological work ,.. c o l l e c t i v i t i e s must be treated as solely 
the resultants and-modes of organisation of the particular acts of 
individual persons, since these alone can be treated as agents i n a 
course of subjectively understandable action,' (Weber, 1947: lOl) 
3 
4 
See above, Chapter 2, p 58 f f 
See above, Chapter 6, pp 141-142 
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The 'actor' extends over only a limited period of time and number of 
situations: i t i s , l i k e the chosen cognitive concepts i n Chapter 6, an 
id e a l - t y p i c a l concept whose l e v e l of generality w i l l be governed by 
considerations of u t i l i t y i n explanation, rather than being a p r i o r i 
specified. 
Several writers apart from Weber have indicated i n their work a 
standpoint that would concur with the methodological individualism 
proposed here, Mannheim, i n h i s l a t e r 'Essays on the Sociology of 
Culture', claims that we need to make: 
',.. certain revisions i n the popular image of 
man. Personality t r a i t s are not attributes of 
the individual as such, but rather aspects of 
h i s behaviour i n p a r t i c u l a r relationships. What 
may appear to be a pervasive personality t r a i t 
could e a s i l y prove a dependent variable of speci-
f i c associations, ... I n short, personal a t t r i -
butes ,.. are working abstractions which i n the 
l a s t analysis have meaning only within well-defined 
areas of behaviour . ... i t i s misleading to speak 
of the s o c i a l determination of the individual -
as though the person and h i s society confronted one 
another as discrete e n t i t i t e s . ' 
(Mannheim, 1956: 46) 
Within the more s p e c i f i c f i e l d of individual and group consciousness, 
G Mead states that a s i g n i f i c a n t symbol presupposes a s o c i a l context of 
significance, a universe of discourse (1934: 89): this need not lead 
us to assumptions of individual or s o c i a l consistency associated with 
Mead's concept of the "-generalized other', nor to adopt the terminology 
of a 'universe of discoursed i f that would imply the individual's 
involvement i n one basic universe, such as the common'«-sense everyday 
world of Berger and Liickmann, or the integrating values of Parsons' 
c u l t u r a l system. The '"social context of significance' may instead be 
taken to place an emphasis on the situation (including the other actors) 
i n which a meaningful action takes place, and hence to imply that 
meanings should not be considered as somehow physically located within 
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the individual, but rather considered as pertaining to the actor i n a 
limited s o c i a l context. 
Methodological individualism i s thus seen to be able to avoid the 
traps of both group and individual realism. I t i s furthermore capable 
of analysing both s o c i a l systems and social groups. We may thus proceed 
to the analysis of s o c i a l relationships i n the general model from a 
methodological i n d i v i d u a l i s t standpoint. 
(iv) Individual and Group i n the Development of World View 
from Class 
I n Chapter 6 we concluded that 'world view' i s best conceived as a 
'rag-bag' concept of individual consciousness. I t i s now apparent that, 
since 'world view' applies to consciousness beyond that of the context-
bound actor, i t may be seen equally i n terms of individual or group con-
sciousness, I n neither case would assumptions of consistency or coherence 
operate, and i t s u t i l i t y i n the analysis of 'group consciousness' would 
be s i m i l a r to that described for individual consciousness at the end of 
Chapter 6, An example of our approach to group consciousness may be given 
through an analysis of a passage by Becker and Geer on 'group culture': 
' C l a s s i c a l l y , culture i s conceived as arising i n res^ 
ponse to some problem faced by a group. The problem 
i s one that individual members of the group see as 
common to a l l members; i t i s a shared problem. I n 
some way, a way of meeting the problem i s arrived at, 
a mode of action that i s agreed to be the best or 
most proper solution. The solution leads to, or 
implies, more general views and assmptions «- the 
perspectives and values underlying the culture, i t s 
'world view' . The organised whole of such problem 
solutions i s the culture of the group.' 
(Becker and Geer, 1971: 56) 
Here we find the predominant pragmatic conception of consciousness; the 
si g n i f i c a n t point however i s that the problem i s not one pertaining to a 
sociologist's r e i f i e d group or system^ but one that i s recognised as such 
by the group's members, who together work out a solution. So far, then, 
154 
Becker and Geer do not run counter to the principles of methodological 
individualism; nor indeed does t h e i r observation that such solutions may 
be extended to more general perspectives. Where we should d i f f e r from 
them, however, i s i n t h e i r conception that such problem solutions con-
s t i t u t e an 'organised whole' which i s the culture of the group: such a 
conception incorporates unnecessary assumptions of consistency and cohe-
rence, and, unlike an approach i n terms of actor/interactors, takes the 
group out of i t s s o c i a l context and needlessly grants to i t a trans-
s i t u a t i o n a l r e a l i t y . Groups, l i k e individuals, must be seen within their 
s o c i a l context^, and not be asstmied to possess an i n t r i n s i c non-relative 
existence: as noted above, methodological individualism i s able to avoid 
both group and individual realism, 
A methodological i n d i v i d u a l i s t standpoint may thus be applied to the 
necessary consideration of s o c i a l relationships i n the formation of per-
spectives. We must take account of the influence of those with whom the 
actor comes into contact: i n many cases their influence upon the develop-
ment of the actor's consciousness w i l l be more profound that his own 
'direct* experience, though perhaps the most usual pattern i s a situa-
tion of mutual influence such as that suggested i n the Becker and Geer 
quotation. Even where one ascertains the strong influence of a group of 
which the actor i s not a member, t h i s group may of course i t s e l f be 
analysed i n terms of relationships between actors. 
Within the sphere of '^class' ^  one may distinguish between d i r e c t l y 
and i n d i r e c t l y contacted groups, 'Contact' here i s used i n a broad and 
weak sense of r e l a t i n g , not necessarily i n 'face-to-face'' terms. The 
d i r e c t - i n d i r e c t d i s t i n c t i o n refers to whether the contact i s d i r e c t l y 
through elements of the actor's c l a s s experience, evaluation and action; 
or, le s s d i r e c t l y related to the -actor's c l a s s , through the ideological 
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powdr of others.•'• Although ideological power i s not a central concern i n 
our analysis, i t i s worth noting that i t may enhance the influence of 
those d i r e c t l y contacted, and i t i s necessary (in order to influence) i f 
contact would not otherwise be a d i r e c t r e s u l t or i n t r i n s i c part of the 
individual's situation or action. Ideological power may or may not be 
related to c l a s s factors; i t does however require some control over, or 
at l e a s t access to, the means of communication and some likelihood (e.g, 
legitimate authority) that the actor w i l l be persuaded by one's views. 
This f a c i l i t y for ideological power,may^ then, be p a r t i a l l y determined by 
the objective features of an actor's clas s ; and indeed his very economic 
situation may be based upon the u t i l i s a t i o n of ideological power, without 
which means he could not avoid threats to the maintenance of his position. 
The f a c i l i t y , of course, i s not s u f f i c i e n t (for conscious influence) 
without the v o l i t i o n , and t h i s w i l l be linked to the subjective aspects 
of the actor's c l a s s , i n the mode of either 'commitment' or 'direct inter-
estedness',^ 
The desire and capacity of a l t e r s to use ideological power w i l l thus 
be the major factor foirging those relationships of ego that are not 
d i r e c t l y involved i n h i s actions/situations, the extent of the power con-
ditioning (though to some extent defined in terms of ) the degree of 
influence. Our i n t e r e s t however l i e s i n those groups 'directly contacted' 
through the actor's c l a s s , i . e . on the basis of his economic situation 
(and what i t a t t a i n s ) , economic action (and conditions thereof) and work 
situation. Such groups may for instance include those with whom the 
individual r e l a t e s for or i n the achievement of the values which his 
present or future economic situation attains or i s aimed at attaining. 
Though of course a l t e r ' s ideological power may be related to the 
lack of such power involved i n ego's class position. The 
'directTindirect' d i s t i n c t i o n i s based on that made at the con-
clusion of Chapter 2, p 65 above. 
2 See above, Chapter 2, pp 33-34 
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even i f the economic action conditions of the various actors concerned 
vary greatly. This contact may be simply a case of mutual cognitive 
influence; or may mean the actor taking account of others through their 
r e l a t i o n to himself i n terms of economic situation, so that, e.g., he 
follows the norms of h i s status group, or keeps his manners d i s t i n c t from 
those of a lower status. The 'contact' may alternatively be more a 
question of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with a group based on economic situation, thus, 
l i k e 'taking account', not necessarily Involving personal relationships. 
Face-to-face relationships may derive not only from the actor's economic 
situation, but may of course be involved in the actions which are the means 
for achieving his economic ends: here are included those whom the actor 
encounters i n his work situation, and more s p e c i f i c a l l y those whose 
relationships to the actor constitutes a significant aspect of the means, 
or of the delimiting conditions thereof> to his economic ends. Even where 
not d i r e c t l y encountered, such others may be taken account of i n one's 
economic action^ and of course the actor may identify with others to the 
extent of including their own economic ends within h i s own."*" 
The relationships that the actor forms i n h i s work situation may be 
of considerable significance. The work situation may act as a further 
determinant of the actor'>s contacts, i . e . of the selection of those whan 
he i n f a c t does contact, from amongst those who constitute (in the way 
indicated above) elements of h i s economic action: e.g., his work situation 
may i s o l a t e him from those who together might cooperate to r a i s e the 
market value of t h e i r s k i l l s . The work situation w i l l also affect the 
degree of visibi11ty of the s o c i a l relations which act as conditions-
delimiting the actor*s means to economic ends: any p a r t i c u l a r work situa-
tion may, for instance, tend to reveal or obscure the power relations that 
may constitute the basis of the system within which the actor's economic 
This was mentioned i n Chapter 5, p 111 above. 
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action operates. The work situation may moreover influence the actor's 
economic ends: he may cone to include i n his own ends the economic ends 
of those with whom he works. And even i f his s o c i a l relations at work 
are formed only through the work situation i t s e l f , and are not a 'con-
s t i t u t i v e ' element of his economic action, they may nonetheless be of 
considerable significance i n imparting both economic and other attitudes 
of those concerned. 
In sum, s o c i a l groups may influence the actor through their 'direct' 
involvement i n the various aspects of h i s class: h i s economic situation, 
economic action and work situation. The mode of influence concerned may 
be: a) faceT'tO'r.face interaction, which one must not see merely i n terms 
of one-rway influence (from others to s e l f ) , as the case i s frequently 
that of groups of actors i n a similar position working out together common 
cognitions and evaluations; b) the actor taking account of others in his 
judgements and actions: t h i s may include taking negative account of them, 
e.g. as competing r i v a l s , or conflicting groups; c) iden t i f i c a t i o n of the 
actor with others, e.g, so that t h e i r economic ends/means are seen as his 
own ends/means. I n none of t h i s are we implying that the actor i s unin-
fluenced i n his clasiST-related consciousness by groups outside of the 
cl a s s context; but since our in t e r e s t i s in the influence of class upon 
the development of world view, our emphasis w i l l c l e a r l y be upon what may 
be broadly .termed '^class contacts' . These i n turn may of course be related 
to the system i n which they may have their origin as the 'potential group 
formations' mentioned i n Chapter 5,''" 
We have seen previously how consciousness may be 'extended' from a 
pa r t i c u l a r situation/action because of the l a t t e r ' s salience or temporal 
2 
p r i o r i t y . I t i s clear that the prior or frequent making of class contacts 
"'• See above. Chapter 5, p 119 
See above. Chapter 4, p 92 
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may lead to the extension of the consciousness involved therein to 
other spheres: the understanding of new situations thus occurs through 
the application of categories previously appropriated elsewhere - in 
thi s case through the actor's cl a s s contacts, i n a process similar to 
that described by Scheler i n his discussion of the application of social 
categories to wider spheres of knowledge. This process can be traced i n 
the negative sense of lack of alternative s o c i a l contacts: McLeod and 
Chaffee suggest that the 'learning' of one version of s o c i a l r e a l i t y may 
simply be the inevitable r e s u l t of the absence of competing versions within 
the s o c i a l system (McLeod and Chaffee, 1972: 56) ; but one can see that, 
even where such competing versions are available, the individual may not 
come into contact with them. The extension of consciousness from one 
sphere may thus be due to the lack of competing sources of 'information' -
a situation which i n our case would mean a narrow set of cla s s contacts 
and few contacts outside the sphere of class (perhaps through class 
factors being the most important determinants of s o c i a l relationships i n 
the society concerned), 
Some of the elements of c l a s s , for instance the structure of economic 
situations and what they a t t a i n , are of particular significance i n the 
study of s o c i a l groups and th e i r ideas, and the analysis may of course 
proceed along the methodological i n d i v i d u a l i s t lines suggested above. An 
examination of such factors i s l e s s relevant i n tracing the development 
of the consciousness of a pa r t i c u l a r individual, except: a) in so far 
as we analyse the sources of the thought of an individual i n a stable 
economic situation as an economic^^-situation'-conditioned group product, 
an analysis which would not be of primary i n t e r e s t i n a study of the 
development of h i s consciousness, and which indeed would tend to refer 
back to a group and i t s consciousness existing prior to the individual. 
See above, Chapter 4, p 93 
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the l a t t e r adopting the former's consciousness through a process of 
socialis a t i o n f b) i n so far as h i s consciousness develops i n relation 
to developments i n h i s economic situation, though even here the most 
si g n i f i c a n t developments may occur through already s o c i a l l y current 
ideas being adopted i n the process of s o c i a l i s a t i o n into a new group 
based on a new economic situation. The question of whether or not the 
study of s o c i a l groups and t h e i r ideas i s relevant to the analysis of 
the development of the consciousness of a particular individual must not 
of course be confused with the question of the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of methodolo-
g i c a l individualismJ we should contend that methodological individualism 
i n the foim of an ideal-typical actor model i s equally applicable to the 
study of s o c i a l groups and of p a r t i c u l a r individuals. Indeed the very fact 
of the importance of s o c i a l relationships i n our model, an importance that 
we have attempted to demonstrate i n t h i s section, increases the u t i l i t y of 
the ideal-rtypical actor model of economic situation and action: communica-
tion within a grouf^ baaed on shared c l a s s factors w i l l tend to overcome a 
p a r t i c u l a r individual's indifference or ignorance, and lead to his adopting 
cognitions and evaluations more d i r e c t l y related to his own economic 
situation and action (or at l e a s t to the aspects of h i s economic situation 
and action conditions that he shares with the group) and to the potential 
economic action that he shares with them. Thus, for instance, although 
an individual may be unaware of the macro-system conditions of his economic 
action, and uninvolved in c o n f l i c t aimed at large-scale socio-economic 
change, some contingent aspects of the consciousness that develops i n 
those i n a s i m i l a r position who are so aware/involved may nonetheless 
become h i s consciousness through group communication, yet s t i l l without 
h i s necessarily Becoming consciously and directly involved i n cl a s s con-
f l i c t . I t i s presTmiably such situations that give c r e d i b i l i t y to Goldmann's 
le s s a n a l y t i c a l notion of the 'maximimi potential consciousness' of a group.''' 
•'• See above, Chapter 2, p 41 f f 
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I n the terminology of Chapter 5, then, the idiosyncrasies of the 
actual consciousness of the individual i n the position w i l l tend with 
group communication (where the group i s based on shared class factors) 
to be weakened i n favour of consciousness more exclusively based on 
position i n the structure. Again, i n terms of Goldmann's concepts of 
consciousness,''' such communication i s l i k e l y to lead to the individual's 
actual consciousness ( i . e . i n addition to his basic consciousness) being 
more adequate (in the sense of more directly related to his economic 
position) since communication based on class factors w i l l give such 
factors greater p r i o r i t y i n the individual's consciousness. From this 
i t would seem that the p r i n c i p a l u t i l i t y of the concepts of 'basic' and 
'adequate'' consciousness related to the 'position i n the structure' i s as 
idealr-types i n a model for comparison wi-th the development of an individ-
ual's 'actual' consciousness. At t h i s point i t i s worth examining the 
general methodological basis for the construction of an ide a l - t y p i c a l 
actor model, 
Cv) Idealr-typical Actor Models 
In Chapter 1 (section i l l ) we arrived, through a comparison of Weber 
and Pareto, at a basic conceptual framework for -the analysis of action. 
This framework has found expression at various points in the argment to 
t h i s stage: i t has been used either I m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y i n e a r l i e r 
chapters, such as i n the conception of the substructure i n -the sociology 
of knowledge presented i n the conclusion of Chapter 2; i n Chapter 5, i n 
the emphasis on ends and values as components of the Individual's economic 
action; and i n Chapter 6, where sentiment i s seen as a non-^consciously 
formulated value. The comparison of Weber and Pareto, then, can lead to 
the development of a suitable framework for -the idealr-typical analysis of 
See above. Chapter 2, section i v 
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action. We have already provided an argument for a methodological indi-
v i d u a l i s t approach i n terms of 'actors'; here we s h a l l concentrate on 
developing the case'''for i d e a l - t y p i c a l analysis i n terms of rational 
constructs. 
One of the functions of idealrrtypical analysis i n sociology i s to 
provide c l a r i t y , and thus communi'pability,of description: 
as regards exposition, to the extent that i t wishes 
to be unambiguous, the use of precise formulations i n 
the sphere of c u l t u r a l analysis i s i n many cases absol-
utely necessary. ... s o c i a l science i n our sense i s conT-
cerned with p r a c t i c a l significance. This significance can 
however very often be brought unambiguously to mind only 
by relating the empirical data to an ideal limiting case'. 
(Weber, 1949: 94.) 
This does not imply that sociology can deal only with rational action, but 
that non-logical action must be translated i n terms of a 'sociological 
r a t i o n a l i t y " (Sahay, 1972t 46ff, 106ff & 174^5), through which non-
r a t i o n a l elements such as non«rConsciously formulated sentiments and moti-
vations are seen as values and ends, thus enabling not only c l a r i t y of 
description but also the use of the ideal'rtype i n comparative analysis 
and thus i n explanation, 
2 
In terms of Pareto's threefold analysis of b e l i e f s , where subjective 
analysis becomes necessary (because objective analysis reveals non-
l o g i c a l i t y ) the u t i l i t y of the b e l i e f for the actor may be revealed, 
e.g. through i t s legitimation of a non-logical action. The analysis may 
thus reveal the unacknowledged underlying sentiment, which i s rendered 
idealT-typically conscious and related i n logical manner to the action. 
Thus sentiment as well as value and end may become lo g i c a l l y related to 
action i n the ra t i o n a l ideal<?type. This l a t t e r i s then compared with the 
empirical situation, thus revealing, i f motive or action i s found to d i f f e r 
"'• This case was f i r s t presented i n Chapter 1, p 9 above, 
2 
See above. Chapter 2, p 29 
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from t h a t h y p o thesised i n the idealr-type, other values/ends/sentiments 
a t work, or e l s e a n o n - l o g i c a l 'association-^tendency' of motive and 
a c t i o n . T h i s i n d i c a t e s the p l a c e o f association'-tendencies i n our 
r a t i o n a l i d e a l " t y p i c a l model: although they a r e of considerable impor-
tance i n the comparison of the i d e a l s t y p i c a l with the a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n , 
and although consciousness may develop from them (e.g. i n the form of 
l e g i t i m a t i o n s of them) , they are not involved i n our model of c l a s s as 
a s u b s t r u c t u r e i n t h e s o c i o l o g y of knowledge. T h i s model aims a t por-
t r a y i n g the s t r o n g e s t i n f l u e n c e t h a t c l a s s f a c t o r s may have upon the 
development of co n s c i o u s n e s s , and, where a c t i o n i s concerned, r a t i o n a l i t y 
o f connection between motive and a c t i o n w i l l demonstrate the s t r o n g e s t 
i n f l u e n c e , H a b i t u a l a c t i o n f o r i n s t a n c e would not be of primary i n t e r e s t 
to us, as i t would not r e v e a l the development of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s con-
sciousn e s s , though t h e r e remains the p o s s i b i l i t y o f t r a c i n g such a c t i o n s 
t o the sentiments e t c , of a pre«?existent group, i n which case t h e i r a c t i o n 
may be understood once more i n terms of s o c i o l o g i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y . 
T h i s emphasis on i d e a l - ? t y p i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y , however, a p p l i e s only to 
t h e . a c t i o n elements of c l a s s . We have already noted i n Chapter 5 the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f consciousness a r i s i n g through the experience of elements 
of c l a s s , i n p a r t i c u l a r o f the work s i t u a t i o n , as a p o s s i b l y unintended 
2 
a s p e c t o f economic a c t i o n f and i n Chapter 4 we s t r e s s e d the 'extension' 
model of the development of s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l consciousness as an a l t e r n a -
t i v e to the u t i l i t a r i a n approach,^ The development of consciousness i n 
A s i m i l a r p o i n t was made i n Chapter 5 i n r e l a t i o n to the assumption 
of i d e a l ^ t y p i c a l economic motivation i n the d e l i n e a t i o n of c l a s s 
s i t u a t i o n s ; see above,p m , The concept of economic motivation 
draws a t t e n t i o n t o the q u e s t i o n of the degree of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y 
p e r t a i n i n g t o economic actiont i n the ideals-type f u l l intention*-
a l i t y i s assumed. Economic motivation may of course be d i f f e r -
e n t i a t e d by k i n d as w e l l as by degree: i n a d d i t i o n to being more 
or l e s s pronounced, i t may i n c l u d e the ultimate ends w i t h i n i t s e l f , 
or the economic ends towards which the ac t o r i s motivated may be 
means to other, non-economic ends, such as s t a t u s or p o l i t i c a l power. 
2 
3 
See above. Chapter 5, p 121 
See above. Chapter 4, p go f f 
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s u b s t r u c t u r e or s u p e r s t r u c t u r e thus cannot be seen s o l e l y as a r a t i o n a l 
a c t , though the i n f l u e n c e of c e r t a i n elements of c l a s s (e.g. conditions 
of economic a c t i o n ) i s seen a t i t s s t r o n g e s t where the a c t i o n involved 
i s conceived i n i d e a l - t y p i c a l l y r a t i o n a l terms. 
Having thus presented arguments f o r a c e r t a i n k i n d of general model -
i . e . i d e a l - t y p i c a l , r a t i o n a l (where a c t i o n i s i n v o l v e d ) , methodological 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t r- , we may now proceed to see how g e n e r a l elements of world 
view (from Chapter 6) may develop i n r e l a t i o n to elements of c l a s s (from 
Chapter 5 ) . A p r e l i m i n a r y comparison of the concepts of consciousness 
i n s u b s t r u c t u r e and s u p e r s t r u c t u r e i s necessary a t t h i s stage. 
t v i ) comparison of Concepts of S u b s t r u c t u r a l and S u p e r s t r u c t u r a l 
Consciousness 
I n Chapter 3 we o u t l i n e d v a r i o u s elements of consciousness t h a t may 
be developed from the s\:ibstructure and t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l 
consciousness through f u n c t i o n i n g more widely f o r the i n d i v i d u a l than 
merely i n r e l a t i o n to the p a r t i c u l a r s u b s t r u c t u r a l a c t i o n / s i t u a t i o n . 
The elements concerned were: m a t e r i a l l y pragmatic knowledge, l e g i t i m a t i o n s 
2 
( p r e ^ and post'=?action), 'promotions' and ' extensions'. I n Chapter 6 a 
d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the s u p e r s t r u c t u r e was made i n terms of 
concepts of consciousness form and content of a c e r t a i n l e v e l of gener-
a l i t y ; a t t i t u d e , cogniti've s t y l e and c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e . The reason f o r 
the d i f f e r e n c e between these two seemingly u n r e l a t e d c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n s of 
consciousness i s t h e i r d i f f e r i n g purposes: the second c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n i s 
not concerned w i t h how the s u p e r s t r u c t u r e developed, but w i t h engendering 
concepts o f consciousness form and content t h a t would be capable of an 
adequate l e v e l . o f s i t u a t i o n a l and temporal g e n e r a l i t y ; w h i l e the f i r s t 
See above. Chapter 3, j p 81-82 
2 'sExtensions' are of course by d e f i n i t i o n emergent only a t the 
s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l l e v e l , 
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c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n was i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d to notions of consciousness 
development, i n both u t i l i t a r i a n and n o n - u t i l i t a r i a n modes. The two 
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n s a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y synonymous: f o r i n s t a n c e , any of 
the widened elements of consciousness i n the f i r s t c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n may 
c o n s i t u t e an a t t i t u d e ; s i m i l a r l y a c 6 g n i t i v e s t y l e may be an extension or 
adopted f o r u t i l i t y ; and though a l e g i t i m a t i o n or pragmatic knowledge 
cannot of i t s e l f c o n s t i t u t e a c o g n i t i v e s t y l e , the c o g n i t i v e form thereof 
may be extended i n t o a c o g n i t i v e s t y l e . 
I n Chapter 6 we noted t h a t i t i s u s e f u l to have a term ( i . e . 'attitude') 
applying over time and over d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s , and which w i l l include 
c o g n i t i o n s , e v a l u a t i o n s and sentiments, thus avoiding d i s t i n c t i o n s between 
the c o g n i t i v e and the e v a l u a t i v e , and between t h a t which i s and i s not 
c o n s c i o u s l y f o r m u l a t e d . D o e s t h i s mean, then, t h a t these f i n e r d i s t i n c -
t i o n s o f consciousness should be abandoned i n s u p e r s t r u c t u r e and substruc-
t u r e , and be r e p l a c e d even i n the l a t t e r by ' a t t i t u d e ' ? An i n s p e c t i o n of 
Chapter 5 would suggest otherwise* i n addition to a r a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s i n 
terms o f means, ends and v a l u e s (thus i n v o l v i n g conscious formulations 
through s o c i o l o g i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y ) , the a n a l y t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between 
c o g n i t i o n s and e v a l u a t i o n s i s c l e a r l y advocated, e.g. i n an a n a l y s i s of 
the p r o c e s s through which the a c t o r evaluates the ends or means which 
appear f e a s i b l e to him. I n the superstruct\are such d i s t i n c t i o n s l o s e 
t h e i r r e l e v a n c e i n t h e i r l e s s s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n to a c t i o n / s i t u a t i o n : 
indeed, as noted i n Chapter 3, on the more g e n e r a l l e v e l of b e l i e f systems 
e t c . i t i s d i f f i c u l t (sometimes impossible) to d i s t i n g u i s h between the 
2 
e x i s t e n t i a l and the e v a l u a t i v e . 
Looking a t the problem from the p o i n t o f view of ' a t t i t u d e ' , i t 
i s c l e a r t h a t the g e n e r a l i t y of t h i s concept i s appropriate a t the 
s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l l e v e l , but t h a t i n the sub s t r u c t u r e we r e q u i r e concepts 
See above. Chapter 6, p 135 
2 See above, Chapter 3, p 87 
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of consciousness more s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l a t e d to p a r t i c u l a r elements of 
c l a s s , r a t h e r than g e n e r a l i t i e s t h a t may develop therefrom. T h i s a t 
l e a s t i s the case i f we wish to analyse the development of consciousness 
i n an i n d i v i d u a l i n r e l a t i o n to h i s c l a s s , r a t h e r than merely providing 
an account of, f o r i n s t a n c e , an i n d i v i d u a l ' s h a b i t u a l economic a t t i t u d e s . 
We may, however, wish t o g i v e an account of the a t t i t u d e s the i n d i v i d u a l 
b r i n g s to h i s c l a s s p o s i t i o n , as long as the m o d i f i c a t i o n of these a t t i -
tudes i s seen through the i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h s p e c i f i c elements of con-
s c i o u s n e s s i n v o l v e d i n , f o r i n s t a n c e , economic a c t i o n . 
'Cognitive s t y l e ' ' , p o s s e s s i n g a l e v e l of g e n e r a l i t y e q u i v a l e n t to 
' a t t i t u d e ' , i s s i m i l a r l y r e s t r i c t e d to the s u p e r s t r u c t u r e i n our model; 
but the more p a r t i c u l a r ' c o g n i t i v e form' may, l i k e cognitions and evalu-
a t i o n s , be i n v o l v e d i n the siabstructure. 'Cognitive s t r u c t u r e ' , however, 
i s a p p l i c a b l e to both s u b s t r u c t u r e and s u p e r s t r u c t u r e : as noted i n 
Chapter 6 i t has a g r e a t e r v a r i a b i l i t y of a p p l i c a t i o n , a n d i t may thus 
be used to i n v e s t i g a t e formal p r o p e r t i e s of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the 
elements of the a c t o r ' s s v i b s t r u c t u r a l (as w e l l as s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l ) 
consciousness, 
I f 'world view' i s defined, as i n Chapter 6, as a loose agglomeration 
of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s (or even group's) consciousness, then i t too cannot 
be confined to the superstinacture, s i n c e a l l the elements of the i n d i -
v i d u a l ' s consciousness a r e p a r t of h i s world view. Given t h a t we must 
always s t a r t w i t h the actor'••s d e f i n i t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n , and then may 
see developments of h i s ''def i n i t i o n s ' i n r e l a t i o n to h i s experience of 
the s i t u a t i o n or involvement i n the action,'world view' w i l l thus be 
p r e s e n t a t the o u t s e t , during the development o f consciousness i n the 
s u b s t r u c t u r e , and i n the developed s u p e r s t r u c t u r e , which may i t s e l f be 
^ See above. Chapter 6, p 143 
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the s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r f u t u r e s p e c i f i c d e f i n i t i o n s and a c t i o n s . T h i s 
apparent c i r c u l a r i t y i s more adequately described i n s p i r a l terms, as can 
be seen i n a review of the 'career' process accounted i n Chapter 5.^ 
Having compared a l t e r n a t i v e concepts of consciousness i n r e l a t i o n to 
t h e i r f u n c t i o n i n the a n a l y s i s of s u b s t r u c t u r e and s u p e r s t r u c t u r e , we may 
now examine the p r o c e s s whereby s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l consciousness may develop 
from a s u b s t r u c t u r e of c l a s s elements. 
( v i i ) The P r o c e s s of World View Development i n R e l a t i o n to C l a s s 
We have a l r e a d y i n d i c a t e d , i n t h i s and previous chapters, p o s s i b l e 
modes of development of consciousness from the s u b s t r u c t u r e , as w e l l as 
concepts f o r the a n a l y s i s of the a c t u a l l y developed s u p e r s t r u c t u r e . I t 
should now be made more c l e a r , however, what p o i n t s of development are to 
be d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n the s u b s t r u c t u r e , thus u t i l i s i n g our remarks i n 
Chapter 5, These 'points of development' w i l l c o n s i s t of consciousness 
d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d i n the elements of c l a s s p r e v i o u s l y o u t l i n e d , s i n c e , 
as i n d i c a t e d i n Chapter 2, an ideal'' s u p e r s t r u c t u r e cannot develop from 
2 
a ' m a t e r i a l ' s u b s t r u c t u r e . One major p o i n t of development c o n s i s t s i n 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s i t u a t i o n and values; some aspects of a s i t u a -
t i o n may a t t a i n or render a t t a i n a b l e c e r t a i n values or ends, whose adop-
t i o n i s then favoured i f they appeal to unformulised sentiments or are 
h i g h l y regarded i n the s o c i e t y concerned. The s i t u a t i o n i n question may 
be the economic s i t u a t i o n or work s i t u a t i o n , or the c o n d i t i o n s of economic 
a c t i o n ; these l a t t e r c o n d i t i o n s may f o r i n s t a n c e render f e a s i b l e c e r t a i n 
ends, which themselves may c o n s t i t u t e a new economic s i t u a t i o n , perhaps 
a t t a i n i n g new v a l u e s . Both a c t u a l and p o s s i b l e s i t u a t i o n and a c t i o n must 
thus be taken i n t o account; though, i n an a n a l y s i s of the development of 
See above. Chapter 5, p 122 
2 See above. Chapter 2, pp 22-27 
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an i n d i v i d u a l ' s consciousness, m o t i v a t i o n i s l i k e l y to be s t r e s s e d , with 
a consequent emphasis on the p o s s i b l e , and i n t e r e s t i n the a c t u a l w i l l be 
c o n f i n e d to work s i t u a t i o n and developed econcanic s i t u a t i o n . T h i s a p p l i e s 
e q u a l l y to the second major 'point of development' , which l i e s i n the 
experience of c e r t a i n elements of c l a s s : s i n c e we a r e using a r a t i o n a l 
model w i t h r e s p e c t to action,"'' the development of consciousness w i l l be 
seen i n terms o f 'experience' only i n r e l a t i o n t o aspects of the work 
s i t u a t i o n t h a t are unintended consequences of economic a c t i o n , or i n 
r e l a t i o n to a developed economic s i t u a t i o n . 
The t h i r d p o i n t o f development of consciousness i n the substructure 
i s t h a t most p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l a t e d to economic a c t i o n , i . e . the development 
of consciousness of r e l e v a n t a s p e c t s of economic a c t i o n according to the 
s e l e c t i v e c r i t e r i a o f one's economic ends. The a c t o r ' s economic ends 
s e l e c t i v e l y d i r e c t h i s c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t i n the given co n d i t i o n s of h i s 
economic a c t i o n and the means thereby d e l i m i t e d , these o b j e c t i v e f e a t u r e s 
of h i s a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t i n g the data cognised. A g r e a t e r emphasis on such 
2 
c o g n i t i o n i s l a i d by strong economic motivation, and such motivation 
a l s o b r i n g s about e v a l u a t i o n o f the means, s i n c e , i f no other e v a l u a t i v e 
c r i t e r i a are i n v o l v e d , the mere e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the means i n b r i n g i n g 
about.economic advancement w i l l arrange the means i n an e v a l u a t i v e h i e r -
archy. The p o t e n t i a l h i e r a r c h a l ordering of the means to economic 
advance thus c o n s t i t u t e s an important o b j e c t i v e f e a t u r e of the a c t o r ' s 
economic a c t i o n j w h i l s t the- a c t u a l ( s u b j e c t i v e ) h i e r a r c h y f o r the a c t o r 
i s a product of h i s c o g n i t i v e / e v a l u a t i v e i n t e r e s t , and may thus be modi-
f i e d i n p r a c t i c e by the degree o f h i s economic motivation^, by the extent 
to which he can acqui r e knowledge of the conditions o f h i s economic a c t i o n , 
•'• See above, p 162 
2 
T h i s i s why, i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a general model to show the most 
powerful i n f l u e n c e of c l a s s f a c t o r s upon conscious];iess development, 
strong economic mo t i v a t i o n i s assianed, 
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by the e x c l u s i o n of some forms of economic advance (and hence some means) 
by h i s s p e c i f i e d economic ends, and by the e x c l u s i o n of those means which 
co\interact some of h i s other v a l u e s (those, f o r i n s t a n c e , which are the 
u l t e r i o r reason f o r h i s economic ends), 
Consciousness may thus develop i n r e l a t i o n to economic a c t i o n both 
through the data cognised ( i . e . the o b j e c t i v e f e a t u r e s of the a c t i o n ) , 
and through the s u b j e c t i v e i n t e r e s t involved i n the a c t i o n , which makes 
c o g n i t i o n an a c t i v e s e l e c t i v e p r o c e s s , r a t h e r than a p a s s i v e absorptive 
one. C l e a r l y t h i s l a t t e r p o i n t a p p l i e s to a l l t h e areas of consciousness 
development through c l a s s - even "experience'; but i t i s economic a c t i o n 
t h a t i s doubly e f f e c t i v e (through ' i n t e r e s t ' and 'data') i n the develop-
ment of consciousness, except where the c o g n i t i v e or e v a l u a t i v e i n t e r e s t 
d e r i v e s from f a c t o r s not i n t r i n s i c a l l y involved i n the economic a c t i o n . 
Having o u t l i n e d the t h r e e major 'points of development' of substruc-
t u r a l consciousness, i t may now be seen that the modes of development of 
s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l consciousness i m p l i e d i n the c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the 
l a t t e r i n Chapter 3/are not a l l e q u a l l y a p p l i c a b l e a t each p o i n t : 
m a t e r i a l l y pragmatic knowledge, 'promotions•> and prer-action l e g i t i m a t -
i o n s w i l l a l l o r i g i n a t e i n the m o t i v a t i o n to economic a c t i o n , before 
f u n c t i o n i n g more widely as s u p e r s t r u c t u r e . Other l e g i t i m a t i o n s may a r i s e 
not only subsequent t o econOmiov a c t i o n , but a l s o i n r e l a t i o n to the values 
and ends whose adoption i s o b j e c t i v e l y favoured. 'Extensions' however may 
have t h e i r r o o t s i n any of the p o i n t s of consciousness development: s i n c e 
they are not confined to u t i l i t a r i a n consciousness, they may develop even 
from eitperifehce of economic or work s i t u a t i o n . 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g a t t h i s p o i n t to note t h a t extensions are espec-
i a l l y l i k e l y to occur where the a c t i o n / s i t u a t i o n i s p a r t i c u l a r l y s a l i e n t 
f o r the . a c t o r , S t r e n g t h of economic motivation may be one form t h a t such 
•'" See above. Chapter 4, p 92 
169 
s a l i e n c e may t a k e , so t h a t the a c t o r becomes committed to extensions 
t h a t d e r i v e from the consciousness i n v o l v e d i n h i g h l y economically moti-
vated a c t i o n s . Strong economic motivation w i l l tend to be r e l a t e d to 
the d e s i r e to m a intain or a l t e r one's pr e s e n t economic s i t u a t i o n , and 
economic s i t u a t i o n i n t u r n may be more or l e s s s a l i e n t i n d i f f e r e n t 
s o c i e t i e s i n c o n d i t i o n i n g other spheres of l i f e . " * " A negative evalua-
t i o n of one's p r e s e n t economic s i t u a t i o n w i l l tend to make one more con-
s c i o u s of the v a l u e s , ends and means involved i n one's economic a c t i o n , 
thus r e i n f o r c i n g the argument t h a t strong economic motivation ( i n t h i s 
case a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the negative evaluation) i s a necessary element i n a 
r a t i o n a l model of the most powerful i n f l u e n c e of c l a s s elements upon the 
development o f consciousness. 
I n the argument thus f a r i n t h i s s e c t i o n , i t w i l l be obvious how 
a t t i t u d e s may develop from the ''points of consciousness development' 
through the modes o f e x t e n s i o n , l e g i t i m a t i o n or whatever: any of the 
Chapter 3 c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n s of s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l consciousness w i l l con-
s t i t u t e an a t t i t u d e i n i t s meaningful content. I t may however be worth-
w h i l e noting some p o s s i b l e developments of c o g n i t i v e s t y l e s , and examining 
the r o l e of c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e . 
C e r t a i n c a s e s may p r e s e n t a p o t e n t i a l development of a t t i t u d e or 
c o g n i t i v e s t y l e from a p a r t i c u l a r s u b s t r u c t u r a l c o g n i t i o n . For i n s t a n c e , 
the c o g n i t i o n t h a t , whatever means one-chooses, one w i l l r e c e i v e money 
without effort,, may l e a d to a l a c k of concern about money, which i n turn 
could l e a d e i t h e r to a g e n e r a l a t t i t u d e of devaluation of the importance 
of f i n a n c i a l matters, ox^ to a g e n e r a l c o g n i t i v e (or p o s s i b l y more appro-
p r i a t e l y e v a l u a t i v e ) s t y l e of i n d i f f e r e n c e , and l a c k of d e s i r e to commit 
2 
o n e s e l f to anything. T h i s i l l u s t r a t e s the d i f f i c u l t y i n d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g 
T h i s reaffiinms the importance of t a k i n g account of 'what economic 
s i t u a t i o n a t t a i n s ' ^ See above. Chapter 5, p 120 
2 One may note t h a t i f commitment and i n d i f f e r e n c e may be seen as 
e v a l u a t i v e s t y l e s , then c l e a r l y commitment could not be t h e / 
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beitween a t t i t u d e s and c o g n i t i v e / e v a l u a t i v e s t y l e s a t c e r t a i n l e v e l s : a 
s t y l e of i n d i f f e r e n c e only t o f i n a n c i a l matters could be i n d i s t i n g u i s a b l e 
from an a t t i t u d e - the d i s t i n c t i o n r e s t s upon whether we are concerned 
w i t h a g e n e r a l e v a l u a t i o n or a g e n e r a l form of e v a l u a t i o n , and the only 
way we can t e l l the d i f f e r e n c e i n p r a c t i c e i s i f the s t y l e passes beyond 
the bounds of meaningful coherence^ i n which case i t s coherence must be 
formal. 
I t was mentioned i n Chapter 6 t h a t a c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e may be i n f l u -
e n t i a l i n the development o f a c o g n i t i v e s t y l e . T h i s can be seen not only 
i n the context of the mutual i n f l u e n c e o f s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l elements upon one 
another, b u t i n terms of the development of s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l from substruc-
t u r a l c o n sciousness. Thus the s t r u c t u r e of the c o g n i t i o n s d i r e c t l y involved 
i n one's c l a s s may^ f o r i n s t a n c e , be recognised as inconiSistent, which may 
l e a d to a q u a l i t y of h e s i t a n c y i n the c o g n i t i v e forms i n the s u b s t r u c t u r e , 
which i n t u r n may be extended i n t o a wider cautious c o g n i t i v e s t y l e . I n 
g e n e r a l terms, then, the s u b s t r u c t u r a l c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e may g i v e r i s e 
t o c o g n i t i v e s t y l e s t h a t f u n c t i o n more widely than merely i n r e l a t i o n to 
the s i i i j s t r u c t u r e . 
An important f i e l d f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of the concept of c o g n i t i v e 
s t r u c t u r e i s t h a t of the a c t o r ' s c l a s s contacts over time. S e v e r a l w r i t e r s 
have noted the importance of s o c i a l m o b i l i t y , f o r example, as an i n f l u e n c e 
upon the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s thought: Daiches shows how a 
l a r g e number of E n g l i s h n o v e l i s t s have been s u b j e c t to s o c i a l m o b i l i t y , 
thus l e a d i n g to t h e i r : 
"... moral imagination (being) nourished by c u r r e n t s 
from more than on^ c l a s s , * (Daiches, 1971: 165) 
the/ 
g e n e r a l mode of development of s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l consciousness, 
s i n c e l a c k of commitment i n the s\jbstruet\are may be extended 
to a g e n e r a l e v a l u a t i v e s t y l e of i n d i f f e r e n c e . 
^ See above, Chapter 6, p 141 
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Mannheim claim s t h a t s o c i a l m o b i l i t y a c t s as an important condition 
favouring the development of s c e p t i c i s m (1956: 1 4 9 f f ) ; and, i n the con-
t e x t of h i s work on i n t e l l e c t u a l s , sees a tendency towards ' t o t a l o r i e n -
t a t i o n and s y n t h e s i s ' a r i s i n g from the i n t e r a c t i o n , through t h e i r common 
ed u c a t i o n a l h e r i t a g e , o f i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h c o n t r a s t i n g c l a s s backgrounds. 
(1936; 136ff) I n our terms, then, the c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e t h a t i n c l u d e s 
those c o g n i t i o n s and e v a l u a t i o n s of the a c t o r thiat develop through h i s 
c l a s s c o n t a c t s over time, may g i v e r i s e t o more widely functioning (e.g. 
r e l a t i v i s t i c ) c o g n i t i v e s t y l e s . Much here w i l l depend upon how r e s i s t a n t 
the a c t o r i s to the views o f those around him, i . e . to what extent he i s 
'compartmentalised'- from the world view of h i s c l a s s c o n t a c t s . As we have 
seen J , ' c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e ' i s a p p l i c a b l e at s e v e r a l l e v e l s of g e n e r a l i t y : 
i t s a p p l i c a t i o n i s appropriate i f of use, e.g. as above i n the exjilanation 
o f the development of c o g n i t i v e s t y l e s . One may, :for i n s t a n c e , not only 
see th.e c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e of the s i j b s t r u c t u r e i n a broader temporal and 
i n t e r a c t i o n a l context; as j u s t suggested, but may take a wider c o g n i t i v e 
s t r u c t i i r e i n the i n d i v i d u a l t h a t would include spheres of h i s l i f e other 
than c l a s s ; the extent to which such a wider c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e a p p l i c a -
t i o n i s u s e f u l w i l l again depend upon the degree of compartmentalisation, 
t h i s time , of the c l a s s sphere from other areas of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s l i f e . 
T h i s p o i n t about the n e c e s s i t y of a s c e r t a i n i n g the p o s i t i o n of sub-
s t r u c t u r a l consciousness i n a broader i n d i v i d u a l context a p p l i e s more 
w i d e l y t o the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l development, and r e i n -
f o r c e s some.of the arguments put forward i n Chapter 4 concerning the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p Between s u b s t r u c t u r e and s u p e r s t r u c t u r e , i n p a r t i c u l a r the 
emphasis nipon the s t r u c t u r a l and h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e s towards the 
i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y , ^ and the e x p o s i t i o n of the theory of e l e c t i v e 
2 
a f f i n i t y , and hence the r e j e c t i o n of the conception of a n e c e s s a r i l y 
See above. Chapter 4, j p 94-96 2 , 8 102 
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d i r e c t and c o n t e x t l e s s r e l a t i o n s h i p between s u b s t r u c t u r e and s u p e r s t r u c -
t u r e . Thus i n c o n c e n t r a t i n g on the components of the a c t o r ' s world view 
t h a t may develop from elements of h i s c l a s s , we must not overlook the 
f a c t t h a t such developments w i l l i n t e r a c t i n some way with h i s pireviously 
formed world view, which w i l l i n c l u d e the a t t i t u d e s t h a t he br i n g s to the 
economic a c t i o n i t s e l f , and p o s s i b l y even s p e c i f y the economic ends 
i n v o l v e d i n such a c t i o n . Thus the a t t i t u d e s and c o g n i t i v e s t y l e s t h a t 
develop i n r e l a t i o n to the i n d i v i d u a l ' s c l a s s enter i n t o a process of 
mutual e l e c t i v e a f f i n i t y w i t h the components of h i s p r e v i o u s l y e x i s t e n t 
world view, thus l e a d i n g t o m o d i f i c a t i o n s i n t h i s world view over time. 
The previous world view may provide the c r i t e r i a f o r s e l e c t i o n amongst the 
p o s s i b l e l e g i t i m a t i o n s , extensions e t c . , as w e l l as amongst the p o t e n t i a l 
elements o f the s u b s t r u c t u r a l consciousness i t s e l f ; w h i l s t the newly 
developed consciousness may be d e c i s i v e i n the s e l e c t i o n of what i n the 
previous world view i s to be r e t a i n e d . Furthermore, elements of the 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s world view should be seen i n the context of the world view 
c u r r e n t i n h i s s o c i a l context a t the time; c l a s s contacts, e.g. through 
work s i t u a t i o n , may develop h i s s u b s t r u c t u r a l consciousness through a 
process of ' i d e a l p r a g m a t i s m ' , o r t h i s process may induce, through con-
t a c t s w i t h competing i d e o l o g i e s outside the f i e l d of s o c i a l c l a s s , a more 
conscious formulation o f the a t t i t u d e s developed from s u b s t r u c t u r a l con-
s c i o u s n e s s , A p r o c e s s o f e l e c t i v e a f f i n i t y may be found to ob t a i n here too, 
where the i n d i v i d u a l s e l e c t s h i s l e g i t i m a t i o n s or promotions, f o r i n s t a n c e , 
from those a v a i l a b l e i n h i s s o c i a l context. These p o i n t s f u r t h e r r e i n f o r c e 
our arguments e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter as to the importance o f seeing the 
2 
i n d i v i d u a l i n the context o f h i s s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
See above. Chapter 3, p 78 
2 See above, s e c t i o n i v . 
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( v i i i ) C o n c l u s i o n 
I n t h i s chapter we have attempted to bring together the Work on c l a s s 
as svibstructure (Chapter 5) and world view as s u p e r s t r u c t u r e (Chapter 6) 
i n the l i g h t of the more developmental c a t e g o r i e s of consciousness of 
Chapter 3 and the g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of s u b s t r u c t u r e - s u p e r s t r u c t u r e 
r e l a t i o n s i n Chapter 4. 
I n t r a c i n g the development of s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l consciousness, the 
a n a l y t i c a l r o l e s o f the concepts of consciousness put forward i n Chapter 3 
and 6 were compared, and were seen i n r e l a t i o n to c e r t a i n key 'points of 
development' of consciousness i n the s i i b s t r u c t u r e . Three major p o i n t s of 
development were o u t l i n e d : the r e l a t i o n s of values and ends to p o s s i b l e 
or a c t u a l economic or work s i t u a t i o n ; the 'experience' of work s i t u a t i o n 
or developed economic s i t u a t i o n ; and consciousness of r e l e v a n t aspects of 
economic a c t i o n according to the s e l e c t i v e c r i t e r i a of one's economic 
ends. The development of the a c t o r ' s consciousness was not however taken 
out of the context of h i s wider world view and the world views of h i s con-
temporaries; q u e s t i o n s of compartmentalisation and the breadth of a p p l i c a -
b i l i t y o f ' c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e ' were d i s c u s s e d here; and the p i c t u r e of 
c l a s s ^ c o n d i t i o n e d world -view development th a t emerged was one of s p i r a l 
r a t h e r than c i r c u l a r development and r a t h e r than mere determination by 
o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s . F u r t h e r s p e c i f i c a t i o n of a s o c i a l context of con-
s c i o u s n e s s development was provided by the concept of ' c l a s s c o n t a c t s ' , 
whether f a c e - t o - f a c e or through i d e n t i f i c a t i o n or 'taking account': 
p a r t i c u l a r emphasis was p l a c e d upon the p o t e n t i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of s o c i a l 
c o n t acts i n the work s i t u a t i o n . ''•Priority' of c l a s s c o n t a c t s , l a c k of 
a l t e r n a t i v e s o c i a l c o n t a c t s , and ther s a l i e n c e of economic s i t u a t i o n / a c t i o n 
and work s i t u a t i o n f o r the i n d i v i d u a l , were a l l seen to be r e l e v a n t con-
d i t i o n s o f the degree of i n f l u e n c e of c l a s s f a c t o r s . 
P A R T I I I : LITERATURE AS A SPECIAL CASE 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART I I I 
The chapters i n t h i s p a r t of the t h e s i s s e rve as a l i n k between 
the g e n e r a l model developed i n the previous chapters, and the e m p i r i c a l 
a n a l y s i s o f the novels of C h a r l o t t e and Emily BrontS. Before applying 
to t h e s e p a r t i c u l a r cases the model of how world view may be conditioned 
by c l a s s f a c t o r s , i t i s n e c e s s a r y to examine the s p e c i a l problems t h a t 
authors and novels p r e s e n t to those who wish to r e l a t e the world views 
of the l a t t e r to c l a s s elements a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the former. I t has 
been made c l e a r s e v e r a l times i n p r e v i o u s chapters t h a t our i n t e r e s t 
l i e s i n the development of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s thought i n r e l a t i o n to c l a s s 
f a c t o r s , and t h i s w i l l be seen to be the case both i n the o r i e n t a t i o n of 
t h i s chapter and i n the e m p i r i c a l work on the Bront6s, But even i f i t 
were p o s s i b l e t o d e a l w i t h i n d i v i d u a l authors simply i n terms of the 
c l a s s concepts developed i n previous chapters (and we s h a l l see t h a t t h i s 
i s not the case) , then we should s t i l l face the problem of the s t a t u s of 
'world views' i n l i t e r a t u r e and of developing a methodology f o r literary 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r the purposes of s o c i o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s . Our aim then 
i s to b r i n g together the p e r s p e c t i v e s of the sociology of knowledge and 
the s o c i o l o g y of l i t e r a t u r e i n a p a r t i c u l a r approach to l i t e r a t u r e t h a t 
n e g l e c t s n e i t h e r the author nor the l i t e r a r y work. The emphasis upon 
the author means t h a t our i n t e r e s t i s d i r e c t e d more towards the c r e a t i o n 
than the r e c e p t i o n of the work, except i n s o f a r as t h i s l a t t e r i n f l u e n c e s , 
through knowledge or expectations thereof, the l i t e r a r y work i t s e l f . 
Raymond Wi l l i a m s has claimed t h a t l i t e r a t u r e i s one of the most 
important of the documents a v a i l a b l e f o r the c u l t u r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of p a s t e r a s , (1965s 65) T h i s view would add j u s t i f i c a t i o n , i f any were 
f e l t to be n e c e s s a r y , f o r s e l e c t i n g f o r d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s authors and 
t h e i r e x p r e s s i o n s , out of the manifold occupations t h a t one might have 
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chosen. The r e l i a b i l i t y of these 'docvraients' however remains debatable: 
to what extent and o f what e x a c t l y are they documents, and how f a r 
should we t r e a t l i t e r a t u r e as a s p e c i a l case, f o r which modified models 
and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c methods a r e n e c e s s a r y ? 
I n these c h a p t e r s , then, we s h a l l explore the nature of l i t e r a t u r e 
a s a s p e c i a l case f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of the g e n e r a l model of c l a s s and 
world view developed above. The s p e c i a l nature of l i t e r a t u r e w i l l be 
examined i n the f i r s t t h r e e chapters i n terms of the l i t e r a r y r o l e , the 
l i t e r a r y a c t and the l i t e r a r y form, remembering i n each s e c t i o n t h a t we 
are not d e a l i n g w i t h a l l t h a t might be included under such general 
headings, but r a t h e r w i t h the p a r t i c u l a r aspects w i t h which we are 
concernedj, and which w i l l be of use i n our a n a l y s i s of the novels of 
C h a r l o t t e and Emily BrontS, e.g. the author r o l e , f i c t i o n as a l i t e r a r y 
form, e t c . The f i n a l chapter i n t h i s P a r t w i l l review the methodology 
f o r the s o c i o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of l i t e r a t u r e suggested by a w r i t e r 
to whose work we p a i d c o n s i d e r a b l e a t t e n t i o n i n P a r t One: L u c i e n 
Goldmann; and w i l l conclude w i t h an attempt to t a c k l e s e v e r a l b a s i c 
methodological i s s u e s t h a t a r i s e from Goldmann's work. 
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CHAPTER 8; THE LITERARY ROLE 
(i) Introduction 
In t h i s chapter an attempt i s made to analyse the author role as 
a cl a s s role, and thus to apply to authorship the model that we have 
already outlined i n previous chapters concerning the development of 
consciousness from cl a s s elements. In this connection i t i s worth 
pointing out what we are not trying to do: we are not attempting to 
put forward a theory of the sort of c l a s s conditions that tend to 
engender l i t e r a r y c r e a t i v i t y i n general, as may be found i n Daiches 
(1971) account of the influence of s o c i a l mobility upon the l i t e r a r y 
imagination, and i n Mannheim's (1956: 147ff) study of the s o c i a l roots 
of r e f l e c t i v i t y and scepticism amongst dispossessed i n t e l l e c t u a l s . Nor 
are we concerned with an analysis of the general conditions which engender 
authorship as a sp e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l role i n the division of labour. 
And since we are p r i n c i p a l l y interested in the development of an individ-
ual's thought i n r e l a t i o n to cl a s s factors, our study cannot cover the 
case of the individual who merely adopts through his background the con-
sciousness already associated with a certain c l a s s . 
( i i ) Authorship as a Class Role 
What then are the p r i n c i p a l ways i n which 'class' i s most relevant 
to the study of the author? A model of the author i n terms of i d e a l -
t y p i c a l economic motivation and rational motive-action connection would 
reveal the strongest influence of cl a s s elements, but there i s no point 
i n repeating here t h i s model as outlined in Chapter 7, except insofar as 
i t bears d i r e c t l y upon the role of author. Perhaps the p a r t i c u l a r i t y of 
,the author role may be revealed through i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ' class contacts'''•, 
See above. Chapter 7, p 157 
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such as piJblishers, c r i t i c s and audience who may influence the author's 
economic success, or fellow authors with whom he may associate to 
improve the conditions of his economic action, as where professional 
author-groups form and attempt to control the access to key positions 
in the l i t e r a r y role-system (Ftigen, 1968: 26) . Yet such facets of 
professionalisation are not peculiar to authors. Similarly one might 
emphasise as a possible condition of strong cl a s s influence upon the 
author's world view the narrowness of h i s class contacts'*", i n the extreme 
case a l l the l i t e r a r y r o le-set sharing a similar class-situation with 
the author, and a l l l i t e r a r y contacts being 'class contacts'. Yet this 
would not reveal the special nature of the contact involved i n the author 
role. I t i s the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c nature of authorship, though shared with 
other i n t e l l e c t u a l occupations, that the economic action involved i s at 
the same time a production, or at l e a s t expression, of consciousness. 
This gives authorship i t s peculiarity of being subject in i t s very economic 
action to a twofold cl a s s influence: the l i t e r a r y work i s in the extreme 
case modified i n accordance with the expectations of those who can apply, 
or influence the application of, economic sanctions; and the 'accordance' 
may furthermore be with the cl a s s - r e l a t e d attitudes of these economically 
s i g n i f i c a n t persons. Thus a r a t i o n a l class model of the author would 
see the development, or at l e a s t expression, of consciousness as a 
2 
ra t i o n a l act, since, unlike most other forms of economic action , develop-
ment/expression of consciousness i s part of the economic action i t s e l f . 
I n connection with a cl a s s model of authorship, then, the expression of 
the author's consciousness should be seen i n purely u t i l i t a r i a n terms as 
far as he i s concerned, the consciousness expressed being either of direct 
See above. Chapter 7, p 158 
2 
See above. Chapter 7, .162-rl63 
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u t i l i t y for those who constitute the economically rewarding audience, 
or of s u f f i c i e n t a f f i n i t y with t h e i r consciousness to render acceptance 
and positive appreciation l i k e l y ; yet the consciousness expressed may 
be seen as only of i n d i r e c t u t i l i t y for the author, i . e . through economic 
rewards. In such circumstances the biographical investigation of the 
author would appear irrelevant, as Goldmann (1967: 497) indeed suggests 
i s generally the case. I t may be, of course/ that the l i t e r a r y form 
acceptable to the audience i s merely a traditional one, part of a 
r e l a t i v e l y autonomous l i t e r a r y sphere with l i t t l e connection with non-
l i t e r a r y consciousness whether in terms of a f f i n i t y or u t i l i t y . In such 
a case the rational economic author might s t i l l adopt such a traditional 
form for the i n d i r e c t u t i l i t y for him of i t s acceptability to his poten-
t i a l audience. 
Turning from the special character of economic action for the author, 
a more daunting challenge to the cl a s s model i s presented i f we simply 
ask i n what ways the author can support himself economically, as this 
question, which jumps readily to mind as soon as one considers the author 
i n economic terms, already implies the p o s s i b i l i t y that authorship i s not 
the p r i n c i p a l economic role for the individual author, may be undertaken 
ch i e f l y for non-economic reasons, and indeed i s not necessarily seen 
in occupational terms at a l l . The ideal-typical economic motivation 
of our general model i s precisely what one cannot assume for authors, 
which i s not to say that a l l the author's non-economic orientations are 
merely random and that sociological rationality i s i n this case inappli-
cable: rather one must study the role and orientations of authorship in 
t h e i r own right and not merely i n cl a s s terms, yet through the framework 
of means, ends and values that has been used with advantage i n the 
analysis of cl a s s i n previous chapters. 
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One of the reasons why one must study the author role in i t s own 
right i s that without such study one could not ascertain the importance 
of c l a s s elements amongst others that make up the situation of a par-
t i c u l a r author. Yet even i f we find that in a certain case the class 
model i s irre l e v a n t to the study of the author role, t h i s does not 
imply that the model may not be applied to the individual outside his 
role as author, and that his cl a s s situation may not influence the 
development of consciousness subsequently expressed in his l i t e r a r y 
works. I n other words we may s t i l l investigate the development of 
consciousness from c l a s s elements i n an individual even where his author-
ship cannot be seen i n cl a s s terms. 
As suggested above, the cl a s s elements of the author role are l i k e l y 
to be most prominent when t h i s i s the sole means of income and the sole 
motivation for l i t e r a r y action. That t h i s i s not the rule i s indicated 
by Laurenson's study of a sample of 170 writers who were born or died 
between 1860 and 1910 and who produced their work mainly in Great B r i t a i n : 
'In spite of the achievements of Besant towards the 
professionalisation of the author's role and the 
improvement i n t h e i r position during the nineteenth 
century, most writers - with the exception of women -
needed remuneration from second jobs at some time during 
t h e i r l i f e . ... Of those with no l i s t e d alternate or 
alternative job, we find seven with considerable private 
incomes and only four keeping themselves entirely as 
writers.' 
(1969: 317-318) 
Nevertheless the c l a s s - r e l a t e d consciousness of the audience may exert 
strong influence upon the author's writing, p a r t i c u l a r l y where publicly 
recognised 'success' i n one form or another i s his prin c i p a l aim, thus 
leading him to pay close attention to the expectations of those with 
whcan he wishes to be successful, e.g. colleagues, c r i t i c s , a s e l e c t 
or wider audience. The 'success' though i s not necessarily economically 
sought, but may be valued for the sake of fame or simply for the feeling 
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of pride engendered i n the author when h i s merit i s publicly affirmed. 
The question whether 'success' must include an economic aspect w i l l 
depend upon how public recognition of l i t e r a r y worth i s accorded in 
the society concerned. Equally s i g n i f i c a n t i s the matter of 'what 
economic situation attains'''• i n the case of the economically successful 
author: an elevated economic situation may be le s s effective i n attaining 
s o c i a l status, and hence perhaps l e s s s a l i e n t for the author, than 
l i t e r a r y merit recognised by e l i t e c r i t i c s . Authorship may be a role 
i n which the highest economic rewards are not always correlated with 
the highest status rewards. Bourdieu however suggests that these two 
kinds of reward are i n fa c t often associated: the a r t i s t i s now 
' ... confronted with a public, ah undifferentiated, 
impersonal and anonymous 'mass' of faceless readers. 
These readers are a market composed of potential buyers 
able to give to a work that economic sanction which, in 
addition to assuring the a r t i s t ' s economic and i n t e l l e c -
tual independence,is not always entirely lacking i n 
cu l t u r a l legitimacy.' 
(1971: 164) 
Thus far we have applied to the situation of the author two of the 
p r i n c i p a l elements of our previously developed conception of c l a s s : 
economic action (the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c economic action of the author) and 
what economic s i t u a t i o n attains (the values that are associated with 
attaining elevated economic situations through authorship). Are we 
not equally able to apply the concept of work situation and include 
iinder t h i s the facets of the author role that would otherwise escape 
under the application of the c l a s s model? This would obviously be neat 
and convenient, yet i t would mean distorting the meaning of work si t u a -
2 
tion as outlined i n Chapter 5. 'Work situation' may certainly indicate 
See above, Chapter 7, p 169 
^ See above. Chapter 5, p 120 
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Important non-economic aspects of the author role, but only where this 
l a t t e r i s undertaken for economic motives, and i t i s clear that this 
i s not necessarily the case. We must take account of writing which, 
although perhaps achieving income, i s not undertaken for any such aim, 
and yet which involves experiences and evaluations which are formative 
of further consciousness. Authorship must be seen as a s o c i a l role 
instead of merely an economic role, so that for instance the s o c i a l 
relations which are engaged i n as an author, irrespective of whether 
one's motivation i s economic or otherwise, must be considered, and not 
merely i n economic l i g h t as 'class contacts', but rather perhaps as 
'role contacts'. 
Such a conception of l i t e r a r y role-relationships implies a concern 
with l i t e r a t u r e as an i n s t i t u t i o n , a concern that sometimes excludes 
consideration of author orientations, l e t alone s t r i c t l y economic ones, 
unless f u l l y i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d i n Parsonian fashion. 
( i i i ) Authorship as an I n s t i t u t i o n a l Role 
Few would agree with Kavolis (1968: 6-7) when he j u s t i f i e s not 
dealing with the s o c i a l organisation of a r t i s t i c enterprise since i t 
can hardly be regarded as the basic sociological determinant of st y l e , 
even though, he admits, the relationships between a r t i s t i c expression 
and sociocultural conditions operate within a definite i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
structure, and elements of this may modify a r t s t y l e . Yet even i f the 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l aspects of a r t are not regarded as 'the basic' determinant, 
i t does not mean they are unimportant conditioning factors which may be 
ignored. Other writers indeed give t h i s aspect of l i t e r a t u r e prominence 
i n t h e i r studies: Fligen, for instance, claiming that l i t e r a r y action i s 
a s p e c i a l form of interpersonal behaviour that i s differentiated from 
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other categories of s o c i a l action, regards the investigation of the 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l aspects of l i t e r a r y action as one of the two main branches 
of the sociology of l i t e r a t u r e . (1968: 19) Bourdieu i n s i s t s that 
account i s taken of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d ' i n t e l l e c t u a l f i e l d ' which has 
become an increasingly complex system, 
'... increasingly independent of external influences 
(which from t h i s point on must pass through the media-
ting structure of the f i e l d ) ...' 
(1971: 163) 
The view of l i t e r a t u r e as an i n s t i t u t i o n w i l l lead to the consid-
eration of the various members of the l i t e r a r y role set, their expec-
tations of the author, and the sanctions they are w i l l i n g and able to 
use. Yet neither consensus nor: c l a r i t y nor r i g i d i t y can be assumed: 
the author may be subject to conflicting, ambiguous or f l e x i b l e role 
expectations; and, as we s h a l l see,"*" the analysis of the l i t e r a r y role 
system w i l l be inadequate i f undertaken from a supposedly external 
point of view: expectations and sanctions w i l l influence the author 
p r i n c i p a l l y through h i s conception of them and his evaluation of their 
significance, and h i s actions w i l l furthermore be influenced by his 
attitude towards the l i t e r a r y system as a whole. 
Several writers go beyond a general description of l i t e r a t u r e i n 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l terms, and focus more directly upon the position of the 
author within the system. Laurenson (1969: 320-322) presents a 
typology of writers, with two polar extremes of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
and individualisation. The l a t t e r type appears to be favoured by 
Wilson, who regards the a r t i s t as: 
'... almost by definition a deviant and isolated 
individual. His angle of v i s i o n renders him 
exceptional. ' 
(1973: 10) 
See below, section (iv) , p 190 
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The a r t i s t ' s deviance, however, i s 'positive' according to Wilson, 
since he i s an innovator, who presents fresh values and perspectives 
to the world. This i s reminiscent of Duvignaud's view of the a r t i s t 
as an atypical individual: 
"... the a r t i s t i c sign i s a 'group of meanings', a l l 
the more unsettling because i t i s always created by an 
atypical individual, someone who frees himself from 
immediate r e a l i t y by putting forward an order and a 
new arrangement which offers a different image of man ...' 
(1972: 55) 
Clearly such a view can make certain important points on the roots of 
a r t i s t i c c r e a t i v i t y , i n that the or i g i n a l a r t i s t i s l i k e l y to have 
been exposed to an atyp i c a l set of circumstances, i n the same way as, 
Mannheim suggests, the s c e p t i c a l i n t e l l e c t u a l i s the product of 
displacement from a privileged s o c i a l class (1956: 149ff); but not a l l 
a r t i s t s are so o r i g i n a l , or indeed so atypical. 
Kern does not take t h i s extreme position on the a r t i s t ' s atypica-
l i t y , since he stresse s group a f f i l i a t i o n ; but he does regard the a r t i s t 
as 'free-floating' i n the Mannheimian sense: 
' Even more important than the group into which an author 
i s born i s the group with which he a f f i l i a t e s . This i s 
true because authors tend to become 'free' i n t e l l e c t u a l s , 
men who through insight and education are able to see 
through the traditions of their own group, and to a l l y 
themselves i n t e l l e c t u a l l y with any other sector of society. 
... This new attachment w i l l become more important than 
the author's origin. Or to put i t another way, the type 
of public to which the author addresses himself w i l l tend 
to shape h i s work.' 
(1942: 510) 
Kern's hypothesis of the importance of group a f f i l i a t i o n w i l l appear 
l e s s universally applicable i f we question his assimption that authors 
are free-floating ( i . e . group of b i r t h may continue to be v i t a l for some), 
and i f we take into account the p o s s i b i l i t y of Laurenson's extreme type 
of individualised authors, who, as r e l a t i v e i s o l a t e s , may not a f f i l i a t e 
to any s o c i a l group, or who may form a s p e c i f i c a l l y l i t e r a r y clique 
rather than a f f i l i a t i n g to a pre-existent s o c i a l group. 
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Yet although Laurenson's typology helps us to avoid narrow 
u n i v e r s a l i s t i c descriptions of the a r t i s t ' s position, i t cannot account 
for what i s , according to Bourdieu, the modern i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d nature 
of legitimated high-art/ a situation that combines the Romantic s e l f -
conceptions of Laurenson's individualised writers, , with a high degree 
of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n . For Bourdieu, the i n t e l l e c t u a l or a r t i s t , 
faced with a mass market for h i s work, cultivates an ambition for 
autonomy, for a separation of himself and his universe from the everyday 
world, and refuses -
"... to recognise any but the i d e a l reader, who must be 
an 'alter ego', that i s , another i n t e l l e c t u a l , present 
or future, able to assme i n h i s creation or compre-
hension of works of a r t the same truly i n t e l l e c t u a l 
vocation which characterises the autonomous i n t e l l e c t u a l 
as one who recognises only i n t e l l e c t u a l legitimacy.' 
(1971: 165) 
And yet, despite t h i s appearance of r a d i c a l autonomy, the a r t i s t ' s 
work i s especially l i k e l y to foster the mirror-conception of s e l f : 
'Few s o c i a l actors depend as much as a r t i s t s , and i n t e l l e c -
tuals i n general, for what they are and for the image that 
they have of themselves on the image that other people have 
of them and of what they are.' 
(1971: 166) 
The ' i n t e l l e c t u a l f i e l d ' , which maintains a certain autonomy from 
external influences, i s nonetheless highly i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d according 
to the s p e c i f i c logic of competition for cultural legitimacy (1971: 163), 
which legitimacy, associated with the denial of concern for public 
response, i s at l e a s t preliminarily arranged by the members of the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l f i e l d i t s e l f , often i n Schticking's 'mutual admiration 
s o c i e t i e s ' to which Bourdieu draws, attention. (1971: 165) This i s not 
to deny that such ' i n t e l l e c t u a l consecration' may require the confirm-
ation of economic v i a b i l i t y amongst a wider public (1971: 164), and 
thus • the role of the public may be considerably greater than admitted 
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i n the s e l f - c o n c e p t i o n s o f the a r t i s t . Bourdieu indeed allows t h a t 
the p u b l i c may have a more d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e upon the self-image of 
a r t i s t s than merely through t h e i r economic power: they may take what 
i s perhaps j u s t a c o i n c i d e n c e o f authors published under the same 
format and i d e n t i f y them as a s c h o o l , i n such a way t h a t the authors 
i n v o l v e d take account of one another i n t h e i r f uture work and conform 
t o t h e i r newly c o n s t i t u t e d p u b l i c image. (1971: 172) 
Bourdieu does not c l a i m u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a b i l i t y f o r the k i n d of 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n and r e l a t i v e autonomy t h a t he p o r t r a y s : the s i t u a -
t i o n i s h i s t o r i c a l l y and c u l t u r a l l y l i m i t e d . Yet h i s study r e v e a l s 
the p o t e n t i a l complexity of f a c t o r s i n v o lved i n d e s c r i b i n g the a r t i s t ' s 
p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the l i t e r a r y system, and indeed i n d e s c r i b i n g the system 
i t s e l f . Common to t h i s and to most other s t u d i e s of the author's 
p o s i t i o n i s the concern w i t h h i s degree of autonomy. Most would con-
c l u d e t h a t the nature of l i t e r a r y work can grant g r e a t e r autonomy to 
the author than to other workers, i n a t l e a s t two r e s p e c t s : there i s 
some degree o f e x p e c t a t i o n of c r e a t i v i t y from the author; and, as Fttgen 
p o i n t s out, the very f i c t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r of l i t e r a t u r e allows experiment 
without r i s k , without i r r e v e r s i b l e consequences (1968: 22). Nevertheless, 
Ftigen adds, t h e r e i s almost always some l i m i t a t i o n upon t h i s freedom: 
the l i m i t a t i o n may simply e x i s t i n the form of 'die k t i n s t l e r i s c h e 
V e rschlttsselung' (1968: 2 2 ) , an a r t world which remains locked f o r a l l 
those who have not a c q u i r e d the n e c e s s a r y c u l t u r a l key,''" thus r e s u l t i n g 
i n a r e s t r i c t i o n o f r e a d e r s h i p and hence of the d i f f u s i o n of the i d e a s 
i n the l i t e r a r y work. Where t h i s c u l t u r a l enclosure i s thought to be 
i n s u f f i c i e n t l y e f f e c t i v e , or simply non-existent, the l i t e r a r y 
A s i m i l a r p o i n t i s made i n another a r t i c l e by Bourdieu (1968), 
i n which the understanding of works o f a r t i s seen to depend 
upon a c c e s s to adequate i n t e r p r e t i v e codes. 
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questioning of norms may be subject to a variety of sanctions, ranging 
from derogatory labels for the work (such as 'trash') and loss of 
prestige for the author, to censorship and punishment by the relevant 
authorities; though such sanctions may be warded off through public 
disclaimers made by the author. 
The question of autonomy i s closely related to that of comparment-
a l i s a t i o n : as implied by both Ftigen and Bourdieu, the l i t e r a r y world 
may be more or l e s s publicly compartmentalised from non-literary roles 
and actions. Furthermore, i n accordance with our emphasis upon the 
'actor' rathernthan the 'individual'•*•, authorship may be a role played 
by the individual and involving a r e l a t i v e l y autonomous province of 
2 
meaning for him : the l i t e r a r y actor may be r e l a t i v e l y divorced from 
the economic actor etc. , and thus h i s attitudes may not extend over a l l 
provinces. This twofold potentiality of compartmentalisation may be 
highly s i g n i f i c a n t where the influence of, for instance, a class-related 
cognitive structure i s concerned.^ I n the case of the author, the 
significance of the cognitive structure of h i s l i t e r a r y role contacts 
w i l l depend on the degree to which he i s aware of expectations and 
obtains feedback of response: he may be r e l a t i v e l y distanced from the 
1 
2 
See above. Chapter 7, pp 150-153 
'Relatively autonomous' seems preferable to ' f i n i t e " , as i t 
avoids the apparent corollary of an ' i n f i n i t e ' and basic 
'everyday l i f e ' , which we should regard as i t s e l f capable of 
including several r e l a t i v e l y autonomous spheres. I n other 
words, we find Berger & Luckmann's 'relatively autonomous 
universes of meaning' (1967: 104) more plausible and more 
useful than the contrast between ' f i n i t e provinces of meaning' 
and 'the paramount r e a l i t y of everyday l i f e ' . (1967: 39) I t 
should be noted that Schutz himself (from whom Berger and 
Luckmann take many of t h e i r concepts and much of their argii- . 
ment) considers the paramount r e a l i t y of everyday l i f e to be 
nonetheless a f i n i t e province of meaning. (Schutz, 1973: 230) 
See above. Chapter 7, BP 170-171 
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various groups that make up h i s audience and from thlair consciousness, 
and hence iinaware of any cjjntradiction between his world view and theirs 
and indeed of any inconsistency i n the cognitive structure of the l i t e r a r y 
participants. S i m i l a r l y the author may be compartmentalised i n his 
l i t e r a r y a c t i v i t y with respect to his other a c t i v i t i e s , i n which case 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (such as inconsistency) of his overall cognitive struc-
ture w i l l be neither apparent to nor problematic for him. 
I t i s by now clear that the r e l a t i v e strength of the numerous 
variables that may come to influence the author i n his work w i l l , as 
Laurenson points out, vary h i s t o r i c a l l y , i . e . -
•,.. according to the period i n which the author i s 
writing, and according to the p u l l s and pressures, 
sanctions and opportunities, which are operating, 
moulding the way i n which he structures h i s world, 
affecting the presentation of his material.' 
(1972: 91) 
We must however take p a r t i c u l a r note of the importance of the subjec-
t i v i t y of the author i n i t s effect upon the strength of the more 
objective variables that may influence him. 
(iv) The Ends and VAlues of the Author 
Many of those whose views on the author role we have already con-
sidered have i n thei r statements implied certain t y p i c a l aims on the 
part of authors, e.g. the formulation of fresh values and perspectives 
(Wilson) , or the competition for c u l t u r a l legitimacy (Bourdieu). Indeed 
few would deny that the subjective aspect of the author role i s relevant 
to the sociological study of authorship, though some would r e s t r i c t 
the analysis of t h i s aspect to that which f a l l s within the f i e l d of 
the normative. Fligen for instance argues that the sociology of l i t e r -
ature should not concern i t s e l f with the manifold motives for l i t e r a r y 
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action, but rather with l i t e r a r y behaviour that shows a r e l a t i v e 
s t a b i l i t y , and with those invariances that provide a r e l i a b l e orien-
tation to participant individuals. He i s thus concerned with role-
expectations and -fulfilments, with normative behaviour that i s inde-
pendent of individual motives. (1968: 19) This would imply that unless 
individual motives are normatively oriented, then they are irrelevant 
to the fulfilment of the author role. Where they are irrelevant in this 
way, as must be the case with a large pjroportion of the unconscious 
motivations that could be involved i n the decision to write l i t e r a t u r e , 
then we agree with Ftigen that they f a l l outside of the province of 
sociology. Yet there e x i s t several motivations which are neither so 
neatly structured as to f a l l within the sphere of predominant, norma-
tiv e role-conceptions, nor so unique and deeply unconscious as to defy 
explication i n r a t i o n a l terminology. I t i s these orientations (which 
are by no means unconnected with role-expectations and -fulfilments) 
of which we wish to take account i n the sociological study of the 
individual author. The role of author cannot adequately be seen i n 
purely objective or normative terms: as mentioned i n Chapter 5,''" some 
cognitions and evaluations may be necessary for the individual to be in 
the position at a l l , but i f we are to study the influence of h i s s i t u a -
tion and action upon h i s thought, we cannot neglect the consciousness 
he brings to the situation which cannot be derived from an analysis 
of the position i t s e l f ; and whilst i t may be claimed that any situation 
necessarily involves certain forms of experience, the description thereof 
may be i n f i n i t e unless seen i n r e l a t i o n to the individiial's ends and 
values. From t h i s statement, which i s a broader version of one pre-
viously constructed i n r e l a t i o n to economic situation, i t may be seen 
See above. Chapter 5, p 119 
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that much of our general approach to class i n previous chapters may 
be applied to the analysis of the l i t e r a r y role, so that one may ask 
such questions as: what are the author's ends and values i n relation 
to h i s l i t e r a r y a c t i v i t y ? what i s h i s attitude towards the existing 
l i t e r a r y system as a whole? and to what extent do h i s l i t e r a r y ends 
and values involve commitment to a personal, l i t e r a r y or wider societal 
system of actions? 
In the analysis of the individual's ends and values i n relation 
to h i s role as author, we must not assume that he has a positive evalu-
ation of writing i n i t s e l f , or indeed even for e x t r i n s i c reasons: his 
writing may i n some cases be understood better i n terms of conformity 
than of deliberate choice. An example of t h i s may be seen as a 
corollary of Laurenson's argument that, with increasing monetary rewards 
i n the nineteenth century, -
'... The romantic image of the writer could be reconciled 
with the Victorian ethos of self-help, 'respectability' 
and pecuniary s t a b i l i t y . ' 
(1969: 316) 
- i . e . one may find cases i n which authorship was not only reconciled 
with t h i s ethos, but indeed was the only means of conformity thereto for 
a p a r t i c u l a r individual. I f h i s i n t e r e s t i n authorship amounts to l i t t l e 
more than such conformity, then presumably he w i l l attempt to s a t i s f y 
s u f f i c i e n t l y the expectations of those who are able to guarantee his 
economic security etc. I f however he has more positive motives for 
writing, then we can no longer be s a t i s f i e d with an outline of predom-
inant role-expectations, as Ftigen would provide us with, but rather we 
must accept that the author's ends and values w i l l e f f ect the degree of 
consideration that he grants to the views of different groups amongst 
those who receive h i s work. 
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Concerning author motivation, j u s t as we have seen with descrip-
tions of author positions, some sociologists are prone to make statements 
of intended universal a p p l i c a b i l i t y : Wilson, for instance, suggests that, 
apart from economic rewards, -
'The other major type of reward on which a r t i s t s depend 
ig the approbation of a peculiarly qualified audience. 
This audience may perhaps be best characterised as a 
s e l e c t jury of one's peers. ... what i s important i s 
not their numbers but their quality.' 
(1973: 10) 
Wilson considers such moral support to be comparable with that of 
other professionals i n science and scholarship. Admittedly Wilson i s 
writing of the 'fine' a r t i s t , yet even here the assumption that such 
rewards are universally sought seems untenable. Bramstedt suggests 
that the writer's choice of audience i s a more complex matter: there 
may be a gap between h i s ideal and h i s actual public. (1964: 261ff) 
He may, as Wilson suggests, take as his 'significant others' a small 
group of i n t e l l e c t u a l s , but these may be able to offer him l i t t l e finan-
c i a l support. Thus h i s choice of audience may determine his livelihood, 
and i n turn r e f l e c t h i s ambition, di s i n t e r e s t , etc., i n the economic 
sphere; and furthermore h i s acceptance by a particular audience may 
determine (and thus be sought for) s o c i a l status. (Bramstedt, 1964: 332) 
I n sum, Bramstedt would claim that the author's evaluations of class and 
status w i l l influence his choice of audience, because of the l a t t e r ' s 
e f f e c t i n turn upon his cl a s s and status position. 
To choose an audience may be seen as offering to that audience the 
power to wield positive and negative sanctions according to one's 
performance; and, as we have seen, different audiences have access to 
dif f e r e n t sanctions, so that i n choosing one's audience one may be 
declaring one's evaluation of the various rewards available. Thus the 
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most d i r e c t l y i n f l u e n t i a l role contacts w i l l be those that are of 
greatest salience"*" for the author, i . e . that are most s i g n i f i c a n t 
i n r e l a t i o n to h i s ends and values. We must not however forget the 
-2 
point made i n Chapter 5, that the ends and values that are l i k e l y 
to be adopted are those that are seen as feasible: thus an author 
who receives unfavourable reviews from c r i t i c s but achieves popular 
success may adjust h i s values accordingly, and, i n so doing, decrease 
the salience of c r i t i c s , and increase that of his wider audience. I t 
would seem plausible to hypothesise that this reaction i s more frequently 
found than that i n which there i s a devaluation of what i s achieved 
against what might have been. 
The influence of success upon the author, whichever groups are 
involved i n i t s recognition, and whether i t s rewards are of prestig-
ious or f i n a n c i a l character (or both), i s clearly a case which i n d i -
cates the importance of taking account of the author's values and 
ends: not only may the author's values lay greater or l e s s e r emphasis 
on the different forms of success, but his values may influence the 
choice of meafis to success i n such a way that the most rational means 
may be avoided i f they clash with h i s values."^ Furthermore, as we 
have seen, achieved success may bring within the bounds of f e a s i b i l i t y 
new ends and values (a new position may achieve previously unformu-
l i s e d values and provide altered conditions of action), whose adoption 
thus becomes more " r e a l i s t i c " . His new ' role-situation', e.g. with 
enhanced c u l t u r a l legitimacy and/or economic standing, may thus act 
4 
as a s i g n i f i c a n t 'point of development' of his consciousness. Yet 
See above. Chapter 4, p 92 and Chapter 7, pp 168-169 
^ See above. Chapter 5, p 122 
^ See above. Chapter 5, pp 122-123 
^ See above. Chapter 7, p 166 
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even without a c h i e v i n g s u c c e s s , and thus a l t e r i n g h i s l i t e r a r y 
s t a n d i n g , the author's consciousness may develop simply through 
experience o f the unintended consequences o f l i t e r a r y a c t i o n . 
F i n a l l y i n t h i s s e c t i o n we s h a l l look a t the author's a t t i t u d e 
to the wider l i t e r a r y system, an a t t i t u d e comprising cognitions and 
e v a l u a t i o n s which a r e both i n f l u e n t i a l upon h i s a c t i o n w i t h i n t h a t 
system, and i n t u r n d e r i v e f r o n the a c t i o n . One might hypothesise 
2 
t h a t those who attempt t o p u b l i s h t h e i r work tend to have a commitment 
t o the l i t e r a r y system, and to i t s l e g i t i m a t i n g i d e o l o g i e s (such as 
t h a t good works w i l l be p u b l i s h e d , o r w i l l even achieve success i n 
terms o f c r i t i c a l a c c l a i m and both q u a l i t y and q u a n t i t y of audience) ; 
and f u r t h e r t h a t those who do achieve success are confirmed i n t h e i r 
commitment (upon which perhaps now depends a new and rewarding s e l f -
image w i t h which they would be u n w i l l i n g to p a r t ) . T h i s hypothesis i s 
o f course d i f f i c u l t to uphold i n the fac e of authors' claims t h a t they 
c a r e nothing f o r the r e a c t i o n s o f c r i t i c s and the wider audience; y e t 
such an a t t i t u d e may be f o m d to be a r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n adopted a g a i n s t 
the p o s s i b i l i t y o f being disappointed or hurt by adverse c r i t i c i s m or 
low s a l e s . P r o t e s t i s , i n any case, u s u a l l y d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t p a r t i c u l a r 
i n d i v i d u a l s or the e x i s t i n g system: f a i t h may nonetheless be maintained 
t h a t i f only one's work can be p i i b l i s h e d then a t l e a s t a f u t u r e audience 
w i l l understand and a p p r e c i a t e i t . 
(v) C onclusion 
I n t h i s chapter we have attempted to see authorship i n terms of 
the c l a s s model developed i n p r e v i o u s chapters. Although we i n d i c a t e d 
the k i n d of s i t u a t i o n i n which we should f i n d an i d e a l - t y p i c a l i n f l u e n c e 
See above. Chapter 7, p 167 
2 
See above. Chapter 2, p 33 
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of c l a s s elements, i t became c l e a r t h a t , i n order to examine the r e l a -
t i o n s h i p between an author's c l a s s and the world view of h i s l i t e r a r y 
works, the author r o l e i t s e l f must be taken i n t o account, even (or 
perhaps e s p e c i a l l y ) where i t s non-economic a s p e c t s mediate the i n f l u e n c e 
of c l a s s elements. N e v e r t h e l e s s i t has been seen t h a t many of the 
concepts developed i n previous chapters i n r e l a t i o n to the c l a s s model 
may be ^ f r u i t f u l l y a p p l i e d to the a n a l y s i s of author r o l e s . I n par-
t i c u l a r , the a p p l i c a t i o n of s o c i o l o g i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y has meant going 
beyond the a n a l y s i s o f the author i n purely normative i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
terms, to I n c l u d e the not n e c e s s a r i l y i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d ends and values 
t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l b r i n g s to the author r o l e - s i t u a t i o n . 
I n the next chapter we s h a l l take up v a r i o u s p o i n t s from t h i s 
chapter f o r f u r t h e r development, i n p a r t i c u l a r (1) the notion t h a t 
the l i t e r a r y a c t of the author i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by i t s I n v o l v i n g the 
development or e x p r e s s i o n of consciousness i n the a c t i t s e l f ; and 
(2) the emphasis upon the s p e c i a l nature of the contact i n v o l v e d i n 
the author r o l e , and upon the s i g n i f i c a n c e of audience-groups as 
elements of the s o c i a l context of expression. 
These , p o i n t s were introduced on p^^79.rrlQo of t h i s chapter. 
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CHAPTER 9; THE LITERARY ACT 
( i ) I n t r o d u c t i o n 
I n t h i s chapter we examine the ' l i t e r a r y a c t ' o f the author, i n 
order to a s c e r t a i n whether i t s l i t e r a r y q u a l i t y demands the a p p l i c a t i o n 
o f p a r t i c u l a r concepts and models. G a r f i n k e l has argued t h a t s o c i a l 
a c t i o n s can be seen as 'documents' ( G a r f i n k e l , 1972: 358): to what extent 
i s l i t e r a r y a c t i o n a s p e c i a l k i n d of document? 
We d e a l f i r s t w i t h two common c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n s of l i t e r a t u r e , i . e . 
i n terms of the theory o f a r t as communication, and as expression. The 
i m p l i c a t i o n s o f these views are c r i t i c a l l y explored, followed by a r e -
a s s e r t i o n o f the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the s o c i a l context of l i t e r a r y 'communi-
c a t i o n ' o r 'expriession!. T h i s l a s t s e c t i o n thus p o i n t s to s o c i a l reasons 
f o r the p e c u l i a r i t y of l i t e r a t u r e as a document; whereas the next chapter 
('The L i t e r a r y Form') concentrates upon the formal aspects of l i t e r a t u r e 
t h a t must be taken i n t o accovint i n an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and explanation of 
world views. 
( i i ) The L i t e r a r y A c t as Conmiunication 
Probably the most g e n e r a l l y h e l d view i n the sociology of l i t e r a t u r e 
i s t h a t l i t e r a t u r e , along with a l l the a r t s , i s a mode of communication; 
communication i s furthermore h e l d to be the predominant motivation of 
the a r t i s t ; and there i s o f t e n the assumption t h a t , a t l e a s t i n 'success-
f u l ' a r t , communication i s achieved - the a r t i s t manages to convey a 
meaningful experience to the audience. Raymond Williams i s one of the 
most ardent supporters o f t h i s view: 
"Art cannot e x i s t u n l e s s a working communication can be 
reached, and t h i s communication i s an a c t i v i t y i n which both 
a r t i s t and s p e c t a t o r p a r t i c i p a t e . When a r t communicates, a 
human experience i s a c t i v e l y o f f e r e d and a c t i v e l y r e c e i v e d . 
Below t h i s a c t i v i t y t h r e s h o l d there can be no a r t . ' (1965: 42) 
L a t e r i n the same chapter W i l l i a m s modifies t h i s s i m p l i s t i c view of a r t 
by i n t r o d u c i n g v a r i o u s c o m p l i c a t i n g f a c t o r s such as the 'time-lag' (1965: 
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49) , i . e . s u c c e s s f u l a r t i s t h a t which e v e n t u a l l y communicates. C e r t a i n l y 
the assumptions of the nai v e view of a r t as communication would make the 
ta s k o f the s o c i o l o g i s t much e a s i e r : as with the concept of ' i n t e r s u b j e c -
t i v i t y ' , one could conveniently f o r g e t many of the problems of i n t e r p r e -
t a t i o n , and l i t e r a t u r e , i n s o f a r as i t merited the l a b e l ' a r t ' , would become 
merely a means of s u c c e s s f u l communication between the s u b j e c t i v i t y of 
a r t i s t and audience. Sahay i n d i c a t e s the s i m p l i s t i c nature of such a 
view i n another context: the s o c i o l o g y of language. He suggests t h a t the 
a s s m p t i o n of the i n t e r s i a b j e c t i v i t y of language depends on s u p e r f i c i a l 
a n a l y s e s o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l i n g u i s t i c norms, r a t h e r than on the a n a l y s i s of 
' r e a l ' language, i . e . the m u l t i p l e p o s s i b l e v a r i a t i o n s of meaning. (1975: 56) 
I n a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the i d e a of a time-lag of l i t e r a r y understanding, 
W i l l i a m s makes the d i s t i n c t i o n between the p e r s o n a l meanings of the a r t i s t 
and the common meanings of h i s audience: i f the d i s t a n c e between these 
meanings i s g r e a t , the a r t i s t may be involved i n a long hard s t r u g g l e to 
f i n d means o f communication t h a t w i l l bridge the gap. (1965: 48-49) T h i s 
o f course s t i l l i m p l i e s the mot i v a t i o n to communicate, but does not assume 
i t s immediate s u c c e s s . The d i s t i n c t i o n between p e r s o n a l and common meanings 
u n d e r l i e s Bourdieu's view of a r t perception as i n v o l v i n g the mastery of the 
code i n h e r e n t i n the work o f a r t ; communication depends on a sh a r i n g of 
codes, and the o r i g i n a l a r t i s t who developes new forms to communicate h i s 
p e r s o n a l meanings must o f n e c e s s i t y be ahead of h i s time, h i s work being 
adequately understood only a f t e r t h e new code has been mastered. (Bourdieu, 
1968: 600) 
As soon as one admits the p o s s i b i l i t y of a divergence between the 
meanings.of a r t i s t and audience, v a r i o u s problems are r a i s e d , such as: 
which audience groups a r e capable of comprehending the work of a r t ? to what 
e x t e n t does the a r t i s t have these groups i n mind i n the process of c r e a -
t i o n ? and to what e x t e n t i s the a r t i s t concerned w i t h communication anyway, 
i . e . can we i n f a c t assume commionication to be one of h i s ends? I t may 
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c e r t a i n l y be suggested t h a t the a r t i s t , even i n the sphere of 'high 
a r t ' , u s u a l l y has some audience i n mind, though t h i s may be only a 
s e l e c t group of h i s c o l l e a g u e s . Y e t even i f a t times c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
o f audience can be shown to be r e l a t i v e l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t , and furthermore 
i f we can demonstrate i n a m i n o r i t y of cases a l a c k of d e s i r e on the 
p a r t of the a r t i s t to communicate w i t h any o t h e r s , we may nonetheless 
wish to r e t a i n the theory of a r t as communication as a general hypo-
t h e s i s to be a p p l i e d i n each case; f o r the value of such a theory l i e s 
l e s s i n i t s m i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y than i n the d i r e c t i o n i t gives to our 
p e r c e p t i o n . We are encouraged by t h i s theory to look f o r attempts by 
the a r t i s t to communicate, w h i l s t r e c o g n i s i n g t h a t the force with which 
such attempts are made i s a matter of degree. 
T h i s g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e of looking f o r attempts by the a r t i s t to 
communicate w i l l make the r e s e a r c h e r more pe r c e p t i v e of e f f o r t s to 
convince an audience of, f o r example, the r e a l i s m and legitimacy of a 
f i c t i o n a l course of a c t i o n . Such communication endeavours are amongst 
the most important elements t o be i n c l u d e d i n the s o c i o l o g i c a l i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n of l i t e r a r y work, as we s h a l l see i n s e c t i o n ( i i i ) below. 
Bourdieu, working on a d i s t i n c t i o n made by P a u l V a l e r y between works 
t h a t c r e a t e t h e i r own p u b l i c and those t h a t a re c r e a t e d by t h e i r p u b l i c , 
puts forward a continuum o f audience r e l e v a n c e , from the ' b e s t - s e l l i n g 
authors' , where one assianes -
' ... t h a t s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s ... c a r r y more weight i n t h e i r 
i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o j e c t than the i n t r i n s i c n e c e s s i t y of the 
work of a r t . ' 
t o those authors who -
' ... i n r e f u s i n g t o conform to the expectations of a c t u a l 
readers, impose the demands which the n e c e s s i t y o f the work 
enforces on them, without conceding anything to the i d e a , 
a n t i c i p a t e d o r experienced, t h a t , readers form or w i l l form 
of t h e i r work. (19/71:167) 
One may note t h a t one of the i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s i s t h a t o b s c u r i t y may 
come to be seen by a r t i s t s , c r i t i c s and audience a l i k e as a s i g n of high 
a r t , as c l e a r l y a new code i s i n v o l v e d and furthermore one which presents 
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such d i f f i c u l t i e s o f deciphering as to i n d i c a t e the a r t i s t ' s l a c k of 
care f o r audience response, and hence h i s claim to high a r t s t a t u s ! 
A c y n i c might go f u r t h e r and suggest t h a t o b s c u r i t y , a t l e a s t up to a 
c e r t a i n p o i n t , may be h i g h l y p r i z e d by p r o f e s s i o n a l i n t e r p r e t e r s ( c r i t i c s , 
academics) , as i t p r ovides them w i t h more work and j u s t i f i e s t h e i r 
p r o f e s s i o n a l e x i s t e n c e : t h i s may apply p a r t i c u l a r l y to l i t e r a r y works 
where t h e r e i s thought to be a complicated but o b j e c t i v e code to crack, 
and where the i n t e r p r e t e r ' s e x p e r t i s e may be demonstrated and h i s claim 
t h e r e t o j u s t i f i e d . 
So f a r we have i n d i c a t e d the p o s i t i v e and negative e v a l u a t i o n s to 
be made o f the theory o f a r t as communication from a r t i s t to audience. 
Some t h e o r i s t s , however, consider a r t i s t i c communication to be more 
f u l l y i n t e r a c t i v e than t h i s ( i . e . not j u s t communication, but i n t e r -
a c t i o n ) ; w h i l s t o t h e r s emphasise the i n t e g r a t i v e functions of a r t i s t i c 
communication ( i . e . not j u s t communication, but i n t e g r a t i o n ) . A l b r e c h t 
f i n d s both o f these tendencies i n the work of H. D. Duncan, i n whose 
view l i t e r a t u r e i s a k i n d of language f o r coimnunicating between people: 
a means of s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n . A l b r e c h t sees i n the emphasis upon 
i n t e r a c t i o n the i m p l i c a t i o n of a high degree of s o l i d a r i t y and congruence 
of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s amongst the l i t e r a r y p a r t i c i p a n t s . He r i g h t l y con-
s i d e r s such a model to be u n r e a l i s t i c , i n t h a t l i t e r a r y commianication i s 
not n e c e s s a r i l y i n t e r a c t i v e a t a l l , but i s r a t h e r a chain of communication 
w i t h p o s s i b l e feedback. (1970: 4-6) 
The view of a r t as i n t e g r a t i v e i s however q u i t e widely held: 
K a v o l i s puts forward the f u n c t i o n a l i s t theory of a r t , according to which 
a r t e i t h e r embodies the values of the s t a t u s quo, or, i n times of s o c i a l 
change, a i d s the r e i n t e g r a t i o n of s o c i e t y by providing new 'symbolic 
f o c i of s o c i o c u l t u r a l i n t e g r a t i o n ' . (1968: 5) Y e t i t i s not j u s t the 
•'• James Joyce's 'Finnegan's Wake'_ may be an example of t h i s k i n d 
of l i t e r a r y work. 
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f u n c t i o n a l i s t ^ who emphasise i n t e g r a t i o n : George Mead, f o r i n s t a n c e , 
puts forward a view of a e s t h e t i c experience t h a t i s p e c u l i a r l y 
u t i l i t a r i a n and c o l l e c t i v i s t . He p r e s e n t s a e s t h e t i c experience -
' ... as a p a r t o f the attempt to i n t e r p r e t -complex 
s o c i a l l i f e i n terms of the goals toward which our 
e f f o r t s run.' (1926: 384-5); 
so t h a t , f o r Mead, the p o l i t i c i a n ' s p o r t r a y a l of the f i n a l Utopia f o r 
which he i s s t r i v i n g i s an a e s t h e t i c a c t . T h i s then i s a goal-oriented 
conception t h a t c o n t r a s t s s t r i k i n g l y w i t h Kant's notion of d i s i n t e r -
estedness i n a e s t h e t i c s . There i s moreover i n Mead's conception of 
a e s t h e t i c s a p a r t i c u l a r emphasis upon i n t e g r a t i v e g o a l s , as seen f o r 
i n s t a n c e i n h i s comments on enjoyment i n reading(newspapers: whether 
t h i s enjoyment -
' ... has an a e s t h e t i c f u n c t i o n or not depends upon whether 
the s t o r y o f the news ... s e r v e s to i n t e r p r e t to the reader 
h i s experience as the shared experience of the community of 
which he f e e l s h i m s e l f t o be a p a r t . ' (1926: 390) 
S i m i l a r l y i t seems t h a t Mead i s c r i t i c a l of the a e s t h e t i c p o t e n t i a l i t y 
of the movie, when he cl a i m s t h a t -
' I t does not l e n d i t s e l f r e a d i l y to shared experience.' 
(1926: 391) 
Genuine a e s t h e t i c s are f o r Mead f a r from being e s c a p i s t : they should 
l e a d us t o f i n d v a l u e i n the l i f e t h a t we l i v e ; they should i n s p i r e us 
t o p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t y and t o r e c o g n i s e , i n a r a t h e r Durkheimian sense, 
ovir r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h o t h e r s , perhaps i n cooperative e f f o r t . Aes-
t h e t i c s f o r Mead c o n s t i t u t e s a b r i n g i n g together of the t e c h n i c a l 
and the f i n a l i n t o an a e s t h e t i c t o t a l i t y t h a t i n c o r p o r a t e s means and 
ends, s e l f and o t h e r s , by r e l a t i n g means to ends and s e l f to o t h e r s . 
Those new to the s o c i o l o g y of l i t e r a t u r e may be forgiven f o r 
t h i n k i n g t h a t such statements as those j u s t d i s c u s s e d are the unrepre-
s e n t a t i v e i d e a s of an i d i o s y n c r a t i c philosopher: such unfortunately i s 
n o t the c a s e . Value-judgements cloaked as p h i l o s o p h i c a l statements 
w i t h p r e t e n s i o n s to l a n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y , or doubly cloaked as s o c i o -
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l o g i c a l f a c t s , abo\and i n the so c i o l o g y of a r t . T h i s i s not to deny t h a t 
amongst such statements one may f i n d hypotheses t h a t show i n s i g h t and 
t h a t may be p r o f i t a b l y employed i n more a n a l y t i c s t u d i e s . The work of 
Jean Duvignaud i s a good example of such a case. H is f i v e 'working 
hypotheses' on a r t i s t i c c r e a t i o n (1972: 48ff) are w e l l worth examina-
t i o n , even though un d e r l y i n g them (and i n p a r t i c u l a r the 'polemic 
s i g n ' h ypothesis - 1972: 51-52) i s a narrow philosophy of a r t , t h a t 
i t s e l f appears to r e s t upon an e v a l u a t i o n of the optimal f u n c t i o n of 
a r t . Here again we f i n d the theory of a r t as communication, but taken 
f a r beyond the comparatively modest claims o f Raymond W i l l i a m s : 
' ... a work of a r t ( i s ) an attempt to overcome an o b s t a c l e -
... t h i s o b s t a c l e c o n s i s t s of everything t h a t prevents the 
t o t a l communication which the a r t i s t , whatever h i s m a t e r i a l s , 
cannot choose but t r y to r e a l i s e . ' (Duvignand, 1972: 50) 
' ... every s i g n i f i c a n t imagined a c t i o n i s a commmication 
from a d i s t a n c e which i s never r e c o n c i l e d to t h i s d i s t a n c e . 
We say 'from a d i s t a n c e ' because i f men d i d not have to 
reach out t o one another, separated by space and time, 
through the b a r r i e r s c r e a t e d by groups and c l a s s e s , they 
would not need t o r e l y on s i g n s any more than on the imag-
i n a r y . ' (1972: 52, Duvignaud's emphasis) 
The aim of a r t , then, i s ' t o t a l communication', prevented by d i s t a n c i n g 
o b s t a c l e s without which a r t would not be necessary. T h i s view would 
appear t o see a r t as the s o l u t i o n t o Durkheim's problems of s o c i a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n ; f o r both a r t i s t and audience the c h i e f motivation seems 
to be 'complete i n t e g r a t i o n ' (1972: 143). 
The view o f a r t as not j i a s t t r y i n g to communicate, but aiming 
a t i n t e g r a t i o n or t o t a l communication, i s the most r a d i c a l v e r s i o n 
of the theory o f a r t as communication; and i f we had doubts about 
the more modest v e r s i o n s , then we s h a l l be s t i l l more vmwilling to 
accept u n c r i t i c a l l y the i n t e g r a t i v e t h e o r i e s t h a t read i n t o a r t y e t 
more assumptions concerning i t s nature and purposes. 
So f a r i n t h i s s e c t i o n we have reviewed the common conception of 
a r t as a form of commiinication, and have taken from t h i s a p o s i t i v e 
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c o n t r i b u t i o n i n the f o m of a d i r e c t i o n f o r a n a l y t i c perception - the 
s e a r c h f o r attempts t o communicate; and we have made a b r i e f c r i t i c a l 
examination o f some i n t e g r a t i v e t h e o r i e s of a r t , t h a t stem from s u r -
p r i s i n g l y d i v e r g e n t sources: f v i n c t i o n a l i s t s , George Mead, and Jean 
Duvignaud. There i s however a view of a r t as communication t h a t i s 
c o n s i d e r a b l y more l i m i t e d than any so f a r d i s c u s s e d , i . e . the notion 
t h a t the a r t i s t , even i f making no attempt to communicate w i t h others, 
i s endeavouring to communicate an experience to h i m s e l f . For i n s t a n c e , 
i n the context of f i c t i o n , i f the author i s unconcerned w i t h convincing 
o t h e r s , e.g. of the r e a l i s m of a p a r t i c u l a r dialogue, he w i l l nonethe-
l e s s s t i l l have t o convince h i m s e l f . T h i s conception i s expressed most 
cogently again by Raymond W i l l i a m s , t h i s time i n a work ('Communications') 
w r i t t e n a f t e r 'The Long Revolution', from which our e a r l i e r quotations 
were taken: 
'Many a r t i s t s and s c i e n t i s t s share t h i s fmdamental unconcern 
about the ways i n which t h e i r work w i l l be r e c e i v e d . ... I t i s 
to themselves, i n a way, t h a t they f i r s t show t h e i r conceptions, 
p l a y t h e i r music, p r e s e n t t h e i r arguments. Not only as a way 
of g e t t i n g these c l e a r , i n t h e process of almost endless t e s t i n g 
t h a t a c t i v e composition i n v o l v e s . But a l s o , whether c o n s c i o u s l y 
or not, as a way of p u t t i n g the experience i n t o a communicable 
form. I f one mind has grasped i t , even i f only the mind t h a t 
a l s o c r e a t e d i t , then i t may be open to other minds. ' 
(1968: 112-3) 
I t i s not c l e a r here whether Williams i s s t i l l c l a i m i n g t h a t , even 
un c o n s c i o u s l y , the a r t i s t n e c e s s a r i l y aims a t communication with o t h e r s , 
but what i s p a r t i c u l a r l y v a l u a b l e i n Williams' statement i s the view 
o f the a r t i s t b e i n g h i s own audience and thus making sur e t h a t the work 
of a r t a t l e a s t communicates something t o h i m s e l f . I t i s t h i s minimal 
assumption o f the theory of a r t as communication t h a t i s an e s s e n t i a l 
foundation f o r the s o c i o l o g y of a r t , i n s o f a r as . t h i s l a t t e r aims to 
i n c l u d e w i t h i n i t s purview the meanings of the work of a r t f o r i t s 
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c r e a t o r . •'• I t i s t h i s minimal hypothesis t h a t j u s t i f i e s our seeing 
a r t i s t i c c r e a t i o n as a s o c i a l a c t , s i n c e the means by which the a r t i s t 
communicates w i t h h i m s e l f cannot be t o t a l l y i n d i v i d u a l : they w i l l 
i n c l u d e the conventional meanings of h i s s o c i a l environment, or a t 
l e a s t of a province t h e r e o f . As Williams points out, the communica-
t i o n system i s not something t h a t l i e s outside of the a r t i s t , and which 
he makes use of i f he wishes to communicate: i t i s ' i n f a c t p a r t of 
h i m s e l f , and when an a r t i s t c r e a t e s he uses t h i s system i n communi-
c a t i n g w i t h h i m s e l f (1968: 112) T h i s point of view w i l l obviously 
f i n d favour w i t h symbolic i n t e r a c t i o n i s t s , who emphasize the s o c i a l 
c h a r a c t e r of mind as i n t e r n a l i s e d s o c i a l d i s c o u r s e . The a r t i s t must 
thus be seen as a s o c i a l being: 
'That i s , even i f he has no formal t r a i n i n g , and even i f 
he i s t o t a l l y vinaware of the a r t i s t i c or l i t e r a r y t r a d i -
t i o n i n which he stands, one would expect to f i n d i n h i s 
work ex p r e s s i o n s d e r i v e d from, or r e l a t e d t o , h i s s o c i a l -
e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n . (Wolff, 1975: 6, my emphasis) 
T h i s statement by Janet; Wolff leads us on to the examination of an 
important c o r o l l a r y o f the theory of a r t as communication: the concep-
t i o n o f a r t as e x p r e s s i n g meaning. 
( i i i ) The L i t e r a r y Act as E x p r e s s i o n 
I f a r t i s to commiinicate meaning, then i t must ejcpress i t , a t 
l e a s t f o r the a r t i s t . The c o n j u n c t i o n of communication and expression 
i s p a r t i c u l a r l y c l e a r i n the work of Collingwood. Collingwood d e f i n e s 
a r t i n the f o l l o w i n g way: 
'By c r e a t i n g f o r o u r s e l v e s an imaginary experience or 
a c t i v i t y , we express our emotions; and t h i s i s what we 
c a l l a r t . ' (1958: 151) 
T h i s i s not recognised as an aim by a l l s o c i o l o g i s t s of a r t -
see f o r i n s t a n c e Silbermann, 1968. Note a l s o t h a t the 'meanings 
of the work of a r t f o r i t s c r e a t o r ' does not imply t h a t the 
c r e a t o r i s always aware of these meanings: there may f o r i n s t a n c e 
be many non-conscious background assimptions i n a l i t e r a r y work, 
assumptions t h a t a re e s s e n t i a l t o the o v e r a l l comprehension of 
the work and y e t which are unrecognized by the author. 
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A r t i s the e x p r e s s i o n of emotion, and there appears to be an equation 
of consciousness and e x p r e s s i o n , i n t h a t u n t i l a person has expressed 
an emotion he does not y e t know what i t i s (1958: 109-110); hence 
by e x p r e s s i n g i t he becomes conscious of i t and thus communicates i t 
t o h i m s e l f . A e s t h e t i c e x p r e s s i o n i s furthermore l i n k e d to speech: 
'The a e s t h e t i c a c t i v i t y i s the a c t i v i t y of speaking. 
Speech i s speech only so f a r as i t i s both spoken and 
heard. A man may, no dovibt, speak to h i m s e l f and be 
h i s own h e a r e r ; but what he says to h i m s e l f i s i n 
p r i n c i p l e capable of being s a i d to any one s h a r i n g h i s 
language.' (1958: 317) 
T h i s i s e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y s i m i l a r to the passage by Williams (1968: 112-3) 
quoted above (p.202) What i s p e c u l i a r t o Collingwood's approach i s 
t h a t a r t i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n may not n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e ' o b j e c t i v e ' 
e x p r e s s i o n ; i . e . i t may remain i n the realm of s u b j e c t i v e imagination: 
' ... a work of a r t may be completely c r e a t e d when i t 
has been c r e a t e d as a t h i n g whose only p l a c e i s i n the 
a r t i s t ' s mind.' (1958: 130) 
T h i s may w e l l be the case f o r some forms of l i t e r a t u r e and music, 
but seems l e s s l i k e l y t o apply to s c u l p t u r e , f o r i n s t a n c e . Such a 
view underemphasises the p a r t t h a t the medixom p l a y s i n the c r e a t i o n 
of the work of a r t . Collingwood thus s o l v e s the problem of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the work of a r t and the consciousness of the 
a r t i s t by equating the two: f i r s t l y through p o s t u l a t i n g the e x i s t e n c e 
o f the work o f a r t i n t h e imagination, and secondly by denying t h a t 
consciousness may precede e x p r e s s i o n , and thus t h a t the work of a r t 
may express a p r i o r consciousness. T h i s l a t t e r argument can be upheld 
only i f one accepts Collingwood's conception of a r t as e x p r e s s i n g 
emotions: to see a r t as e x p r e s s i n g a t t i t u d e s , values e t c . would give 
b i r t h t o the problem, avoided by Collingwood, of the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between the p r i o r a t t i t u d e and the a e s t h e t i c a l l y expressed a t t i t u d e . 
D e spite a v o i d i n g c e r t a i n key problems i n the sociology of a r t , 
the work of Collingwood i s nonetheless v i t a l f o r i t s r e c o g n i t i o n of 
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the r e l a t i o n s h i p between communication and e x p r e s s i o n , and indeed 
f o r i t s emphasis upon the a l t e r a t i o n o f mental phenomena t h a t i s 
i n c u r r e d by e x p r e s s i n g them: 
'There i s emotion before we express i t . But as we express 
i t , we confer upon i t a d i f f e r e n t kind of emotional 
c o l o u r i n g ; i n one way, t h e r e f o r e , expression c r e a t e s what 
i t e x p r e s s e s , f o r e x a c t l y t h i s emotion, c o l o u r i n g and a l l , 
only e x i s t s so f a r as i t i s expressed.' (1958: 152) (my emphasis) 
F r e q u e n t l y , however, one f i n d s i n the sociology of a r t a naive 
e x p r e s s i o n theory t h a t ignores the i n f l u e n c e of expre^ssion upon t h a t 
which i s expressed. Looking a t the work of a r t from the p o i n t of view 
of e x p l a n a t i o n , i t i s . c o n s i d e r e d to express the consciousness of an 
age or a s o c i e t y ; and from the other d i r e c t i o n , u s i n g a r t to i n t e r p r e t 
s o c i a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , the work of a r t i s t r e a t e d as a docvmient. Of 
what then may a r t be seen as a document - of which groups and of what 
consciousness? Swingewood claims t h a t the most popular s o c i o l o g i c a l 
approach t o l i t e r a t u r e i s the docimientary one t h a t argues t h a t 
l i t e r a t u r e provides a m i r r o r to the age (1972: 13); but he advocates 
g r e a t c a r e w i t h t h i s 'conception of the mirror': 
'Above a l l e l s e , of course, i t ignores the w r i t e r h i m s e l f , 
h i s awareness and i n t e n t i o n . ' (1972: 15) 
T h i s i s a v a l i d p o i n t , and furthermore Swingewood would not want to 
see the l i t e r a r y work as a mere r e f l e c t i o n o f the w r i t e r ' s conscious-
ness. 
I t may be t r u e t h a t to m d e r s t a n d most works of a r t i t i s necessary 
to see them i n the context of t h e i r wider enveloping c u l t u r e : Bourdieu 
f o r i n s t a n c e advocates the ' i c o n o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ' of Panofsky, 
according to which: 
' ... the iconographical meanings and methods of compo-
s i t i o n a r e t r e a t e d as ' c u l t u r a l symbols', as expressions 
of the c u l t u r e of an age, a n a t i o n or a c l a s s ...' (1968: 592-3) 
But the v a l i d i t y of t h i s approach w i l l depend on the e x t e n t to which 
the meanings and forms of the work of a r t are seen as mere expressions 
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o f a wider c u l t u r e , i g n o r i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a s t y l e may be p a r t 
o f an ongoing and p a r t i a l l y autonomous t r a d i t i o n . One may of course 
a v o i d the problem of demonstrating the r e l a t i o n s h i p of a r t and s o c i a l 
c o n d i t i o n s by imposing upon both a s i n g l e s e t of c a t e g o r i e s , thus 
proving by f i a t t h a t a r t i s the m i r r o r of s o c i e t y , or v i c e v e r s a . 
T h i s would seem to be the method argued by Kenneth Burke, who suggests 
t h a t s o c i o l o g i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n should -
"... d e r i v e i t s r e l e v a n c e from the f a c t t h a t i t should 
apply both to works of a r t and to s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s 
o u t s i d e o f a r t . ' (1973: 137) 
- which ignores the f a c t t h a t such c l a s s i f i c a t i o n may introduce unwarr-
anted assumptions i n t o the d e s c r i p t i o n s of both the works of a r t and 
the s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s . , 
To fofcus our c r i t i q u e o f the n a i v e expression theory of a r t , i t 
i s n e c e s s a r y to p o i n t to the p o t e n t i a l c r e a t i v i t y and r e l a t i v e autonomy 
of a r t . A r t i s t i c works may be t r e a t e d as documents of the conscious-
ness o f more or l e s s s p e c i f i c groups i n space and time ( i . e . from 
p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s to whole e r a s ) , and of more or l e s s s p e c i f i c 
spheres of consciousness (e.g. from p a r t i c u l a r a e s t h e t i c a t t i t u d e s to 
o v e r a r c h i n g world v i e w s ) . The conception of a r t as expressing the 
w orld views of broad s o c i a l groups ignores, as s t r e s s e d i n the Swinge-
wood quotation above, the a r t i s t h i m s e l f : i t f a i l s to take account of 
h i s p o t e n t i a l i s o l a t i o n and above a l l of h i s c r e a t i v e a e s t h e t i c 
e x p l o r a t i o n - u n l e s s h i s c r e a t i v i t y i s deemed, as i n Goldmann,"^ to be 
e f f e c t i v e p r i n c i p a l l y i n f u r t h e r i n g the already e x i s t e n t tendency of 
the consciousness of a s o c i a l c l a s s ; or, more r a d i c a l l y , i s thought to 
be e f f e c t i v e i n c r y s t a l l i s i n g an e n t i r e cultiare. Duvignaud i s r i g h t l y 
c r i t i c a l of such a view; 
^ See Chapter 11, S e c t i o n ( i i ) ; below. 
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' I t i s e q u a l l y debatable whether an i n d i v i d u a l can deal 
w i t h an e n t i r e e r a : to t h i n k t h a t a great a r t i s t c r y s t a l l -
i s e s i n h i m s e l f the widespread problem of h i s time and t h a t 
he embodies i n h i s work an e n t i r e c i v i l i s a t i o n i s to accept 
a romantic image which does not correspond to r e a l i t y . ' 
(1972: 40) 
I t i s i n t h i s c o n t e x t t h a t Duvignaud c r i t i c i s e s Lukacs' study of Goethe 
f o r making the l a t t e r i n t o 'the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of eve r y t h i n g h i s e r a 
contained'. T h i s k i n d of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s avoided by Duvignaud through 
h i s conception of the a r t i s t as an ' a t y p i c a l i n d i v i d u a l ' . (1972: 55 
& 6 0 f f ) I n g e n e r a l Duvignaud i s concerned t o r e j e c t any s i m p l i s t i c 
conception o f a r t r e f l e c t i n g r e a l i t y : he would agree with Raymond 
Williams t h a t the r e a l i t y which the a r t i s t e x presses i s already i n t e r -
p reted, a l r e a d y formed (Williams, 1965: 35-36),-; and he goes beyond t h i s 
t o s t a t e t h a t r e a l i t y as d e s c r i b e d by the a r t i s t has been 'twice 
transformed - once by s o c i e t y and again by the a r t i s t ' . (Duvignaud, 
1972: 29) A s i m i l a r p o i n t i s made by Z e r a f f a concerning the n o v e l i s t , 
whose works, he c o n s i d e r s ,-
' ... are both a e s t h e t i c a n a l y s e s and syntheses of a 
r e a l i t y which the n o v e l i s t had already analysed and 
s y n t h e s i s e d before he s t a r t e d to w r i t e J ' (1973: 37) 
The s o c i o l o g i s t , he suggests, should study the novel i n terms of two 
l e v e l s of e x p r e s s i o n : 
' ... the one the t h i n k i n g behind the book, the other 
what i s w r i t t e n i n i t ...' (1973: 37) 
These statements o f Duvignaud and Z e r a f f a emphasise the c r e a t i v i t y 
of the a r t i s t ' s work: the notion t h a t a r t i s not merely the expression 
of p r e - e x i s t e n t meanings but,as w i t h Collingwood, the di s c o v e r y of 
meanings through e x p r e s s i o n . I t i s t h i s conception which forms the 
foundation of C a s s i r e r ' s work on the philosophy of c u l t u r e : 
' (Man) cannot l i v e h i s l i f e without expressing h i s 
l i f e . The v a r i o u s modes of t h i s e xpression c o n s t i t u t e 
a new sphere. They have a l i f e of t h e i r own ...' (1970: 247) 
Here the emphasis i s not j u s t upon the new sphere, but upon the ' l i f e 
of t h e i r own'. A r t may thus be a r e l a t i v e l y autonomous 'universe of 
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d i s c o u r s e ' , whose meanings are confined to a l i m i t e d ' s o c i a l context 
of s i g n i f i c a n c e ' r a t h e r than e x p r e s s i n g wider s o c i a l consciousness. 
2 
The p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e l a t i v e compartmentalisation should t h e r e f o r e be 
allowed; and Wil l i a m s o v e r s t a t e s the case when he claims t h a t a r t -
' ... comes t o us as p a r t of our a c t u a l growth, not 
e n t e r i n g a ' s p e c i a l a r e a ' of the mind, but a c t i n g on 
and i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h our whole p e r s o n a l and s o c i a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . (1965: 50) 
The e x t e n t to which a r t i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n i s r e l a t e d to everyday con-
s c i o u s n e s s i s v a r i a b l e ; and the a b i l i t y to recognise t h i s , the a b i l i t y 
to compartmentalise and e n t e r i n t o r e l a t i v e l y autonomous a e s t h e t i c 
spheres, i s c l e a r l y a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r the comprehension of those 
a r t i s t i c works t h a t are d i s t a n t from the present everyday l i f e . Without 
such a r e c o g n i t i o n , without mastery o f the various s o c i a l codes req u i r e d 
f o r the a r t i s t i c works a v a i l a b l e , the v i n i n i t i a t e d are i n danger of 
applying -
' ... to an unknown and f o r e i g n universe the a v a i l a b l e 
schemes o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h a t i s to say those which 
enable the f a m i l i a r u n i v e r s e to be apprehended as having 
meaning, ... those which organise t h e i r day-to-day per-
ception and guide t h e i r p r a c t i c a l judgement. ' (Bourdieu, 1968t594) 
As soon as one admits t h a t a r t may be a r e l a t i v e l y autonomous sphere, 
one has to allow t h a t the ex p r e s s i o n o f meanings i n a r t w i l l a l t e r the 
meanings through t h e i r b e i n g expressed i n the a v a i l a b l e a r t i s t i c forms. 
T h i s i s the p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t governs Chapter 10, i n which we s h a l l 
e xplore the s p e c i a l nature of the l i t e r a r y form and i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s 
f o r the l i t e r a r y e x p r e s s i o n of consciousness. 
I n the review of the n a i v e e x p r e s s i o n theory of a r t , no d i s t i n c t i o n 
was made between i n t e n t i o n a l e x p r e s s i o n ( c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o the theory 
o f a r t as communication) and 'documentary' expression ( r e l a t e d t o the 
view o f a r t as a document) . T h i s i s the d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t i s made by 
Mannheim between 'exp r e s s i v e ' and 'documentary' meaning'^: i n the l a t t e r 
See above. Chapter 7, pp 152-^153 
2 
c f the d i s c u s s i o n of the compartmentalisation of l i t e r a r y r o l e s . 
Chapter 8 above, p 188 
^ See above Chapter 3, p 68 f f 
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a c u l t u r a l o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n p o i n t s to a g l o b a l outlook beyond i t s e l f . 
W illiams s i m i l a r l y w r i t e s of 'documentary c u l t u r e ' and the p a r t i c u l a r 
importance of the a r t s o f a p e r i o d , which can, a l b e i t u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y , 
g i v e s us a sense o f the ' s t r u c t u r e of f e e l i n g ' of t h a t period. (1965: 
64-65) Bourdieu's emphasis upon i c o n o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may be 
seen i n the same p e r s p e c t i v e : i n terms of Barthes' t e r m i n o l o g y , w h a t 
i s s i g n i f i e d i n the work of a r t i s seen as a s i g n i f i e r of the wider 
c u l t u r e . At f i r s t s i g h t these views o f a r t as documentary expression 
seem to be f a r removed from the theory of a r t as communication; y e t 
the two p e r s p e c t i v e s are seen to be r e l a t e d i f communication i s agreed 
t o depend as much on non-conscious as on c o n s c i o u s - i n t e n t i o n a l express-
ions o f meaning: a r t i s t i c comprehension does not depend s o l e l y upon the 
r e c o g n i t i o n of the c o n s c i o u s l y intended meanings of the a r t i s t , f o r even 
t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n may be based upon the taken-for-granted assvimptions 
t h a t the audience s h a r e s w i t h the a r t i s t . The c r i t i q u e s of the naive 
communication and e x p r e s s i o n t h e o r i e s of a r t have been designed to show 
t h a t the a r t i s t and the audience do not n e c e s s a r i l y share a common 
world view, and t h a t where assimiptions are shared these are not necess-
a r i l y r e l a t e d t o wider s o c i a l consciousness. Nevertheless, where the 
a r t i s t does aim to communicate he w i l l not be expressing h i s meanings 
i n a vacuum, but r a t h e r i n a s p e c i f i c s o c i a l context t h a t w i l l i n f l u e n c e 
h i s e x p r e s s i o n . I t i s thus v i t a l to acknowledge the s i g n i f i c a n c e not 
only o f the form of l i t e r a r y e x p r e s s i o n but a l s o of i t s context: the 
former we s h a l l examine i n Chapter 10, the l a t t e r i n the s e c t i o n .that 
now f o l l o w s : 
( i v ) The S o c i a l Context of L i t e r a r y E x pression 
I n the c o n c l u s i o n to Chapter 8 i t was mentioned t h a t the present 
chapter would take up the p o i n t t h a t the l i t e r a r y a c t i s p e c u l i a r 
i n t h a t i t expresses or develops consciousness i n the a c t i t s e l f . 
See B a r t h e s , 1973: 112ff. 
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So far i n this chapter we have been concerned to examine the ways i n 
which l i t e r a r y action may be seen as the communication or expression 
of consciousness: yet are we indeed able to argue that the expression 
of consciousness i s the sp e c i a l quality of l i t e r a r y (or a r t i s t i c , or 
i n t e l l e c t u a l ) action rather than action in general?''' Surely any action 
may be seen as expressing consciousness, and not j u s t intentionally but 
also i n a 'documentary' sense? Even a 'style of l i f e ' may be seen as 
the expression of a world view, as Jaspers notes (1922: 44) , and the 
expression here cannot be taken to be wholly intentional or unintention-
a l . Thus although there are s p e c i a l factors i n l i t e r a r y expression, the 
f a c t that i t expresses consciousness i s not one of them. We s h a l l there-
fore find that much of our argument concerning l i t e r a r y expression applies 
more generally to diverse forms of s o c i a l action: l i t e r a r y action may thus 
be seen to be distinguished from other types of action by degree rather 
than by kind, though the differences do arise partly from l i t e r a t u r e ' s 
p a r t i c u l a r kind of expression of consciousness, an expression that being 
verbal and prolonged has a peculiar v i s i b i l i t y . L i t e r a r y expression w i l l , 
as we have seen, involve varying degrees of development of consciousness, 
rather than mere rei t e r a t i o n ; there i s a certain minimal degree of inten-
t i o n a l i t y i n the writing and publication of a l i t e r a r y work; and the 
writer w i l l tend to be p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned with communication, with 
the problem of being understood by an audience with whom he may have no 
d i r e c t contact, and thus with the preconceptions that the various audience 
groups, to which he might address himself, w i l l bring to the l i t e r a r y 
s i t u a t i o n . I t i s those factors, the s o c i a l context of l i t e r a r y expression, 
that we are p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned with in t h i s section. 
See above, Chapter 2, p 65, where we write of consciousness 
being involved i n action i n th0. form of expression in or motiva-
tion towards action. 
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An emphasis upon the s o c i a l context of l i t e r a t u r e teaches one 
above a l l to beware of taking a l i t e r a r y work as a straightforward 
docvunent of the world view of i t s author. As Ojrwell points out, a 
writer's l i t e r a r y personality may have l i t t l e to do with h i s private 
character. (1965: 81) 
One pervasive element i n the s o c i a l context of l i t e r a r y creation 
consists of the aesthetic attitudes that predominate in the society 
and period concerned. (See for example Duvignaud, 1972: 65ff) These 
attitudes may include definitions as to what w i l l count as l i t e r a t u r e , 
what are thought to be i t s functions, and thus how i t s forms and content 
are to be evaluated. The writer who wishes to be piablished and, further, 
to be p o s i t i v e l y evaluated, w i l l certainly take accomt i n his work of 
one or other of the aesthetic attitudes that predominate in his society. 
I t i s indeed c h i e f l y through taking a c c o u n t o f those who make up 
his potential audience that the author i s exposed to their influence, 
though with some of his audience the author may have more direct face-
to-face contact or closer i d e n t i f i c a t i o n than 'taking account' suggests. 
But 'taking accomt' i s of p a r t i c u l a r importance in authorship i n a 
2 
sense that was not mentioned i n Chapter 7, i . e . taking account of others 
not only i n one's cooperative or competitive action plans or i n one's 
l i f e s t y l e , but rather i n terms of acknowledging their views and 
expectations so that one's expressions w i l l not offend them or indeed may 
be p o s i t i v e l y appraised by them. The writer i s thus l i k e l y not j u s t to 
take accoimt of his readers' general attitudes towards l i t e r a t u r e , but of 
t h e i r wider, non-literary attitudes, and of their definitions and 
This i s a central element i n the "special nature of the contact 
involved i n the author role" mentioned i n Chapter 8, p 179 
above. 
2 See above. Chapter 7, pp 156-^157 
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expectations of him i n p a r t i c u l a r . This l a t t e r point i s made by 
Bovirdieu: 'publication' means 'being made piJblic' and establishes 
a public meaning of the writer's works of which he has to take 
account i n his future l i t e r a r y creation. (1971:166) 
The extent to which the writer w i l l be influenced by the various 
groups that make up h i s audience w i l l of course be related to the 
salience which these groups have for his goals, as mentioned i n 
Chapter 8.''' In so f a r as he i s influenced, i t may be through selec-
tion of certain aspects of his world view for public expression. Just 
as a form of selection i s involved i n the cognitive mapping that i s 
part of an attitude, so i s selection involved in the piablic expression 
of attitudes: the sociology of expression i s indeed an important adjunct 
of the sociology of knowledge. I f encouraged by the s o c i a l context, one 
of the author's attitudes may be extended to become the formative prin-
2 
ciple for a whole l i t e r a r y work: extension i s thtis a process that may 
occur not merely on the l e v e l of unexpressed consciousness. 
Selection may be made not only from the world view of the author, 
but from that of h i s chosen audience too, especially i f the l a t t e r i s 
a 'rag-bag' world view as suggested i n Chapter 7:^ i. e . even i f the 
author wishes to create a work that w i l l be completely acceptable to 
h i s audience, he may be able to s e l e c t , from t h e i r inconsistent world 
view, perspectives which are congruent with his own. There may indeed 
be a process of mutual elective a f f i n i t y between his world view and 
4 
the world views of h i s role-contacts. 
Few would deny that selection of some sort i s necessarily a part 
of l i t e r a r y creation: Collingwood however i s a rare exception -
See above. Chapter 8, p 193 
2 
The way i n which attitudes may act as 'formative principles' i n 
l i t e r a t u r e i s discussed i n Chapter 10, p 232ff below. 
^ See above. Chapter 7, p 153 
4 
c f Chapter 7, p 172 above. 
213 
'People sometimes talk as i f 'selection' were an essential 
part of every a r t i s t ' s work. This i s a mistake. In a r t 
proper there i s no such thing; the a r t i s t draws what he 
sees, expresses what he f e e l s , makes a clean breast of his 
experience, concealing nothing and altering nothing.' 
(1958: 56) 
Later i n the same book, however, Collingwood at l e a s t allows that the 
a r t i s t may s e l e c t which emotions he i s to express: 
'The a r t i s t may take h i s audience's limitations into 
account when composing his work; i n which case they w i l l 
appear to him not as limitations on the extent to which 
hi s work w i l l prove comprehensible, but as conditions 
determining the subject-matter or meaning of the work 
i t s e l f . ... he takes i t as his business not to express 
hi s own private emotions ... but the emotions he shares 
with his audience.' (1958: 312) 
Admittedly Collingwood claims t h i s to be the case only for the a r t i s t 
who i d e n t i f i e s with h i s audience and 'collaborates' with i t : but then 
he claims that such collaboration i s the norm for the a r t i s t who 
wishes to publish h i s work; and he has a highly optimistic view of 
the selection that i s i t s consequence: 
'The audience i s perpetually present to him as a factor 
i n h i s a r t i s t i c labour; not as an anti-aesthetic factor, 
corrupting the s i n c e r i t y of his work by considerations 
of reputation and reward, but as an aesthetic factor, 
defining what the problem i s which as an a r t i s t he i s 
trying to solve - which emotions he i s to express - and 
what.constitutes a solution of i t . The audience which the 
a r t i s t thus feels as collaborating with himself may be 
a large one or a small one, but i t i s never absent.' 
(1958: 315) 
While Collingwood i s dovibtless right to suggest the tendency of the 
a r t i s t to have an audience continually i n his mind during the process 
of a r t i s t i c creation, he exaggerates i n several respects: i n par-
t i c u l a r i n underrating the extent to which the a r t i s t may see h i s 
audience as a limiting factor; and the extent to which unaesthetic 
considerations of reputation and reward may influence h i s work. 
Selection in accordance with audience expectations w i l l not appear 
aestheti c a l l y desirable to. every a r t i s t ; and the problem i s not 
solved by l a b e l l i n g 'impure' those who do not conform to Collingwood's 
norms. 
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considerations of audience perspectives may however lead beyond 
mere selection from one's own world view. Not a l l the assumptions of 
a l i t e r a l ? ^ viniverse are e x p l i c i t l y spelled out; the writer may be 
aware of which assumptions he can leave as such, and which he has to 
explicate for h i s audience. Depending on the audience, he w i l l f e e l 
a greater or l e s s e r need to convince of the realism of a described 
course of events, to persuade of i t s morality,''" of even to j u s t i f y i t s 
portrayal. We may therefore find him pronovincing legitimations that 
he would not find necessary within his world view outside t h i s public 
context. Piablic expression may thus occasion the development of con-
2 
sciousness through ide a l pragmatism. 
Jus t as the world view of h i s audience may influence the writer, 
so may i t s cognitive structure"^ -*. and not merely in the sense that i f 
the world view i s an inconsistent 'rag-bag' he w i l l have greater 
freedom of choice i n h i s expression. The cognitive structure of the 
4 
l i t e r a r y role-set may lead to a cognitive style apparent i n the 
l i t e r a r y work: for example, i f the cognitive structure appears to show 
consistency, t h i s may lead to a confident, assured and intimate 
cognitive style i n the work, or perhaps a defiant s t y l e i f the per-
spectives are a l i e n to the author; i f the audience's cognitions appear 
to lack differentiation and a r t i c u l a t i o n , the cognitive s t y l e of the 
work may be cautious; i f the cognitive structure reveals divergent 
expectations, the s t y l e of work may be moralistic, with the author 
^ For instance, the characters involved may require elaborate 
vocabularies of motive that are acceptable to the readers. 
2 
See above. Chapter 3, p 78 
^ Assuming that he i s aware of t h i s cognitive structure - see above 
Chapter 8, p 189 
4 The concept of 'expressive s t y l e ' would be more accurate here: 
see below. Chapter 10, p 236 
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supplying a multitude of legitimations. Thege are merely more or 
l e s s plausible hypotheses, but they indicate that the author may 
be influenced by the structure of the cognitions of h i s audience as 
w e l l as by the cognitions themselves. 
A passage from the work of Bourdieu suggests a way i n which 
the cognitive s t y l e of the author i n h i s work may be influenced by 
the s o c i a l definition of h i s work: 
'Even the author most indi f f e r e n t to the lure of success 
and the l e a s t disposed to make concessions to the demands 
of the public i s surely obliged to take account of the 
s o c i a l truth of his work as i t i s reported back to him by 
the public, the c r i t i c s or analysts, and to redefine his 
creative project i n r e l a t i o n to t h i s truth. When he i s 
faced with t h i s objective definition, i s he not encouraged 
to rethink h i s intentions and make them e x p l i c i t , and are 
they not therefore i n danger of being altered?' (1971: 168) 
Yet i t i s not j u s t h is intentions that may be altered; for, beyond 
c l a r i f y i n g them for himself, he may wish to make them e x p l i c i t in his 
work, thus altering the cognitive s t y l e of his l i t e r a r y expression. 
On the other hand Bourdieu does not underrate the extent to which 
the s o c i a l definition of a writer's work may fixate h i s creative 
project, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the case of the successful author: 
' I t might be possible for creative a r t i s t s to be 
more vulnerable to success than to f a i l u r e , and indeed 
they have been known to f a i l to conquer their own 
success, and to subordinate themselves to the pressures 
imposed by the s o c i a l definition of a work of a r t which 
has received the consecration of success.' (1971: 167) 
The successful writer thus has a public that i s i d e n t i f i e d with him, 
that i s 'his' , and to which h i s work i s acceptable, as long as he pro-
duces the kind of work with which he i s now identified. The writer 
w i l l thus tend to become involved i n a gradual process of commitment"'' 
to the l i t e r a r y form and content that has granted him success, and 
indeed to his l i t e r a r y identity and his public. Insofar as t h i s 
•'" See above. Chapter 2, p. 33 
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commitment i s confirmed by repeated success, subsequent alteration 
of creative project becomes increasingly m l i k e l y . 
This kind of commitment implies at le a s t some degree of sincerity 
i n the writer's l i t e r a r y expression, a b e l i e f in what he writes. Yet 
we must not ignore the p o s s i b i l i t y of the author writing principally 
for u l t e r i o r motives. Seeing his l i t e r a r y ejspression i n purely u t i l i -
t arian terms, as suggested i n Chapter 8.''" In Chapter 2, i n connection 
with Pareto's concept of derivations, we emphasised that u t i l i t y does 
not operate in a vacuiam: 
'the princ i p l e of u t i l i t y works within a context, such 
as the audience for the derivation, the d i f f e r e n t i a l 
' a v a i l a b i l i t y ' of various derivations to the actor, and ^ 
the generally accepted modes of expression/rationalisation.' 
Yet i n subsequent chapters we have cpncentrated upon the u t i l i t y for 
the actor of the i n t r i n s i c meaning of the b e l i e f s that he adopts. 
In Chapter 7, for instance, we tended to see the individual selecting, 
from those legitimations that are available, those that w i l l merely 
3 
s a t i s f y himself: as soon as we consider public expression, acceptability 
to others becomes relevant. Thus, whilst not ignoring factors of 
a v a i l a b i l i t y , we have perhaps previously underemphasised the element 
of pviblic acceptability i n the b e l i e f s the actor adopts; and of course 
although we have dealt with u t i l i t a r i a n developments of consciousness, 
4 
such as 'promotions' , not u n t i l Chapter 8 have we introduced 
u t i l i t a r i a n expressions, i . e . expressions whose i n t r i n s i c meaning 
i s i r r e l e v a n t for the actor and thus whose u t i l i t y for him l i e s 
wholly i n the extent to which they produce rewards from those who 
receive them. The element of connotation may here be c r u c i a l ; e.g. 
See above Chapter 8, Ep 179-180 
2 
See above. Chapter 2, p 30 
^ See above. Chapter 7, p 172 
^ See above. Chapter 3, p 80 
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certain expressions may act to signify"*" one's character. I n the sphere 
of a r t , Albrecht notes Parsons' point that a s e t of a r t i s t i c standards , 
may become a symbol of belonging to a subcultural group. (Albrecht, 1970: 
13) L i t e r a r y expression may indeed be undertaken more for rhetorical 
reasons - to demonstrate the a b i l i t y to use l i t e r a r y language; to 
2 
connote a p a r t i c u l a r l i t e r a i y s t y l e - than for the communication of 
i n t r i n s i c meaning: i t may be j u s t a 'form of words'.^ Expressions which 
are t o t a l l y u t i l i t a r i a n i n this sense are perhaps exceptional; but 
u t i l i t y i s a central aspect of most expressions, even where the actor 
i s sincere i n the conscioiisness expressed. As often said, one may be 
able to t e l l the truth and nothing but the truth, but one can never t e l l 
the whole truth: the aim of t h i s section has been to indicate that what 
i s expressed i s at the l e a s t selected - at the most fabricated - and thus 
communication can never be j u s t 'for i t s own sake'. 
(v) Conclusion 
In this chapter we have attempted to clear a way through the pre-
dominant conceptions of the l i t e r a r y act as commvinication and expression, 
in order to r e j e c t unnecessary presuppositions and yet to retain those 
points of view that are of value for the sociological interpretation 
of l i t e r a t u r e . We have thereby concentrated upon the s o c i a l nature of 
l i t e r a r y creation even where the author communicates only with himself; 
1 
2 
For examples of connotative s i g n i f i c a t i o n s see the work of 
Roland Barthes. 
See Barthes, 1964: 193. 
This i s reminiscent of a possible interpretation of 'vocabularies 
of motive'. These l a t t e r are seen i n Chapter 3 (p 80 ) as pre-
action legitimations which the actor sincerely adopts; but they 
may also be legitimations that, whether pre- or post-action, are 
merely vocabularies, forms of wor.§s that, apparently l i k e seme 
l i t e r a r y expressions, may be far from the actor's 'real' con-
sciousness: i . e . , insincerely uttered; expressions to be made on 
appropriate, occasions. 
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upon any attempts he does make to communicate with others; upon 
expression, both intentional and 'documentary', as an e s s e n t i a l 
part of communication; and upon the potential c r e a t i v i t y and 
r e l a t i v e autonomy of l i t e r a r y expression. F i n a l l y , i n examining 
pi±ilic l i t e r a r y expression (or ' l i t e r a r y publication'), we envisaged 
the author taking account of the aesthetic attitudes predominant i n 
his society; of the world view and cognitive structure of his audience; 
and of the s o c i a l definition of h i s work, involving a gradual process 
of commitment on the part of the successful author. These influences 
were seen to involve the writer i n various degrees of selection and 
fabrication, including the development of explications, letigimations, 
vocabularies of motive and cognitive styles in the l i t e r a r y text; 
and, i n the extreme case, the promulgation of u t i l i t a r i a n expressions 
with purely r h e t o r i c a l function. We thereby established, in particular, 
the importance of seeing the l i t e r a r y act in i t s s o c i a l context; and, 
i n general, the relevance of the sociology of expression as an adjunct 
of the sociology of knowledge. 
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CHAPTER lO: THE LITERARY FORM 
(i ) Introduction 
Having examined i n the l a s t chapter the s o c i a l influences upon 
the piiblic expression of l i t e r a r y meaning, we concentrate i n th i s 
chapter upon the formal aspects of l i t e r a r y expression, that i s upon 
those aspects of l i t e r a r y form that either af f e c t or are intimately 
connected with the expression of meaning in l i t e r a t u r e . These formal 
aspects cannot be ignored i n any adequate account of the sociological 
interpretation and explanation of l i t e r a r y world views. 
We begin with an examination of the relationship between l i t e r a r y 
meanings and l i t e r a r y symbols; continue with an examination of concepts 
of widier s t r u c t u r a l form and of s t y l e i n lit e r a t u r e ; then explore the 
importance of taking into account the forms that are available for the 
author to use i n h i s work; and conclude with an analysis of the nature 
of f i c t i o n and the relevance of t h i s nature for the sociological 
interpretation of l i t e r a r y meaning. 
( i i ) The Expression of Content i n Form: Meaning i n Symbols 
When one speaks of the 'content' of an a r t i s t i c work, one i s 
usually referring to the meanings that the work conveys, or (which i s not 
the same thing) that the author intends to convey. The 'form' i n which 
the a r t i s t conveys t h i s meaning i s sometimes taken to refer to the 
'materials' that he uses for a r t i s t i c expression, whether these 
materials be, for instance, types of stone, the sound of certain 
musical instruments, or written words. Sins of omission and, i n 
pa r t i c u l a r , of commission are inherent i n the very nature of the a r t i s t ' s 
materials"*", so that these w i l l of necessity a l t e r the actual expression 
of that which was intended to be expressed. 
•'• See Levin, 1973: 64. 
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This modification of the theory of art as expression i s however 
not enough for some. Bouwsma i s more rad i c a l l y c r i t i c a l of attempts 
to see a r t as expressing meaning: he finds the analogy with language 
deceptive, and i n p a r t i c u l a r questions whether one can 'translate' 
the meaning of a work of a r t : -
'The meaning of sentences i s translatable, but the 
'meaning' of poems, of music, i s not ... I t makes 
sense to ask. What does the sentence express? I t 
expresses a meaning, of course, and you may have 
some way of showing what t h i s i s , without using 
the sentence to do so. But now i t makes no sense 
to ask. What does the poem express? or What does 
the music express? We may say, i f we l i k e , that 
both are expressive, but we must beware of the 
analogy with language. And we may prevent the help-
l e s s searching i n t h i s case, by i n s i s t i n g that they 
'express' nothing, nothing at a l l . ' 
(Bouwsma, 1961: 164) 
Bouwsma would however agree that j u s t because a work of a r t i s untrans-
latable i t does not mean that i t cannot express i n the sense of 'evoke':-
'Now then, do poems and music and pictures evoke 
emotions as sentences evoke images? I think that 
they frequently do.' (1961: 161) 
A work of a r t , then, may be untranslatable, i n the sense that there 
may be no other combination of symbols that w i l l evoke the same response 
i n us, but i t may nonetheless evoke. However one may argue, against 
Bouwsma, that i t may be impossible in many cases to find an exact 
translation of a sentence into alternative available symbols. Thus 
the 'analogy with language' may not be so inappropriate after a l l , 
as long as one does not assume, as indeed one should not assume even 
with verbal language, exact t r a n s l a t a b i l i t y , or indeed common int e r -
pretation of symbols. 
One may however take Bouwsma's argvunent further than he himself 
does, and consider whether the reason that some a r t i s t i c symbols may 
be unlike verbal language i s that i n a r t i s t i c 'expression' the 
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perception"*" of the symbol may be such an important part of the meaning-
f u l experience that i t constitutes the fundamental barrier to trans-
la t i o n : an alternative symbolic form would thus f a i l to convey the 
same meaning or at l e a s t the a r t i s t i c experience could not be trans-
lated into a very different form, e.g. a different expressive mode. 
For instance, transposition into another musical key might lose l i t t l e 
meaning, but translation from the musical to the linguistic-conceptual 
would e n t a i l considerable alteration of experience. 
Bourdieu seems to be making a s i m i l a r point i n his discussion of 
the codes i n t r i n s i c to works of a r t : original works cannot be reduced 
to the prevailing c u l t u r a l codes, for they -
' ... carry with them the very categories of their 
own perception ...' 
(1968: 600) 
One can neither translate these works, nor formulate the rules for 
t h e i r comprehension:-
'The repeated perception of works of a certain s t y l e 
encourages the unconscious i n t e r i o r i z a t i o n of the 
rules which govern the production of these works. 
Like rules of grammar, these rules are not apprehended 
as such, and are s t i l l l e s s e x p l i c i t l y formulated and 
formulatable: ... As i s seen from the facts of the 
case of the musical work, the most exact and best 
informed discursive translations cannot take the place 
of the execution, as a hie et nunc rea l i z a t i o n of the 
individual fom, which i s irreducible to any formula: ' 
(1968: 601-2) 
With Bourdieu though, as withBouwsma, the untranslatability of a work 
of a r t appears to derive from the lack of alternative available symbols 
that w i l l give one j u s t t h i s p a r t i c u l a r experience: there appears to 
be no recognition that a further reason for untranslatability derives 
•*" Whether actual or imaged. 
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from the significance i n certain a r t forms of the very perception of 
the symbol as part of the a r t i s t i c experience. Here the meaning 
cannot be abstracted from the experience of the syiubol: i t i s symbol-
bound. This does not mean that the symbol i n i t s e l f ( i . e . apart from 
an interpretative context) i s anything but a meaningless objectivity. 
Thus symbol and concept/experience should not be confused, as Bouwsma 
seems to do i n seeing sadness i n the music (1961: 166-7). The experience 
appears to be in the work of a r t because the former i s either inherently 
or contingently dependent on the l a t t e r for actualisation. Similarly 
the perception of the work of a r t and i t s interpretation may appear to 
be synonymous, whereas i n fact the reason for the perception of the 
a r t i s t i c symbols not preceding t h e i r interpretation may be that the 
perception i s guided by the interpretation. 
I f the above use of the term 'symbol' implies a theory of a r t as 
symbolic, then Stevenson (1965) would dissent, at le a s t as far as the 
non-representational arts are concerned. He would agree that a r t may 
be expressive and evocative, but would deny that i t i s necessarily 
symbolic, i n the sense of standing for a concept or experience. I t seems 
however that Stevenson i s working with a r e s t r i c t i v e conception of 
symbolism, i n which the symbol i s supposed to be arbitrary, and thus 
merely to stand for an experience without being part of that experience. 
I f then, as suggested above, the perception of the symbol becomes a 
necessary part of the aesthetic experience, then the symbol i s no 
longer merely symbolic - yet i t does not follow that i t i s not symbolic 
at a l l . The question then becomes not so much. Are the a r t s symbolic? 
as, Are there symbolic elements i n the arts? I n symbolism (unlike mere 
association, for instance) there must be some element of detracting 
from the i n t r i n s i c or prior meaning ( i f any) of the symbol so that i t 
may be used as a form to evoke meaning beyond i t s e l f , j u s t as i n Barthes' 
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myths the o r i g i n a l sign becomes emptied of meaning so as to be used 
as a form to symbolise a concept. But i n myths i t i s only the cynic 
who i s aware of such a purely symbolic relationship: the innocent reader 
of myths focuses upon the mythical symbol as an 'inextricable whole made 
of meaning and form'. (1973: 128) Barthes uses t h i s as an argimient 
that myths are not syinbolic; we should use a p a r a l l e l argument to 
indicate that a r t i s t i c symbols are not always purely symbolic, i n that 
perception of the symbol may constitute part of the experience, so that, 
in Barthes' terms, the appreciated work of art (or element thereof) i s 
a 'sign' which i s the 'associative t o t a l ' of the s i g n i f i e r (the symbol 
whose perception i s an i n t r i n s i c part of the aesthetic experience) and 
the s i g n i f i e d (the concept or experience evoked by the symbol). (1973: 122-3) 
We may note at th i s point an interesting d i s t i n c t i o n between 
symbolism and evocation: i n symbolism the s i g n i f i e r i s capable of being 
retained i n mind without detracting from the meaning of the si g n i f i e d 
(as would happen with many mere associations) , and thus can stand for 
whilst standing with the s i g n i f i e d . I f the ' s i g n i f i e r ' cannot be thus 
retained, the case may be merely one of association or evocation. Although 
symbolism necessarily evokes, evocation i s not necessarily symbolic: the 
memory of mother may evoke the memory of father without the former 
symbolising the l a t t e r . 
The above argument c l e a r l y gives an affirmative answer to our 
question: Are there symbolic elements in the arts? - and we should 
not wish to r e s t r i c t the recognition of such elements to the repre-
sentational a r t s . Arnheim points out that even 'abstract' a r t -
"... i s not 'pure form", because even the simplest l i n e 
expresses v i s i b l e meaning and i s therefore symbolic. 
I t does not offer i n t e l l e c t u a l abstractions, because 




The idea of ' v i s i b l e meaning' rather than ' i n t e l l e c t u a l abstractions' 
conveys well the significance of the percpetion of the symbol as part 
of the experience, and of the consequent d i f f i c u l t y of 'translation' 
into l i n g u i s t i c concepts. The extent to which the perception of a r t i s t i c 
symbols constitutes a s i g n i f i c a n t part of the aesthetic experience w i l l , 
however, vary between different a r t forms. A word, written or spoken, 
and a se r i e s of musical notes maybe eqially symbolic; but the perception 
of the v i s u a l or aural form of the word w i l l , unlike the music, not 
always be an i n t r i n s i c element i n i t s aesthetic appreciation. Especially 
where non-poetic, we are more l i k e l y to find or create sxjbstitute symbols 
for words than for music. This does not however mean that exact trans-
latio n into already existent alternative symbols i s always possible: 
one must often make do with apprpximation. In referring to words as 
symbols, we must of course remember that the symbol i s a physical a r t i -
f a c t that stands for the concept, rather than the word being a concept 
that symbolises something else (e.g. 'the thing i t s e l f ) . 
The p o s s i b i l i t y of a substitute symbol for a concept does not imply 
that one can have concepts without at least imaged symbols: i t may be 
that these are necessary to organise 'reality' into formed subjective 
meaning. Thus there are three leve l s of potential dependency of exper-
ience upon symbolic form: the experience may be capable of occurring 
without symbols; or symbols may be necessary for the experience to be 
evoked (e.g. because no other combination of materials can be found that 
w i l l evoke the same experience, give the same associations e t c . ) ; or i t 
may be that the actual perception of symbols i s an important part of 
the experience, so that i t i s more than j u s t a case of evocation. 
Although symbol and experience may be more i n t r i n s i c a l l y related 
than i s suggested by the notions of expression i n or evocation by a work 
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of a r t , t h i s dd.es not mean that one cannot attempt to express a prior 
experience in a work of a r t , or that the work may . not evoke a svibsequent 
similar experience: i t merely denies that the whole 'expression' can be 
reduced to the p r i o r or subsequent experience, since i t i s experience 
'in form'; i . e . , translation'into another form, or removal of symbolic 
form altogether, would a l t e r the nature of the experience, as the per-
ception of the symbol i s part of the experience. Where exact translation 
i s i n another sense equally impossible, i . e . where the evocation of an 
experience requires a p a r t i c u l a r set of symbols and their associations, 
then s i m i l a r l y one could hardly come to this experience before expression 
in symbolic form. Here perhaps an evocation theory of a r t , as one might 
c a l l i t , i s thus stronger than a simple expression theory. This point 
would be supported by Cas s i r e r , who sees a r t as a process of discovery 
rather than merely as expression or imitation. (1970: 158) Cassirer 
emphasises the formal elements of a r t , the medium of expression, not j u s t 
as technical means of communicating a prior experience, but as part of 
the formation of the aesthetic experience i t s e l f : -
'Art i s indeed expressive, but i t cannot be expressive 
without being formative. And t h i s formative process i s 
carried out i n a certain sensuous medium ... for a great 
painter, a great musician, or a great poet, the colours, 
the l i n e s , rhythms, and words are not merely a part of 
h i s technical apparatus; they are necessary moments of 
the productive process i t s e l f . ' 
C1970: 156-7) 
'The context of a poem cannot be separated from i t s form -
from the verse, the melody, the rhythm. These formal 
elements are not merely external or technical means to 
reproduce a given in t u i t i o n ; they are part and parcel of 
the a r t i s t i c i n t u i t i o n i t s e l f . ' 
(1970: 172) 
Williams makes a s i m i l a r point i n his account of a r t i n terms of des-
cribing an experience which one only f u l l y discovers through i t s 
description: 
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"There can be no s e p a r a t i o n , i n t h i s view, between 
'content' and 'form', because f i n d i n g the form i s 
l i t e r a l l y f i n d i n g the content - t h i s i s what i s meant 
by the a c t i v i t y we have c a l l e d ' d e s c r i b i n g ' . ' 
(1965: 42) 
T h i s of course i n t r o d u c e s the p o s s i b i l i t y that a r t may attempt to express 
an experience a l r e a d y d e s c r i b e d i n another form, e.g. l i n g u i s t i c form. 
Y e t wherever a r t attempts t o express a p r i o r experience, we may f i n d a 
double forming p r o c e s s as d e s c r i b e d by Z e r a f f a : both the work of a r t 
and the t h i n k i n g behind i t p o s s e s s shape and form. (1973: 37) The 
p r i o r concept or experience, a l r e a d y ' i n form' i n the sense of not being 
formless u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d r e a l i t y , i s thus re-formed i n a r t ; so t h a t 
the p r i o r concept/experience and the a r t i s t i c a l l y , re-formed concept/ 
experience cannot be equated, though may be r e l a t e d , e.g. through analogy. 
I f the o n l y p o s s i b l e t r a n s l a t i o n from p a r t i c u l a r a r t i s t i c symbols 
i n t o another s e t of symbols i s approximate, analogous t r a n s l a t i o n - i n 
o t h e r words i f , one i s unable t o capture p r e c i s e l y the same experience i n 
other symbols - one may nonetheless through such approximate t r a n s l a t i o n 
s t i l l c o n s t r u c t u s e f u l types (e.g. of s t y l e ) t h a t have a c e r t a i n degree 
of g e n e r a l a p p l i c a b i l i t y , e.g. to the forms of s e v e r a l a r t s . I t may be 
noted t h a t even r e l a t i v e l y s p e c i f i c s t y l i s t i c concepts (e.g. applying to 
the work o f a s i n g l e a r t i s t ) are c o n s t r u c t s , a b s t r a c t i n g aspects of the 
work f o r s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n , and emphasising s t y l i s t i c e f f e c t s and meanings 
through a process of approximate t r a n s l a t i o n . T h i s l a t t e r process i s 
indeed i n e v i t a b l y i n v o l v e d i n a r t c r i t i c i s m , which e x p l i c a t e s aspects 
of a work of a r t i n r a t i o n a l n o n - a e s t h e t i c terms. Y e t i s i s not j u s t the 
a r t c r i t i c whose work o f e x p l i c a t i o n i n v o l v e s t r a n s l a t i o n : t r a n s l a t i o n i s 
•'" Other r e l e v a n t p o i n t s made by C a s s i r e r , Williams and Z e r a f f a 
are d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter 9, pp206-7 above, i n the context of the 
i n q u i r y i n t o the c r e a t i v i t y of a r t i s t i c e x pression. 
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a l s o i n h e r e n t i n any attempt a t the s o c i o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
hiiman behaviour. Geertz argues l i k e w i s e with r e s p e c t to ethnography: 
'Doing ethnography i s l i k e t r y i n g to read ( i n the sense 
o f ' c o n s t r u c t as reading o f ) a manuscript ... w r i t t e n 
not i n c o n v e n t i o n a l i z e d graphs of sovind but i n t r a n s i e n t 
examples o f shaped behaviour.' 
(1975: 10) 
S i m i l a r l y i n Chapter 7 we have contended t h a t n o n - l o g i c a l a c t i o n must 
be t r a n s l a t e d i n terms o f s o c i o l o g i c a l rationality.''• The problems of 
s o c i o l o g i c a l ' t r a n s l a t i o n ' , then, are not confined to the sphere of 
the a r t s . 
The arguments t h a t we have put forward i n t h i s s e c t i o n have profound 
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e o r i e s o f a r t , p a r t i c u l a r l y where these emphasise 
2 
communication o r e x p r e s s i o n . F i r s t l y , i t i s immediately apparent 
t h a t , s i n c e symbol and experience are not to be confused, we cannot 
assume i d e n t i t y o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and thus the theory o f a r t as evoca-
t i o n ( a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the r e c e p t i o n a s p e c t of the theory of a r t as 
communication) must be modified to allow divergent meanings a t the 
r e c e i v e r end of communication. Secondly, the theory of a r t as expression 
(which i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a r t as communication a t the producer end) must 
be r e v i s e d to allow f o r a r e l a t i o n s h i p of some dependency between symbol 
and experience, so t h a t the experience one wishes to express i s a l t e r e d 
by the very e x p r e s s i o n thereof. The theory of a r t as communication i s not 
3 
however without use : i t s value l i e s i n i t s emphasis on i n t e n t i o n to 
express ( f o r s e l f or others) o r r e c e i v e meaning; and indeed u n l e s s 
a r t i s t i c symbols are t r e a t e d as^ symbols ( i . e . as expressing meaning f o r 
See above. Chapter 7, p 161 
2 See above. Chapter 9, f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of some of these t h e o r i e s . 
A s i m i l a r p o i n t i s made i n Chapter 9, p l 9 8 above. 
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a t l e a s t some c r e a t o r or observer) then they are not a r t , nor indeed 
symbols. Furthermore, where the a r t i s t i s attempting symbolic expression 
i n art,"*" h i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the attempt i s l i k e l y to depend upon a t l e a s t 
h i s r e c e p t i o n (from the work of a r t ) of an experience t h a t approximates i n 
some way the o r i g i n a l experience he wished to express, though modified 
and developed i n i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h the symbolic e x p r e s s i o n . Both 
e x p r e s s i o n and r e c e p t i o n , and to t h i s extent some form of communication, 
are t h e r e f o r e elements of a r t i s t i c production. 
So f a r we have considered a p a r t i c u l a r v e r s i o n of the problem of 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between form and content, i . e . the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
symbol and meaning, and a p a r t i c u l a r s o l u t i o n o f f e r e d by Boiwsma, i . e . 
the u n i t y of symbol and meaning, a p o i n t of view we have both elaborated 
and c r i t i c i s e d . But these matters do not exhaust the problem of form 
and content i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the a r t s : f o r t h i s i t i s necessary 
to c o n s i d e r a wider concept of form than t h a t of 'symbolic form'. 
( i i i ) Meaningful Content and Wider Form 
Bourdieu, f o l l o w i n g Panofsky, argues s t r o n g l y a g a i n s t viewing the 
themes and s e n s i b l e q u a l i t i e s o f a work of a r t out of context. The broad-
e s t l e v e l - o f context i s s u p p l i e d by ' iconology', i n which the themes and 
t h e i r formal and t e c h n i c a l arrangements are seen i n terms of the funda-
mental p r i n c i p l e s t h a t guide t h e i r s e l e c t i o n and composition: 
'Thus, i t i s only s t a r t i n g from an i c o n o l o g i c a l i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n t h a t the formal arrangements and t e c h n i c a l 
methods and, through them, the formal and e x p r e s s i v e 
q u a l i t i e s , assume t h e i r f u l l meaning ..." 
(1968: 593) 
1 Of course not a l l a r t i s t s a r e concerned w i t h the expression 
o f a p r i o r experience: one must remember the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
a ' t r i a l and e r r o r ' approach to a r t . 
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The 'fundamental p r i n c i p l e s ' are taken u l t i m a t e l y to d e r i v e from the 
c u l t u r e o f a group or epoch, an assimiption which cannot be u n c r i t i c a l l y 
supported. Bourdieu has however made a valu a b l e c o n t r i b u t i o n i n h i s 
emphasis upon p r i n c i p l e s of s e l e c t i o n and composition. These p r i n c i p l e s 
a r e o f t e n conventions w i t h i n which the a r t i s t works, and Bourdieu points 
out t h a t even ' r e a l i s m ' i s s u b j e c t to such conventions: he suggests t h a t 
r e a l i s m I n v o l v e s an unconscious agreement between a r t i s t and p u b l i c as 
to what i s r e a l and how i t should be represented, so t h a t an 'o b j e c t i v e ' 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n awes i t s o b j e c t i v i t y more to conformity w i t h s o c i a l r u l e s 
as to what c o n s t i t u t e s o b j e c t i v i t y , than to concordance w i t h ' r e a l i t y ' . 
(1968: 591) 
Within the s o c i o l o g y o f l i t e r a t u r e . Burns and Burns pursue a s i m i l a r 
argument to t h a t of Bourdieu, and focus upon the concept of 'composition' 
which they choose i n pr e f e r e n c e to s t y l e or form. Composition, i n t h e i r 
sense of the term, i s found most r e a d i l y i n novels and p l a y s , as i t 
r e l a t e s to the 'sense of an ending' t h a t Kermode s t r e s s e s i n l i t e r a t u r e : 
'Composition has to do w i t h the p r i n c i p l e s of s e l e c t i o n 
and c o n s t r u c t i o n which govern the i n d i v i d u a l l y c r e a t e d 
f i c t i v e worlds o f w r i t e r s - p r i n c i p l e s by which they 
d e s c r i b e or designate p h y s i c a l s e t t i n g s , s i t u a t i o n s , 
a c t o r s and a c t i o n s , and by which these are ordered i n t o 
seqiaences which move towards an ending. The ending 
c o n s t i t u t e s ... a c l o s u r e which renders a l l t h a t we 
have seen and heard comprehensible and meaningful.' 
(Burns and Burns, 1973: 21) 
The ordered sequences a r e connected by (not n e c e s s a r i l y r a t i o n a l ) c a u s a l 
paths. The emphasis upon sequence, c l o s u r e , and moving towards an 
ending, makes i t c l e a r t h a t Burns and Burns' concept of 'composition' 
i s a p p l i c a b l e to a l i m i t e d type of l i t e r a t u r e , which may g e n e r a l l y be 
d e s c r i b e d as 'plo t l i t e r a t u r e ' , i n which 'What happens next?' and 'What 
happens i n the end?' a r e of paramount concern. N e v e r t h e l e s s , i f we 
focus upon t h e i r more g e n e r a l statements, i t i s c l e a r t h a t they share 
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Bourdieu's v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the p r i n c i p l e s of s e l e c t i o n and 
composition i n works of a r t : the emphasis i s upon the s e l e c t i o n and 
o r g a n i s a t i o n of s u b j e c t -matter, r a t h e r than i s o l a t e d fragments of s u b j e c t -
matter . 
The r e g a r d f o r o r g a n i s a t i o n i n l i t e r a t u r e i s shared by Goldmann, who, 
w i t h Lukacs, c l a i m s to make a r a d i c a l break w i t h those s o c i o l o g i e s t h a t 
a re more concerned w i t h the content than the g e n e r a l form of l i t e r a r y 
works: 
',.. Lukacs sought out the i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n between 
c r e a t i o n and s o c i a l consciousness not i n the contents 
but i n the c a t e g o r i e s which s t r u c t u r e one or other of 
them, ... The same c a t e g o r i e s ... may govern worlds 
w i t h completely d i f f e r e n t contents, ... ' 
(Goldmann, 1973: 120) 
The ' s i g n i f i c a n t c a t e g o r i a l s t r u c t u r e s ' t h a t Goldmann f i n d s i n l i t e r a t u r e 
a r e thought to correspond to those t h a t may be discovered i n the 'mental 
s t r u c t u r e s ' o f a c e r t a i n s o c i a l group: there i s a correspondence of 
o r g a n i s a t i o n - they share a common 'organising p r i n c i p l e ' . (Williams, 
1971: 12-13) W i l l i a m s makes i t c l e a r t h a t , i n the work o f Lukacs and 
Goldmann, he s t r o n g l y approves of t h i s emphasis on forms: he f i n d s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y v a l u a b l e the a n a l y s i s o f l i t e r a r y forms -
'... where changes o f viewpoint, changes of known 
and knowable r e l a t i o n s h i p s , changes of p o s s i b l e and 
a c t u a l r e s o l u t i o n s , could be d i r e c t l y demonstrated, 
as forms o f l i t e r a r y o r g a n i s a t i o n , ...' 
(Williams, 1971: 15) 
L i t e r a r y form f o r W i l l i a m s , then, seems to be equated w i t h l i t e r a r y 
o r g a n i s a t i o n and, from the l i s t i n the above q'uotation, appears to 
i n d i c a t e r a t h e r a concern w i t h g e n e r a l content than a d i s m i s s a l of 
content c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Indeed i t would be f u t i l e to attempt to d i s t i n -
g u i s h s h a r p l y between l i t e r a r y form ( i n the sense of formative p r i n c i p l e s ) 
and g e n e r a l content, s i n c e both i n f l u e n c e , and are manifested through, 
the s e l e c t i o n and composition of more s p e c i f i c content. 
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D e s p i t e W i l l i a m s ' admiration f o r Liakacs and Goldmann, he does 
complain t h a t they too r e a d i l y equate form and genre: 
'... form, i n Lukacs and Goldmann, t r a n s l a t e s too o f t e n 
as genre or as kind; ... we s t a y , too o f t e n , w i t h i n a 
r e c e i v e d academic and u l t i m a t e l y i d e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n i n 
which 'epic' and 'drama', 'novel' and 'tragedy', have 
i n h e r e n t and permanent p r o p e r t i e s , from which the a n a l y s i s 
begins and to which s e l e c t e d examples are r e l a t e d . ' 
(Williams, 1971: 15) 
A c o n t r a s t to the i d e a l i s t conception of genre i s provided by Z e r a f f a , 
who d e f i n e s genre a s : 'a form o f a r t s u b j e c t to the framework of a 
p a r t i c u l a r s e t of r u l e s ' (1973: 40) - or a t l e a s t t h i s i s n o n - i d e a l i s t 
i f the r u l e s are r e c o g n i s e d to be h i s t o r i c a l l y s p e c i f i c and mutable. 
Genre seems to combine asp e c t s of form and medium (e.g. n a t u r a l i s t i c 
p a i n t i n g , the e p i c poem, t e l e v i s i o n drama - though even these c a t e g o r i e s 
a r e too broad and may w e l l i n c l u d e s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e g e n r e s ) , and 
g e n e r a l l y to imply a g r e a t e r degree o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n than form 
per s e . 
To r e t u r n to the concept of form, the reason f o r t h i s and s i m i l a r 
concepts being given such emphasis i n the sociology of l i t e r a t u r e i s 
t h e i r supposed value i n r e v e a l i n g s o c i a l p e r s p e c t i v e s outside of the 
l i t e r a r y context. A l l the w r i t e r s so f a r mentioned i n t h i s s e c t i o n 
make some such c l a i m f o r the s i g n i f i c a n c e of l i t e r a r y form. Z e r a f f a , 
looking a t the problem from the other d i r e c t i o n , shows how a s o c i a l 
p e r s p e c t i v e can l e a d to a l i t e r a r y form. He d i s c u s s e d the work of 
Don P a s s e s : the frame of r e f e r e n c e f o r the w r i t i n g of 'Manhattan T r a n s f e r ' 
was provided by the formation of a perception of Manhattan i t s e l f . 
Z e r a f f a here argues t h a t , '... through i t s formal c h a r a c t e r ... a work 
of a r t exposes r e a l i t y . ' (1973: 38) I n t h i s condensed statement, 'formal 
c h a r a c t e r ' would seem to r e f e r to the formative p r i n c i p l e s of s e l e c t i o n 
and composition d i s c u s s e d above i n the work of Bourdieu and Burns and 
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Burns; and the ' r e a l i t y ' exposed would be more f u l l y d e s c ribed as the 
a l r e a d y formed r e a l i t y of a p e r s p e c t i v e an r e a l i t y , i . e . the frame of 
r e f e r e n c e t h a t i s the guiding p r i n c i p l e behind the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the 
work. 
The i d e a of a frame o f r e f e r e n c e as the formative p r i n c i p l e of a 
l i t e r a r y work i n d i c a t e s once more the d i f f i c u l t y of making a simple and 
c l e a r - c u t d i s t i n c t i o n between form and content. Wellek and Warren 
recognise t h i s d i f f i c u l t y i n t h e i r theory of l i t e r a t u r e (1963: 140-141) : 
they f i n d t h a t 'content', adequately conceived, i s formed r a t h e r than 
formless; and t h a t 'form' may apply both to the formation of content, 
and t o the l i n g u i s t i c elements (symbols i n our terminology) t h a t convey 
the content. They thus opt f o r an a l t e r n a t i v e d i s t i r i t i o n between aesthe-
t i c a l l y i n d i f f e r e n t elements: ' m a t e r i a l s ' - and the o r g a n i s a t i o n of these 
m a t e r i a l s f o r a e s t h e t i c purposes: ' s t r u c t u r e ' . The m a t e r i a l s i n c l u d e 
both 'form' ( i n the sense o f symbols) and 'content' ( i n the sense of 
imorganised s u b j e c t - m a t t e r ) . These d i s t i n c t i o n s bear a marked s i m i l a r i t y 
to those t h a t we have developed above, i . e . symbols, meanings and form. 
We choose 'form' i n p r e f e r e n c e to ' s t r u c t u r e ' , as i t i m p l i e s l e s s a 
d e s c r i p t i o n of g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r a l q u a l i t i e s l i k e coherence, and seems 
more r e a d i l y to i n c l u d e the formative p r i n c i p l e s t h a t l i e behind the 
s t r u c t u r e . 
The concept o f l i t e r a r y ' s t r u c t u r e ' however r a i s e s questions con-
cerning the r e l a t i o n s h i p between concepts of s t r u c t u r e or form d i s c u s s e d 
i n the context of l i t e r a t u r e , and those concepts of conscioijsness dis-^ 
cussed i n Chapter 6. What i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p , f o r i n s t a n c e , between 
l i t e r a r y form and c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e (or a t t i t u d e s , or c o g n i t i v e s t y l e s ) ? 
We have, a f t e r a l l , a l r e a d y noted how a frame of r e f e r e n c e can be a 
formative p r i n c i p l e f o r a l i t e r a r y work: t h i s would seem to imply a c l o s e 
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r e l a t i o n s h i p between a g e n e r a l a t t i t u d e and a l i t e r a r y form. A 
c o g n i t i v e s t y l e would seem a t f i r s t s i g h t to be l e s s l i k e l y to func-
t i o n as a major formative p r i n c i p l e : i t may however be found t h a t a 
c e r t a i n author's c h i e f c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s h i s i l l u s t r a t i o n of a p a r t i c -
u l a r c o g n i t i v e s t y l e , e i t h e r through the s t y l e of h i s own expression 
(a p o i n t taken up below i n the d i s c u s s i o n of 'expressive style'"''), or 
2 
through the p o r t r a y a l of c o g n i t i v e s t y l e s i n h i s c h a r a c t e r s . S i m i l a r l y 
a g e n e r a l a t t i t u d e may be conveyed by the l i t e r a r y work as a whole, or 
the author may choose to p o r t r a y a v a r i e t y of a t t i t u d e s i n h i s charac-
t e r s : the l a t t e r s e l e c t i o n , however, may lead to the conveying of the 
former g e n e r a l a t t i t u d e . As f o r c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e , t h i s would seem to 
have a p a r a l l e l i n the more a b s t r a c t s t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the 
work, such as c o n s i s t e n c y , d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , or, a t a l e s s g e n e r a l l e v e l , 
temporal o r g a n i s a t i o n and n a r r a t i v e complexity. C l e a r l y as the s t r u c -
t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s become more s p e c i f i c , so they are more d i f f i c u l t 
to d i f f e r e n t i a t e from p o i n t s o f view i n the l i t e r a r y work: a p a r t i c u l a r 
n a r r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e may be used t o convey aspects o f a g eneral s o c i a l 
p e r s p e c t i v e , or may be used f o r a purpose not d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to 
a t t i t u d e communication, e.g. convincing an audience of the r e a l i s t i c 
c h a r a c t e r of a d e s c r i p t i o n . T h i s l a t t e r point leads us to r e c a l l the 
many p o i n t s made i n Chapters 8 and 9 concerning the inadequacies of a 
n aive e x p r e s s i o n theory of a r t , p a r t i c u l a r l y where a work of a r t i s seen 
as a docmerit of the world view of the a r t i s t . Thus although a g e n e r a l 
a t t i t u d e may f u n c t i o n as a formative p r i n c i p l e f o r a l i t e r a r y work, we 
must not assume t h i s a t t i t u d e to p e r t a i n to p a r t i c u l a r persons or to 
g e n e r a l n o n - l i t e r a r y spheres of s o c i a l l i f e . The formative p r i n c i p l e s 
See below, pp 236-237 
2 
P a t r i c k White's 'The V i v i s e c t o r ' may be an example of a novel of 
t h i s type, whose formative p r i n c i p l e i s the p o r t r a y a l o f a 
c o g n i t i v e s t y l e (an extreme form of a n a l y t i c a l c y n i c i s m ) , both 
through the work as a whole, and i n p a r t i c u l a r through the 
thoughts of the hero H u r t l e D u f f i e l d . 
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may for instance be predominantly u t i l i t a r i a n or aesthetic. The author 
may choose to portray attitudes and cognitive s t y l e s that w i l l appeal 
to h i s audience; or h i s aesthetic aims may lead him to discover forms of 
l i t e r a r y organisation, rather than merely using them as means of 
expression. I n a l l t h i s , however, one must not assume that the author 
i s f u l l y aware of the formative p r i n c i p l e s behind h i s work: the 'form' 
of the novel cannot be simply taken as an intentional 'message', for 
the communication of which the content i s arranged. Not a l l l i t e r a t u r e 
i s pure allegory recognised and intended by the author; The 'form' of 
a l i t e r a r y work i s a construct for the purpose of explicating the 
principles of selection and composition therein. 
I n t h i s section we have explored various conceptions of form and 
content, stressing the importance of seeing them i n relation to, 
rather than divorced from, one another. In short, meaningful content 
i s either already formed before being expressed i n a l i t e r a r y work 
(for which i t may constitute a p r i n c i p l e of selection and composition) , 
or i s discovered through l i t e r a i y formation. 'Form' i n the sense of 
symbols i s adequately understood only i n the wider interpretive context 
of l i t e r a r y formative pr i n c i p l e s ; and 'form' i n the sense of the general 
mode and principles of organisation of the work i s equally dependent 
upon meaning, as Wolff points out: 
'In the case of l i t e r a t u r e , the interdependence of 
content and reference with a r t i s t i c form i s par-
t i c u l a r l y clear; patterns of words are inseparable 
from t h e i r associations for any reader who understands 
the language, and the perfection i n , say, the structure 
of a plot i s t o t a l l y dependent on the meaning of the 
events described ... (the) assumption that appreciation 
of form i s e a s i l y detachable from content, meaning and 
association i s probably wrong.' 
(1975: 13-14) 
F i n a l l y i t may be noted that the form of a work of l i t e r a t u r e may develop 
through the extension of certain aspects of content so that they become 
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the formative p r i n c i p l e s f o r the whole work: thsj^g may occur through 
the r e s t r i c t i o n o f a l t e r n a t i v e themes t h a t might otherwise have been 
developed. On the other hand, a form once developed may r e s t r i c t the 
themes t h a t an author can i n c l u d e w i t h i n t h a t form, e s p e c i a l l y i f the 
author p l a c e s a premium on f a c t o r s o f consistency and u n i t y : here we may 
f i n d a c o n s i s t e n t g e n e r a l content permitting and r e s t r i c t i n g the more 
s p e c i f i c content. 
( i v ) S t y l e 
So f a r i n t h i s chapter we have avoided t a c k l i n g the problem of 
s t y l e , except i n the sense o f a c o g n i t i v e s t y l e expressed i n a l i t e r a r y 
work. Y e t s t y l e must be recognised (along w i t h form and content) as one 
o f the most f r e q u e n t l y employed concepts i n l i t e r a r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
Indeed any thorough a n a l y s i s o f meaningful content must take account of 
s t y l e : Schapiro i n d i c a t e s t h a t , i f we go beyond a narrow conception of 
content as s ubject-matter, then both subject-matter and s t y l e may be seen 
to express the more g e n e r a l 'content' of broad a t t i t u d e s and p e r s p e c t i v e s . 
(1961: 105) Schapiro r e f e r s to one conception of s t y l e as a means of 
communication of d i f f u s e connotations (1961: 104) and i t i s t h i s concep-
t i o n t h a t appears to be the most u s e f u l f o r our purposes. There i s 
indeed an obvious connection here w i t h the work of Barthes. Barthes 
sees the subject-matter o f a l i t e r a r y t e x t as i t s m a n i f e s t message, 
i . e . what i t s language denotes; t h i s content-expressed-in-language however 
a l s o connotes a second message on a plane which encompasses the f i r s t 
plane o f content: t h i s i s the 'connotative' message, and may c o n s t i t u t e 
a l i t e r a r y s t y l e , such as ' a f f e c t i o n ' . (Barthes, 1964-! 192-3) . Thus 
The e x t e n s i o n p r o c e s s here i s s i m i l a r to t h a t d e s c r i b e d i n 
Chapter 7, concerning the e x t e n s i o n of p e r s p e c t i v e s through a 
l a c k of a l t e r n a t i v e a v a i l a b l e p o i n t s of view. See above. 
Chapter 7, p 158 
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l i t e r a r y s t y l e can be seen as a second-order communication of meaning: 
a s e c o n d - l e v e l usage of l a n g u a g e . B o t h Barthes, f o l l o w i n g Guiraud 
(Bar t h e s , 1964: 195), and Wellek and Warren (1963: 24) suggest t h a t such 
s t y l i s t i c connotations are p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e l y to a r i s e where there are 
d e v i a t i o n s from normal l i n g u i s t i c usage, such as deviant a s s o c i a t i o n s 
of words. 
S t y l e i s thus a most important concept i n e x p r e s s i o n , as i t r e f e r s 
to a c e r t a i n means f o r the communication of meaning; i t i s thus d i s t i n c t 
from c o g n i t i v e s t y l e , which i s more concerned with the manner i n which 
2 
an a c t o r holds c e r t a i n c o g n i t i o n s and e v a l u a t i o n s . L i t e r a r y s t y l e i s 
an o f t e n i n t e n t i o n a l medivon of e x p r e s s i o n , w h i l s t c o g n i t i v e s t y l e i s 
fovmd i n the formal p r o p e r t i e s o f unexpressed consciousness. There i s 
however an important s t y l i s t i c concept which shares p r o p e r t i e s of both 
l i t e r a r y and c o g n i t i v e s t y l e s w h i l s t being synonymous w i t h n e i t h e r : 
' e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e ' i s not normally an i n t e n t i o n a l communication medium, 
y e t i t i s concerned w i t h the formal p r o p e r t i e s of expressed consciousness. 
The e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e i s the c o g n i t i v e s t y l e o f the author's l i t e r a r y 
e x p r e s s i o n ^ : i t i s not j u s t a c o g n i t i v e s t y l e , a manner of holding 
c o g n i t i o n s and e v a l u a t i o n s , but r a t h e r r e f e r s to the way these are h e l d 
p v i b l i c l y (e.g. i n the p u b l i c context of l i t e r a r y e x p r e s s i o n ) . The express-
i v e s t y l e i s of course connoted f o r the i n t e r p r e t e r by the manner i n which 
the l i t e r a r y content i s expressed: l i k e l i t e r a r y s t y l e , t h e r e f o r e , i t 
may be taken as a second-order communication of meaning; but i t i s 
c l e a r l y much more s p e c i f i c than l i t e r a r y s t y l e , which can convey a much 
g r e a t e r v a r i e t y of meanings (such as the d i f f u s e emotions and a s s o c i a t i o n s 
The 'secondary' l e v e l does not n e c e s s a r i l y imply a s u b s i d i a r y s t a t u s . 
2 
See above. Chapter 6, p 140 
^ T h i s was f i r s t mentioned i n Chapter 9 (p 214 above) , where s e v e r a l 
p l a i u s i b l e hypotheses were put forward concerning the i n f l u e n c e of 
the c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e o f an audience upon the e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e 
of a l i t e r a r y work. 
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that Schapiro suggests may be communicated by s t y l e - 1961: 104), and 
the expressive s t y l e of a work i s le s s l i k e l y to be recognised by an 
author and to have been used consciously as a medium of communication. 
The concept of expressive s t y l e once more i l l u s t r a t e s the importance 
of acknowledging the sociology of expression as a v i t a l adjunct of the 
sociology of knowledge. 
Meaningful themes i n l i t e r a t u r e and styles of l i t e r a r y presen-
tation are c l e a r l y not themselves disparate fragments which the l i t e r a r y 
form brings together into a unity: both themes and styles already possess 
form. L i t e r a r y form thus has various levels of generality (though our 
usage of the term concentrates upon the more general formative principles 
of the work) ; and so themes and s t y l e s could be considered particular 
kinds of l e s s broadly compassing form that are worth differentiating in 
certain types of a r t . Where a r t i s representational, there i s a language 
of representation whose manner of usage may connote further diffuse 
meanings, and thus constitute a s t y l e . I n non-representational a r t there 
i s no obvious d i s t i n c t i o n between a principle and secondary usage of an 
aesthetic language: a l l the symbols i n these arts could be said to be 
s t y l i s t i c a l l y conveying content. Nettl has attempted to distinguish 
between s t y l e s and themes i n music (see Nettl, 1964: Chapter 6) , but his 
description of themes would appear to refer either to objective sequences 
of musical symbols (in which case the style of their presentation constit-
utes the means by which they can communicate meaning); or to individual 
musical 'ideas' (which would be d i f f i c u l t to distinguish from the diffuse 
connotations of s t y l e i n our terminology: Nettl's concept of st y l e would 
then seem closer to our notion of general form or the structure of the 
work). I t i s thus d i f f i c u l t to envisage no n - s t y l i s t i c meaningful themes 
The s t y l e that Barthes described as 'affection' would be an expressive 
s t y l e i n our terminology; whereas, e.g. Schapiro's discussion of 
'gothic' s t y l e s would refer rather to aesthetic/literary s t y l e s . 
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i n music (outside o f programme m u s i c ) . I n l i t e r a t u r e i t i s l i k e l y to 
be e a s i e r t o d i s t i n g u i s h between themes and s t y l e s . Remembering our 
d i s c u s s i o n of ' t r a n s l a t i o n ' above"*", l i t e r a r y themes are l i k e l y to be 
more r e a d i l y and adequately t r a n s l a t e d i n t o r a t i o n a l n o n - a e s t h e t i c 
terminology than l i t e r a r y s t y l e s , the l a t t e r p r e s e n t i n g problems of 
t r a n s l a t i o n s i m i l a r t o those posed by music. 
We have a l r e a d y noted t h a t themes and s t y l e s may be seen as p a r t i c -
u l a r k i n d s o f form w i t h i n the g e n e r a l form of the l i t e r a r y work: but can 
a s t y l e i t s e l f a c t as a work's formative p r i n c i p l e ? S t y l e may indeed be 
a major a x i s of composition, i n the sense t h a t the work i s designed 
c h i e f l y f o r the a p p r e c i a t i o n of c e r t a i n s t y l i s t i c connotations: these 
connotations perhaps together w i t h the perception of the symbols through 
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which they are conveyed , may thus c o n s t i t u t e a formative p r i n c i p l e f o r 
the work. But we must not assume t h a t a discovered homogeneity of s t y l e 
n e c e s s a r i l y means t h a t the s t y l e was an a e s t h e t i c o r g a n i s i n g p r i n c i p l e : 
the s t y l e may be merely homogeneous, a common technique r a t h e r than an 
i n t e n t i o n a l source o f a e s t h e t i c u n i t y . T h i s point i s made by Schapiro 
(196i: 88) , who a l s o r e g r e t s the unquestioning s e a r c h f o r homogeneity 
of s t y l e w i t h i n a r t works: we may f i n d s e v e r a l s t y l e s w i t h i n the same 
work. S i m i l a r l y we cannot assume consistency between s t y l i s t i c and 
thematic elements: 
' ... the content o f a work o f a r t often belongs to 
another region of experience than the one i n which 
both the p e r i o d s t y l e and the dominant mode of t h i n k -
ing have been formed; an example i s the s e c u l a r a r t 
o f a p e r i o d i n which r e l i g i o u s i d e a s and r i t u a l s are 
primary, and, con v e r s e l y , the r e l i g i o u s a r t of a 
s e c u l a r i s e d c u l t u r e . ' 
(Schapiro, 1961: 106) 
1 
2 
See above, p 224 f f 
T h i s i s of p a r t i c u l a r r e l e v a n c e i n p o e t i c s t y l e . 
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F i n a l l y we must re-emphasise t h a t s t y l e should not be taken as a simple 
e x p r e s s i o n of world view. I t may be an extension, a t one time meaning-
f u l l y a s s o c i a t e d with a p a r t i c u l a r subject-matter, but then g e n e r a l i s e d 
t o a common usage: 
'A s t y l e t h a t a r i s e s i n connection with a p a r t i c u l a r 
content o f t e n becomes an accepted mode governing a l l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of the p e r i o d . ' 
(Schapiro, 1961: 105) 
I t may thus become a t r a d i t i o n , an accepted communication form r a t h e r 
than a form f o r communication. As such i t i s a mere technique or 
r h e t o r i c , a c r a f t t h a t may be developed by a r t i s t s to demonstrate 
t h e i r s k i l l . A r t i s t i c commvmication, however, depends very l a r g e l y 
on a c c e p t a b l e forms, whether geneiral, s t y l i s t i c or thematic; and these 
forms a r e not always meaningless r h e t o r i c that must be adopted f o r one's 
work t o be favourably r e c e i v e d , f o r , a t the opposite extreme, they may 
d e l i n e a t e the concerns w i t h which the a r t i s t must become involved i f 
he i s to achieve s u c c e s s f u l a e s t h e t i c ccaranunication i n h i s own time. 
We s h a l l thus now explore the question o f the forms t h a t are a v a i l a b l e 
t o the w r i t e r , and the manner i n which these r e s t r i c t and permit, mould 
and induce h i s e x p r e s s i o n . 
(v) A v a i l a b l e Forms 
I n the c r e a t i o n o f a work o f a r t , the a r t i s t has to work w i t h those 
symbols t h a t are the i n h e r e n t o r conventional t e c h n i c a l apparatus o f 
h i s medium: he has to use the symbols t h a t are a v a i l a b l e to him, though 
he may be a b l e to modify and add to these. But the broader concepts of 
form and content, which we have explored s i n c e s e c t i o n ( i i ) of t h i s 
c hapter, w i l l a l s o confront the a r t i s t as conventions w i t h which he must 
come to terms: he w i l l have a t h i s d i s p o s a l a l i m i t e d s e t of themes, 
s t y l e s and g e n e r a l formative p r i n c i p l e s for h i s work. At the broadest 
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l e v e l he may be working w i t h i n a h i g h l y i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d genre, encased 
i n a r i g i d framework of r u l e s . I n the sociology of l i t e r a t u r e . Burns 
and Burns suggest t h a t t h e r e i s a 'conventional and conceptual meta-
f i c t i v e apparatus' w i t h which the author must comply i f he i s to achieve 
adequate communication. The s h a r i n g of t h i s apparatus by w r i t e r and reader 
i n v o l v e s a common acknowledgement of -
'... a u n i v e r s e of f i c t i v e worlds, with a grammar of 
conventions, r u l e s o f the game, and conceptual vocab-
u l a r y of i t s own ...' 
(Burns and Burns, 1973: 22) 
The k i n d s of conventions t h a t t h i s l i s t would appear to i n c l u d e are 
the types o f a c t i o n and outcome t h a t are portrayed, the s t r u c t u r a l and 
s t y l i s t i c p a t t e r n s employed, the l i t e r a r y devices t h a t may be used, 
and even the v o c a b u l a r i e s o f motive t h a t are thought to be s u i t a b l e f o r 
the c h a r a c t e r s . As Bourdieu suggests, these conventions may be ' t a c i t l y 
assumed r a t h e r than e x p l i c i t l y p o s t u l a t e d ' : p a r t of the ' c u l t u r a l 
vinconscious' of a s o c i a l group or p e r i o d . (1971: 180) 
The symbolic, thematic, s t y l i s t i c and s t r u c t u r a l forms t h a t are 
a v a i l a b l e to an author may a c t both as r e s t r i c t i o n s upon h i s expression 
and as sources of i n s i g h t . We have already noted t h a t a l i t e r a r y form, 
i n the sense of a c o n s i s t e n t g e n e r a l content, may l i m i t the development 
of p o t e n t i a l themes i n a work."*" S i m i l a r l y the form of the work may 
c o u n t e r a c t the v a l u e s o f the w r i t e r , as Swingewood suggests i s the 
case w i t h B a l z a c ' s r e a l i s m (1972: 87); or i t may b e l i e h i s philosophy, 
a s , a c c o r d i n g to Kermode; i s apparent i n S a r t r e ' s 'La Nausee': here i t 
i s the novel as genre t h a t i s denying the v a l i d i t y of what the w r i t e r 
attempts t o express t h e r e i n : 
See above, p 235 
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'... although i t i s a novel, i t r e f l e c t s a philosophy 
i t must, i n so f a r as i t p o s s e s s e s novel form, b e l i e . ' 
(1973: 220)^ 
The c o n f l i c t between the author's d e s i r e to express and the forms of 
exp r e s s i o n a v a i l a b l e t o him may however take the form of a simple 
i n c o m p a t a b i l i t y between the forms t h a t he has a p a r t i c u l a r a b i l i t y and 
i n c l i n a t i o n to use, and the forms t h a t a r e t r a d i t i o n a l l y a v a i l a b l e to 
him and t h a t promise g r e a t e r economic v i a b i l i t y . O r w e l l , f o r i n s t a n c e , 
sees Dickens as a c a r i c a t u r i s t who i s y e t committed to p l o t : 
'(he) was c o n s t a n t l y s e t t i n g i n t o a c t i o n c h a r a c t e r s 
who ought to have been p u r e l y s t a t i c ... (who) are 
f i n a l l y i n v o l v e d i n ' p l o t s ' where they a r e out of 
p l a c e and where they behave q u i t e i n c r e d i b l y . ' 
(1965: 133) 
We may thus see Dickens as being b e s t able to engage i n c a r i c a t u r e , but 
as having to s e t h i s work w i t h i n the predominant framework of p l o t 
l i t e r a t u r e , a framework encoviraged by s e r i a l i s e d p i i b l i c a t i o n . On the 
other hand, a v a i l a b l e a r t i s t i c forms may suggest new p e r s p e c t i v e s to an 
author. New forms t h a t a re developed w i t h i n the sphere of another a r t 
may provide an impetus f o r the generation of f r e s h forms and p e r s p e c t i v e s 
i n l i t e r a t u r e . An obvious i n s t a n c e of t h i s i s the i n f l u e n c e of f i l m 
upon the novel: Z e r a f f a , f o r example, points out t h a t Don Passes used 
i d e a s about f i l m montage i n the composition of 'Manhattan T r a n s f e r ' . 
(1973: 38) More g e n e r a l l y one may argue, with Kroeber (1970: 123), 
t h a t the experiences t h a t are a v a i l a b l e f o r a r t i s t s i n e x i s t e n t works 
of a r t a r e the springboard f o r t h e i r own attempts a t expression: they 
s t a r t from a v a i l a b l e forms, which they a t f i r s t i m i t a t e and then develop. 
On the other hand, one must beware of holding an o v e r - r e s t r i c t i v e 
conception of the novel form: those who have a f i x e d i d e a of a par-
t i c u l a r genre may be unable t o recognise developments o f t h a t genre. 
V i r g i n i a Woolf, f o r i n s t a n c e , was much c a s t i g a t e d f o r being 'unable' 
to p o r t r a y charactejcs i n her nov e l s : y e t her r e j e c t i o n of c h a r a c t e r s 
as a mode of o r g a n i s a t i o n i n the novel d e l i b e r a t e l y r e f l e c t s her 
r e j e c t i o n of c h a r a c t e r s as a mode of o r g a n i s a t i o n i n our knowledge 
o f the world. T h i s i s made e x p l i c i t i n such works as 'Jacob's Room' 
and 'The Waves'. 
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r a t h e r than s t a r t i n g w i t h t h e i r own i n d i v i d u a l experience, which they 
then compromise through the use of a e s t h e t i c conventions. C l e a r l y both 
of these i d e a l - t y p i c a l images of the a r t i s t must be born i n mind, as 
n e i t h e r can be assumed u n i v e r s a l l y t o p r e v a i l . I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t , 
however, t h a t Kroeber i s predominantly concerned with the v i s u a l a r t s : 
the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of r e a l i t y i n p a i n t e r l y symbols, f o r i n s t a n c e , i s 
more l i k e l y to be confined w i t h i n a realm of formal a r t i s t i c t r a i n i n g , 
than the v e r b a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of r e a l i t y , a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t i s 
moreover not l i m i t e d to the l i t e r a r y . The w r i t e r i s thus more l i k e l y 
than the p a i n t e r t o f e e l a c o n f l i c t between h i s a l r e a d y formed r e a l i t y 
p e r s p e c t i v e (assuming t h a t he wishes t o give l i t e r a r y e xpression thereto) 
and the forms t h a t he f i n d s a v a i l a b l e . 
We must e q u a l l y avoid both the view t h a t the forms i n a l i t e r a r y 
work d e r i v e simply from t h a t which the author wishes to express t h e r e i n , 
and the view t h a t t r a d i t i o n d e t e m i n e s unambiguously what the w r i t e r i s 
able to e x p r e s s . The development of l i t e r a t u r e i s more adequately seen 
as the c o n t i n u a l m o d i f i c a t i o n of t r a d i t i o n , w i t h the r e t e n t i o n of some 
elements w h i l s t o t h e r s a r e undergoing r e v o l u t i o n . T h i s i s the p o i n t of 
view expounded by C u r t i u s , and approved by Burns and Burns (1973: 22); and 
i t r e i n f o r c e s the emphasis p l a c e d i n Chapter 4 upon a s t r u c t u r a l and 
h i s t o r i c a l perspective''', and i n Chapter 7 upon the m o d i f i c a t i o n s of 
2 
s u p e r s t r u c t u r e over time. 
Even where a f i x e d and narrow t r a d i t i o n encompasses l i t e r a r y 
e x p r e s s i o n , we must not assume t h a t c o n t i n u i t y of the l i t e r a r y forms 
i m p l i e s c o n t i n u i t y of t h e i r f u n c t i o n , and thus of t h e i r meaning."^ Where 
•'• See above. Chapter 4, pp 9A->95, i n the context o f our d i s c u s s i o n 
of Mannheim. 
2 See above. Chapter 7, pp 171-172 
^ 'As the f u n c t i o n i s changed so i s the meaning' - see above. 
Chapter 4, p 95 i n r e l a t i o n to Mannheim. 
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a wider s e l e c t i o n o f a l t e r n a t i v e forms I s available''", there may be a 
process of mutual e l e c t i v e a f f i n i t y between the world view of the 
2 
author and the a v a i l a b l e l i t e r a r y forms. Where no neat a f f i n i t y can 
be found, the author, i f aiming a t a e s t h e t i c u n i t y , w i l l attempt to 
r a t i o n a l i s e ( i n the sense o f making c o n s i s t e n t ) the meanings he intends 
to express and the forms he must use to express them: i n the process 
both meanings and forms are l i k e l y to undergo a l t e r a t i o n . The new forms 
t h a t may thus develop are l i k e l y to r e q u i r e l e g i t i m a t i o n s to be put 
forward on t h e i r b e h a l f , e s p e c i a l l y i f the expectations of t r a d i t i o n a l 
c r i t i c s have s a l i e n c e f o r the author. 
F i n a l l y i n t h i s s e c t i o n we may note the suggestion by Burns and 
Burns (1973: 321) t h a t the work o f an i n d i v i d u a l author may i t s e l f 
c o n s t i t u t e a t r a d i t i o n . Y e t t h i s must not be taken to mean t h a t we 
should merely see the w r i t e r ' s work i n the context of h i s work as a 
whole; but r a t h e r i n the s o c i a l context of the expectations and evalua-
t i o n s made of him by o t h e r s . ^ He may be faced with the problem of 
f o l l o w i n g a p a r t i c u l a r l y s u c c e s s f u l work, of perhaps maintaining the 
o r i g i n a l i t y of h i s work - which may present a dilemma, i n t h a t the f o m s 
t h a t he has made a v a i l a b l e f o r h i m s e l f through h i s o r i g i n a l i t y may not be 
used again without r e l i n q u i s h i n g some of t h e i r o r i g i n a l i t y : t h i s 
may not worry him i f he f o l l o w s h i s own newly c o n s t i t u t e d t r a d i t i o n . 
F i n a l l y i n t h i s chapter we s h a l l explore some of the a t t r i b u t e s 
t h a t p e r t a i n l e s s to t r a d i t i o n o r convention, but r a t h e r are i n h e r e n t 
i n the very nature of w r i t t e n f i c t i o n . 
B a r t h e s would say: where there i s a higher 'degree of freedom' 
of the ' r h e t o r i c a l code' - 1964: 196. 
C f Chapter 7, p l 7 2 where the world view of the i n d i v i d u a l i s 
seen as developing through mutual e l e c t i v e a f f i n i t y w ith 
e x i s t e n t w;orld views. 
C f the d i s c u s s i o n of Bourdieu's i d e a s on the s o c i a l d e f i n i t i o n 
o f the w r i t e r ' s work, i n Chapter 9, p215 above. 
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( v i ) The Nature o f Wri t t e n F i c t i o n 
There are two major approaches to d e s c r i b i n g the nature of f i c t i o n , 
v i z . i n terms of l i t e r a r y language and i n terms o f l i t e r a r y t r u t h and 
b e l i e f . The f i r s t approach i s favoured by Barthes, who considers t h a t 
the r h e t o r i c of l i t e r a t u r e makes i t l i t e r a r y and thus g i v e s to a 
v e r b a l communication the s t a t u s of a work of a r t : 
"... i n a d d i t i o n to the element o f story-making which i t 
shar e s with other a r t e f a c t s , l i t e r a t u r e i s possessed of 
an element which g i v e s i t s p e c i f i c i t y : i t s language.' 
(1964: 191) 
T h i s language i n t r a d i t i o n a l l i t e r a t u r e i s embedded i n a myth i n which 
' l i t e r a r y d i s c o u r s e ' i s the s i g n i f i c a t i o n : the d i s c o u r s e s i g n i f i e s the 
concept of l i t e r a t u r e . (1973: 134) The emphasis on l i t e r a r y language 
le a d s Barthes to see -
'... a l i t e r a r y work or t e x t as a message which puts 
the emphasis on i t s e l f ... i t i s the message i t s e l f , 
i t s p a t t e r n , the p h y s i c a l p r e s e n t a t i o n of i t s s i g n s 
which a re s t r e s s e d ...' 
(1964: 194) 
The e x p r e s s i v e , connotative and denotative f u n c t i o n s of l i t e r a t u r e are 
thus seen as l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t - a view t h a t c o n t r a s t s with, t h a t of Fligen, 
who s t r e s s e s the very s t o r y - t e l l i n g aspects o f l i t e r a t u r e t h a t Barthes 
p a s s e s by. I n Barthes! terms, Ftigen emphasises the r e c e p t i o n of: l i t e r a r y 
communication, and i n p a r t i c u l a r the s p e c i a l k i n d of b e l i e f a s s o c i a t e d 
w i t h t h i s r e c e p t i o n . Fllgen c l a i m s t h a t there i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
r e a l i t y - c l a i m i n v o l v e d i n l i t e r a r y communication: 'ein eigentUmlicher 
W i r k l i c h k e i t s a n s p r u c h ' . (1968: 21) To appreciate a l i t e r a r y work i n 
l i t e r a r y manner one must adopt an a t t i t u d e appropriate to l i t e r a r y 
r e a l i t y : i . e . , n e i t h e r simply b e l i e f nor quite d i s b e l i e f , but r a t h e r 
suspension o f d i s b e l i e f . One may argue t h a t t h i s a t t i t u d e i s found i n 
r e l a t i v e degrees: i n some forms o f l i t e r a t u r e g r e a t e r d i s b e l i e f may be 
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encouraged; i n o t h e r forms the aim may be a much stronger degree of 
emotional involvement, a t the expense of a e s t h e t i c d i s t a n c e . Never-
t h e l e s s , Fllgen's c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the l i t e r a r y a t t i t u d e i s widely 
a p p l i c a b l e , p a r t i c u l a r l y to the l i t e r a t u r e of the r e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n . 
I n such works, as we s h a l l see, the d e v i c e s t h a t are used to encourage 
the suspension o f d i s b e l i e f are p a r t i c u l a r l y worthy of i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
I t i s w i t h i n t h i s realm, of the techniques t h a t are used to encourage 
the l i t e r a r y a t t i t u d e , t h a t one can see a l i n k between the work of Barthes 
and Ftigen: the v e r y use of l i t e r a r y language may a i d the reader's t r a n s -
i t i o n i n t o the f i c t i o n a l u n i v e r s e i n which suspension of d i s b e l i e f i s 
the appropriate a t t i t u d e . 
Duvignaud tends to concentrate upon the c r e a t i o n r a t h e r than the 
r e c e p t i o n of a r t , thus r e v e a l i n g another angle on the nature of f i c t i o n . 
Duvignaud s t r e s s e s t h a t c r e a t i v i t y and imagination occur not only i n 
a r t i s t i c a c t i o n : wider s o c i a l a c t i o n a l s o possesses these q u a l i t i e s (1972: 
21) . I n the context o f l i t e r a t u r e , he would argue t h a t f i c t i o n i s not 
such a s p e c i a l c a s e , as one may see i n the formation of f i c t i o n a l and 
a c t u a l s o c i a l u n i v e r s e s the c r e a t i o n of a world according to v a l u e s . 
Such a p o i n t of view would, however, ignore the e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e s 
between s o c i e t a l and a r t i s t i c c r e a t i o n : to a c e r t a i n degree the w r i t e r 
can c r e a t e on h i s own a f i c t i o n a l u n i v e r s e ; and, because i t is_ f i c t i o n a l , 
the consequences of l i v i n g t h e r e i n do not have to be faced. Duvignaud's 
emphasis upon the c r e a t i v i t y o f a r t i s however, h e l p f u l : 
' I n r e a l i t y , every a r t i s t i c experience of the c r e a t i o n 
of forms I s - to use an image from card-playing - a .'new 
d e a l ' which, w h i l e undoubtedly making use of e s s e n t i a l 
elements from the 'hvmian landscape' i n h a b i t e d by the 
a r t i s t (whether t h i s landscape i s i n h i s mind or a c t u a l ) , 
suggests a new arrangement and a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of the 
e s t a b l i s h e d system.' (1972: 42) 
We should t h e r e f o r e not see l i t e r a t u r e as merely a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of 
an e x i s t i n g order: the p r e s e n t a t i o n of a 'new d e a l ' i s a h i g h l y s i g n i f i -
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cant a t t r i b u t e of l i t e r a r y c r e a t i o n , and leads us to recognise the 
importance of v a l u e s i n l i t e r a t u r e . The f a c t t h a t l i t e r a t u r e can 
p o r t r a y a re-arrangement of the world means t h a t the f i c t i o n a l world 
can conform more c l o s e l y to v a l u e s . T h e search f o r v a l u e s as formative 
p r i n c i p l e s of l i t e r a r y works thus becomes e s t a b l i s h e d as a major task 
f o r the s o c i o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of l i t e r a t u r e , as long as we do not 
f o r g e t the s t r i c t u r e s p l a c e d upon such an i n v e s t i g a t i o n by the elements 
of l i t e r a r y autonomy t h a t we have p r e v i o u s l y d i s c u s s e d . The question of 
the a t t r i b u t i o n o f the v a l u e s d i s c o v e r e d i n a l i t e r a r y work cannot however 
be s o l v e d a p r i o r i . Both t h i s q u e s t i o n , and the broader one of values i n 
l i t e r a t u r e , w i l l be d i s c u s s e d f u r t h e r i n the next chapter. 
Although l i t e r a t u r e does not c l a i m , according to Ftigen and Duvignaud, 
to p o r t r a y an e m p i r i c a l world, nonetheless i f some form of r e a l i s m i s i t s 
aim, i f i t hopes t o convince of the a u t h e n t i c i t y of i t s u n i v e r s e , to the 
extignt of the suspension of d i s b e l i e f , i t may have to r e s o r t to v a r i o u s 
l i t e r a r y d e v i c e s , the use of which indeed r e v e a l s a c l a i m to r e a l i s m . 
An example of t h i s i s f i r s t - p e r s o n n a r r a t i v e , which may grant g r e a t e r 
a u t h e n t i c i t y , but i s l i k e l y to c r e a t e problems fo r the author wishing to 
impart c r u c i a l information through h i s f i r s t - p e r s o n n a r r a t o r . Thus L e v i n 
p o i n t s out t h a t P r o u s t ' s r e a l i s m from the standpoint of the f i r s t - p e r s o n 
n e c e s s i t a t e s the convention of eavesdropping ( L e v i n , 1973: 65-66). I n 
'Wuthering Heights' we f i n d a g r e a t complexity of f i r s t - p e r s o n n a r r a t i v e : 
n a r r a t i v e w i t h i n n a r r a t i v e w i t h i n n a r r a t i v e , and t h i s very complexity, 
and the c a r e f u l use of l i t e r a r y d e v i c e s to s u s t a i n i t , r e v e a l the s t r e n g t h 
of E m i l y BrontS's e f f o r t s to c l a i m r e a l i s m . 
T h i s ' conformity to values' does not imply the p o r t r a y a l of a 
p o s i t i ve Utopia, but r a t h e r of a f i c t i o n a l universe which, i n 
comparison w i t h a n o n - f i c t i o n a l world view, i s l i k e l y to be 
more p u r e l y r e l a t e d to values, whether i n a p o s i t i v e or 
n e g a t i v e manner. 
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I r r e s p e c t i v e of problems of r e a l i s m , the l i t e r a r y work as a 
work o f a r t w i l l confront s p e c i f i c a l l y a e s t h e t i c p r o b l e m s , e s p e c i a l l y 
i f some notion o f a e s t h e t i c u n i t y i s paramount. These problems may 
once again l e a d to the use of l i t e r a r y d e v i c e s , e.g. to e s t a b l i s h p l o t 
u n i t y i n a novel. P u r e l y l i t e r a r y d e v i c e s become i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t 
t o d i s t i n g u i s h here from what one might c a l l the i d e o l o g i c a l devices 
t h a t may be used i n l i t e r a t u r e : thus unexpected developments i n a p l o t 
may modify the otherwise i n e v i t a b l e course of events described. I n t h i s 
context, Williams p o i n t s t o the use of 'magical' devices to postpone the 
c o n f l i c t between e t h i c and experience (Williams, 1965: 8 2 ) . 
Many of the problems t h a t the author encounters thus appear to stem 
from a f e l t need f o r c o n s i s t e n c y i n h i s work. T h i s need may of course 
d e r i v e from a high v a l u a t i o n of a e s t h e t i c unity; but i t may e q u a l l y 
d e r i v e from a f a c t o r s t i l l more i n t r i n s i c to w r i t t e n f i c t i o n , i . e . the 
nature of f i c t i o n as a p u b l i c , w r i t t e n statement. Consistency i s c l e a r l y 
l i k e l y to be a g r e a t e r concern where a l i t e r a r y work threatens to occasion 
the p u b l i c r e v e l a t i o n o f c o n t r a d i c t o r y views through t h e i r j u x t a p o s i t i o n 
i n i n s p e c t a b l e w r i t t e n form. The g e n e r a l structxare of the l i t e r a r y work 
w i l l t h e r e f o r e tend towards g r e a t e r consistency than the c o g n i t i v e 
s t r u c t u r e of e i t h e r author or audience. Kern, f o l l o w i n g Mannheim, 
suggests t h a t -
'... an a t t i t u d e may not be worked out because the con-
t r a d i c t i o n s w i t h i n i t would become apparent ...' 
(1942: 510) 
What we a r e proposing here, however, i s that ' l i t e r a t u r e may f o r c e , 
through the conscious c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t i t i n v o l v e s , the working out 
of a t t i t u d e s , u n l e s s the author i s a b l e to r e s o r t to the kinds of 
S c h a p i r o makes t h i s p o i n t i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of R i e g l ; 
S c h a p i r o , 1961: 101 
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magical de v i c e to which W i l l i a m s draws a t t e n t i o n . I f he i s unable or 
u n w i l l i n g t o make use o f such d e v i c e s , l i t e r a t u r e as a p u b l i c w r i t t e n 
statement w i l l expose the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s : of the e l a b o r a t e d a t t i t u d e s 
t h e r e i n , u n l e s s the author i s a b l e t o develop, through i d e a l pragmatism, 
hi g h e r l e v e l i n t e g r a t i v e l e g i t i m a t i o n s . Such w i l l be the course of 
a c t i o n o f an i d e a l - t y p i c a l c o n s i s t e n c y - o r i e n t e d w r i t e r ; not a l l 
w r i t e r s w i l l be so aware of i n c o n s i s t e n c y (despite the tendency of 
l i t e r a t u r e to r e v e a l i t ) o r be so l o a t h e to admit to i t . 
We have seen the k i n d of i n f l u e n c e t h a t l i t e r a t u r e as a p u b l i c 
w r i t t e n statement w i l l have upon the general form of the l i t e r a r y work: 
to complete t h i s a n a l y s i s we must ask what w i l l be the e f f e c t upon the 
s p e c i f i c themes and e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e o f the work. I n so f a r as consistency 
i s encouraged by the v e r y nature of published w r i t t e n f i c t i o n , a c o n s i s t e n t 
g e n e r a l content w i l l r e s t r i c t the themes t h a t the author can develop i n 
h i s work: t h i s was a l r e a d y p o i n t out on p 235 above. With r e s p e c t to 
e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e , l i t e r a t u r e as a p u b l i c w r i t t e n statement, d e l i b e r a t e l y 
conceived, w i l l tend to encourage i n the w r i t e r a g r e a t e r awareness of 
h i s own a t t i t u d e s and assumptions, which may i n t u r n i n f l u e n c e h i s 
e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e , e.g. i n the d i r e c t i o n of over-anxious s e l f - l e g i t i m a t i o n , 
complacent om i n i s c i e n c e , o r p e d a n t i c e x a c t i t u d e . 
( v i i ) C onclusion 
I n t h i s chapter we have i n v e s t i g a t e d those concepts t h a t have been 
used, and those t h a t should be used, i n the a n a l y s i s of the e x p r e s s i o n 
of meaning i n l i t e r a r y form. We have examined the i m p l i c a t i o n s of these 
concepts f o r a theory o f l i t e r a r y expression, and thus i n d i c a t e d those 
a s p e c t s of l i t e r a t u r e as a form of expression t h a t must be taken i n t o 
See above. Chapter 3, p 78 
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account i n any attempt to e x p l i c a t e the meaning 'expressed' t h e r e i n . 
The l i t e r a r y elements t h a t were thought noteworthy of d i s t i n c t i o n 
were seen i n r e l a t i o n s h i p s - o f mutual i n f l u e n c e w i t h one another, as was 
the case f o r the elements of consciousness t h a t we o u t l i n e d i n Chapter 6. 
I n p a r t i c u l a r , we examined the f o l l o w i n g : the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
symbols and meanings i n v a r i o u s forms of a r t , the p o t e n t i a l i n h e r e n t 
or contingent dependence o f meaning upon a c t u a l i s a t i o n of symbols, the 
consequent problem of t r a n s l a t i o n , and the i m p l i c a t i o n s thereof f o r 
the theory o f a r t as communication i n both i t s e x p r e s s i v e and evocative 
a s p e c t s ; the r e l a t i o n s h i p between meaningful content and wider formative 
p r i n c i p l e s i n l i t e r a t u r e , between t h i s wider l i t e r a r y form and concepts 
of consciousness form, and between l i t e r a r y form and themes; the concepts 
of l i t e r a r y s t y l e and e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e , and the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
s t y l e s and themes, and s t y l e s and forms; the forms a v a i l a b l e to the 
author - symbolic, thematic, s t y l i s t i c and s t r u c t u r a l - and the p o s s i -
b i l i t y o f c o n f l i c t between intended expression and a v a i l a b l e forms; and 
f i n a l l y the nature o f w r i t t e n f i c t i o n , with r e s p e c t to the r e a l i t y c r e a t e d 
and the language used to c r e a t e i t , the importance of values and l i t e r a r y 
and i d e o l o g i c a l d e v i c e s i n i t s c r e a t i o n , and the i n f l u e n c e (e.g. upon 
the use of these d e v i c e s and the encouragement of consistency) of l i t e r -
a t u r e ' s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c p u b l i c i n s p e c t a b l e form and of an emphasis upon 
a e s t h e t i c u n i t y . 
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CHAPTER 11: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LITERATURE 
( i ) I n t r o d u c t i o n 
I n t h i s chapter we are concerned w i t h i s s u e s i n the soc i o l o g y of 
l i t e r a t u r e t h a t may broadly be c a l l e d methodological. The focus i s 
upon how a s o c i o l o g i s t i n t e r p r e t s l i t e r a t u r e , but l e s s i n terms of 
the t h e o r e t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f c e r t a i n s o c i o l o g i c a l models and concepts, 
than i n terms of t h r e e problem a r e a s : (a) the general aims of the 
s o c i o l o g y of l i t e r a t u r e , e.g. l e v e l s o f g e n e r a l i t y and types of gener-
a l i t y attempted; (b) the methodology i m p l i c i t or e x p l i c i t i n s o c i o -
l o g i c a l attempts to i n t e r p r e t l i t e r a t u r e , e.g. the p l a c e of va l u e s i n 
l i t e r a r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; and (c) p a r t i c u l a r methods f o r the s o c i o l o g i c a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of l i t e r a t u r e , e.g. the s o r t s of question t h a t one may 
d i r e c t a t a l i t e r a r y work. Most of the i s s u e s t h a t f a l l w i t h i n the 
f i r s t two o f the above problem a r e a s , and th a t we s h a l l d i s c u s s i n l a t e r 
s e c t i o n s o f t h i s chapter, are r a i s e d by the work of L u c i e n Goldmann, which 
a t p r e s e n t c o n s t i t u t e s the s i n g l e major attempt a t a g e n e r a l sociology of 
li t e r a t u r e . " ' ' I t i s thus w i t h an examination of Goldmann's work t h a t we 
s h a l l commence. 
( i i ) L u c i e n Goldmann's Sociology o f L i t e r a t u r e 
I n Chapter 2, S e c t i o n ( i v ) , an account was presented of Goldmann's 
so c i o l o g y of knowledge. T h i s i s c l e a r l y e s s e n t i a l as a background to 
h i s s o c i o l o g y o f l i t e r a t u r e , p a r t i c u l a r l y with r e s p e c t to h i s views on 
Wi l l i a m s i n p a r t i c u l a r avows the importance of Goldmann's work 
f o r the soc i o l o g y o f l i t e r a t u r e , claiming t h a t 'Goldmann's 
concepts o f s t r u c t u r e , and h i s d i s t i n c t i o n s of kinds of 
consciousness' a r e s i g n i f i c a n t advances, and t h a t , w h i l s t 
o f t e n based upon L\ikacs, they are nonetheless developed beyond 
h i s work. (Williams, 1971: 11) 
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the r e l a t i o n between world view and s o c i a l c l a s s : world view remains 
a c e n t r a l concept i n h i s s o c i o l o g y of l i t e r a t u r e , and i s again r e l a t e d 
to group consciousness i n a way t h a t n e g l e c t s i n d i v i d u a l i t y , i n t h i s 
c ase of the author. We begin w i t h Goldmann's conception of the w r i t e r 
and the l i t e r a r y work, as t h i s has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the macro- versus 
m i c r o - a n a l y s i s of l i t e r a r y p r o c e s s e s , and f o r the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
l i t e r a t u r e w i t h r e f e r e n c e to v a l u e s . 
Goldmann's conception of the w r i t e r d i f f e r s r a d i c a l l y from Mannheim's 
no t i o n of the p r e s e n t , r e l a t i v e l y autonomous i n t e l l i g e n t s i a . (Mannheim, 
1936: 139) F o r Goldmann, g r e a t w r i t e r s and philosophers are the excep-
t i o n a l few -
'... who e i t h e r a c t u a l l y achieve or who come very near to 
a c h i e v i n g a completely i n t e g r a t e d and coherent view of 
what they and the s o c i a l c l a s s to which they belong are 
t r y i n g to do. ... (They) express t h i s v i s i o n on an imag-
i n a t i v e or conceptual plane ..., and the more c l o s e l y t h e i r 
work expresses t h i s v i s i o n i n i t s complete and i n t e g r a t e d 
form, the more important does i t become. They then achieve 
the maximum p o s s i b l e awareness of the s o c i a l group whose 
nature they a r e e x p r e s s i n g . ' (1964: 17) 
T h i s view i s r e m i n i s c e n t o f one of Mannheim's statements which i s not 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s notion of the ' f r e e - f l o a t i n g i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ' : 
'Even when a seemingly i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l g i v e s form 
to the Utopia of h i s group, i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s t h i s 
can r i g h t l y be a t t r i b u t e d to the group to whose 
c o l l e c t i v e impulse h i s achievement conformed.' 
(1936: 186) 
Goldmann s i m i l a r l y w r i t e s o f the ' c o l l e c t i v e a s p i r a t i o n s ' of a group 
f i n d i n g e x p r e s s i o n i n the imaginative c r e a t i o n of a f i c t i o n a l world. 
(1973: 122) Y e t Goldmann's work a l s o contains c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , and i n 
o t h e r p l a c e s he i s l e s s dogmatic on the r e l a t i o n between the w r i t e r and 
h i s s o c i a l environment: 
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'.. . i t i g cibvious t h a t the freedom o f the t h i n k e r and 
w r i t e r d i f f e r s g r e a t l y from t h a t of other persons; 
t h e i r t i e s w i t h the l i f e of s o c i e t y are d i v e r s e l y 
complex and m e d i a t i z e d i n d i f f e r e n t ways; the I n t e r n a l 
l o g i c of t h e i r work i s autonomous i n d i f f e r e n t ways, to 
a much g r e a t e r e x t e n t than any a b s t r a c t and m e c h a n i s t i c 
s o c i o l o g y has ever been w i l l i n g to admit ...' 
(1969: 59) 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , Goldmann i s unable i n p r a c t i c e to allow f o r these d i v e r s e l y 
complex t i e s . H i s very c r i t e r i a o f greatness f o r l i t e r a r y works i m p l i e s 
coherence, c o n s i s t e n c y , and the extreme expression of the world view of 
a s o c i a l c l a s s : 
'Great p h l l o s p h i c a l and a r t i s t i c works r e p r e s e n t the 
coherent and adequate e x p r e s s i o n s of ... world-views .,. 
t h e i r content being determined by the maximum p o t e n t i a l 
consciousness of the group, of the s o c i a l c l a s s i n 
g e n e r a l ..." (1969: 129) 
The manner i n which Goldmann w r i t e s of the consciousness of a group 
i m p l i e s some k i n d of i n n e r dynamic which r e s u l t s ^ a t i t s height, i n 
g r e a t works of a r t : 
•... any g r e a t l i t e r a r y or a r t i s t i c work i s the expression 
of a world view. T h i s v i s i o n i s the product of a c o l l e c -
t i v e group consciousness which reaches i t s h i g h e s t 
e x p r e s s i o n i n the mind of a poet or t h i n k e r . ' 
(1964: 19) 
As might be expected from our d i s c u s s i o n i n Chapter 2,^ the world view 
expressed by the w r i t e r i s t h a t of a s o c i a l c l a s s , a t l e a s t i n so f a r 
as we are d e a l i n g w i t h a ' v a l i d l i t e r a r y work' (1964: 9 9 ) . The i m p l i c i t 
l o g i c behind t h i s c l a i m runs as f o l l o w s : (a) any v a l i d l i t e r a r y work 
takes i n the whole of hman l i f e ; (b) the consciousness of only those 
groups^whose world views take i n the whole of s o c i a l l i f e , w i l l f i n d 
e x p r e s s i o n i n such works; (c) s i n c e the seventeenth century (or s i n c e 
a n t i q u i t y - 1969: 102) only s o c i a l c l a s s e s c o n s t i t u t e such groups. 
See above. Chapter 2, p 51 f f 
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Goldmann's notion of a e s t h e t i c v a l u e , which i s the foundation f o r h i s 
statements about g r e a t works o f l i t e r a t u r e , i s taken over from Lukacs, 
and r e f e r s to the s o l u t i o n of the c o n t r a d i c t i o n between m u l t i p l i c i t y and 
u n i t y . On the one hand the w r i t e r should c r e a t e -
'.. . a r i c h and m u l t i p l e u n i v e r s e o f i n d i v i d u a l 
c h a r a c t e r s and p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s ..." 
(1967: 515); 
and on the other hand the value of a e s t h e t i c u n i t y should impel organis-
a t i o n of the d i v e r s e elements i n t o a coherent whole. Both aspects of 
a e s t h e t i c value are e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t with Goldmann's notion o f a l l 
g r e a t l i t e r a r y works, ex p r e s s i n g a world view. Goldmann's p a r t i c u l a r 
emphasis upon 'unity' a l s o makes h i s use o f s t r u c t u r a l i s t methods f o r 
the a n a l y s i s of l i t e r a t u r e completely v a l i d , each g r e a t work by d e f i n -
i t i o n p o s s e s s i n g a coherent s t r u c t u r e w i t h very few heterogeneous elements. 
I t i s important here t o enquire whether i t i s p o s s i b l e to e r a d i c a t e values 
from the study of l i t e r a t u r e i n a way t h a t Goldmann f a i l s to do. The only 
way i n which t h i s c ould be accomplished would be by f a i l i n g to s e l e c t 
which l i t e r a r y works to study, except according to random methods. Yet, 
even i f t h i s were done, the very process of h i s t o r i c a l s e l e c t i o n , by means 
of which works of the p a s t become known to us, i m p l i e s s e l e c t i o n according 
to v a l u e s : one e i t h e r has t o s e l e c t according to one's own v a l u e s , or 
e l s e r e l y upon those t h a t have governed which l i t e r a r y works of the p a s t 
have s u r v i v e d t i l l the p r e s e n t day; and the former s e l e c t i o n process can 
i n any case take p l a c e only w i t h i n the f i e l d already s e l e c t e d by the 
l a t t e r . •'" Goldmann i s i n f a c t q u i t e j u s t i f i e d i n s e l e c t i n g the works 
he w i l l study according to an a e s t h e t i c value, as long as the a c t u a l 
2 
a n a l y s i s o f the works thus s e l e c t e d i s not d i s t o r t e d by h i s v a l u a t i o n s , 
"'• F o r an account of why C h a r l o t t e and Emily BrontS were s e l e c t e d 
f o r our case s t u d i e s i n the s o c i o l o g y of l i t e r a t u r e , see pp 287-290, below. 
2 Values are, however, n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e d i n l i t e r a r y i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n : see below, p 274 f f 
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and as long as he does not attempt s c i e n t i f i c a l l y to v a l i d a t e h i s 
c r i t e r i a of l i t e r a c y g r e a t n e s s . What Goldmann seems to claim, however, 
i s t h a t h i s method of s e l e c t i o n and h i s t o r i c a l s e l e c t i o n a r e p r a c t i c a l l y 
one and the same: the c r i t e r i o n o f greatness by means of which works 
a r e ' s e l e c t e d ' by h i s t o r y i s t h a t o f the coherent expression of a world 
view (1967: 503), and t h i s i s a l s o the p r i n c i p l e t h a t guides Goldmann 
i n h i s s e l e c t i o n . 
The most important c r i t i c i s m s to be r a i s e d a t t h i s p o i n t , then, are 
t h a t Goldmann overemphasises the degree of coherence i n what are regarded 
( g e n e r a l l y , and a l s o by him) as g r e a t works of the p a s t ; t h a t h i s t o r i c a l 
s e l e c t i o n i s not always according to Goldmann's v a l u e - c r i t e r i a ; and t h a t , 
even i f we were to agree w i t h Goldmann t h a t a l l g r e a t l i t e r a r y works are 
the e x p r e s s i o n o f a world view, then i t does not n e c e s s a r i l y follow (unless 
f o r c e d t o do so by definition''') t h a t the world view concerned represents 
the maximm p o t e n t i a l consciousness of a c l a s s or even of a group. 
Turning now more d i r e c t l y to Goldmann's methodology f o r the sociology 
of l i t e r a t u r e , four stages of a n a l y s i s can be seen to emerge from a 
comparison of h i s v a r i o u s w r i t i n g s on the s u b j e c t , i n p a r t i c u l a r 'The 
Hidden God' (1964) and 'The Sociology of L i t e r a t u r e : S t a t u s and Problems 
of Method' (1967). 
1. S t a r t i n g from the t e x t , Goldmann sees the elements thereof as 
being f u l l y understood only i f incorporated i n t o a wider s t r u c t u r e . A 
model i s thus c r e a t e d which i n c l u d e s a l l the t e x t , nothing more and 
nothing l e s s . (1967: 496) T h i s can be done, of course, only i f the t e x t 
i t s e l f p o s s e s s e s some k i n d o f coherence. (1964: 12) The a c t u a l process of 
•'• See above. Chapter 2, p 5 1 f f f o r an examination of Goldmann's 
c i r c u l a r i t y o f argument on t h i s i s s u e . 
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c r e a t i n g the model i s d i a l e c t i c a l , i n t h a t one looks a t the t e x t , 
t h i n k s of a s u i t a b l e model, and a d j u s t s t h i s model as one reads the 
t e x t more c l o s e l y , deeply and thoroughly, which then enables one to 
understand more of the t e x t . (1967: 505 & 513) The model thus c r e a t e d 
i a termed the 'universe o f the work', which i n f a c t i s the world view 
expressed by the work (1967: 445 & 514) (or works; i f we cannot j u s t i f y 
i t s autonomy, the work must be considered with others by the same author T 
1967: 503). The s t r u c t u r e must account f o r the m a j o r i t y of elements i n 
the t e x t , t h i s being one of the two c r i t e r i a f o r adequacy of compre-
hension, the other being the i m p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t another s t r u c t u r e would 
account f o r more (1967: 500-501). Goldmann suggests a s p e c i f i c procedure 
f o r checking the adequacy of a model: the research worker should compare 
the model -
'.. . w i t h the whole of the work st u d i e d , paragraph by 
paragraph, i n the case of a t e x t i n prose; l i n e by l i n e , 
i n the case of a poem; speech by speech, i n the case o f 
a p l a y ... (and determine): (a) to what extent each u n i t 
a n a l y s e d i s i n c o r p o r a t e d i n the o v e r a l l hypothesis; 
(b) the l i s t of new elements and new r e l a t i o n s h i p s not 
provided f o r i n the i n i t i a l model; (c) the frequency, 
w i t h i n the work, o f the elements and r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
provided f o r i n t h i s model.' (1967: 513) 
2. The next s t e p i n the a n a l y s i s i s to look around f o r a world v i s i o n 
which e x i s t e d a t the time and which corresponds to the univer s e of the 
work, though the l a t t e r may i n f a c t be an extreme exaggeration o f the 
former: i n t h i s case the exaggerated former i s considered to be the 
world v i s i o n corresponding to the u n i v e r s e of the work. For P a s c a l 
and R a c i n e , according to Goldmann, the universe of the work i s the t r a g i c 
v i s i o n , and the exaggerated world v i s i o n i s extreme Jansenism. (1967: 500) 
The 'correspondence' i n v o l v e d between the universe o f the work and the 
world view i s not, according to Goldmann, one of content, but of ' s i g n i -
f i c a n t c a t e g o r i a l s t r u c t u r e s ' , i . e . the mental c a t e g o r i e s which -
C f Mannheim's d i a l e c t i c a l method o f 'docvunentary i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ' f o r 
the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a world view from c u l t u r a l o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n s -
see Chapter 3 S e c t i o n ( i i ) , pp69-71 above. 
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'... shape both the e m p i r i c a l consciousness of a c e r t a i n 
s o c i a l group and the imaginary universe c r e a t e d by the 
w r i t e r . ' (1967: 495) 
I t i s t h i s f a c t which enables the s o c i o l o g y of l i t e r a t u r e , according to 
Goldmann, t o feake as i t s o b j e c t of study works of g r e a t a e s t h e t i c value, 
and not merely those i n which the author g i v e s a d e t a i l e d and unimag-
i n a t i v e account o f the s o c i a l l i f e o f h i s time. (1967: 494-5) 
These f i r s t two s t a g e s of the a n a l y s i s complete the t a s k of i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n or comprehension, which Goldmann defi n e s as: 
'... the b r i n g i n g to l i g h t of a s i g n i f i c a n t s t r u c t u r e 
immanent i n the o b j e c t s t u d i e d ...' (1967: 500) 
E x p l a n a t i o n , which i s achieved through what we see as Goldmann's next 
two s t a g e s , i s conceived a s : 
'... nothing other than the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of t h i s 
s t r u c t u r e , as a c o n s t i t u e n t element, i n an immed-
i a t e l y embracing s t r u c t u r e , which the r e s e a r c h 
worker does not explore i n any d e t a i l e d manner but 
only i n so f a r as such e x p l o r a t i o n i s necessary i n 
order to render i n t e l l i g i b l e the genesis of the work 
which he i s studying.' (1967: 500) 
The e x p l a n a t i o n of the g e n e s i s o f a t e x t must be both c a u s a l l y and 
meaningfully adequate: 
' i t s v a l i d i t y i s to be judged s o l e l y and e x c l u s i v e l y 
i n accordance w i t h the p o s s i b i l i t y o f e s t a b l i s h i n g a t 
l e a s t a r i g o r o u s c o r r e l a t i o n - and as f a r as p o s s i b l e 
a s i g n i f i c a n t and f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p - between, on 
the one hand, the development of a v i s i o n of the world 
and the g e n e s i s of a t e x t o r i g i n a t i n g from i t , and, on 
the other hand, c e r t a i n phenomena e x t e r n a l to the l a t t e r . ' 
(1967: 501) 
3. The next stage must thus c o n s i s t of the explanation of the g e n e s i s 
o f the extreme world view (which corresponds to the universe of the work) 
as the i d e a l l y pragmatic''' response to the i n t e l l e c t u a l problems posed by 
the world view i n i t s more moderate or confused form. Goldmann appears 
F o r a d i s c u s s i o n of ' i d e a l pragmatism', see above. Chapter 3 p 78 
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to underemphasise the need f o r evidence of some form of communication 
between the formulators of the extreme world view ( i n the case of Racine 
and P a s c a l , the authors themselves) and those who h e l d the l e s s h i g h l y 
developed world view. 
4. The world view which c o n s t i t u t e s the explanation of the extreme world 
view now becomes the s u b j e c t of a f u r t h e r explanation, i n terms of the 
problems i n h e r e n t i n the economic and s o c i a l l i f e of a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l 
group, f o r Goldmann a s o c i a l c l a s s , i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . (1964: 99) 
Within Goldmann's account, as o u t l i n e d above, there i s no suggestion 
t h a t we should look a t the world view of the w r i t e r concerned, and indeed 
he s t r e s s e s the merely marginal importance of b i o g r a p h i c a l d e t a i l s and 
the author's i n t e n t i o n s . (1967: 497) C e r t a i n good reasons f o r Goldmann's 
standpoint may be i n d i c a t e d here. F i r s t l y , i t i s o f t e n not p o s s i b l e to 
formulate a world view of the author except from h i s w r i t i n g s : h i s own 
world view must i n such cases remain a matter f o r s u p p o s i t i o n f o r which 
we have no independent e v i d e n c e . S e c o n d l y , the world view expressed 
i n the author's w r i t i n g s cannot be taken as i d e n t i c a l to h i s world view 
2 
o u t s i d e the l i t e r a r y sphere. Goldmann i m p l i e s t h i s i n h i s cla i m t h a t 
the a e s t h e t i c v a l u e of coherence may l e a d the w r i t e r to put forward a 
world view c o n f l i c t i n g w i t h v a r i o u s i d e a s , values and a s p i r a t i o n s t h a t 




P a u c i t y of independent evidence i s a problem encountered i n the 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f Emily BrontS's world view. (See below, p 288) 
Goldmann claim s t h a t using the work i t s e l f as evidence f o r the 
world view of the author produces a ' v i c i o u s c i r c l e ' explanation, 
i n which the work i t s e l f i s seen to be determined by a paraphrase 
o f the work. (1967: 507) One might however suggest the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of some asp e c t s of the author's world view (hypothesised from a 
study of c e r t a i n elements of h i s work) conditioning other elements 
of h i s l i t e r a r y u n i v e r s e . 
T h i s p o i n t has been much emphasised i n the l a s t t hree chapters, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r e l a t i o n to the sociology of expression. By 
i t s e l f , however, i t does not c o n s t i t u t e a v a l i d reason f o r 
i g n o r i n g the author - h i s ends, v a l u e s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
S i m i l a r p o i n t s are made on pp 240 and 247 of Chapter 10 above. 
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work f o r the author i s d i s t i n c t from the mental s t r u c t u r e governing 
the work, which c o n s t i t u t e s the ' o b j e c t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e ' of the work, 
i . e . the p e r s p e c t i v e s p r e s e n t o f which the author i s not n e c e s s a r i l y 
aware. (1967: 497) 
The f a c t t h a t the author's world view must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h a t 
of h i s l i t e r a r y works, should not however lead us to ignore with Goldmann, 
the author's o r i e n t a t i o n s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s , i n so f a r as we have evidence 
f o r these a p a r t from h i s works. Goldmann's n e g l e c t of the author leads a l l 
too e a s i l y to the k i n d of 'macro-history' of which Williams accuses him 
(1971: 1 5 ) : W i l l i a m s advocates a ' m i c r o - s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s ' , and, i n our 
view, the author would c o n s t i t u t e a s i g n i f i c a n t element of such an a n a l y s i s . 
I n r e l a t i o n to Goldmann's stages o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and explanation, we 
should w i s h to know why i t should be t h i s p a r t i c u l a r author who formulates 
the extreme world view from i t s l e s s developed v e r s i o n ; why he f e l t i t 
n e c e s s a r y to develop i t ; and how he came to communicate w i t h the o r i g i n a l 
world view i n the f i r s t p l a c e . Without such an a n a l y s i s , we should have 
no adequate connection between the world view of a s o c i a l group and the 
u n i v e r s e of a l i t e r a r y work: the r e l a t i o n s h i p would remain merely p l a u s i b l e . 
Goldmann i s undoubtedly c o r r e c t i n h i s c l a i m t h a t the experience of 
a s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l i s i n s u f f i c i e n t to formulate a world view (1967: 495), 
but t h i s i s only t r u e i n the sense t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l always s t a r t s from 
somewhere, from some k i n d of world view; and i t i s e q u a l l y t r u e to say 
t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l may by h i m s e l f develop i t , without us being able to 
reduce t h i s to the ' c o l l e c t i v e s u b j e c t ' , to the ' c o l l e c t i v e a s p i r a t i o n s ' 
(1967: 494 & 498) of a s o c i a l group. Yet the only context i n which 
Goldmann c o n s i d e r s t h a t a p e r s o n a l study of the author i s r e l e v a n t i s 
t h a t o f i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s and v a r i a t i o n s : the i n d i v i d u a l d e t a i l s of a world 
view may be h i s t o r i c a l l y and p e r s o n a l l y s p e c i f i c . (1964: 21) I t seems 
almost as i f Goldmann wishes to t r a c e the world view to i t s c l a s s o r i g i n s . 
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and e x p l a i n the d e v i a t i o n s from t h i s i n terms of the author's psyche. 
What Goldmann t h e r e f o r e l a c k s i s any conception of a s o c i o l o g i c a l explan-
a t i o n i n terms of an i n d i v i d u a l . Any account t h a t c o n s i d e r s the author 
o t h e r than a s a group r e p r e s e n t a t i v e must thus be p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n 
Goldmann's eyes; f o r psychology i s concerned w i t h i n d i v i d u a l s , i n h i s 
view, and sociology w i t h groups, and e s p e c i a l l y w i t h s o c i a l c l a s s e s . 
Goldmann thus bypasses the author i n jimiping from the world view of a 
s o c i a l c l a s s to the l i t e r a r y u n i v e r s e , and t h e r e f o r e f a i l s to provide 
n e c e s s a r y l i n k s i n an e x p l a n a t i o n o f the genesis of the l i t e r a r y work. 
At t h i s p o i n t i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to examine to what extent Goldmann 
f o l l o w s h i s methodological p r i n c i p l e s i n p r a c t i c e . He h i m s e l f r e f e r s 
mostly to h i s work on P a s c a l and Racine, and h i s methodology often seems 
simply to be c l a r i f y i n g h i s procedure i n these s t u d i e s . I t may t h e r e f o r e 
be more in f o r m a t i v e to look b r i e f l y a t a study he mentions only i n 
p a s s i n g : 'Le Theatre de Genet e t Ses Etudes Sociologiques'. (1966) 
Here Goldmann tak e s Genet's p l a y s and c o n s t r u c t s f o r each the u n i v e r s e 
of the work. He then compares these l i t e r a r y u n i v e r s e s , t r a c e s t h e i r 
development, and f i n a l l y t u r n s h i s a t t e n t i o n outside the works themselves 
to d i s c o v e r p a r a l l e l l s i n the thought of c e r t a i n s o c i a l groups. For the 
f i r s t p l a y , 'Haute S u r v e i l l a n c e ' , the universe of the work i s c l e a r l y a 
world view r e p r e s e n t i n g an adequate response by an i n d i v i d u a l to h i s 
s o c i a l p o s i t i o n i n the ' s o u s - p r o l e t a r i a t ' or Lumpenproletariat. (1966: 98) 
Here there i s no problem of i n v e s t i g a t i n g how the author came to be 
i n v o l v e d w i t h a s u b p r o l e t a r i a n world view, s i n c e Genet l i v e d f o r a g r e a t 
p a r t o f h i s l i f e amongst p e t t y t h i e v e s . I n d e l v i n g i n t o the work i n 
g r e a t e r d e t a i l , however, Goldmann f i n d s t h a t many elements of t h i s world 
view correspond to conceptions, v a l u e s and morals belonging to what he 
c a l l s 'bourgeois s o c i e t y ' , only these values e t c . are a p p l i e d i n a 
d i f f e r e n t context: t h a t of i n d i v i d u a l s outside of and condemned by bourgeois 
s o c i e t y . (1966: 101) W h i l s t t h i s i s i n t e r e s t i n g and q u i t e convincing. 
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Goldmann n e v e r t h e l e s s f a i l s t o a n a l y s e why the s u b - p r o l e t a r i a t i n general, 
or i n t h i s s p e c i f i c case (or why Genet himself, i f not the whole sub-
proletariat) , should i n c o r p o r a t e i n i t s world view elements g e n e r a l l y 
regarded as being appropriate f o r the b o u r g e o i s i e . The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
d e f i c i e n c y i n Goldmann's methodalogy, the f a i l u r e to go beyond 'corres-
pondence' t o an a n a l y s i s o f meaningfully connected c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , 
thus appears again here. T h i s d e f i c i e n c y i s indeed even more apparent 
i n Goldmann's a n a l y s i s of the four l a t e r p l a y s , i n which Genet's sub-
p r o l e t a r i a n world view becomes l e s s and l e s s important as the elements 
of another world view a r e p r o g r e s s i v e l y adopted. Goldmann g i v e s an 
e x c e l l e n t account of the development of Genet's thought and how t h i s can 
be accounted f o r only i n terms of Genet's i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the world view 
of-.the l e f t - w i n g i n Western Europe, p a r t i c u l a r l y the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a of 
the French L e f t . (1966: 96 & 115) Y e t there i s no attempt to d i s c o v e r 
why Genet should have adopted the v i s i o n of t h i s group, and the a n a l y s i s 
thus i n e v i t a b l y remains a t the l e v e l of d e s c r i p t i v e correspondence. 
Furthermore, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t the s o c i a l group of ' l e f t -
wing i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ' i s not i n i t s e l f a s o c i a l c l a s s , but merely what 
Mannheim would c a l l an ' i n t e l l e c t u a l stratum'. (1952: 186) There i s 
however i n Goldmann's work no attempt t o t r a c e the s o c i a l f a c t o r s i n f l u -
encing the development of t h i s stratum i n the way t h a t Mannheim would 
suggest ( f o r i n s t a n c e through an a n a l y s i s of c l a s s o r i g i n s and s o c i a l 
m o b i l i t y - Mannheim, 1956: 142-155). Thus Goldmann, who so f r e q u e n t l y 
s t r e s s e s the importance of c l a s s i n the a n a l y s i s of world views, i n t h i s 
i n s t a n c e omits any examination of o b j e c t i v e c l a s s p o s i t i o n and concentrates 
s o l e l y on the conception o f the c l a s s s t r u c t u r e , and thus on the world 
view i t s e l f . 
Swingewood asks a s i m i l a r q u e s t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to Goldmann's study of 
Malraux: 'But what p r e c i s e l y was Malratax's r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h communism 
and t h e r e f o r e w i t h the working c l a s s whose v i s i o n he e x p r e s s e s ? ' 
(Swingewood, 1972: 76). 
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Having seen how the flaws i n Goldmann's methodology become apparent 
i n p r a c t i c e , i t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s important to s t r e s s the u t i l i t y of the 
s o c i o l o g i c a l aim of h i s work. I t i s t h i s aim, to see the work i n i t s 
s o c i a l context, which c o n s t i t u t e s the g r e a t value of h i s approach. T h i s 
accounts f o r h i s l a c k of reductionism to i n d i v i d u a l psychology, w i t h i n the 
framework o f which so many l i t e r a r y i n t e r p r e t e r s work. To look f o r a 
' p s y c h o l o g i c a l ' e x p l a n a t i o n of Genet's p l a y s i s to miss the p o i n t t h a t 
the i n d i v i d u a l ' s psyche i s i t s e l f l a r g e l y s o c i a l l y conditioned and func-
t i o n s w i t h i n a s o c i a l context, and i s t o f a i l t o account f o r changes i n 
the way Genet views the world. An explanation of such changes i n terms 
of the i n t r i n s i c development of a p e r s p e c t i v e i s inadequate i n t h a t i t 
assumes the n e c e s s i t y of j u s t t h i s course of development, w h i l e many 
other courses were a v a i l a b l e , and, of course, i t f a i l s to supply a 
reason f o r the development i t s e l f : why d i d the p e r s p e c t i v e not remain 
s t a t i c ? S i m i l a r l y inadequate i s the view that, r a t h e r than a l i t e r a r y 
t r a n s p o s i t i o n of h i s t o r i c a l events as Goldmann suggests i s the case w i t h 
'Le Balcon' (1966: 11), the work simply t r a c e s the l o g i c a l consequences 
of a c e r t a i n type of a c t i o n w i t h i n a c e r t a i n type of s i t u a t i o n : t h i s view 
cannot e x p l a i n why t h i s s p e c i f i c k i n d of a c t i o n i s chosen i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
type of s i t u a t i o n , and why t h i s outcome (of the many p o s s i b l e ) i s chosen 
f o r e x p o s i t i o n . Goldmann's approach, w h i l e incomplete, a t l e a s t avoids 
these t r a p s and focuses a t t e n t i o n f r u i t f u l l y w i t h i n the framework of the 
s o c i a l . Goldmann's work i s a l s o an attempt to b r i n g together the sociology 
o f knowledge and the s o c i o l o g y of literature"*", and thus shares our aim 
of p r o v i d i n g s o c i o l o g i c a l explanations of meaningful l i t e r a r y e x p r e s s i o n s . 
Indeed Goldmann's methodology, i f modified and supplemented i n the 
ways we have suggested above, i s of c o n s i d e r a b l e value f o r the sociology 
of l i t e r a t u r e . One o f the major m o d i f i c a t i o n s t h a t we have suggested i s 
•'" Kern (1942) shows t h a t Mannheim's work can be u t i l i s e d i n s i m i l a r 
manner. 
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i s t h a t the world view t h a t corresponds to the u n i v e r s e of the work must 
not be assumed to be a t t r i b u t a b l e a u t o m a t i c a l l y to a s o c i a l c l a s s . Even 
i f one ignores the author and attempts an explanation i n terms of the 
u l t i m a t e group o r i g i n s of a l i t e r a r y world view,""" a c a r e f u l examination 
must be made of which i n d i v i d u a l s and groups share the world view, to 
e l u c i d a t e the s o c i a l composition of t h i s ' i n t e l l e c t u a l stratvmi'; and 
then f i n a l l y the world view may be r e l a t e d to the s o c i a l e x i s t e n c e of 
the groups concerned. T h i s would be the model of i n v e s t i g a t i o n advocated 
by Mannheim. (1952: 186) 
The other suggested m o d i f i c a t i o n s of Goldmann's work are p a r t i c u l a r l y 
r e l e v a n t t o our i n t e r e s t i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between, on the one hand, 
the u n i v e r s e of a l i t e r a r y work ( i n v o l v i n g problems of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n -
m o d i f i c a t i o n s B + C) and, on the other hand, the development of the 
author's thought i n r e l a t i o n to h i s l i t e r a r y and c l a s s s i t u a t i o n and 
a c t i o n ( i n v o l v i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the author - m o d i f i c a t i o n A) . These 
m o d i f i c a t i o n s , which we s h a l l now proceed to explore f u r t h e r i n the subse-
quent s e c t i o n s of t h i s chapter, may be sijmmarised as f o l l o w s : 
A. Wherever p o s s i b l e , the author should be taken i n t o account i n the 
s o c i o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s o f l i t e r a r y works. The i n v e s t i g a t i o n should not 
be r e s t r i c t e d to c o r r e l a t i n g the u n i v e r s e of the work w i t h the world 
view of c e r t a i n s o c i a l groups: t h e r e must be an examination of the 
author's r e l a t i o n s h i p to these groups, and of the reasons f o r h i s 
adoption and development of c e r t a i n elements of the world view concerned. 
I n t h i s a n a l y s i s we cannot d i a n i s s the study of the author's own world 
view as i r r e l e v a n t . 
Such e x p l a n a t i o n i s not a n e c e s s a r y element of a l l s t u d i e s i n the 
s o c i o l o g y of l i t e r a t u r e : Goldmann's study of Genet, f o r i n s t a n c e , 
would be complete a t the l e v e l of Genet's r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the 
l e f t - w i n g i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ; Goldmann needs to make a f u r t h e r i n v e s t i -
g a t i o n o f t h i s stratum only i f he c l a i m s t h a t the world view of 
Genet's p l a y s has c l a s s o r i g i n s . 
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B. Goldmann's a e s t h e t i c v a l u e s of m u l t i p l i c i t y and u n i t y lead him 
t o view g r e a t works of l i t e r a t u r e as providing t o t a l and coherent per-
s p e c t i v e s . Y e t the assumption of coherence and ' t o t a l i t y ' can make 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n seem d e c e p t i v e l y easy. The i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s and p a r t i a l i t y 
o f l i t e r a r y works must be admitted and examined i n d e t a i l . 
C. Goldmann's d e c l a r e d aim i s to c o n s t r u c t the ' o b j e c t i v e meaning' of 
l i t e r a r y works, implying t h a t only one o b j e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s 
p o s s i b l e . We should urge, on the c o n t r a r y , r e c o g n i t i o n of the r o l e of 
the r e s e a r c h e r ' s v a l u e s i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n of models of f i c t i o n a l 
u n i v e r s e s . 
( i i i ) Macro- ve r s u s Micro-Sociology of L i t e r a t u r e 
We have noted above^ W i l l i a m s ' c o n t r a s t o f macro-history and micro-
s t r u c t u a l a a a l y s i s . One might argue t h a t Goldmann i s undertaking the 
l a t t e r , i n t h a t he does concentrate on the works of p a r t i c u l a r authors; 
y e t h i s predominant a s s m p t i o n , t h a t the u n i v e r s e s of g r e a t l i t e r a r y 
works can be r e l a t e d to broad world views and s o c i a l c l a s s e s , l i m i t s 
h i s c a p a c i t y f o r r e s e a r c h i n terms of p a r t i c u l a r a c t o r s , o r i e n t a t i o n s 
and r e l a t i o n s h i p s . We f i n d t h i s tendency equally i n other w r i t e r s who 
c l a i m to take the author i n t o accotint, w h i l s t i n e f f e c t viewing him 
merely as the instrument o f wider s o c i a l f o r c e s . A b e l l ' s attempt to 
s y n t h e s i s e v a r i o u s approaches to the a r t s f a l l s i n t o t h i s t r a p : the 
only way he can conceive of i n t e g r a t i n g the study of the author w i t h 
wider s o c i o l o g i c a l acco.unts i s t o see the author as an 'organ of 
e x p r e s s i o n ' f o r the ' c o l l e c t i v e background'. ( A b e l l , 1970: 735) Other 
t h e o r i s t s d i s m i s s the r e l e v a n c e o f s u b j e c t i v e a s p e c t s of the author f o r 
s o c i o l o g i c a l explanation. Barbu admits the s i g n i f i c a n c e of s u b j e c t i v i t y . 
See above, p 258 
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but only i f i t i s orthodox: the ' p e r s o n a l i t y ' of the a r t i s t i s r e l e v a n t 
only i n so f a r as i t expresses the dominant c u l t u r e of the s o c i e t y . 
(Barbu, 1970: 21) Eve c l a i m s t h a t the s u b j e c t i v e aspects of an author 
have only p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n t e r e s t . (1975: 67) Wollheim would agree: he 
c o n s i d e r s s u b j e c t i v e elements 'ps y c h o l o g i c a l ' , y e t , u n l i k e Barbu and Eve, 
ta k e s t h i s as proof t h a t s o c i o l o g i c a l explanations are inadequate: 
'Indeed i t seems t h a t p a r t i c u l a r s o c i o l o g i c a l explan-
a t i o n s are l i k e l y t o be acceptable only to the degree 
to which i n t e r p o l a t i o n of p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s between 
the s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s and the works of a r t i s easy and 
n a t u r a l : t h a t i s to say, to the degree to which as 
explanations they cease to be s o c i o l o g i c a l . ' 
(1970: 575) 
Wollheim thus appears to equate a l l meaningful explanation with psycho-
l o g i c a l e xplanation: c l e a r l y he has never encountered the sociology of 
Max Weber, f o r example. At t h i s p o i n t we s h a l l not attempt to defend 
the a n a l y s i s of the author and h i s si±)jectivity i n the sociology of 
l i t e r a t u r e , s i n c e we have a l r e a d y i n d i c a t e d our views on t h i s s u b j e c t 
i n Chapter 8.^ T h i s argument, however, i s p a r t of a broader one con-
cerning the r e l a t i v e m e r i t s of the macro-versus m i c r o - s o c i o l o g i c a l 
approaches to l i t e r a t u r e . An example of the former approach would be 
the p o s i t i n g of broad g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s r e l a t i n g a r t i s t i c genres to s o c i a l 
s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a b l e s ; the l a t t e r approach, on the other hand, tends to 
favour a p a r t i c u l a r case study t h a t takes account of s p e c i f i c a c t i o n s , 
o r i e n t a t i o n s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Both approaches are e q u a l l y capable 
o f a comparative emphasis. Without a c t u a l l y attempting both of these 
approaches (the r e s e a r c h on the BrontSs i n Chapter 12 c l e a r l y f a l l s 
w i t h i n the case study mode of i n v e s t i g a t i o n ) , i t would be unwise to 
r e j e c t e i t h e r { n e v e r t h e l e s s , Wilson's c r i t i q u e o f broad-scale g e n e r a l -
i s a t i o n s seems h i g h l y p e r t i n e n t : 
See above. Chapter 8, s e c t i o n ( i v ) , p 189 f f 
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'... the attempt t o embrace huge h i s t o r i c a l e r a s and 
whole a r t i s t i c t r a d i t i o n s / i n e v i t a b l y leads to a l o s s 
of GSoncretene^s, to a submerging o f the i n d i v i d u a l a r t i s t , 
the t a n g i b l e a r t o b j e c t , and the v e r i t a b l e s o c i a l 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l context t h a t are r e a l l y the crux of 
a t t e n t i o n . ' (1973: 2) 
The c r u c i a l emphasis here i s upon the concrete s o c i a l - p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
context; the mere i n c l u s i o n of s o c i o p s y c h o l o g i c a l mechanisms i s not 
enough to avoid the l o s s o f cpncreteness t h a t Wilson laments, as we 
can see i n the work o f K a v o l i s , who i n c l u d e s such mechanisms i n h i s very 
broad g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a r t i s t i c s t y l e and 
s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e . (1968: P a r t I ) We must thus d i s t i n g u i s h between the 
macro-micro c o n t r a s t and the quest i o n o f breadth o f g e n e r a l i s a t i o n : 
h i g h l y a b s t r a c t g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s may operate a t the m i c r o - s t r u c t u r a l 
l e v e l , w h i l s t s t u d i e s on the macr o - l e v e l may, as with Goldmann, recog-
n i s e the h i s t o r i c a l l i m i t s to t h e i r g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s . I t i s worth i n d i -
c a t i n g , however, a tendency t h a t l i n k s macro-analysis to broad g e n e r a l -
i s a t i o n : both share the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f i n c l u d i n g 
'... only the t y p i c a l , r e c u r r i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f 
a r t and of s o c i e t y ...'. ( K a v o l i s , 1968: 7) 
From the above account, the optimal mode of i n v e s t i g a t i o n would 
appear to be t h a t o f case s t u d i e s t h a t include m i c r o - s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s 
without ignoring the broader s o c i a l context. Yet what kinds o f g e n e r a l -
i s a t i o n can one hope f o r from such an approach? Geertz i n d i c a t e s an answer 
to t h i s q u e s t i o n i n h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f a p a r t i c u l a r case study method: 
the p r a c t i c e of ethnography. He d e s c r i b e s attempted explanation i n ethno-
graphy as ' s p e c i f i c a t i o n ' or 'diagnosis': 
'... s t a t i n g , as e x p l i c i t l y as we can manage,, what the 
knowledge thus a t t a i n e d (through ' t h i c k d e s c r i p t i o n ' ) 
demonstrates about the s o c i e t y i n which i t i s fovind 
and, beyond t h a t , about s o c i a l l i f e as such.' 
(1975: 27) 
1 The p o i n t i s made i n Chapter 7, s e c t i o n ( i i i ) , p l 4 8 f f above, 
t h a t methodological i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n terms of 'actor' termi-
nology does not imply the n e g l e c t o f s o c i a l systems and s o c i a l 
groups. 
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He thus i n c l u d e s two kinds of generalisation''' t h a t may emerge from 
ethnographic i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The f i r s t of these we should c a l l h i s t o r -
i c a l g e n e r a l i s a t i o n , and i n v o l v e s s t a r t i n g from 'exceedingly extended 
acquaintances w i t h extremely s m a l l matters', and approaching broader 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s through the 'extension of our analyses to wider contexts'. 
(1975: 21) The second k i n d o f g e n e r a l i s a t i o n , a more a b s t r a c t theory, 
does not aim t o 'codify a b s t r a c t r e g u l a r i t i e s ' , to c r e a t e g e n e r a l laws, 
but r a t h e r to 'make t h i c k d e s c r i p t i o n p o s s i b l e ' by attempting -
'... t o take a l i n e o f t h e o r e t i c a l a t t a c k developed i n 
connection with one e x e r c i s e i n ethnographic i n t e r p r e -
t a t i o n and employ i t i n another ...'. 
(1975: 25-26) 
T h i s more d i s t r a c t theory c l o s e l y resembles the formal 'general how' 
2 
models r e f e r r e d to i n Chapter 2, r a t h e r than more s u b s t a n t i v e models 
t h a t p o s t u l a t e g e n e r a l law.s. I s i s the 'general how' models t h a t we 
have attempted t o develop throughout t h i s t h e s i s , and i t i s these t h a t 
we s h a l l use to enable the ' t h i c k d e s c r i p t i o n ' of the l i t e r a r y expressions 
of C h a r l o t t e and Emily BrontB i n P a r t IV. 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n we have advocated the undertaking of m i c r o - s t r u c -
t u r a l case s t u d i e s t h a t i n c l u d e the a n a l y s i s of the author, h i s o r i e n -
t a t i o n s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s , w i t h i n the broader s o c i a l context; and t h a t 
are both aided by^, and encourage the development of, h i s t o r i c a l g e n e r a l -
i s a t i o n s and formal models. 
The d i s t i n c t i o n i s i m p l i c i t r a t h e r than e x p l i c i t i n Geertz's work. 
2 
See above. Chapter 2, pp 63-64 
3 
H i s t o r i c a l . g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s a i d case s t u d i e s by i n d i c a t i n g the 
broader s o c i a l context; formal models are of use i n suggesting 
those v a r i a b l e s t h a t have been found to be worth taki n g i n t o 
account i n c e r t a i n types of study. 
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The next section again takes i t s point of departure from Goldmann, 
and examines the implications of the concepts of ' coherence' and ' t o t a l i t y ' 
for the interpretation of l i t e r a r y works. 
(iv) Coherence and T o t a l i t y i n L i t e r a r y Interpretation 
The concept of 'coherence', as we have seen, plays an important part 
i n the work of Goldmann and h i s followers: great works of l i t e r a t u r e 
possess coherence i n the sense of presenting a f i c t i o n a l universe that 
consistently r e f l e c t s the world view of a s o c i a l c l a s s . Leenhardt claims 
that the concept of coherence does not refer to l o g i c a l non-contradiction, 
but rather to the functioning of the elements i n relation to the whole. 
(1970: 99) In other words, a l l the elements of a l i t e r a r y universe 
cohere i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n to a guiding perspective on the world, even i f 
the elements sometimes seem to contradict one another. In fact, however, 
Goldmann seems to go further than Leenhardt's more moderate statement 
implies, and postulates universal 'tendencies to self-consistency', which 
are especially evident i n great works of l i t e r a t u r e (1973: 115 & 120) . 
At the very l e a s t , then, coherence i s assumed i n great works of l i t e r -
ature, i f not necessarily consistency; and t h i s assumption of coherence 
i s e s s e n t i a l i f we are to claim that the universe of a great l i t e r a r y 
work r e f l e c t s but one world view that accounts for a l l the elements of 
the work. 
Coherence i s indeed a common crit e r i o n for the evaluation of l i t e r -
ature. Cassirer, for instance, arguing from a standpoint veiry d i f f e r -
ent from that of Goldmann, claims that the work of a great poet -
'... possesses a clear organisation and a r t i c u l a t i o n ... 
Every single element must be f e l t as. part of a compre-
hensive whole.' (1970: 185) 
Yet C a s s i r e r does not use t h i s statement to support an interpretation 
of l i t e r a t u r e i n terms of world view. Duvignaud indeed suggests that 
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the coherence t h a t a work of a r t p o s s e s s e s has no necessary connection 
w i t h a ' v i s i o n o f the world', but may be merely 
"... the r e s u l t o f the p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
a temperament or p e r s o n a l i t y ; ' (1972; 39). 
On the other hand, l a c k of coherence should not n e c e s s a r i l y deter us 
from endeavours a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . As Geertz p o i n t s out, 
'... coherence cannot be the major t e s t o f v a l i d i t y 
f o r a c u l t u r a l d e s c r i p t i o n . ... The force o f our 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s cannot r e s t , as they are now so o f t e n 
made t o do, on the t i g h t n e s s w i t h which they h o l d 
together, o r the assurance w i t h which they are argued.' 
(1975: 17-18) 
One may thus d i s s e n t from Goldmann's approach on three c o m t s , according 
to which one may argue: 1) t h a t not a l l g r e a t l i t e r a t u r e possess 
coherence; 2) t h a t not a l l coherent works manifest a coherent world 
view; 3) t h a t not only coherent works are capable or worthy of s o c i o -
l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I t might nonetheless s t i l l be argued t h a t i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n o f l i t e r a r y works i n terms o f world view i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e 
u n l e s s the works po s s e s s coherence. T h i s would be n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e i f 
we accepted the Goldmann d e f i n i t i o n o f world view. Y e t i n Chapter 3,^ 
we c o n t r a s t e d Mannheim's and Goldmann's conceptions of world view, and 
decided t h a t Mannheim's was l e s s r e s t r i c t i v e . I n Chapter 6 t h i s argu-
ment was taken f u r t h e r , and we a r r i v e d a t a concept of world view i n which 
n e i t h e r c o n s i s t e n c y nor coherence were assumed.^ There i s no reason why 
t h i s conception o f world view should be i n a p p l i c a b l e to works of l i t e r -
a t u r e t h a t l a c k coherence. 
Before we l e a v e the concept of coherence, i t i s worth remarking 
upon the i d e a ' o f a l l the elements of a l i t e r a r y work forming one whole, 
which may then be grasped as the u n i v e r s e of the work. T h i s notion i s 
of course n a i v e l y o p t i m i s t i c : one can never account f o r a l l the aspects 
of a work. There i s the i m p l i c a t i o n here of an o b j e c t i v e meaning of the 
See above. Chapter 3, p 73 
2 See above. Chapter 6, p 144 
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work, which can be s e i z e d and d e l i n e a t e d . The i d e a of o b j e c t i v e 
meaning i s taken up i n the next s e c t i o n . 
The emphasis on an a l l - i n c l u s i v e account of a l i t e r a r y work i s 
p a r a l l e l e d , i n the work of Lukacs, Goldmann and t h e i r f o l l o w e r s , by 
the p o s t u l a t e of ' t o t a l i t y ' i n a w o r l d view; indeed world view here i s 
taken to imply p r e c i s e l y a t o t a l o r g l o b a l p e r s p e c t i v e : 
'A world v i s i o n i s d e f i n e d as 'a s i g n i f i c a n t g l o b a l 
s t r u c t u r e ' , a t o t a l comprehension of the world which 
attempts to grasp i t s meaning i n a l l i t s complexity 
and wholeness.' (Swingewood, 1972: 65) 
Swingewood p o i n t s out t h a t Goldmann takes over the concept of t o t a l i t y 
from Lukacs. (Swingewood, 1972: 63) F o r Lukacs, t o t a l i t y i s an inherent 
human d e s i r e , and i s a fundamental p r i n c i p l e of a l l works of a r t . I n 
modern a l i e n a t e d s o c i e t y , the a r t i s t ( p a r t i c u l a r l y the n o v e l i s t ) s t r i v e s 
to a c h i e v e t o t a l i t y i n an attempt to r e t r i e v e l o s t s o c i a l u n i t y . 
Laurenson c l a i m s t h a t t o t a l i t y i n l i t e r a t u r e becomes more and more 
d i f f i c u l t to achieve as c a p i t a l i s m progresses: the w r i t e r becomes 
i n c r e a s i n g l y m arginal t o c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y , both i n h i s f u n c t i o n , and 
w i t h r e s p e c t to h i s r e s t r i c t e d audience. (1972: 94-96) She seems to 
imply t h a t i f the w r i t e r i s s u f f i c i e n t l y i n t e g r a t e d w i t h a wide enough 
audience, then t h e r e are l e s s o b s t a c l e s to the achievement of t o t a l i t y . 
Swingewood c o n s i d e r s t h a t , w h i l s t F i e l d i n g was s t i l l a ble to portray a 
'whole s o c i e t y ' , (1972: 17) the g r e a t modern n o v e l i s t s tend t o l a c k t h i s 
c a p a c i t y : t h e r e i s 'no t o t a l i t y ' i n Lawrence's novels (1972: 8 6 ) ; and 
the t r e n d of contemporary f i c t i o n i s to lose grasp of the whole, so t h a t , 
w i t h R o b b e - G r i l l e t and the p r a c t i t i o n e r s of the new novel, the move -
'. .. i s away from l i t e r a r y t o t a l i t i e s towards a wholly 
p r i v a t e , i n d i v i d u a l , s u b j e c t i v e world - a p a r t i a l 
r a t h e r than t o t a l view.' (1972: 77) 
^ T h i s account of Lukacs' theory i s taken from de Man, 1966: 530. 
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I t i s c l e a r from the above staternents t h a t ' t o t a l i t y ' i s taken 
to mean something more than merely a coherent p e r s p e c t i v e : i t suggests 
a c e r t a i n breadth of coverage. A t the extreme i t would imply the k i n d 
o f comprehensiveness t h a t Marx designates as the t a s k of s o c i a l s c i e n c e , 
which l e a d s to -
'... the reproduction of the concrete s i j b j e c t ( s o c i e t y ) 
i n the course o f reasoning.' 
(quoted by Swingewood, 1972: 64) 
L e s s a m b i t i o u s l y conceived, ' t o t a l i t y ' would appear to r e f e r to a k i n d 
of ' s o c i a l r e a l i s m ' i n l i t e r a t u r e , the passing of which i s r e g r e t t e d by 
the above t h e o r i s t s . Here a t o t a l p e r s p e c t i v e would take i n t o view the 
e s s e n t i a l elements of the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e . I t i s however immediately 
apparent t h a t an e v a l u a t i o n according to ' t o t a l i t y ' i s a r e l a t i v e and 
v a l u e - l a d e n judgement: what one c r i t i c may consider to be e s s e n t i a l s , 
another may judge as i r r e l e v a n c i e s . C e r t a i n l y we must d i s s e n t from the 
view than an a r t i s t can be deemed to d e a l with a 'whole s o c i e t y ' . 
Duvignaud makes t h i s p o i n t f o r c e f u l l y : 
' I t i s e q u a l l y debatable whether an i n d i v i d u a l can d e a l 
w i t h an e n t i r e e r a : to t h i n k t h a t a great a r t i s t c r y s t a l l -
i z e s i n h i m s e l f the widespread problem o f h i s time and 
t h a t he embodies i n h i s work an e n t i r e c i v i l i z a t i o n i s 
to accept a romantic image which does not correspond 
to r e a l i t y ... I n a d d i t i o n , t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n n e g l e c t s 
or ignores the many asp e c t s of r e a l l i f e t h a t cannot be 
p e r c e i v e d by a s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l , whatever h i s s o c i a l 
s t a t u s . ' (Duvignaud , 1972: 40) 
I t i s i n t h i s context t h a t Duvignaud i s hi g h l y c r i t i c a l o f Lukacs' 
attempt to make Goethe i n t o -
'... the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f e v e r y t h i n g h i s e r a contained, 
a l l the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f experience belonging to h i s 
p e r i o d i n h i s t o r y . ' (1972: 40) 
I n the p r e v a i l i n g sense o f ' t o t a l i t y ' , then, one cannot have a g l o b a l 
view: a l l 'world views' are p a r t i a l and s e l e c t i v e - R o b b e - G r i l l e t i s 
not alone i n t h i s ; and the v e r y assumption t h a t the works of c e r t a i n 
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w r i t e r s p r e s e n t a t o t a l v i s i o n may make one b l i n d to the p r i n c i p l e s of 
s e l e c t i o n and composition t h a t are operative i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n of 
these works. I t a l s o encourages a too f a c i l e assurance t h a t one can 
grasp and communicate t h i s t o t a l view i n l i t e r a r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , thus 
r e f u s i n g to recognise the i n h e r e n t s e l e c t i v i t y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
To summarise t h i s s e c t i o n , one need assime n e i t h e r coherence nor 
t o t a l i t y i n order t o be a b l e to apply the concept of 'world view' to 
l i t e r a t u r e as long as world view i s conceived as i n Chapter 6 above, 
r a t h e r than as Goldmann d e f i n e s i t . I f , on the other hand, one does 
assiane coherence and t o t a l i t y i n l i t e r a r y works (even i f r e s t r i c t e d to 
'great l i t e r a r y works') , then these a s s m p t i o n s tend to reduce awareness 
o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and p a r t i a l i t y , and to encourage one to n e g l e c t the 
i n h e r e n t problems o f l i t e r a r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The following s e c t i o n now 
d e a l s w i t h some of these problems. 
(v) Values i n L i t e r a r y I n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
S e v e r a l i s s u e s a r i s e from the question of the r o l e of values i n 
l i t e r a r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . There i s f i r s t l y the problem o f how one i s 
t o s e l e c t the works t h a t a re to be i n t e r p r e t e d . Goldmann and h i s f o l l o w e r s 
would wis h to r e s t r i c t t h e i r s o c i o l o g y of l i t e r a t u r e to the study of 
'great' l i t e r a r y works: our opinion on t h i s matter has already been made 
c l e a r above"*", namely t h a t s e l e c t i o n according to values i s i n some sense 
i n e v i t a b l e , though one should not attempt to v a l i d a t e one's s e l e c t i o n 
i n terms of ' o b j e c t i v e ' g r e a t n e s s ; furthermore, t h a t a 'world view' 
methodology i s not n e c e s s a r i l y r e s t r i c t e d to 'great' l i t e r a r y works -
to make t h i s l a t t e r assumption would be to introduce value-judgements 
i n t o the very h e a r t o f s o c i o l o g i c a l methodology. 
See above, pp 253->254 
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A p a rt from the q u e s t i o n o f va l u e s i n the s e l e c t i o n o f l i t e r a r y 
works, th e r e i s the problem of the p l a c e of values i n the works themselves. 
A t i t s most extreme, l i t e r a t u r e i s seen as co n s c i o u s l y v a l u e - o r i e n t e d , 
a p u r p o s e f u l s e a r c h f o r s o c i a l v a l u e s . Swingewood appears to come 
c l o s e to t h i s p o s i t i o n : 
' I t c o uld be argued, then, t h a t the 'true' meaning o f 
g r e a t l i t e r a t u r e and the s o c i a l groups i n v o l v e d i n i t s 
production l i e s p r e c i s e l y i n the quest and the st r u g g l e 
of both f o r 'aut h e n t i c v a l u e s ' , the values of a genuine 
himian community i n which human needs, a s p i r a t i o n s , and 
d e s i r e s are mediated throiagh s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n . I f t h i s 
i s so, and i t w i l l be defended l a t e r i n the book ...' 
(1972: 16) 
T h i s i s s t r o n g l y r e m i n i s c e n t of the go a l - o r i e n t e d conception o f a r t 
found i n the work of George Mead"*", i n which a'genuine a e s t h e t i c s ' i s 
r e l a t e d t o i n t e g r a t i v e v a l u e s . More g e n e r a l l y , W i l l i t o s s ees 
a r t as a form of d e s c r i p t i o n which aims a t v a l i d a t i o n : 
'The s e l e c t i o n and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n involved i n our des-
c r i p t i o n s embody our a t t i t u d e s , needs and i n t e r e s t s , which 
we seek to v a l i d a t e by making them c l e a r to others. ' 
(1965: 55) 
Y e t even t h i s most g e n e r a l attempt t o des c r i b e a r t as v a l u e - o r i e n t e d i s 
not a c c e p t a b l e , a t l e a s t where the meaning of v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n i s taken 
to imply seme k i n d o f attempt a t conversion or j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I t i s 
indeed p o s s i b l e to take e x a c t l y the opposite view: Duvignaud argues 
t h a t a u t h e n t i c i t y depends upon -
detachment from f i n a n c i a l , i d e o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l 
concerns - i n other words, the au t h e n t i c work of a r t 
cannot s e r v e as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r any other a c t i v i t y 
except i t s e l f . ' (1972: 37) 
Ye t t h i s opposite extreme i s e q u a l l y r i g i d and narrow i n i t s viewpoint; 
f o r even i f the whole work i s not a d e l i b e r a t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r some 
d e s i r e d s t a t e o f a f f a i r s , i t may nonetheless contain l e g i t i m a t i o n s o f 
a c t i o n s and a t t i t u d e s portrayed. 
See above. Chapter 9, p 200 
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One may recognise the r o l e o f v a l u e s i n l i t e r a t u r e without adopting 
e i t h e r o f the above extreme s t a n d p o i n t s . As i n Chapter 10, l i t e r a t u r e 
may be regarded as an i n t e n t i o n a l c o n s t r u c t i o n i n which v a l u e s c o n s t i t -
ute formative p r i n c i p l e s , which i s not to say t h a t a message. i s being 
put a c r o s s , s t i l l l e s s t h a t there i s a necessary m o r a l i s t i c element i n 
l i t e r a t u r e . We merely suggest t h a t , i f ideas have s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the 
2 
formation o f s o c i a l r e a l i t y , they w i l l p l a y an even g r e a t e r r o l e i n the 
c r e a t i o n o f inve n t e d f i c t i o n a l r e a l i t y ; and, where some sense of commit-
ment i s i n v o l v e d i n the guiding i d e a s of l i t e r a r y c o n s t r u c t i o n , we may 
speak o f ' v a l u e - i d e a s ' . Where these p l a y some p a r t i n the s e l e c t i o n and 
o r g a n i s a t i o n o f the su b j e c t - m a t t e r o f a l i t e r a r y work, then our i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n o f t h a t work w i l l concentrate l e s s upon the nature o f the subject-
matter i n i t s own r i g h t , and more upon the i n d i c a t i o n t h a t i t s composition 
o f f e r s o f the operation o f the guiding v a l u e - i d e a s . The se a r c h f o r such 
v a l u e - i d e a s i s encouraged by the view o f a r t i s t i c c r e a t i o n as i n t e n t i o n a l 
and purposive, r a t h e r than i n s t i n c t i v e o r h a b i t u a l . ^ T h i s does not mean, 
however, t h a t the author i s i n t e n t i o n a l l y presenting a v a l u e - i d e a through 
the composition o f h i s subject-matter, i n the way t h a t Barthes suggests 
t h a t , i n myth, the 'concept' i s i n t e n t i o n a l and i s the motivation which 
caused the myth to be u t t e r e d . (1973: 118) I f every l i t e r a r y work has 
4 
a 'message' , the v a l u e - i d e a s o f which i t i s c o n s t i t u t e d may nonetheless 
be without c o n s i s t e n c y , without even unconscious aim of conversion, and 





See above. Chapter 10, p 246 
See Eve, 1975: 68 
See C a s s i r e r , 1970: 158 
T h i s i s suggested by O r w e l l : 'But every w r i t e r , e s p e c i a l l y every 
n o v e l i s t , has a 'message', whether he admits i t or not, and the 
minutest d e t a i l s o f h i s work are i n f l u e n c e d by i t . A l l a r t i s 
propaganda.' (1965; 125) 
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Thus one meaning of l i t e r a r y interpretation i n sociology would be 
to explicate the value-ideas"'' that, largely unconsciously, guide the 
construction of the f i c t i o n a l universe. Such interpretation would be 
r e l a t i v e l y easy i f there were certain c l e a r l y ascertainable predominant 
concerns i n the l i t e r a r y work; but usually one must face the p o s s i b i l i t y , 
as for any other human expression, of several meaningfully adequate inter-
pretations. This contrasts with Goldmann's view of elucidating the 
2 
'objective meaning' of the work, and with Leenhardt's notion of the 
exposition of the world view of a l i t e r a r y work enabling the interpre-
tation of i t s various elements. (Leenhardt, 1970: 106) As Collingwood 
points out, there i s no such thing as 'the' meaning of the work (1958: 
311) : the corollary of t h i s i s that l i t e r a r y analysis, as indeed cultural 
analysis generally, i s ' i n t r i n s i c a l l y incomplete'. (Geertz, 1975: 29) 
To claim a complete interpretation would thus be to ignore the part that 
our concerns play i n the analysis of l i t e r a t u r e . I n the terms of Gadamer, 
v i a Janet Wolff, l i t e r a r y interpretation may be seen to involve a 
'hermeneutic mediation' of the work and i t s 'Dasein' and the interpreter 
and h i s Dasein (Wolff, 1975: 3): i n relation to the above discussion, one 
might replace 'Dasein' by 'value-ideas'. Valid l i t e r a r y interpretation 
must thus always be both value-referent"^ ( i n the sense of investigating 
what appear to be the predominant value-ideas expressed by the work) , and 
value-relevant (in the sense of recognising one's own selective interest 




Note that these are not necessarily those of the author. 
See above, p 258 
Aron uses the concept of 'value-reference' i n a similar sense: 
'And the science of culture i s a comprehension, through value-
reference, of existences that are defined by the creation of 
values.' (1968: 205) Aron, i n stressing the values inherent 
i n the svibject-matter, tends to underemphasise the role of 
the values of the researcher (1968: 189); and yet elsewhere 
he recognises the role of 'our' values in research, and thus 
acknowledges the p r i n c i p l e of value-relevance. (1964 : 68-70) 
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certain focal points - upon p a r t i c u l a r aspects of the predominant 
themes, and upon a number of svibsidiary themes - that one considers to 
be at l e a s t i n d i r e c t l y relevant to one's 'evaluative attitudes'.''•) 
There i s no i n t r i n s i c reason why objectivity cannot be achieved within 
the compass of value-relevance, unless, that i s , one's own interests i n 
the matter are so narrow and i n f l e x i b l e as to exclude altogether the 
recognition of value-ideas predominant i n the work, and hence to provide 
what must be deemed a dis t o r t i v e interpretation. 
There remains however the problem of how one i s to render e x p l i c i t 
certain aspects of the i m p l i c i t value-ideas, the 'unstated meaning 
structures' (Cicourel, 1964: 153) , i n the l i t e r a r y work. Wellek and 
Warren point out that one cannot re l y on the author's own e x p l i c i t 
pronouncements on h i s work, as these may be better understood as ideal 
plans, r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s , or currently acceptable c r i t i c a l formulae. (1963: 
148) Thus we cannot use the author's statements to avoid the responsibility 
of constructing our own reading of the work. This involves giving a 
conceptual expression to what i s i m p l i c i t l y assvmied i n the work; as Leenhardt 
points out, the construction of conceptually schematised world views for 
l i t e r a r y works i s the product of c r i t i c a l elaboration: the works themselves 
only hint at such schemas. (1970: 105) In formulating the universe of the 
work, in elucidating i t s i m p l i c i t 'structures of s i g n i f i c a t i o n ' (Geertz, 
1975: 9) , i t must be recognised that we are involved in a process of 
2 
translation : to conceptualise the implicit-unstated means 'fixing i t 
into inspectable form' (Geertz, 1975: 19)"^, and this form of presentation 
cannot but transmute the 'content': 
See Weber, 1949: 151. 
2 
The necessity of translation i n a l l sociological interpretation 
was noted above. Chapter 10, pp 226-227 
Craib s i m i l a r l y notes that the sociological interpretation of 
l i t e r a t u r e involves a reconstruction into e x p l i c i t terminology, 
(craib, 1974: 326) 
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'... the l i n e between mode of representation and 
stibstantive content i s as undrawable in c u l t u r a l 
analysis as i t i s in painting;' (Geertz, 1975: 16). 
I t i s i r o n i c that the very 'structure of feeling', evidence of which 
Williams suggests i s best provided by the arts of the period (1965: 64-
65), and which he carefully distinguishes from the formulised 'social 
character' (1965: 63), must i t s e l f , as soon as conceptually inscribed 
largely i n terms of values, become akin i n form to the s o c i a l character;-
although, of course, the structure of feeling w i l l include le s s publicly 
stated and o f f i c i a l values, and w i l l admit divergent cognitions and 
evaluations. In conceptual form, then, the structure of feeling w i l l 
n ecessarily lose some of the vague and amorphous quality of 'feeling', 
and w i l l have become transmuted into the inspectable form of value-
ideas . 
Having discussed the conceptual translatory, value-referent and 
value-relevant c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of sociological interpretation, we must 
now consider which questions may be directed at the l i t e r a r y work i n order 
to elucidate those aspects which are relevant to both i t s values and our 
values. 
(vi) Questions to Direct at the L i t e r a r y Work 
In t h i s f i n a l section before the conclusion of t h i s chapter, we 
suggest various questions that are worth bearing i n mind during the 
analysis of a novel. These questions relate to general aspects of the 
world view of the novel, and i n p a r t i c u l a r the broad s o c i a l attitudes 
that are conveyed. Although some questions touch on the expressive 
s t y l e and certain s t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the work, i n general 
the features of l i t e r a r y s t y l e (except for some connotations) and of 
general form are not considered. The response of contemporary readers 
to the novel i s also ignored, as are matters concerning the motivation 
of the author and the forms available to him. These factors are highly 
s i g n i f i c a n t i n relation to why p a r t i c u l a r cognitions and evaluations are 
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apparent i n the work, but they are less relevant for a mere elucidation 
of predominant attitudes therein. I f one start s with a description of 
the 'universe of the work', however, th i s w i l l be of considerable help i n 
an investigation of the formative principles involved i n i t s construction. 
In fomulatihg a s e t of questions worthy of consideration i n l i t e r a r y 
interpretation, we have fovind the work of certain writers especially help-
f u l : i n parti c u l a r , the essay by George Orwell on Chailes Dickens (Orwell, 
1965) presents one of the best interpretations of a single author's 
work i n the whole of the sociology of li t e r a t u r e : many of the questions 
that are i m p l i c i t i n Orwell's study are included i n our l i s t of questions 
below. I n addition, the work of various l i t e r a r y c r i t i c s and interpreters 
has been analysed for topics that appear to be generally worthy of con-
sideration: studies by Kahn, Woolf and Auerbach were found to be of 
pa r t i c u l a r relevance.^ The l i s t of questions, which was ori g i n a l l y 
formulated to aid the interpretation of the novels of Charlotte and Emily 
Brontfe, has subsequently been modified to include further questions that 
emerged as s i g n i f i c a n t i n the examination of their works. Questions 
re l a t i n g to our s p e c i f i c i n t e r e s t i n aspects of c l a s s , and the conscious-
ness involved therein, have not however been included. The questions are 
2 
of a general nature, but do not pretend to be universally applicable: 
they are l i k e l y to be of greatest use i n the interpretation of those novels 
that conform to the 'dominant models of nineteenth century f i c t i o n ' , which 
are 'rooted i n the conceptual scheme of a biography', i n which the character 
i s 'perceived as l i v i n g testimony to so c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l determinism', 
and which aim to c l a r i f y , organise and explain the human condition. 
(Zeraffa, 1973: 47-51) I t must further be noted that the l i s t of questions 
See Kahn, 1938; Woolf, 1966; Auerbach, 1953. 
2 
Thus, although our l i s t of questions might resemble the attempt.b^f 
Kluckhohn to outline a framework of 'universal human problems' for 
the 'systematic ordering of cu l t u r a l value orientations' (1953: 
345) , we do not claim to present a universal and exhaustive scheme 
tor the interpretation of the value orientations of ' a l l people at 
a l l times and i n a l l places' (1953: 346), but rather suggest the 
u t i l i t y of bearing i n mind a set of possible points of investiga-
tion i n the interpretation of a h i s t o r i c a l form of l i t e r a t u r e . 
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does not i n any sense constitute a questionnaire that must be r i g i d l y 
followed as a framework for l i t e r a r y analysis. I t i s more akin to a 
set of possible topics that may f r u i t f u l l y be born i n mind i n depth 
interviews with novels! 
The questions are divided into five sections: A., those that have 
a broad application throughout the novel; B., those that apply generally 
to a l l three of the roughly differentiated areas of the subject-matter: 
characters (including t h e i r spheres of activity) , relationships between 
characters (including s o c i a l groups portrayed) , and society (including 
broader group-relationships and i n s t i t u t i o n s ) ; a n d C , D. andE., those 
that apply more s p e c i f i c a l l y to each of these areas. I n questions con-
cerning content, the negative i s always implied: e.g., what i s not inclu -
ded. I n questions concerning evaluation, a concern with both the type and 
content of evaluation i s implied: e.g., not only whether the evaluation 
i s positive or negative, but whether the type i s moral, aesthetic, 
u t i l i t a r i a n , etc. Inevitably there i s some overlap between questions. 
Guide for the Construction of World Views from Novels; Questions To 
Bear i n Mind 
A. Questions of Broad Application Throughout the Novel 
Human nature: What are the basic characteristics of human nature? 
What i s the evaluation thereof? 
Ways of l i f e : What ways of l i f e are seen to be possible? How 
are the different ways of l i f e evaluated? How 
definite/vacuous i s the ideal way of l i f e ? 
Assimiptions: Which prevailing cognitions and evaluations are 
questioned/assumed? 
Extensions: Which cognitions and evaluations appear to be 
extended beyond thei r original context to apply 
to other spheres? 
Contradictions: What are the contexts of apparently contradictory 
cognitions and evaluations? 
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Uncertainties: What are the uncertainties (which perhaps give momentimi 
to the plot of the novel), and which are resolved or 
l e f t unresolved? 
Readers: What types of reader are presupposed? What i s the 
supposed and desired relationship between author and 
readers? I s t h i s relationship manifested i n an 
expressive style? 
B. Questions Applying Generally to A l l Three Areas of the 
S\3bject Matter 
(Note that when the question relates to characters, i t may apply equally 
to the other areas of the subject-matter: relationships, institutions, etc.) 
Content: What i s the subject-matter of the novel? Who i s 
portrayed? (- according to objective factors, such as 
occupation, sex, status; and subjective factors, such 
as ends, values and b e l i e f s , and the vocabularies of 
motive supplied for characters). What spheres of 
a c t i v i t y , relationships, institutions, aspects of 
past and future, etc., are portrayed? 
Compatability: Which phenomena, attributes etc. are seen as being . 
compatible/incompatible of co-existence? 
Realism: 
Development: 
How are the characters treated with respect to 
- fullness of detail/simplication? 
- a dynamic 'process'/a s t a t i c 'snap-shot' perspective? 
^ a subjective-empathetic/objective-external assessment? 
I n what ways do the characters dhange/develop? Why 
do they change/develop? 
- i n t e r n a l l y plausible reasons. 
- author's machination. 
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Evaluation: Which of the characters are valued most/least highly? 
(e.g.. Who are the heroes and v i l l a i n s ? Which of the 
various i n s t i t u t i o n s represented are closest to the 
ideal?) 
What i s the evaluative basis for these judgements? 
What evaluations are offered concerning the development 
(actiial or potential) of the characters? What are the 
causes and consequences of the highly and poorly regarded 
q u a l i t i e s presented? 
Devices: Where and how are devices used to make evaluational 
points? - e.g., the sympathetic treatment of a character; 
the r i d i c u l e of an in s t i t u t i o n ; 'magical' devices to 
solve problems of evaluational inconsistency. 
Consistency: How consistent i s the assessment of the characters? 
- i n the same character. 
- between different characters. 
Placement 
i n Time: 
Given the author's period, what i s conspicuous by i t s 
presence or absence, either in terms of svibject-matter 
or evaluation? 
Questions Applying More S p e c i f i c a l l y to Characters 
I d e n t i -
f i c a t i o n : 
Which of the characters does the author appear to identify 
with, e.g. autobiographically? 
Superiority/ Which of the characters does the author treat as 
I n f e r i o r i t y : 
inferior/equal/superior to self? What i s the evalua-
tive basis for such treatment? 
Sphere of To what extent are each of the characters seen as being 
Individual' s 
Control: able to influence t h e i r own future? This question 
includes: 
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- What problems do the characters face, and what 
solutions are deemed to be open to them and to be 
efficacious? How are these various solutions evaluated? 
- Where does the potentiality for their self-deter-
mination stop? At which points and i n what ways does 
the r e a l world constrain them? 
- To what extent i s there resort to the unexpected 'deus 
ex Fjachina' type of solution to a character's problems? 
Where does t h i s occur and why i s i t thought to be 
necessary? 
Poetic To what extent and i n what ways (e.g., 'internal' punish-
Ju s t i c e : 
ments such as guilt-feelings; 'external' pimishments such 
as prison; other-worldly punishments such as Hell) do good 
and e v i l gain t h e i r j u s t rewards? 
D. Questions Applying More S p e c i f i c a l l y to Soc i a l Groups Portrayed 
Meiribers of Who (including characteristics and evaluation thereof) i s 
Groups: 
chosen for portrayal out of the groups which constitute 
the subject-matter? 
Represen- Are these individuals representative of these groups? 
tativeness: 
Are they supposed by the author to be representative? 
I f they are not representative, why are j u s t these i n d i -
viduals chosen for portrayal? 
Categori- What c r i t e r i a constitute the basis for the author's 
sation: 
own groupings i n the novel? Does he make apparent his 
self-categorisation? 
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Questions Applying More S p e c i f i c a l l y to Broad Institutions 
and Society 
Society i n What evaluation i s conveyed of society i n general, and 
General: 
what appears to be the reason for t h i s evaluation? 




- p o s s i b i l i t i e s according to the s o c i a l structure 
portrayed i n the novel. 
- p o s s i b i l i t i e s envisaged by the author. 
What i s the evaluation of these p o s s i b i l i t i e s ? 
Which remedies are recognised as possible within the • 
existing s o c i a l order, and which are not? ( i . e . Which 
s o c i a l ' i l l s ' can be 'cured'?) By what means can these 
remedies be effected? Which means of minor s o c i a l remedy 
are favoured, which not, and why? 
( v i i ) Conclusion 
This chapter commenced with an examination of Goldmann' s sociology 
of l i t e r a t u r e , and concentrated upon i t s methodological implications, 
which led to certain suggested modifications of Goldmann's basic assum-
ptions, centred around conceptions of the author, of coherence and 
t o t a l i t y i n l i t e r a t u r e , and of 'objective meaning' in interpretation. 
These modifications were developed i n the three subsequent sections. 
F i r s t l y , the argviraent of macro-versus micro-analysis was taken up, 
and, apart from a re-affirmation of the study of the author in the 
sociology of l i t e r a t u r e , a conclusion was reached upon an optimal mode 
of investigation, that involves the undertaking of a micro-structural 
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case study without neglecting the broader s o c i a l context. H i s t o r i c a l 
generalisation and formal models were emphasised as the two types of 
generalisation that one may use for and derive from such studies. 
Secondly, the concepts of 'coherence' and ' t o t a l i t y ' were examined 
i n greater depth. Neither was found to be necessary as a prerequisite 
for the analysis of l i t e r a t u r e i n terms of world view; and in f a c t 
t h e i r assumption was deemed to reduce awareness of contradictions, 
p a r t i a l i t y , and the problems of l i t e r a r y interpretation. 
Thirdly, there was a discussion of the role of value i n l i t e r a r y 
analysis: i n the sense of selecting l i t e r a r y works for study; i n the 
(rejected) sense of l i t e r a t u r e being necessarily value-oriented; in 
the sense of the value-reference of l i t e r a t u r e , according to which 
value-ideas may act as formative principles of l i t e r a r y works; in the 
sense of the value-relevance of l i t e r a r y interpretation, i n which one's 
own concerns must be recognised. The notion of the 'objective meaning' 
of a Ixtexary work was rejected, along with the idea of a 'complete' 
interpretation. Interpretation was seen as necessarily translatory, 
giving 'inspectable' conceptual form to unstated structures of meaning. 
F i n a l l y a l i s t of questions was proposed, indicating topics that 
are considered worthwhile bearing i n mind during the analysis of a 
novel, where one i s concerned to elucidate general aspects of the 
world view that i t conveys. 
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Having completed Part I I I / and therewith our investigation of 
theoretical and methodological issues i n the sociology of l i t e r a t u r e , 
we may now proceed to bting together our conclusions on the sociology 
of l i t e r a t i i r e (Part I I I ) with our i n t e r e s t i n the development of an 
individual's world view i n r e l a t i o n to class elements (Part I I ) , i n an 
analysis of the novels of Charlotte and Emily Bront6. 
P A R T I V ; TWO CASE STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
LITERATURE 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART IV 
The empirical research into the l i f e and l i t e r a t u r e of Charlotte 
and Emily BrontS has two main functions: i t serves as an I l l u s t r a t i o n 
of the way i n which the general theoretical models developed i n 
previous chapters may be applied to gain insight into the world view 
development and l i t e r a r y works of pa r t i c u l a r individuals; yet, while 
i t may act as an i l l u s t r a t i o n for the reader of this thesis, for the 
writer thereof i t served to generate many of the theoretical and 
methodological concepts and ideas discussed in previous chapters"*" -
• 2 
for, as noted i n Chapter 1, the order i n which the thesis i s l a i d out 
i s not that i n which i t was researched. 
In the BrontS research there i s an application of the pa r t i c u l a r 
approach to the sociology of l i t e r a t u r e that was emphasised in Part I I I , 
i . e . the bringing together of the sociology of knowledge and the sociology 
of l i t e r a t u r e for the analysis of l i t e r a r y expression. The general con-
ceptual models developed i n Part I , i n relation to the sociology of know-
ledge, and the more s p e c i f i c models developed in Part I I , concerning the dev-
elopment of world view i n rel a t i o n to class elements, are thus combined 
with, the recognition of those factors seen i n Part I I I to be relevant to 
the study of l i t e r a r y expression; so that the focus i s upon the develop-
ment of consciousness (both i n the author's world view and i n the world 
views of her l i t e r a r y works) i n r e l a t i o n both to the elements of her 
cl a s s and to her authorship role. There i s therefore c l e a r l y an emphasis, 
i n the interpretation of the novels, upon class-related cognitions and 
evaluations; yet t h i s should not prevent us from recognising the value-
For instance^ the concept '^expressive style'" was generated from the 
research d i i Charlotte and Emily BrontS, On the other hand the subse-
quent re-working of the Brontfe research was considerably improved by 
the systematic application of t h i s concept, which had been c l a r i f i e d 
i n the theoretical sections of the thesis, To use an apposite 
term, we witness here a ' d i a l e c t i c a l ' method of concept formation. 
2 See above. Chapter 1, p 5 
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reference"*" of the novels, e.g. as indicated by the general questions 
2 
posed at the end of Chapter 11. 
In concentrating upon the development of consciousness i n the world 
views of Charlotte and Emily Brontfe and their novels, the research that 
follows i s i n accordance with the theoretical emphasis i n previous 
chapters."^ Yet, inevitably, themes have been explored in e a r l i e r chap-
te r s which pass beyond the confines of relevance to the particular 
empirical studies of Charlotte and Emily BrontS: the Bronte research 
does indeed u t i l i s e many, but cannot involve a l l , of the previously 
expounded concepts and models. Nor does the research, on the other hand, 
claim to present a d e f i n i t i v e account of the development of the world 
views of Charlotte and Emily BrontS; the focus i s upon class and author-
role related factors. The study i s thus not concerned with a s o c i a l -
psychological examination of why the Brontfes took to writing i n their 
youth, even where the economic situation in which they found themselves 
i s relevant to such an examination. The world view of Charlotte and 
Emily, before undertaking economic action, i s taken as a starting point, 
and i s not traced back to family background, childhood reading and 
experiences, etc. Nor are the world views investigated for their deri-
vation from the V i c t o r i a n norm; and forms and devices i n the novels are 
considered more for t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r u t i l i s a t i o n than for their origin. 
Whilst the world views of authors and novels are seen i n the i r contem-
porary c u l t u r a l context, the emphasis i s upon selection and developments 
from predominant world views, rather than tracing these l a t t e r back to 
broad features of the c l a s s structure of the contemporary society. 
The selection of Charlotte BrontS and her novels as principal 
research topic was guided by several factors. Her novels present a 
See above. Chapter 11, p 274 
2 
See above. Chapter 11, p 278 f f 3 See for instance the emphasis upon the development of the conscious-
ness of a p a r t i c u l a r individual, i n Chapter 7, p I58 above. 
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l e s s obvious target for world view interpretation than those of the 
s o c i a l r e a l i s t s ; the novels show considerable variation in form, and 
cannot e a s i l y be subsvmied under a predominant early Victorian l i t e r a r y 
mode; her role as author cannot be naively treated as a class role - a l l 
these factors make the study of Charlotte BrontS and her novels more 
complex and interesting; yet a depth analysis i s rendered easier by her 
r e l a t i v e l y small nvonber of novels, and by the richness of biographical 
evidence that i s available to us, p a r t i c u l a r l y from the work of her 
contemporary Mrs. Gaskell. With Charlotte's s i s t e r Emily we are less 
fortimate: the biographical evidence i s very scanty. Here we have to 
rely upon the well-known events in Emily's l i f e , supplemented by the few 
statements, p r i n c i p a l l y from Charlotte, that give indication of her world 
view. With Emily BrontS we are thus forced to undertake an a c t i v i t y of 
dubious v a l i d i t y , i . e . to take the author's l i t e r a r y expressions as e v i -
dence of her own world view."*" This i s however more reasonable with Emily 
BrontS than with many other authors, as her l i t e r a r y works are s u f f i c i e n t l y 
deviant to discourage interpretation as fabrications in accordance with 
readers' expectations. Clearly, though, hypothesising Emily Brontfe's 
world view from her novel i s given greater c r e d i b i l i t y where we have 
supporting evidence from the scanty biographical details available to us. 
To use a l i t e r a r y document as a h e u r i s t i c means for disclosing an 
individual's c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 'outlook on l i f e ' i s one of the ways in 
2 
which Weber suggests that source material may be used i n h i s t o r i c a l 
research. (1949: 141-2) Our studies of Charlotte and Emily BrontS in 
f a c t view the novels i n a l l three of Weber's suggested ways i n which 
Goethe.'s l e t t e r s acquire 'significance' for history: as h e u r i s t i c means 
for the development of class-concepts (as i n the development of 
the concepts of 'promotions', 'extensions' and 'expressive s t y l e ' 
through the research on Charlotte BrontS); as h e u r i s t i c means 
•'• I t was pointed out i n Chapter 9 (p 211 above) that one must beware 
of taking a l i t e r a r y work as a straightforward document of the world 
view of i t s author. 
2 Weber's example i s Goethe's l e t t e r s to Frau von Stein. (Weber, 1949: 
138ff) . 
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for the disclosure of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c features of a phenomenon (e.g. 
Emily Brontfe's world view); and as a component of a h i s t o r i c a l causal 
context (as i n the explanation of aspects of the expressive s t y l e of 
'Jane Eyre', or i n the account of the influence of the success of 'Jane 
Eyre' upon Charlotte Brontfe's l a t e r novels). 
Of these three modes of significance that l i t e r a t u r e may have for 
the c u l t u r a l sciences, the second, as we have indicated, i s the most 
fraught with dangers, especially where (as with Emily Brontfi) supporting 
evidence i s scanty. Paucity of evidence also renders our hypotheses on 
Emily Brontfife l i t e r a r y role somewhat speculative: for instance, there i s 
l i t t l e information on the ways i n which Emily may have taken account of 
her audience,"'' This contrasts with Charlotte, whose l e t t e r s , as we s h a l l 
see, provide considerable evidence of the l i t e r a r y role contacts that 
have salience for her. There i s the additional d i f f i c u l t y i n studying 
Emily that we do not even have evidence of the development of her world 
view i n the form of a second novelj Emily's response to the c r i t i c a l 
reaction to 'Wuthering Heights'- thus cannot be investigated... 
The work on Emily BrontS thus functions p r i n c i p a l l y as a comparison 
point for the research on Charlotte, rather than as a study i n i t s own 
2 
right. I t also constitutes a preliminary t r i a l for the development and 
application of some of the concepts i n Parts I T I I I of the thesis. I n 
some ways the study of Emily BrontS becomes an exemplification of the 
problems inherent i n an analysis of li t e r a t \ i r e according to our approach, 
whilst the research on Chrlotte Bront6 reveals the more positive possi-
b i l i t i e s of t h i s approach. 
For the importance of "^taking account' in l i t e r a r y expression, 
see above, Chapter 9, p 211 
I t ip for t h i s reason that an additional study of Anne Brontfe would 
not have added s i g n i f i c a n t l y to the value of the research i n Part IVt 
even the poverty of evidence we have on Emily i s richer than the evi'^. 
dence available on the l i f e and thought of Anne, See "The Brontfes: 
Charlotte and Emily", by L L Hinkley (1945) - p a r t i c u l a r l y p 104. 
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Despite the d i f f i c u l t i e s and uncertainties, the research on Emily 
Bronte and 'Wuthering Heights' i s nonetheless extremely valuable for us, 
even though mainly as a contrast to Charlotte. Charlotte and Emily both 
s t a r t from the same economic situation, of course, and there i s indeed 
l i t t l e change i n the economic situation of either; our i n t e r e s t thus 
focuses upon thei r developing economic action (and conditions thereof) 
and work situation, which do contrast s i g n i f i c a n t l y , and which may pro-
vide a source of explanation for t h e i r s t r i k i n g l y different l i t e r a r y 
expressions. 
I n sections (i) and ( v i i ) a short biographical outline i s presented 
of the author concerned. The analysis here i s i n terms of sociological 
r a t i o n a l i t y , and emphasises the values, ends and means of the author i n 
the economic s p h e r e . F o r these biographical sections we have used 
p r i n c i p a l l y Mrs. Gaskell: 'The L i f e of Charlotte BrontS", supplemented 
by Lane (1969) and W i l l i s (1963). A l l page references to the Mrs. Gaskell 
work and to the Brontft novels are to the Thornton Edition, Edinburgh 1924. 
^ For a f u l l e r description of t h i s model of analysis, see Chapter 5, 
p 121 f f 
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CHAPTER 12; WORLD VIEW AND CLASS IN THE LIVES AND WORKS OF 
EMILY AND CHARLOTTE BRONTE 
(i) Einlly Bront6: An Atypical AutJior 
The attraction that Emily BrontS holds as a subject for research 
l i e s partly in her r e l a t i o n to her contemporary context: both novel 
and author are d i s t i n c t l y atypical amongst the many of each produced 
by the early Victorian period. One part i c u l a r unusual aspect of Emily's 
situation springs to mind, i . e . her extreme isolation"'': her work was 
undertaken p r i n c i p a l l y at home; her periods of residence away from the 
Haworth parsonage were few and short; her s o c i a l contacts were similarly 
few, interaction being impeded by her famous 'reserve'. (Gaskell: 110) 
This i s o l a t i o n meant that she was unable to develop a direct knowledge 
of many and varied others: i t i s hardly surprising that her novel i s so 
unlike the 'social novel' we see as being so ch a r a c t e r i s t i c of the time. 
A s i g n i f i c a n t factor i n Emily's r e l a t i v e i s o l a t i o n i s her economic 
orientation and action. With similar opportunities as Charlotte and 
Anne for leaving home to become a governess, she nevertheless chose to 
stay at home to look af t e r her father and to undertake general household 
tasks ( W i l l i s , 1963: 75) , rather than l i v i n g as an employee i n someone 
else's household, subject to th e i r routines, t h e i r moods, their super-
vision, and without the independence that comes from the latitude 
provided by tolerance i n a family situation. The constricting nature 
of available work situations was abhorrent to a l l of the BrontS s i s t e r s , 
This i s not, of course, to claim that she was free from s o c i a l 
influences, but merely that her isolation was r e l a t i v e l y greater -
to an extent lanrecognised e.g. by Eagleton, 1975 - than that of 
other authors of her period, and that her world view would probably 
have developed l e s s a typically had her i s o l a t i o n been less extreme. 
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but p a r t i c u l a r l y so to Emily, whose suffering when away from Haworth 
for any length of time was so profound that she was acknowledged by the 
s i s t e r s to be the one who should stay at Haworth. (Gaskell: 122) 
Her duties at home could be carried out in her own way and time, and 
allowed her f e r t i l e imagination to wander unimpeded. She was able to 
be s o l i t a r y without being questioned, and she could escape a l l human 
contact frequently i n her walks over the beloved familiar moorlands near 
her home. 
I f we consider more systematically the various ways i n which Emily 
could maintain or improve her economic situation, we find s i x basic 
means: writing, teaching as a governess, teaching i n a school, marriage, 
inheritance, dependence upon her family. The f i r s t she never seriously 
considered i n economic terms. Her ambitions as a writer had never been 
•for public success, as with Charlotte, and indeed she was greatly d i s -
tressed when Charlotte by chance discovered the poems whose secrecy Emily 
had c a r e f u l l y preserved. I t took much persuasion from Charlotte before 
Emily would consent to have the poems piablished (Gaskell: 264-5); though, 
of course, subsequently a l l three s i s t e r s agreed to complete a novel for 
publication. I f any public literaary ambition arose then, i t seems to have 
been f a r from monetarily inspired; and indeed, as Lane points out, 
'Wuthering Heights' and Anne's 'Agnes Grey' were accepted by the publishing 
firm of Newby -
'... on rather grudging terms, by which a part of the 
expense was to be borne by the authors.' 
(1969: 207) 
Whatever the nature of Emily's l i t e r a r y ainbition, there i s no doubt about 
her r e l a t i v e i s o l a t i o n from the l i t e r a r y world of publishers and c r i t i c s : 
her contact with these i n her role as author was minimal. Her publishing 
a c t i v i t i e s were handled largely by Charlotte, both i n the case of the 
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poems the three s i s t e r s published together, and i n at l e a s t the early 
attempts at having the novels published. (Gaskell: 264-282) I t i s also 
noteworthy that i t was Charlotte and Anne who travelled to London to 
establish with their publishers the separate identity of the BrontS 
s i s t e r s : Emily as usual remained at home. (Gaskell: 327) As for the 
influence of c r i t i c a l reaction to 'Wuthering Heights', this i s impossible 
to estimate: i t i s unclear whether the c r i t i c s ' negative evaluations of 
the novel discouraged her from embarking upon a second work, or whether, 
as some evidence suggests (Lane, 1969: 224-5), she began another work 
which was never completed, either accommodating her work to the views of 
the c r i t i c s or else ignoring them. 
Teaching as a governess or i n a school were forms of economic action 
that Emily had to consider: the former, as noted above, she rejected; but 
she did take a post as a teacher to a school i n Halifax for s i x months. 
(Gaskell: 122) This was the sole period of employment that Emily under-
took outside of Haworth parsonage,and i t can hardly have encouraged 
her: Charlotte describes i t as -
'... hard labour from s i x i n the morning to eleven at 
night, with only one half-hour of exercise between. 
This i s slavery.' 
(Charlotte BrontS, l e t t e r dated October 2nd. 1836, i n Gaskell: 131) 
Nevertheless i t seems that Emily was favourably inclined to the proposal 
by Charlotte that the three s i s t e r s should set up a school themselves, 
and even agreed to go with Charlotte to Brussels, so that they could 
improve t h e i r French and begin German. (W i l l i s , 1963: 84-5) The idea 
of a school run by themselves c l e a r l y presented a more attractive work 
situation than the apparent alternatives: 
''' Apart from seme odd piano lessons she gave whilst in Brussels 
Lane, 1969: 167 
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'To have a school, was to have some portion of daily 
l e i s u r e , uncontrolled but by her own sense of duty; i t 
was for the three s i s t e r s ... to be together under one 
roof, and yet earning the i r own subsistence;' 
(Gaskell: 190) 
Yet even i n this s i t uation, Emily would have found i t unpleasant to take 
up the fixed, attention-absorbing duties of a teacher; as Charlotte 
writes to M. Heger: 
'Emily does not care much for teaching, but she would 
look after the house-keeping, and, although something of 
a recluse, she i s too good-hearted not to do a l l she 
could for the well-being of the children.' 
(Lane, 1969: 179) 
The plan, however, through lack of response to their attempts to gain 
pupils, had eventually to be given up -
'... by Anne with painful disappointment, by Emily (one 
suspects) with secret r e l i e f , and by Charlotte with a 
crushing sense of defeat.' 
(Lane, 1969: 180) 
As for marriage, i t i s unlikely that Emily ever considered this as 
a means of gaining economic security: indeed there i s no evidence that 
she considered i t at a l l . Certainly her 'reserve' would have acted 
against any deep relationship arising with an e l i g i b l e young man; and 
i n any case Emily's deep involvement in her fantasy world of the 'Gondal' 
chronicles''' may have made any actual individual encountered seem a l l too 
unglamorous compared with those available in her imagination. 
Since the above l i s t e d means available to Emily to maintain or 
improve her economic situation were either rejected or not considered 
by her, she was forced to rely upon her relati^Ves. She inherited a 
small sum from Aunt Branwell, but her p r i n c i p a l dependence was upon her 
father and s i s t e r s . Her economic ends appear to have been very modest: 
•'' See Ratchford, 1955. 
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i t seems that she desired only to be able to continue l i v i n g i n r e l a -
t i v e l y independent i s o l a t i o n near her moors, and that she was thus 
perfectly s a t i s f i e d with taking on the household tasks i n return for 
fi n a n c i a l dependence upon her family. I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that i n 1839, 
when two of the s i s t e r s had to find work and one had to stay behind at 
Haworth, i t was Emily who was chosen to ronain: 
'... Charlotte and Anne must put their shoulders to the 
wheel. One daughter was needed a t home, to stay with 
Mr BrontB and Miss Branwell. ... And Emily, who suffered 
and drooped more than her s i s t e r s when away from Haworth, 
was the one appointed to remain.' 
(Gaskell: 152) 
Simil a r l y i n 1843, when Charlotte returned to Brussels and Anne continued 
as governess with the Robinsons, Emily again stayed behind at Haworth 
to look after her father, who, with his deteriorating eyesight, could 
not be l e f t alone. Emily was indeed 'well content to stay at home'. 
(Lane, 1969: 169) She was apparently s a t i s f i e d with minimal s o c i a l 
interaction and a modest economic situation: in her diary paper of 1845 
she writes -
'We have cash enough for our present wants . I am 
quite contented for myself ... seldom or never troubled 
with nothing to do, and merely desiring that everybody 
could be as comfortable as myself and as undesponding ...' 
(Lane, 1969: 195) 
Her predominant work situation at Haworth, amongst her family, offered 
Emily the maximum amount of s o c i a l independence she could expect/ free 
play for her imagination, freedom from constricting occupational worries, 
and freedom from a demanding job or husband. Given her values, i t i s 
hardly surprising that she was reluctant to take employment away from 
Haworth. 
From a review of Emily BrontS's biography, we thus emerge with a 
picture of a person who i s highly independent (in a s o c i a l rather than 
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economic sense), who has r e l a t i v e l y few s o c i a l contacts and undergoes 
very l i t t l e paid employment, and for whom marriage and economic 
advancement are apparently i n s i g n i f i c a n t goals; - an author, yet with 
few ends i n terms of public success, a t lea s t at f i r s t , and indeed 
piiblishing only a small collection of poems and one novel, and having 
but s l i g h t contact with the l i t e r a r y world of pubishers and c r i t i c s , 
( i i ) The Influence of Emily BrontS's Economic Action upon 
the Cognitive and Evaluative Content of 'Wuthering Heights' 
We see the influence of Emily's economic action most c l e a r l y in 
the cognitive selection involved i n constructing the universe of the 
novel, and most s t r i k i n g l y i n the lack of portrayal of work. There i s 
of course mention of household tasks, such as cooking, washing, ironing^ 
sewing (e.g. pp 121, 457, 462-3) - tasks that Emily herself would have 
undertaken at Haworth Parsonage; but occupations, i n the narrower sense 
of earning one's l i v i n g , are portrayed with l i t t l e complexity: this i s 
the case, for instance, with Heathcliff's and Hareton's agricultural 
work, of which we obtain only a crude background impression (e.g. pp 66 
& 291). Occupational work generally takes place on the dim periphery 
of the 'Wuthering Heights' universe, as in the b r i e f mentions of the 
doctor, lawyer and curate (e.g. pp 129-130, 421 & 59); or in Heathcliff's 
obtaining h i s money one knows not how before he returns after Catherine's 
marriage: 
' I stated before that I didn't know how he gained 
h i s money;' 
(p 134) 
Much of the economic action undertaken by the 'Wuthering Heights' charac-
ters does not involve v i s i b l e work, as i n Edgar, the landowner; Hindley, 
small farmer but not seen i n farming a c t i v i t y ( i f undertaken); Heathcliff, 
the property-owner and gentleman farmer after his return (e.g., we see 
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him instructing Joseph about 'some farming business', but we do not 
learn the nature of the business, or see Joseph carrying out the 
'minute directions' he has been given. - p 490) ; Mr Lockwood, who 
becomes ' t i r e d of being banished from the world' (p 450) and returns 
to London for s i x months (p 442) , either to an unknown occupation, or, 
more l i k e l y , to h i s independent means. The other major characters are 
mainly economically dependent: Catherine Earnshaw/ dependent on Hindley 
before marriage, and on Edgar after marriage; I s a b e l l a , dependent on 
Edgar before marriage, then on Heathcliff after marriage, and then, 
a f t e r running away, somehow existing, we know now how, 'in the south, 
near London' (p 271); Catherine Linton, dependent on Edgar before marriage, 
and upon Heathcliff ; aft e r her marriage to Linton Heathcliff: 
'The r e s t of them do earn t h e i r bread - you l i v e on my 
charityJ', says Heathcliff to her, p 42.; 
Linton Heathcliff, dependent on Heathcliff, but destined for inheritance; 
Hareton, u n t i l the end of the novel -
'... reduced to a state of complete dependence on h i s 
father's inveterate enemy; and l i v e s i n h i s own house 
as a servant deprived of the advantage of wages ..." 
(P 279) 
The emphasis upon economic dependence i s to be expected, given Emily's 
own economic circumstances; and the sparse portrayal of occupational work 
i s consistent with her own narrow experience. 
The role of dependent economic situations i n the novel i s indeed 
of considerable significance: around economic dependence i s constructed 
an important, though probably not predominant, theme of the novel - a theme 
which seems cl e a r l y influenced by Emily's own economic action conditions, 
i . e . the lack of opportunity for women to achieve economic independence. 
I n contrast to the world of Charlotte's novels, i n 'Wuthering Heights' 
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there i s no apparent escape even to employment as a governess. The 
three main female characters (apart from the principle narrator) i n 
the novel i l l u s t r a t e the lack of opportunities: I s a b e l l a has a choice 
between dependence upon Edgar or upon a husband; i n marrying Heathcliff 
she cuts off her t i e s with disapproving Edgar (pp 197-8 & 217) , and in 
leaving Heathcliff she fends we know not how. I n contrast, Heathcliff 
i s able to go away and, though again we know not how, gain a substantial 
sum of money to keep him f i n a n c i a l l y independent thereafter"*": 
'"Rich, s i r I " she returned. "He has, nobody knows 
what money, and every year i t increases ..."' 
(p 47) 
Catherine Linton (junior) i s o r i g i n a l l y expected to inherit her father's 
wealth, but, through a contrived marriage to Heathcliff's c^ing son, 
and throfugh Heathcliff's own marriage to Is a b e l l a , this money eventually 
comes to Heathcliff (p 437) , and she, 'destitute of cash' , becomes 
dependent on him: not u n t i l h is death can she hope for f i n a n c i a l inde-
pendence through inheritance. Her mother, however, provides the best 
i l l u s t r a t i o n of the economic opportunities within the universe of 
'Wuthering Heights': Catherine Earnshaw i s unable to obtain any work 
or use any private money for the purpose of continuing to l i v e at her 
accustomed standard. Marrying Heathcliff would immediately take her 
down to h i s l e v e l of poverty, which could not apparently be alle v i a t e d 
through any economic action on her part. Her only solution, then, since 
Hindley i s unlikely to die soon, and would i n any case leave h i s property 
to his son, i s to marry Edgar, and only then w i l l she be able to help 
Heathcliff materially: 
1 Dupont, i n 'Trois Notes Sur Les BrontS', points out that the rapid 
making of a fortune i s not an u n r e a l i s t i c and magical l i t e r a r y 
device for Emily, but rather was an occurrence that she would 
have encountered frequently i n reading the Leeds Mercury of the 
time, which reported dramatic r i s e s to wealth associated with 
the Railway-Bubble and with emigration lands speculation. 
(Dupont, 1953: 16-19) 
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' ... i f Heathcliff and I married, we should be beggars . .. 
whereas, i f I many Linton, I can aid Heathcliff to r i s e , 
and place him out of my brother's power.' 
(p 120) 
The influence of Emily's economic action upon the evaluative content 
of 'Wuthering Heights' i s seen most strongly i n the attitudes of her 
characters towards money. We have already seen how predominantly 
inheritance and f i n a n c i a l dependency figure in the livelihoods of the 
characters. Whilst this often creates d i f f i c u l t i e s (as we have seen for 
the female characters i n p a r t i c u l a r ) , these arise more from the fact that 
inheritance i s not always available, and from the p o s s i b i l i t y of one's 
being f i n a n c i a l l y dependent upon someone one detests, rather than from 
an aversion to those economic means per se and a contrasting desire to 
earn one's l i v i n g through paid employment. The impression one receives 
i s that, according to the world view i n 'Wuthering Heights', t h i s l a t t e r 
alternative i s to be avoided i f possible: i f i t i s unavoidable, then 
i t should be completed as soon as possible, Heathcliff-style. A 
wealthy economic situation i s valued, not for the money i t s e l f or the 
status that i t brings, but rather for the independence that i t attains, 
an independence that frees one from the necessity of actively maintaining 
or furthering one's economic situation. This, then, appears to be the 
economic value-position i n the 'Wuthering Heights' world view: i t i s 
shared by those of whom the author seems to approve, and, where charac-
ters neglect a proper evaluation of economic matters, they and others may 
suffer the consequence. 
For example, the p r i n c i p l e heroines, the two Catherines, are both 
motivated by status, but both overcome this i n their eventual unequiv-
ocal love for Heathcliff (Catherine senior) or Hareton (Catherine ju n i o r ) . 
But, by. the time Catherine senior abandons her concerns for status, i t i s 
too l a t e : she i s able to reconcile with Heathcliff without reservation only 
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a t the time o f her death (pp 241-2) ; and by then H e a t h c l i f f has degen-
e r a t e d from the uhobsessed freedom o f h i s e a r l y days with Catherine 
Earnshaw, i n t o a mean and v i c i o u s man i n t e n t on accumulation of wealth 
f o r the sake o f power and revenge: 
'... he's very near - close-handed; ... he could not 
have borne to miss the chance of ge t t i n g a few hundred 
more. I t i s strange people should be so greedy when 
they a r e alone i n the w o r l d I ' 
(p 47) 
'The v i l l a g e r s a f f i r m e d Mr. H e a t h c l i f f was "near', and 
a c r u e l hard l a n d l o r d to h i s tenants;' 
(p 293) 
'... my v i o l e n t e x e r t i o n s . ... I g e t l e v e r s and mattocks 
to demolish the two houses, — everything i s ready and 
i n my power ... My o l d enemies have not beaten me - now 
would be the p r e c i s e time to revenge myself on t h e i r 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s - I could do i t and none could hinder me,' 
(p 479) 
T h i s r u t h l e s s p u r s u i t o f a path towards economic power stems from 
C a t h e r i n e Earnshaw's s t a t u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , which d r i v e H e a t h c l i f f to 
le a v e 'Wuthering Heights' to seek h i s fortune: 
'He had l i s t e n e d t i l l he heard Catherine say i t would 
degrade her to marry him, and then he stayed to hear 
no f u r t h e r . ' 
(P 118) 
The r e v e a l e d consequences o f f a l s e economic e v a l u a t i o n s i n d i c a t e Emily's 
concern a t the i l l e f f e c t s o f p l a c i n g value on money other than f o r the 
sake o f independence from o c c u p a t i o n a l w o r r i e s . 
I n I s a b e l l a , the concern f o r the s t a t u s t h a t economic s i t u a t i o n 
a t t a i n s i s cons i d e r a b l y g r e a t e r : she f e e l s a t a l o s s a t 'Wuthering 
Heights', where the comforts obtained by wealth, and a s s o c i a t e d w i t h 
her former s t a t u s , are l a c k i n g . The author's condemnation of I s a b e l l a ' s 
weakness, l a c k of r e s o u r c e f u l n e s s , and dependence upon s e r v a n t s , i s 
i n d i c a t e d both through the open gibes o f the 'Wuthering Heights' 
r e s i d e n t s , and even through N e l l y Dean's attempt a t defending her: 
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' I hope you' l l consider that Mrs. Heathcliff i s 
accustomed to be looked after and waited on, and 
that she has been brought up l i k e an only daughter, 
whomi every one was ready to serve. You must l e t 
her have a maid to keep things tidy about her ..." 
(p 223) 
The reader's sympathy i s however engaged for I s a b e l l a ' s predicament of 
being dependent on a man she detests. 
A comparison of Hareton and Linton Heathcliff, r i v a l s for Catherine 
Linton's affection, reveals Emily's sympathy with Haretbn's lack of 
concern for wealth compared with Linton Heathcliff's feeble and 
avaricious nature: the progressive revelation of the despicable char-
acter of the l a t t e r (the offspring of the mercenary Heathcliff and the 
weak Isabella) contrasts with Hareton's heroic emergence at the end of 
the novel as Catherine Linton's betrothed. 
Hindley and Joseph, neither of whom are portrayed favourably, both 
appear very mercenary. Hindley turns to gambling: 
'There were some persons s i t t i n g at cards - Heathcliff 
joined them; my brother (Hindley) lost some money to 
him; and, finding hifli p l e n t i f u l l y supplied, he requested 
that he would come again i n the evening, ... he (Hindley) 
was always greedy, though what he grasps with one hand 
he f l i n g s away with the other.' 
(pp 146-7) 
'.. . Hindley has been borrowing money on his land; and 
does nothing but play and drink, ..." 
(p 153) 
Joseph's appraisals of people are partly dependent on their economic 
power to benefit him: 
'... Joseph ... fortunately recognised me for a respec-
table character by the sweet ring of a sovereign at his 
feet.' 
(p 500) 
Nelly Dean, narrator for most of the novel, disapproves of evaluations 
of economic situation i n status terms, as i s indicated by her advice 
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to Catherine Earnshaw and Catherine Linton on the subject of the i r r e l a -
tionships with Heathcliff (pp 114-5 & 119) and Hareton (pp 289-291) 
respectively, each 'lower' than themselves. 
The economic values which permeate the 'Wuthering Heights' world 
view are c l e a r l y those which were found to guide Emily i n her own 
economic action: money i s considered to have positive value only in the 
context of i t s capacity to grant independence: once an independent 
economic situation i s secured, concern for the r e a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t matters 
of l i f e can proceed unimpeded. I t i s these matters which constitute the 
pr i n c i p l e subject matter, the predominant themes of the novel: wild 
passions, love and contempt, revenge and hatred, strength and weakness, 
the search for unity beyond that attainable i n this world, the tempering 
value of sympathy. Whilst the endeavour to ascertain the influence of 
Emily's economic action upon the economic cognitions and evaluations i n 
the 'Wuthering Heights' world view i s v a l i d , to attempt to trace the 
predominant themes of the novel to Emily's economic action would be to 
force a wealth of experience into an irrelevant economic framework. 
The point i s that the consciousness involved in her economic action i s 
not extended more generally through her world view: our own interest in 
such consciousness must not blind us to the value-reference of the world 
view of Emily Bront6 or her novel.''' With 'Wuthering Heights' , i t i s 
indeed more interesting to review (as i n the next sections) the pre-
dominant attitudes and cognitive s t y l e s in i t s world view, the atypl-
c a l i t y of i t s formative p r i n c i p l e s , than to trace in the novel the 
manifestation of-the cognitions and evaluations involved i n Emily's 
economic action. This l a t t e r has however been of use: (a) i n indicating 
the place of economic considerations i n the 'Wuthering Heights' world 
•'• For the d i s t i n c t i o n between value-relevance and value-reference, 
see above. Chapter 11, p 274 
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view - not a predominant, but yet a s i g n i f i c a n t place i f one considers 
how c r u c i a l are the themes of dependency , inheritance and greed to the 
working of the plot; (b) i n showing how one may, through analysis of 
plot, description and conversation i n the novel, interpret the economic 
aspects of i t s world view; and (c) i n avoiding the kind of dogmatism 
that would read into Emily's l i f e and works a 'representative' s i g n i -
ficance, an 'embodiment' of certain h i s t o r i c a l class c o n f l i c t s . 
(Eagleton, 1975: 11 & 119-120) 
Emily BrontS's l i t e r a r y role contacts, including her attempts at 
commmicSttion with her readers, are discussed in the next section, as 
a preliminary to an accovint of the atypicallty of the 'Wuthering Heights' 
world view. 
( i l l ) Emily BrontS's L i t e r a r y Role Contacts 
I t was argued above"*" that Emily did not see writing i n occupational 
terms. I f she was r e l a t i v e l y unconcerned with any f i n a n c i a l p r o f i t that 
might accrue from her l i t e r a r y work, she was thus le s s economically 
obliged that those who depend on writing for the i r livelihood, or those 
who write part-time for p r o f i t , to take account of the reception she 
expected from publishers, c r i t i c s and readers. Similarly she could 
neglect paying attention to her d i r e c t and indirect l i t e r a r y role 
contacts i f her piablic l i t e r a r y ambitions were low. Yet i f t h i s l a t t e r 
contention Implies a lack of concern for commionication through her work, 
there i s evidence to suggest the contention i s fa l s e . Miriam A l l o t t 
indeed argues precisely the opposite: she claims that Emily was 
influenced by what she thought -
•'' See above, p 292 
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'... would be most l i k e l y to interest and hold a 
contemporary audience.' 
(1970: 13) 
and thus chose the s t y l e and content of the popular 'dark t a l e s ' in 
Blackwood's magazine; that Emily was also influenced by Scott, for 
whom a taste, shared by the BrontS family, was widespread at the time; 
and that Emily agreed with the popular tradition that the heroine of a 
no-^el should be beautiful. 
We must beware of assuming, however, that any of these l i t e r a r y 
forms were adopted by Emily for u t i l i t a r i a n purposes of commiinlcation: 
her choice of a 'dark t a l e ' and beautiful heroines i n 'Wuthering Heights' 
seems more l i k e l y to be a continuation of a preference already established 
i n Emily's 'Gondal' poems, with t h e i r stark and passionate representations, 
and the beautiful heroine Augusta Geraldine Almeda. The l i t e r a r y forms 
available to Emily, through Scott, Blackwood's, and even the Leeds 
Mercury, certainly suggested themes and styles to her, but our interest 
i s rather i n the way she shaped these forms to her own purposes. Whilst 
writing the Gondal poems, these purposes do not seem to have included 
communication. Once the secret poems were discovered, though, and Emily 
was persuaded to have them pviblished, she took account of the a n t i c i -
pated public reception of her work through selection of the poems that 
she thought would have more universal appeal, and through modification 
of them by the alteration of Gondal names. 
I n 'Wuthering Heights' one might expect to find more evidence of 
attempts at communication; and Indeed, as mentioned i n Chapter lO,"*" the 
narrative structure has such complexity, and i s sustained with such 
^ See above. Chapter 10, p 246 
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care, that i t encourages the conviction that Emily had a strong interest 
i n claiming realism and authenticity for the universe of the novel. Yet 
how are we to reconcile t h i s concern for the reader with the f a c t that 
the novel shocked so many of those who read i t ? Emily's largely non-
economic motive for writing would certainly grant her a degree of freedom 
i n the choice of themes and s t y l e s for her work; but her apparent aim 
of communication would l i m i t t h i s freedom, 5^ she was aware of the 
expectations of her l i t e r a r y role contacts. I t i s indeed a lack of aware-
ness of her readers' expectations, a distance from her role contacts, 
rather than a lack of concern for ccamnunication, that accounts for the 
at y p i c a l i t y of the 'Wuthering Heights' world view. 
(iv) The Atypicality of 'Wuthering Heights' 
The reason why 'Wuthering Heights" di f f e r s so ra d i c a l l y from other 
novels of the time, why i t was so unacceptable to such a large propor-
tion of the Victorian public, and why i t made even Emily"s s i s t e r s 
shudder a t certain aspects of i t s universe, appears to be that Emily 
was unaware: (a) that her public did not share certain of her world view 
assmptions; and (b) that she did not share t h e i r s . 
To deal f i r s t with the l a t t e r : the public would have been di s -
turbed at certain key aspects of thei r s o c i a l world not being taken 
for granted, i n p a r t i c u l a r i n Emily's attitude towards status-distinc-
tions. Emily reveals her disapproval of conventional status-distinc-
tions i n several ways; some have already been mentioned above i n 
connection with Emily's evaluation of economic situations; others 
include the following: 
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Through N e l l y Dean, Em i l y makes a comparison between Hindley and 
H e a t h c l i f f (brought up together, but the l a t t e r an orphan found by, 
and not born of, o l d Mr. Earnshaw) from which H e a t h c l i f f , i n f e r i o r i n 
s t a t u s terms, emerges as s u p e r i o r to Hindley i n other r e s p e c t s (pp 54-55). 
N e l l y Dean l a t e r recounts w i t h obvious disapproval Hindley' s t y r a n n i c a l 
i n s i s t e n c e upon s t a t u s - d i s t a n c e between the Earnshaw family and H e a t h c l i f f 
(pp 66 & 7 7 ) . 
Through C a t h e r i n e s e n i o r , E m i l y r i d i c u l e s Edgar's snobbish a t t i t u d e 
towards H e a t h c l i f f : 
'(Edgar) looked vexed, and suggested the k i t c h e n as 
a more s u i t a b l e p l a c e f o r ( H e a t h c l i f f ) . ... 
(Catherine:) " S e t two t a b l e s here, E l l e n ; one f o r 
your master and Miss I s a b e l l a , being gentry; the 
o t h e r f o r H e a t h c l i f f and myself, being of the lower 
o r d e r s . W i l l t h a t p l e a s e you, dear? Or must I have 
a f i r e l i g h t e d elsewhere?"' 
(p 140) 
C a t h e r i n e j u n i o r expresses h e r b e l i e f -Uiat i t was wrong to invoke 
income/status o b j e c t i o n s to H e a t h c l i f f ' s marrying I s a b e l l a . (p 322) 
I s a b e l l a ' s g e n t i l i t y i s seen t o be merely a product of circvimstance: 
when moved to an environment which does not possess the trapping of 
her s t a t u s , she: 
"... partook of the pervading s p i r i t of n e g l e c t whickh 
encompassed h e r . ... So much had circumstances a l t e r e d 
t h e i r p o s i t i o n s , t h a t ( H e a t h c l i f f ) would c e r t a i n l y have 
s t r u c k a s t r a n g e r as a born and bred gentleman; and h i s 
w i f e as a thorough l i t t l e s l a t t e r n 1 ' 
(p 218) 
W h i l s t L i n t o n H e a t h c l i f f appears more r e f i n e d to Catherine L i n t o n ' s 
eyes a t f i r s t (p 370) , i t i s t h e cruder Hareton who i s the hero of the 
f i n a l s t a g e s of the novel, L i n t o n H e a t h c l i f f being p o r t r a y e d as the most 
c o n t o n p t i b l e of the c h a r a c t e r s . 
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N e l l y Dean's sympathy w i t h C a t h e r i n e L i n t o n ' s d e s i r e to share her educa-
t i o n w i t h Hareton appears to be based on a high e v a l u a t i o n of the ple a s u r e , 
r a t h e r than the p r e s t i g e , which education b r i n g s , (pp 477-8) 
The second a s p e c t o f the d i s t u r b i n g nature o f 'Wuthering Heights' 
f o r i t s readers i s more obvious: elements of the 'Wuthering Heights' 
u n i v e r s e which E m i l y takes f o r granted as e x i s t i n g and as worthy of 
being represented, shock and h o r r i f y her readers. Among other matters, 
such an i n t e n s e h a t r e d and v i n d i c t i v e n e s s , and p h y s i c a l v i o l e n c e towards 
humans and animals, the novel d e a l s w i t h passionate e x t r a - m a r i t a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s , w ithout the author making her condemnation e x p l i c i t . 
These-'gross v i o l a t i o n s of conventional m o r a l i t y are not even s u b j e c t to 
a neat operation o f p o e t i c j u s t i c e ; and the ccxnmonplace V i c t o r i a n values 
of r e s p e c t a b i l i t y , c l e a n l i n e s s , decency, are s e v e r e l y underplayed i n 
comparison, f o r example, w i t h C h a r l o t t e ' s novels. T h i s must be a p r i n -
c i p a l reason why we f i n d , when reading the c r i t i c s o f the time, a -
'... p i c t u r e of almost complete c r i t i c a l d i s a pproval .. .' 
(Watson, 1949: 244) 
and, as A l l o t t p o i n t s out: 
'The f i r s t r e v i e w e r s o f 1847 and 1848 convey, i n 
t h e i r p e r p l e x i t y a t i t s apparent moral unorthodoxy 
and i n the urgency o f t h e i r d i s t r e s s a t i t s v i o l e n c e , 
the strong impression made upon them by t h i s unusual 
a d d i t i o n to the output of new novels. They were 
c e r t a i n l y upset by i t s d e s e r t i n g the accepted conven-
t i o n which r e q u i r e d the author to provide c l e a r moral 
s i g n - p o s t s f o r h i s reader's guidance.' 
(1970: 17) 
A l l o t t here i n d i c a t e s what i s perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t a t y p i c a l i t y 
of 'Wuthering Heights': i t s l a c k o f a m o r a l i s t i c 'expressive style'."*" 
"'• The concept o f 'expre s s i v e s t y l e ' i s introduced i n Chapter 10, 
pp 236-237 
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I t i s probably t h i s , more than simply the p o r t r a y a l o f immorality, 
t h a t shocked the p u b l i c : one could p o r t r a y wicked men and events as 
long as one's condemnation thereof i s made c l e a r i n the t e x t . I n f a c t 
'Wuthering Heights' i s not without moral judgements, as we have already 
seen - b u t these a r e l e f t f o r the reader to i n t e r p r e t r a t h e r than being 
made e x p l i c i t . Ewbank p o i n t s out t h a t the very n a r r a t i v e method which 
Emily uses -
' . .. does not allow of any i n t r u s i v e commment to 
e s t a b l i s h a d i r e c t moral rapport between her and her 
rea d e r s •.. Nor does i t allow f o r the running commen-
t a r y by which an omniscient author could give h i s 
reader the moral bearings o f s i t u a t i o n s and remind 
him o f the exemplary f u n c t i o n o f c h a r a c t e r s and 
i n c i d e n t s ...' 
(1966: 94) 
Ewbank s t r o n g l y emphasises t h a t the absence o f e x p l i c i t moral commen-
t a r y should not be taken to imply a l a c k of moral judgements i n the 
novel. I n other words, what i s m i s s i n g i n the novel i s not moral e v a l -
u a t i o n , but r a t h e r a m o r a l i s t i c e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e ; and Em i l y ' s readers 
could probably have accepted much of the content i f i t had been presented 
w i t h i n the framework o f such a s t y l e . 
The f a c t t h a t Emily chose her p a r t i c u l a r n a r r a t i v e method i s 
s i g n i f i c a n t : i t i n d i c a t e s t h a t she was more concerned with r e a l i s m than 
with moralism. The l a c k of a m o r a l i s t i c e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e may be 
exp l a i n e d i n two p r i n c i p a l ways: Emily was so d i s t a n c e d from her readers 
t h a t she was unaware o f t h e i r expectations of moralism i n the novel; 
and/or she was so d i s t a n c e d from them t h a t she was unaware of the d i v e r -
gence between her assumptions and t h e i r s , and thus o f the need to j u s t i f y 
h e r p o i n t of view. Evidence o f E m i l y ' s l a c k o f r e c o g n i t i o n of the a t y p i -
c a l i t y of her world view, and t h a t of her novel, comes from C h a r l o t t e : 
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'... every page (of 'Wuthering Heights') i s surcharged 
w i t h a s o r t o f moral e l e c t r i c i t y ; arid the w r i t e r was 
unconscious o f a l l t h i s - nothing could make her con-
s c i o u s of i t . ' 
( C h a r l o t t e : l e t t e r t o W S W i l l i a m s , quoted i n G a s k e l l : 415) 
' I f t he a u d i t o r of her work, when read i n manuscript, 
shuddered under the g r i n d i n g i n f l u e n c e o f natures so 
r e l e n t l e s s and implacable - o f s p i r i t s so l o s t and 
f a l l e n ... E l l i s B e l l (Emily BrontS) would wonder 
what was meant, and s u s p e c t the complainant o f a f f e c -
t i o n . ' 
(Quoted i n G a s k e l l : 314) 
A s i m i l a r p o i n t could be made concerning Emily's views on s t a t u s - d i s t i n c -
t i o n s : w h i l s t she r e c o g n i s e s , as noted above, the importance o f s t a t u s 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n people'is a c t i o n s , she does not concur with these 
conventions; y e t she does not engage i n a lengthy j u s t i f i c a t i o n of her 
p o s i t i o n on t h i s i s s u e . She i s l e s s aware of the divergence between her 
world view assimiptions and those o f her readers than i s Charlotte"*", and 
hence does not adopt a s e l f - l e g i t i m a t i n g expressive s t y l e . 
(v) E m i l y BrontB's Work S i t u a t i o n and I t s I n f l u e n c e Upon Her 
C o g n i t i v e and E x p r e s s i v e S t y l e s 
The divergence between Emily BrontS and her readers cannot be 
e x p l a i n e d simply i n terms of her freedom from economic concerns i n her 
authorship, or by the suggestion t h a t her p u b l i c l i t e r a r y ambitions 
were low: the c a r e f u l r e a l i s m of 'Wuthering Heights' i n d i c a t e s , as 
noted above, a c o n s i d e r a b l e concern f o r communication. To account f o r 
the divergence, we must bear i n mind the whole complex of f a c t o r s 
i n v o l v e d i n Emily's ' i s o l a t i o n ' , and i t i s here t h a t c l a s s elements 
again appear s i g n i f i c a n t , i n p a r t i c u l a r Emily's work s i t u a t i o n . 
E m i l y ' s r e l a t i v e l y i s o l a t e d work s i t u a t i o n may he l p to e x p l a i n why 
she i s unaware t h a t h e r readers w i l l expect a m o r a l i s t i c e x p r e s s i v e 
See below, p 369 f f 
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s t y l e , why she i s a b l e t o r e t a i n her deviant world view assumptions, 
why she f a i l s to r e c o g n i s e the a t y p i c a l i t y of these assumptions, and 
thus why she f e e l s no need to adept a s e l f - l e g i t i m a t i n g e x p r e s s i v e 
s t y l e . I t i s not j u s t as a p u b l i c e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e , however, t h a t 
moralism i s l a c k i n g : t h e r e i s no evidence of a m o r a l i s t i c c o g n i t i v e 
style"*" i n E m i l y ' s p r i v a t e expressions (her Gondal poems, bir t h d a y notes, 
e t c . ) . Thus the s e c l u s i o n favoured by her work s i t u a t i o n may be seen 
as s h i e l d i n g her from the predominant contemporary c o g n i t i v e s t y l e of 
moralism, which she would have found d i f f i c u l t to avoid adopting, had 
she been f o r c e d to earn her l i v i n g i n a context l e s s i s o l a t e d than the 
Haworth Parsonage. 
Turning from the c o g n i t i v e s t y l e t h a t i s absent i n Emily BrontS to 
one t h a t i s apparent, i t may be suggested t h a t E m i l y ' s i s o l a t e d work 
s i t u a t i o n i s p a r t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a s t r i k i n g f e a t u r e of the 'Wuthering 
Heights' world view, i . e . an e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e c h a r a c t e r i s e d by:- r a t h e r 
s t a r k , 'extreme' p o r t r a y a l s of i n d i v i d u a l s ; a concentration on e x t e r n a l 
2 
f e a t u r e s ; the i m p l i c a t i o n of a wealth of 'background' i n the c h a r a c t e r s ; 
3 
dimly i l l u m i n a t e d air i b i g u i t i e s ; a' .tendency towards melodrama. Some of 
these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a r e p r e s e n t even i n the f i r s t paragraph of the 
n o v e l , where we have the f i r s t d e s c r i p t i o n of H e a t h c l i f f : 
'. .. I beheld h i s b l a c k eyes withdraw so s u s p i c i o u s l y 
under t h e i r brows as I rode up, and ... h i s f i n g e r s 
s h e l t e r e d themselves, w i t h a j e a l o u s r e s o l u t i o n , s t i l l 




F o r the d i s t i n c t i o n between e x p r e s s i v e and c o g n i t i v e s t y l e , 
see above. Chapter 10, p 236 
See Auerbach, 1953: 12 
' L i f e presented i t s e l f v i o l e n t l y and d r a m a t i c a l l y to her, ... 
she saw l i f e i n u n u s u a l l y bare, dramatic l i n e s . ... Cut o f f from 
the i n n e r aspect, her c o n c e n t r a t i o n upon the outside view of events 
became the more i n t e n s e , and so unconsciously she went 
f u r t h e r i n dramatic emphasis than she r e a l i s e d . ' 
( W i l l i s , 1963: 117-8) 
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T h i s e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e , c l e a r l y apparent i n 'Wuthering Heights', 
i s even more s t r o n g l y e v i d e n t i n Emily's 'Gondal' poems, which are 
the remnants of an imaginary world i n which, i t seems, Emily spent 
much of her time. I t may thus be suggested t h a t t h i s s t y l e i s not 
confined to E m i l y ' s p u b l i c l i t e r a r y e x p r e s s i o n s , but i s a c o g n i t i v e 
s t y l e of r e l a t i v e l y wide extension through her world view. She would 
doubtless have w r i t t e n a very d i f f e r e n t book had she not been so deeply 
i n v o l v e d i n her Gondal e p i c f o r so long: she w r i t e s i n her b i r t h d a y 
note of 1845 (only three y e a r s before her death and a year before 
completing 'Wuthering H e i g h t s ' ) : 
'The Gondals s t i l l f l o u r i s h b r i g h t as ever. I am a t 
p r e s e n t w r i t i n g a work on the F i r s t War.' 
(Quoted by W i l l i s , 1963: 99) 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t to conceive of the Gondal f a n t a s y having such a g r i p 
on her, had she been forc e d , as was C h a r l o t t e , to gain employment f o r a 
c o n s i d e r a b l e l e n g t h of time away from Haworth. What we may c a l l the 
'Gondal' c o g n i t i v e s t y l e c ould s u r v i v e because of Emily's work s i t u a -
t i o n , which allowed time f o r f a n t a s y , and d i d not enforce too prolonged 
a c o n t a c t w i t h a c o n v e n t i o n a l s o c i a l world t h a t might have engendered 
a c o n f l i c t i n g c o g n i t i v e s t y l e . Support i s given to t h i s hypothesis by 
a comparison w i t h C h a r l o t t e , who, as we s h a l l see"*", found i t very d i f f i -
c u l t not to r e t r e a t t o her imaginary world of 'Angria', but nonetheless 
was f o r c e d to break out of i t s grasp through her prolonged absences i n 
employment away from Haworth. 
Y e t i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t the Gondal c o g n i t i v e s t y l e was confined to 
E m i l y ' s l i t e r a r y u n i v e r s e : she may w e l l have viewed those around her 
i n the l i g h t of a s i m i l a r c o g n i t i v e s t y l e , a s t y l e t h a t might have 
broken down under the p r e s s u r e of wider s o c i a l c o n t a c t s , and i s thus 
•*" See below, pp 333-334 
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again maintained,through the i s o l a t i o n provided by her work s i t u a -
t i o n . C h a r l o t t e ' s p e r c e p t i v e comment on t h i s i s s u e i s e n l i g h t e n i n g : 
' I am bound to avow t h a t she had s c a r c e l y more p r a c t i c a l 
knowledge o f the peasantry amongst whom she l i v e d than a 
nun has of the country people t h a t pass her convent g a t e s . 
My s i s t e r ' s d i s p o s i t i o n was not n a t u r a l l y gregarious; 
circumstances favoured and f o s t e r e d her tendency to s e c l u -
s i o n ; ... Though h e r f e e l i n g f o r the people round her was 
benevolent, i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h them she never sought, nor, 
w i t h very few exceptions, ever experienced; ... what her 
mind had gathered of the r e a l concerning them, was too 
e x c l u s i v e l y c o n f i n e d to those t r a g i c and t e r r i b l e t r a i t s , 
o f which, i n l i s t e n i n g to the s e c r e t annals of every rude 
v i c i n a g e , the memory i s sometimes compelled to r e c e i v e 
the impress.' 
(Quoted by G a s k e l l : 314, my emphasis) 
I n terms of Chapter 5., then,"*" E m i l y ' s work s i t u a t i o n experience allowed 
the r e t e n t i o n of the Gondal c o g n i t i v e s t y l e , which might otherwise have 
been excluded had she undergone more prolonged experience o f the r e s -
t r i c t i v e s i t u a t i o n s i n which her s i s t e r s had to work. More p a r t i c u -
l a r l y , i n terms o f Chapter 7, E m i l y ' s work s i t u a t i o n i n v o l v e d a r e l a t i v e 
2 
l a c k of c o n t a c t w i t h competing c o g n i t i v e s t y l e s , or w i t h divergent 
c o g n i t i o n s , and thus the p r i n c i p l e s of her Gondal c o g n i t i v e s t y l e 
remained unchallenged. None o f t h i s i s to suggest t h a t Emily's work 
s i t u a t i o n 'determined' h e r world view: her work s i t u a t i o n , o f f e r i n g 
r e l a t i v e s o c i a l independence and s e c l u s i o n , was c o n s c i o u s l y chosen from 
those a v a i l a b l e to her, probably f o r the p r e c i s e reason of i t s l a c k of 
d i s r u p t i v e i n f l u e n c e upon her world view. 
F i n a l l y i n t h i s s e c t i o n , i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to compare the express-
i v e s t y l e o f 'Wuthering Heights' and t h a t of Dostoievsky's 'The I d i o t ' . 
See above. Chapter 5, p 121 
2 '... a narrow s e t of c l a s s c o n t a c t s and few contacts outside 
the sphere of c l a s s ' - Chapter 7, above, p 158 
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The l a t t e r c o n t r a s t s s t r o n g l y w i t h the former i n having been w r i t t e n 
i n h a s t e f o r s e r i a l i s a t i o n and i n order to earn s u b s i s t e n c e and to pay 
o f f debts. (Magarshack, 1955: 7 f f ) An e f f e c t of urgency i s achieved 
through melodrama: one i s kept on edge a t a l l times, and p a r t i c u l a r l y a t 
the ends o f chapters, to know what w i l l happen next. The c h a r a c t e r s , too, 
appear chosen f o r s e n s a t i o n a l i s m , and tend to l a c k the 'background' 
q u a l i t y o f those i n 'Wuthering Heights'. I n t h i s l a t t e r , by c o n t r a s t , 
the e f f e c t i s unhurried, the p l u r a l i t y of n a r r a t o r s and the leaping 
through time tending to break up any long-sustained t e n s i o n e f f e c t of 
the type t h a t engenders compulsive f u r t h e r reading. The c h a r a c t e r s , 
nonetheless s t a r k and extreme, and j u s t as much p a r t o f a conception t h a t 
may broadly be termed melodramatic, s t i l l convey a g r e a t e r sense o f 
r e a l i s m - not only through the s e t t i n g and reminders of day-to-day 
e x i s t e n c e , but through the i m p l i e d depth of background and ambiguity 
a l r e a d y noted above. They appear to belong more to an i n t e n s e l y f e l t 
m e t a p h y s i c a l realm than the c h a r a c t e r s i n 'The I d i o t ' , who seem to have 
been produced as much f o r arousing the p u b l i c ' s s e n s a t i o n s as f o r expres-
s i n g those of the author. Whatever the reason f o r the s e n s a t i o n a l i s m 
of 'The I d i o t ' , i t does abound w i t h e x p l i c i t e f f u s i o n s o f emotion, 
compared w i t h 'Wuthering Heights', where, as Ewbank p o i n t s out, Emily 
a c h i e v e s h e r e f f e c t -
'... by implying emotion r a t h e t than flooding her 
l i n e s w i t h i t ... ' 
(1966: 151) 
T h i s b r i e f comparison of 'Wuthering Heights' with 'The I d i o t ' does 
suggest t h a t the 'Gondal' c o g n i t i v e st^.le, which c o n s t i t u t e s a major 
formative p r i n c i p l e of E m i l y ' s l i t e r a r y expressions, i s p r o t e c t e d 
from i n c o r p o r a t i o n i n t o a p l o t - s e n s a t i o n form i n her novel, through 
her w r i t i n g thereof being seen i n c h i e f l y non-economic terms. The 
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i n f l u e n c e of economic a c t i o n upon l i t e r a r y form i s p a r t i c u l a r l y c l e a r 
i n t h i s conparison, where the e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e s a r e s u p e r f i c i a l l y so 
s i m i l a r . 
( v i ) C o n c l u s i o n on the Study of Emily Bront6 
I n the f i r s t f i v e s e c t i o n s of t h i s chapter we have attempted to 
t r a c e the i n f l u e n c e o f Emily BrontS's economic a c t i o n and work s i t u a -
t i o n upon her world view and t h a t of her novel. Emily's economic 
a c t i o n was seen t o i n f l u e n c e the c o g n i t i v e and e v a l u a t i v e content of 
'Wuthering Heights', p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the lack of p o r t r a y a l of work, 
i n the emphasis on economic dependence and i n the attitudes, of the 
c h a r a c t e r s towards money. More i n t e r e s t i n g l y , the a t y p i c a l i t y of the 
'Wuthering Heights' world view was considered, p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h r e s p e c t 
t o the treatment of s t a t u s conventions and unorthodox m o r a l i t y . The 
l a c k o f a m o r a l i s t i c or even s e l f - l e g i t i m a t i n g e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e was 
thought p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t . I t was suggested t h a t E m i ly's 
d e v i a n t a t t i t u d e s , and c o g n i t i v e and e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e s , were f o s t e r e d 
by her r e l a t i v e l y i s o l a t e d work s i t u a t i o n , which was a l s o p a r t l y r e s -
p o n s i b l e f o r her 'Gondal' c o g n i t i v e s t y l e . T h i s l a t t e r was d i s t i n -
guished from s e n s a t i o n a l melodrama, a s t y l e t h a t might have been 
encouraged had E m i l y ' s w r i t i n g been economically motivated. 
P a u c i t y of evidence means t h a t much of the r e s e a r c h on Emily 
BrontS's l i f e and thoughtmust remain t e n t a t i v e . We have however 
i n d i c a t e d how the concepts and approaches developed i n previous chap-
t e r s may suggest i n t e r e s t i n g hypotheses about Emily BrontB and her novel. 
I n p a r t i c u l a r , the concepts of work s i t u a t i o n and of c o g n i t i v e and 
e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e have proved i l l u m i n a t i n g . I n the r e s t o f t h i s 
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chapter, several of the hypotheses concerning Emily Brontfi are found 
to be useful in providing points of comparison with our princi p a l 
case study - a study of the l i f e and works of Charlotte Bront6. 
( v i i ) Charlotte Brontfe's Economic Action 
In t h i s section, the well-known features of Charlotte BrontS's 
biography w i l l be reviewed i n the l i g h t of an emphasis upon her econ-
omic action, conceived i n terms of sociological r a t i o n a l i t y as in the 
schema outlined i n Chapter 5.^ Charlotte's economic ends are best 
understood i n relat i o n to her values: i n particular, mental l i b e r t y 
( i n the sense of s u f f i c i e n t l e i s u r e for so l i t a r y r e f l e c t i o n ) : 
' I could l i k e to f e e l some mental lib e r t y . I could 
l i k e t h i s weight of r e s t r a i n t to be taken off." 
(Charlotte: l e t t e r to Emily, July 1839, quoted i n Gaskell: 158); 
duty: 
'She was too apt to consider, that allowing herself 
a holiday was a dereliction of duty ...' 
(Gaskell: 124) 
'(The s i s t e r s ) f e l t that i t was their duty to relieve 
t h e i r father of.the burden of t h e i r support, ... and, 
naturally, the l o t devolved upon the elder ones to find 
some occupation which would enable them to do t h i s . ' 
(Gaskell: 131) 
' She thought much of her duty, and had l o f t i e r and 
ciearer notions of i t than most people, and held fa s t 
to them with more success.' 
(Mary Taylor on Charlotte, quoted i n Gaskell: 525); 
resignation/forebearance: 
"... the poor are born to labour, and the dependent 
to endure.' 
(Charlotte: l e t t e r , July 1839, quoted i n Gaskell: 157) 
With such values i n mind, Charlotte was less attracted by the material 
possessions and s o c i a l status that wealthy economic situations attain, 
than by the prospect of economic independence: 
"*" See above. Chapter 5, p 121 
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'Did I not once say you ought to be thankful for your independ-
ence?' , she writes to E l l e n Nussey, July 1835 (quoted in Gaskell: 120). 
Economic independence would bring mental lib e r t y from occupational 
concerns. Over seven years l a t e r , after the death of her Aunt Branwell, 
she i s able to hope that the railway shares, bought with her inheritance, 
w i l l 'provide a small competency for l i f e ' . (Lane 1969: 258) But i n 
1835 her sense of duty impelled her to seek employment, and thus to earn 
enough to avoid being a burden upon others. (Gaskell: 120) 
The means available to Charlotte to maintain or improve her economic 
situation were the same as for Emily: writing, teaching as a governess, 
teaching i n a school, marriage., inheritance, dependence upon her family. 
Clearly, writing was the most attractive of these p o s s i b i l i t i e s for 
Charlotte: to be a writer had been her dream since childhood. At f i r s t , 
however, writing did not seem feasible to her as a form of economic action: 
',.. she he r s e l f had hardly yet ventured to contemplate 
( p i J b l i c a t i o n ) as a p r a c t i c a l s t e p ' 
( W i l l i s , 1963: 101) 
Charlotte was thus l e f t with the other, less a t t r a c t i v e p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
She certainly had few i l l u s i o n s about her marital prospects: 
"... i t i s an imbfecility, which I re j e c t with 
contempt, for women, who have neither fortune 
nor beauty, to make marriage the principal 
object of th e i r wishes and hopes, and the aim of 
a l l t h e i r actions; ... they had better be quiet, 
and think of other things than wedlock.' 
(Charlotte: l e t t e r to E l l e n Nussey, A p r i l 1843, quoted in Gaskell: 230) 
Although she received several proposals, these she rejected on emotional 
rather than p r a c t i c a l groimds: i t seems that she did not see marriage as 
a step to economic advancement. Increasingly she became convinced she 
would 'never marry at a l l ' (Gaskell: 176) , and claimed that she had 
f u l l y resigned h e r s e l f to her fate as an 'old maid'. (Gaskell: 161) 
Whatever the v a l i d i t y of t h i s claim, her views on marriage in economic 
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terms seem c l e a r ; and w i t h her sense of duty i n s i s t i n g on her not 
being a burden, she would be l i k e l y even when married to expect to 
earn some independent income. 
Her sense of duty i s a l s o r e s p o n s i b l e f o r her r e j e c t i n g dependence 
upon h e r f a t h e r ( G a s k e l l : 131). The r e c t o r ' s s m a l l incumbancy made i t 
i m p r a c t i c a b l e f o r a l l t h r e e s i s t e r s t o stay a t home, and C h a r l o t t e , as 
the o l d e s t , f e l t p a r t i c u l a r l y o b l i g e d to leave home to earn her l i v i n g -
u n t i l some y e a r s l a t e r , when her conscience demanded the opposite, i . e . 
t h a t she remain a t home to tend the s i c k or comfort her family a t the 
time of t h e Branwell s c a n d a l . ( G a s k e l l : 287) 
There Were no g r e a t prospects o f i n h e r i t a n c e f o r C h a r l o t t e ; but 
when Aunt Bra n w e l l died i n 1842, the legacy was considered u s e f u l f o r 
the f u r t h e r a n c e o f the s i s t e r s ' p l a n to s t a r t t h e i r own school; and i t 
was l a t e r thought to be a worthwhile s m a l l investment. For s e v e r a l y e a r s , 
though, C h a r l o t t e had to seek employment, and was thus l e f t w i t h the two 
occupations most obviously open to women of her background: governess 
o r s c h o o l teacher: 
'... teaching seemed to her a t t h i s time, as i t does 
to most women a t a l l times, the only way of earning 
an independent l i v e l i h o o d . ' 
( G a s k e l l : 151-2) 
C h a r l o t t e taught f o r a few y e a r s a t Miss Wooler's school, which she-
had p r e v i o u s l y attended as a p u p i l ; but ev e n t u a l l y the monotony, her 
s e p a r a t i o n from home and s i s t e r s , and her d i s l i k e f o r teaching i t s e l f , 
brought h e r to such a nervous c o n d i t i o n , t h a t a doctor advised her to 
le a v e . ( G a s k e l l : 149) Soon afterwards she obtained a post as a govern-
e s s , but the constant demand upon her time, not allowing her any p e r i o d 
of freedom per day, the s t r a i n o f looking a f t e r unruly c h i l d r e n w i t h 
whom she had but l i t t l e sympathy, and the i s o l a t e d and i n f e r i o r s o c i a l 
p o s i t i o n o f the governess w i t h i n the V i c t o r i a n family, caused her so 
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much a n x i e t y t h a t she l e f t w i t h i n two or three months. ( G a s k e l l : 158) 
However, l i t t l e more than a y e a r l a t e r , she f e l t o b l i g e d once more to 
f i n d a congenial post: 
'Much as she d i s l i k e d the l i f e of a p r i v a t e governess, 
i t was her duty to r e l i e v e h e r f a t h e r of the burden 
of h e r support, and t h i s was the only way open to her. 
So she s e t to a d v e r t i s i n g and i n q u i r i n g w i t h f r e s h 
vigour.' 
( G a s k e l l : 180) 
Although she obtained a p o s t i n a more congenial f a m i l y t h i s time, she 
w r i t e s to her f r i e n d E l l e n : 
'... no one but myself can t e l l how hard a governess's 
work i s to me ... how u t t e r l y a verse my whole mind 
and nature are f o r the employment.' 
( G a s k e l l : 184) 
Mrs G a s k e l l h e r s e l f d e s c r i b e s the d i f f i c u l t y of such a s i t u a t i o n f o r 
C h a r l o t t e : 
"... as her d e f i n i t e acquirements were few, she had 
to eke them out by employing her l e i s u r e time i n 
needlework; and a l t o g e t h e r her p o s i t i o n was t h a t of 
a 'bonne' or nursery governess, l i a b l e t o repeated 
and never-ending c a l l s upon her time. T h i s d e s c r i p -
t i o n of u n c e r t a i n , y e t p e r p e t u a l employment, s u b j e c t 
to the e x e r c i s e o f another person's w i l l a t a l l hours 
o f the day, was p e c u l i a r l y t r y i n g to one whose l i f e 
a t home had been f u l l of abundant l e i s u r e . ' 
( G a s k e l l : 182) 
C h a r l o t t e ' s p s y c h i c d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , together w i t h 
Anne's poor h e a l t h , made her t h i n k more s e r i o u s l y than before of a 
p l a n they had p r e v i o u s l y conceived, of s e t t i n g up a school of t h e i r 
own: 
'To have a s c h o o l , was t o have some po r t i o n of d a i l y 
l e i s u r e , u n c o n t r o l l e d but by her own sense o f duty; 
i t was f o r the t h r e e s i s t e r s , l o v i n g each other w i t h 
so p a s s i o n a t e an a f f e c t i o n , to be together under one 
roof, and y e t earning t h e i r own s u b s i s t e n c e ; ' 
( G a s k e l l : 190) 
C h a r l o t t e obtained a promise of a loan from her Aunt Branwell f o r t h i s 
purpose, but g r a d u a l l y became convinced that, with the l a r g e number of 
s c h o o l s competing f o r p u p i l s , i t was u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e i r venture would 
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succeed, unless they themselves had attained higher standards of educa-
tion. She thus persuaded her aunt to loan them the money for an alterna-
t i v e plan to further t h e i r education abroad, i n Brussels. She was 
convinced that t h i s preparation would enable them to make a success of 
the school project. (Gaskell: 191-3) Thus i n le s s than a year after 
taking up her second, and l a s t , position as a governess, Charlotte had 
l e f t i t and had set off for Brussels with Kmily. About nine months 
la t e r they returned from Brussels at Aunt Branwell's death, but Charlotte 
returned to-continue the considerable educational progress she had been 
making, financing her studies and keep out of earnings as an English 
teacher i n the school. (Gaskell: 226) Charlotte spent most of this 
year (1843) i n Brussels, but towards the end she returned to Haworth, 
her German having progressed s u f f i c i e n t l y , her attachment to M. Heger 
having progressed perhaps too deeply (at the expense of her relationship 
with Mme. Heger), and her father's blindness having progressed danger-
ously. (Lane, 1969: 176-7) She had, of course, besides a l l t h i s , 
been suffering as usual when away from her home and s i s t e r s . 
I t seemed now that the time was ripe for them to attempt to actualise 
t h e i r plan of setting up the i r own school, and thereby to gain the 
independence of working for themselves, with the concomitant greater 
'mental l i b e r t y ' and, of course, the great advantage of the three 
s i s t e r s staying together; they would indeed be remaining at Haworth, 
since they thought of converting part of the parsonage. There was 
however no reply to the cards they had printed advertising the school, 
and so t h i s one p r a c t i c a l hope of independently earning their l i v i n g 
was abandoned. (Gaskell: 249) Charlotte's experience of working away 
from home had by now led her to value a more active l i f e than at Haworth, 
but her father's deteriorating eyesight, and Branwell's increasing 
degeneracy, made her f e e l that i t was now her duty to stay at home. 
(Gaskell: 287) 
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A l l t h i s time the dream of l i t e r a r y success, though somewhat 
u n r e a l i s t i c , must have been a t the back ofhermind, since, as soon as 
she had come across Emily's poems i n the Autumn of 1845, she was very 
quick to suggest p\jblication, and to go about the necessary arrangements, 
negotiations, etc., with great zeal. (Gaskell: 264-8) Their book of 
poems, however, was a ccanplete f a i l u r e , and the s i s t e r s had to bear the 
cost of publication. ( W i l l i s , 1963: 101) During the negotiations, 
however, they had decided that they would each complete a prose tale 
for publication. (Lane, 1969: 197) While Emily's and Anne's efforts 
were accepted, Charlotte's 'The Professor' went the rounds of the 
pviblishers without success; but, even while t h i s f a i l u r e was becoming 
apparent, Charlotte began another work, more suited perhaps to public 
taste: 'Jane Eyre'. (Gaskell: 283) This was eventually accepted by 
Smith and Elder, a firm of publishers who had shown some int e r e s t i n 
'The Professor', and who had expressed interest i n any future work she 
might write i n three volumes and of more v i v i d interest. (Gaskell: 297) 
'Jane Eyre' was piiblished very s w i f t l y , even before the novels of 
Emily and Anne, and was very soon a great success. 'Shirley' and 
' V i l l e t t e ' followed a t Charlotte's own rate of writing, which could not 
be forced. Thus she writes to her pviblishers at the end of 1851: 
' I t i s not at a l l l i k e l y that my book w i l l be ready 
at the time you mention. I f my health i s spared> I 
s h a l l get on with i t as f a s t as i s consistent with 
i t s being done, i f not well, yet as well as I can do 
i t . Not one whit fa s t e r . When the mood leaves me ... i 
.putby the MS. and wait t i l l i t comes back again. 
God knows, I sometimes have to wait long - very 
long i t seems to me.' 
(quoted i n Gaskell: 458) 
I t i s interesting to try to establish the motivation for Charlotte's 
continuing authorship. Whilst economic motives may have been si g n i f i c a n t , 
i t i s unlikely that they were predominant: she never haggled with her 
publishers about remuneration, and indeed her novels, though most successful, 
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never made her wealthy. (Lane, 1969: 258) Her earnings did, however, 
enable her to make some improvements to the parsonage, i n terms of 
furniture etc. (Gaskell: 504)^ and granted her economic independence 
from occupational concerns - yet, after the deaths of Emily and Anne, 
she would i n any case have neither needed, nor been able, to work away 
from Haworth: her father could have supported her, and she f e l t obliged 
to stay at home and look after him as well as carry out other 'home 
duties'. (Gaskell: 382) I t thus seems l i k e l y that Charlotte at f i r s t 
saw authorship as a f a i n t p o s s i b i l i t y of augmenting the family income, 
and that, after the success of 'Jane Eyre', she continued to regard the 
money from the novels as useful. Her original attempts at piiblication, 
however, are more l i k e l y to have been oriented towards l i t e r a r y 'success'"'' 
than wealth or fame; and the desire for the maintenance of this success 
must have contributed to her continued authorship. She also f e l t i t was 
a duty to use the 'faculty of imagination', seen as a g i f t from God, to 
the best of her a b i l i t y . (Gaskell: 369) For example, i n a l e t t e r to 
Mr Smith her px±)lisher, Charlotte suggests that Thackeray w i l l have to 
put more e f f o r t into the writing of 'Esmond' i f the second and t h i r d 
volumes are to be a 'true success': 
'.,. I would do my best. Mr Thackeray i s easy and 
indolent, and seldom cares to do his best.' 
(February 1852, quoted i n Gaskell: 461-3) 
Fame certainly seems highly vmlikely to have been a goal of Charlotte's 
writing: Mrs. Gaskell points out how Charlotte had f e l t a strong temp-
tation to meet some of her publisher's l i t e r a r y friends -
'... but her resolution to remain unknown induced 
her firmly to put i t aside.' 
(Gaskell: 329) 
•'• I n the sense of the public recognition of l i t e r a r y merit: 
see above, Chapter 8, p 182 
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Charlotte indeed employed every means to preserve her anonymity, and 
was most disturbed at the piablic discovery of her 'secret, so jealously 
preserved.' (Gaskell: 373) 
One important reason for Charlotte's continuing authorship was the 
attempt to allay the morbid depressions of loneliness through intense 
a c t i v i t y , the a c t i v i t y of the imagination being p a r t i c u l a r l y suitable. 
This orientation to her work was certainly present i n the writing of 
' V i l l e t t e ' (Gaskell: 416-7), but even more so towards the end of 'Shirley', 
when intense involvement i n her work helped her to stop dwelling on the 
recent deaths i n her family: 
"... the l a s t volimie, I cannot deny, was composed in 
the eager, r e s t l e s s endeavour to combat mental 
sufferings that were scarcely tolerable.' 
(Charlotte: l e t t e r , 5 September 1850, quoted i n Gaskell: 413) 
Shortly after the completion of ' V i l l e t t e ' , Charlotte received her 
fourth proposal of marriage, from Mr Nicholls, her father's curate. This 
offer she was inclined to r e j e c t for the same reasons that she had rejected 
the previous ones: she was neither i n love, nor even found her suitor 
p a r t i c u l a r l y congenial. (Lane, 1969: 288) Charlotte may origi n a l l y have 
had status objections to an a l l i a n c e with Mr Nicholls: 
'She was prejudiced against him, she despised the 
general run of curates, and h i s stipend was £100 
a year.' 
(Lane, 1969: 20O); 
but l a t e r she found he r s e l f out of sympathy with her father's emphasis 
on status distinctions: 
'.. . he says the match would be a degradation, that I 
should be throwing myself away; that he expects me, 
i f I marry at a l l , to do very differently; in short, 
h i s manner of viewing the subject i s , on the whole, 
f a r from being one with which I can sympathise.' 
(Charlotte: l e t t e r to E l l e n Nussey, January 1853, 
quoted i n Lane, 1969: 287) 
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Nevertheless, even when Charlotte f e l t less inclined to r e j e c t Mr Nicholls, 
she found i t d i f f i c u l t to overcame her feeling of duty to respect her 
father's wishes. (Lane, 1969: 297) Eventually, however, her loneliness, 
her perception of Mr Nicholls' extreme devotion to her, and a growing 
affection for him through clandestine correspondence and meetings arranged 
through h i s persistence, altered Charlotte's view of the situation, and 
she attempted to persuade her father to adopt a different attitude towards 
the matter. (Lane, 1969: 298) Whilst Charlotte was not swayed by material 
advantages or disadvantages i n t h i s a f f a i r , her father i t seems may have 
reckoned otherwise: 
'The new curate ... was not giving s a t i s f a c t i o n . Mr Brontfe 
had grown accustomed to the method and thoroughness of 
Mr Nicholls's ministry, and everything seemed troublesome 
now that he was gone. I f he married Charlotte, he could 
come back to Haworth ... The store-room could be turned 
into a study, and out of h i s hundred a year Mr Nicholls 
would contribute to the household. Mr Bront6 began to per-
ceive that the marriage might even have i t s p r a c t i c a l 
advantage. ' 
(Lane, 1969: 299) 
After her marriage, Charlotte had but l i t t l e time to herself: 
' I r e a l l y seem to have had scarcely a spare moment since 
(the wedding) ... my time i s not my own now; ' 
(Charlote: l e t t e r quoted i n Gaskell: 518); 
but she seemed generally happy with the extra household and philanthropic 
duties she performed. (Gaskell: 519) She appears to have been very sat-
i s f i e d with her husband, and, for instance, found his meriting the 
character of -
"... a consistent C h r i s t i a n and a kind gentleman ... better 
than to earn either wealth, or fame, or power.' 
(Charlotte: l e t t e r quoted i n Gaskell: 518) 
Even now that she was so busy, she found time to begin a f i f t h novel, 
'Emma'. (Lane, 1969: 304) This novel was of course never completed, 
her married b l i s s being cut short after only nine months by her death. 
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( v i i i ) The Approach to Charlotte BrontS's Novels 
In the analysis of Charlotte BrontS's novels, we are attempting to 
trace the influence of Charlotte's own world view upon the world views of 
her l i t e r a r y expressions, taking into account her conceptions of her 
l i t e r a r y role. I n turn, her own world view i s considered to be i n certain 
1 , ways developed from her 'class', i n p a r t i c u l a r from the consciousness 
involved i n her economic action and work situatipn. To some extent the 
novels are themselves taken as documents of Charlotte's world view, as 
with Emily and 'Wuthering Heights' i n the previous chapter; but where 
this i s the case, we generally have more evidence than with Emily to 
support a biographical interpretation: for instance, Charlotte's 
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l e t t e r s often evince values which are to be found i n her novels; or her 
friends may l i s t as her" own concerns^ those that we find i n her lite r a l ? / 
works. In several cases, too, elements of the novel's plot are taken 
from Charlotte's own experience: i n particular, i n 'The Professor' and 
' V i l l e t t e ' , her l i f e i n Brussels. Some of the most interesting conclu-
sions of the research, however, are reached where aspects of the novel's 
world view cannot be taken to be synonymous, i n a straightforward manner, 
with Charlotte's own world view: i . e . , especially with regard to 
expressive s t y l e s and changing formative principles in the novels. 
The following analysis centres on an examination of two predominant 
themes that run throughout Charlotte's novels: i . e . , the related themes 
of work and independence. In a l l her novels work i s to some extent the 
siibject-matter, at l e a s t i n terms of making progress i n earning one's 
l i v i n g ; and both economic independence and s o c i a l independence (the 
•'• As defined i n Chapters 5 and 7 above; see p a r t i c u l a r l y 
Chapter 5, p 120 
2 
E.g., 'independence' - see above, p 316 
^ E.g., 'duty' - see above, p 315 
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l a t t e r i n terms of freedom from obligations to others, freedom to be 
alone, etc.) are recurrently important concerns in the novels. Another 
predominant theme that we must recognise, but s h a l l deal with i n less 
depth, i s that of romantic love. Our selective approach i s consistent 
with the recognition of the value-reference''" of the novels, whilst 
concentrating our research on those aspects most relevant to our theoret-
i c a l concerns. We s h a l l thus now explore the themes of work and independ-
ence through Charlotte's four novels, indicating consistencies and 
variations i n t h e i r treatment. 
(ix) 'The Professor' 
The most important theme which runs throiagh 'The Professor' i s that 
of gaining a 'competence' ( i . e . economic independence): 
'A competency was what I wanted; a competency i t was 
now my aim and resolve to secure;' 
(p 254). 
With a few temporary setbacks, the hero, William Crimsworth, strong i n 
aspirations: 
"My hopes to win and possess, my resolutions to 
work and r i s e , ' (p 266), 
makes gradual progress, i s l a t e r joined in h i s economic struggle by the 
heroine, whom he marries, and together they eventioally come within sight 
of t h e i r goal: 
' I f we only had good health and tolerable success, we 
might ... i n time r e a l i s e an independency; and that, 
perhaps, before we were too old to enjoy i t ; ' (p 350). 
The hero had begun h i s story with the need to earn a l i v i n g , having 
rejected occupational and matrimonial help from his a r i s t o c r a t i c 
r e l a t i o n s ; his accovint concludes i n r e t i r e d success. In between we 
trace h i s career, i n which the history of the hero's growth i n value 
becomes the history of h i s increased income and possessions, (e.g. p 246) 
•'" See above. Chapter 11, p 274 
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Thus the subject-matter of the novel i s predominantly work; and 
increasingly the motivation for the work i s progress towards economic 
independence. The values that are most strongly and persistently set 
forth i n the novel are s i m i l a r l y related to economic a f f a i r s , and may 
be summed up as an ethic of s t r i c t economic d i s c i p l i n e . Thus the hero 
i s described in the following terms: 
'... my accounts with my landlady were always straight. 
I had hired small lodgings, which I contrived to pay for 
out of a slender fund - the accvimulated savings of my Eton 
pocket-money; for as i t had ever been abhorrent to my 
nature to ask pecuniary assistance, I had early acquired 
habits of self-denying economy;' (p 25). 
Such an account of the hero i s p a r a l l e l e d i n many places by a picture of 
the heroine even more thoroughly imbued with the s p i r i t of capitalism: 
"... possessed ... of at l e a s t two good points, v i z . , 
perseverance and a sense of duty;' (p 182) 
•personification of discretion and forethought, of d i l i -
gence and perserverance, of self-denial and self-control ... 
model of truth and honour, of independence and conscien-
tiousness -' (p 238) 
"... the dignity of her poverty, the pride of order, the 
fastidious care of conservatism, obvious i n the arrange-
ment and economy of her l i t t l e home; I was sure she would 
not suffer herself to be excused paying her debts;' (p 251) 
' I knew she was not one who could live quiescent and inac-
t i v e , or even comparatively inactive. Duties she must 
have to f u l f i l , and important duties; work to do - and 
exciting, absorbing, profitable work;' (p 350) 
The history and intentions of the heroine p a r a l l e l those of the hero: 
she takes, up lace-mending to earn enough money so that she can be 
educated - education being seen as the means by which a woman can r i s e 
i n the world - with the eventual aim of becoming a governess or school-
teacher. 
Throughout the novel, the antithesis to the ethic of earning one's 
way to independence i s seen as personal dependence, which i s rejected 
in various forms. William Crimsworth finds i t very d i f f i c u l t to ask 
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M. Vandenhuten for help, even though William has promised him that he 
w i l l not hesitate i n seeking assitance: William had saved the l i f e of 
M. Vandenhuten's son. Eventually he asks, not for f i n a n c i a l help, but 
for a recommendation. (pp 278-9) Marrying into wealth as a means of 
attaining the desired economic independence i s despised - perhaps partly 
because i t would s t i l l involve some kind of dependence, and of course also 
because i t would go against the author's strongly held conviction of 
marriage for love: 
'"your only chance of getting a competency l i e s in 
marrying a r i c h widow, or running away with an heiress." 
" I leave such s h i f t s to be put i n practice by those 
who devise them," sa i d I , r i s i n g . " (p 48) 
Not only does the author spurn the notion of a man marrying for economic 
independence: even a woman"s reliance upon her husband's earnings i s 
soundly rejected, as in the words of Prances Henri, the heroine, to 
William: 
'... my efforts to get on w i l l be as unrestrained 
as yours ... I must be no incumbrance to you - no 
burden i n any way. ... Think of my miarrying you to 
be kept by you. Monsieur.' I could not do i t ; ' 
(pp 317-8) 
Despite the emphasis upon economic advancement, the novel r e f l e c t s 
Charlotte's evaluation of what an improved economic situation would 
attains she lacks i n t e r e s t in achieving great wealth, but values highly 
the prospect of a moderate competency that would allow her to stop 
working for a l i v i n g : 
' ... we both agreed that, as Mammon was not our master, 
nor h i s service that i n which we desired to spend our 
l i v e s ; as our desires were temperate, and our habits 
\mostentatious, we had now abundance to l i v e on - ' 
(p 362) . 
In addition to the ultimate goal of economic independence, there i s 
evidence i n the novel of a high evaluation of s o c i a l independence, in 
the sense of freedom from obligations to others, excepting those duties 
that are freely chosen or recognised, or those which one contracts to 
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f u l f i l , within s e t time l i m i t s (so as not to absorb a l l one's free 
time), and i n which one i s responsible for, rather than supervised 
in, the performance. This value of s o c i a l independence i s primarily 
concerned with the work situation ; and i t i s largely the desire for 
such independence i n her work that led Charlotte herself to adopt, 
as the most favoured means of earning her l i v i n g , the school project. 
Both s o c i a l independence, as a pirincipal evaluative c r i t e r i o n of her 
work situation, and the school project, as the chosen means of economic 
action, are centrally involved i n the novel, the value being apparent 
throughout, and the means being eventually selected as the most s u i t -
able form of economic action. 
When the goal of the hero and heroine i s reached, and they r e t i r e 
on t h e i r competency i n England, the absence of the work theme seems to 
leave something of a void. The work ethic i s kept p a r t i a l l y a l i v e 
through charity duties, but the principal reasons for work, economic 
advancement and occupying the mind, have disappeared i n the state of 
married b l i s s , leaving an impression of emptiness. Given that the 
prin c i p a l momentum of the novel i s supplied by the work theme, however, 
Charlotte attempts to provide continuation of this theme, and to breathe 
some l i f e into the otherwise rather empty heaven, through indications of 
the future of Victor, the son of the hero and heroine. Victor i s to 
he banished from t h i s b l i s s f u l existence to Eton, where he w i l l be 
dis c i p l i n e d through salutory suffering to face the d i f f i c u l t i e s of 
th i s world, and emerge able to achieve independently the 'glory of 
success'. (p 374) 
See above, pp 318-319 
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The above examination of the predominant attitudes i n the world 
view of 'The Professor', the princip&l subject-matter portrayed and 
evaluations evinced, shows that there i s a clear consistency between 
the world view of Charlotte as outlined in the introductory biographical 
section of th i s chapter, and the world view of her f i r s t novel. Such a 
demonstration of consistency, however, s t i l l leaves unanswered the 
qiiestion why the themes of work and independence should claim such a 
prominent position i n Charlotte's world view. One might argue that these 
. themes are merely elements of an early Victorian world view,"*" but this 
would f a i l to explain the p a r t i c u l a r strength of these themes i n 
Charlotte's world view, especially i n comparison with her s i s t e r Emily-
I t also neglects the fact that the t y p i c a l woman novelist of the 1840s 
did not write about work and independence, but about: 
"... the woman as an influence on others within her 
domestic and s o c i a l c i r c l e . " 
(Ewbank, 1966: 41) 
'The Professor' i s written as the autobiography of a man working his way 
through l i f e , and i s thus highly atypical as a novel by a woman writer 
of the period. Charlotte, whose economic situation did not allow her to 
remain within the domestic c i r c l e , was able to write with the wider 
experience that her working l i f e had given her. Work and independence 
are furthermore particuarly s i g n i f i c a n t in Charlotte's world view, because 
the type of work (especially i n terms of features of the work situation) 
available to her threatens some of her basic values, especially that 
of s o c i a l independence. I n terms of Chapter 7, Charlotte's work situation 
2 
i s p a r t i c u l a r l y s a l i e n t for her because of her negative evaluation thereof , 
E.g. Charlotte's emphasis upon independence may be seen as 
part of a wider Victorian ethos of self-help - see 
Laurenson, 1969: 316. 
2 See above. Chapter 7, p 169 
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and t h i s negative evaluation makes her more conscious of the values 
relevant to her work situation, of the economic action conditions that 
r e s t r i c t the available work situations, and of the ideal (independent) 
economic situation that would avoid the need to undertake such work. 
Charlotte Brontfe thus provides an excellent example of the development 
of consciousness through work situation experience. The remainder of 
t h i s section w i l l be devoted to an analysis of certain key developments 
of Charlotte's consciousness i n relat i o n to her economic action and work 
situatio n . 
Charlotte's being forced to take a position i n which she f e l t 
unnecessarily controlled, i n which she was unable to exercise respon-
s i b i l i t y within her own sphere of competence, made her p a r t i c u l a r l y 
s e n s i t i v e to the problems of those of her contemporary fellow-women who 
were s i m i l a r l y situated. Charlotte became acutely aware of the severely 
limited means of economic action available to such women, and this 
awareness may have been extended to the moderate 'feminism' that i s 
evident i n her novels. I n 'The Professor", Charlotte i s clearly behind 
Frances' aim to r i s e i n the world and earn her l i v i n g possibly outside 
the sphere commonly reserved for the conventional 'decorous female'. 
Charlotte thus puts the opinion she i s fighting against into the mouth 
of that unappealing character, iMme. Reuter: 
ambition, l i t e r a r y ambition especially, i s not a 
feeling to be cherished i n the mind of a woman;' (p 212) 
A more s i g n i f i c a n t developmfent of Charlotte's consciousness i s 
that of the work ethic, which i s particularly evident i n 'The Professor' 
as witnessed by many of the above quotations. The work ethic i t s e l f i s 
c e r t a i n l y a development beyond a mere moral injunction to earn one's 
l i v i n g . The hypothesis we suggest i s that Charlotte's strong work ethic 
i s evolved i n order to be a harsh master over her desires for time to 
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contemplate and to escape into her fantasy world: out of the economic 
necessity, that forces her to undertake work that denies her mental 
l i b e r t y , she seems to have created a virtue. I t may even be suggested 
that the stronger the necessity to work, and the stronger the temptation 
not to, the more firmly w i l l a work ethic be adopted and maintained. The 
work ethic thus functions for Charlotte as a 'promotion' that makes the 
necessity of earning a l i v i n g easier. I t could thus be abandoned as soon 
as economic independence was achieved - and indeed we have noted the 
eclipse of the work ethic in the b l i s s f u l r e l a t i v e l y inactive finale of 
'The Professor'. Yet the work ethic, once adopted, i s not so ea s i l y 
abandoned: there i s an iriipression of emptiness and stagnation at the 
end of 'The Professor'; and an attempt i s therefore made to rekindle the 
work ethic through stressing the discipline needed for i t s inculcation 
into Victor. The u t i l i t a r i a n adoption of the work ethic thus seems to 
have r i t u a l i s e d the means (working hard for a living) of gaining subsis-
tence and of eventually attaining the end (economic independence) into an 
end i n i t s e l f , so that the or i g i n a l goal seems somewhat emptied of i t s f u l l 
value. The emphasis upon work, i f we f a i l e d to understand i t s r i t u a l i s t i c 
quality, would seem strangely out of place i n Charlotte Brontfi, who 
o r i g i n a l l y worked for a l i v i n g only because she had to, and whose ultimate 
dream was to gain enough to stop working. 
The transformation of the necessity for hard work into a value in 
i t s own right i s only part of a wider extension to related values, such 
as those that have been mentioned in quotations above: punctuality, 
debt-paying, perseverence, discretion, forethought, diligence, s e l f -
denial, self-control, conscientiousness, 'reason', pride of order, 
etc. These values were certainly 'available' to Charlotte in the . 
See above. Chapter 3, p 80. The concept of 'promotion' was 
indeed o r i g i n a l l y devised i n attempting to account for the 
strength of Charlotte BrontS's work ethic. 
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prevailing 'social character' of her time, and she probably adopted 
2 
them through a process of elective a f f i n i t y ; but the strength of 
emphasis that she places on these values indicates, that either they 
have pa r t i c u l a r u t i l i t y for her (e.g. her work situation when a 
governess required great s e l f - r e s t r a i n t , and a concentration upon 
these values may have made s e l f - r e s t r a i n t easier) , or that she i s 3 4 highly committed to them as extensions of her work ethic and, 
ultimately, through the salience of her economic action in disagreeable 
work situations. 
I n 'The Professor' the work ethic becomes the predominant theme and 
appears to r e s t r i c t the development of alternative themes, i n particular 
that of romantic love. With the hero and heroine so highly economically 
motivated, the i r romantic relationship must of necessity take a subsidiary 
place, and indeed at times i t i s conceived i n the l i g h t of a business 
partnership: 
'... years of bustle, action, unslacked endeavour; years 
i n which I and my wife, having launched ourselves in the 
f u l l career of progress ... scarcely knew repose, were 
strangers to amusement, never thought of indulgence, and 
yet, as our course ran side by side, as we marched hand 
i n hand, we neither murmured, repented, nor faltered. ' 
(P 351) 
Even the hero's desire to marry the heroine i s couched within a vocab-
ulary of motive that i s consistent with an overall perspective of 
acquisition: 
"... a strong desire to do more, earn more, be more, possess 
more; and i n the increased possessions ... to include ... 
the wife I inwardly vowed to win.' (p 246) 
In 'The Professor', then, we find a consistent general content acting as a 
r e s t r i c t i v e formative principle, excluding or modifying the treatment of 
alternative themes.^ 
1 2 
See Williams, 1965: 63 See above. Chapter 7', p 172 
3 4 
See above. Chapter 4, p 92 See above. Chapter 3, p 81 
^ See above. Chapter 10, p 235 
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Any account of formative p r i n c i p l e s in 'The Professor' must recog-
nise the r o l e played by a certain self-conscious 'realism' i n the novel, 
i . e . the r e a l i s t i c expressive s t y l e with which Charlotte deals with the 
subject-matter of economic action. The author makes e x p l i c i t her commit-
ment to realism i n the novel: 
'Novelists should never allow Idiemselves to weary of the 
study of r e a l l i f e . I f they observed this duty conscient-
iously, they would give us fewer pictures chequered :viitih 
v i v i d contrasts of l i g h t and shade; they would seldom 
elevate th e i r heroes and heroines to the heights of rap-
ture - s t i l l seldomer sink them to t±e depths of despair;" 
(P 223) 
"My narrative i s not exciting, and, above a l l , not marvellous;' 
(P 14) . 
Thus the developments in the novel, given the extreme conscientiousness 
of the hero and heroine, are generally plausible and probable, rather 
than unexpected and lanlikely; and the lovers are treated, perhaps 
i d e a l i s t i c a l l y , but cert:ainly not as mysterious demigods as i n Emily's 
works and i n Charlotte's former myths of 'Angria". Charlotte's c h i l d -
hood fantasies aroiond the kingldom of Angria had kept a grip on her 
imagination u n t i l the age of 25, when she -
'... r e a l i s i n g the strength of the obsession and i t s 
dangers, broke out of i t with anguish, and not before 
i t had l e f t i t s permanent, and valuable mark'. 
(Lane, 1969: 117) 
Charlotte found i t extraordinarily d i f f i c u l t to give up her fantasy 
l i f e , which must have seemed the only escape open to her from the con-
s t r i c t i o n and s o c i a l dependence involved in her work situation as teacher 
or governess. Yet she abandoned her 'Angifia' cognitive s t y l e , probably 
for two reasons: f i r s t l y , her work, when in employment away from Haworth, 
involved so much of her time that l i t t l e remained for contemplation i n the 
cognitive s t y l e of her Angrianfantasy - this i s a case of exclusion, rather 
than extension, of consciousness. Mrs Gaskell points out the contrast 
between her home l i f e and her l i f e as a governess: at home, her abundant 
l e i s u r e -
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"... made i t possible for her to go through long and 
deep h i s t o r i e s of feeling and imagination, — The 
habit of 'making out' ... had become a part of her 
nature. Yet a l l exercise of her strongest and most 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f a c u l t i e s was now out of the question. 
She could not (as while she was as Miss Wooler's) t e e l 
amidst the occupations of the day, that when evening 
came she might employ h e r s e l f i n more congenial ways.' 
(Gaskell: 182-3) 
Thus Mrs Gaskell contrasts Charlotte's position as a teacher at Miss Wooler's 
school with her l a t e r posts as governess; yet, even at Miss Wooler's, 
Charlotte had f e l t the 'dangers' (as Lane puts i t ) of her fantasy existence, 
i . e . the danger that i t would detract from the proper performance of her 
duties and make i t more d i f f i c u l t for her to resign herself to her situa-
tion: 
" I f you knew my thoughts, the dreams that absorb me, 
and the f i e r y imagination that at times eats me up, 
and makes me f e e l society, as i t i s , wretchedly i n s i p i d , 
you would pity and I dare say despise me. ' 
(Charlotte: l e t t e r to E l l e n Nussey, May 10th 1836, 
quoted i n Gaskell: 126) 
We should thus suggest that the second reason for Charlotte abandoning her 
"Angria" cognitive s t y l e was i n order to develop, as a 'promotion', a 
cognitive s t y l e more suited to her necessity to work, i . e . realism. Yet, 
although she managed to abandon Angria^she did not manage to erase i t s 
cognitive s t y l e , as we s h a l l see i n her other novels. I n 'The Professor', 
however, i t i s realism that holds sway, along with a firm moralism, a 
preaching, self-righteous expressive st y l e that would not allow inconsis-
tencies and thus excludes certain of Charlotte's values that are liberated 
i n the l e s s constricting expressive styles and formative principles of 
her other novels. 
'Rfealism' as a formative p r i n c i p l e in 'The Professor' i s not merely 
Charlotte's expression of a certain cognitive s t y l e : i t implies i n 
addition a definite r e s t r i c t i o n of content, beyond the simple exclusion 
of those cognitions and evaluations that are untenable within a r e a l i s t i c 
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cognitive s t y l e . As BartJies points out"*", realism may be taken to apply 
to either the form or the content of presentation. For Charlotte, 
' r e a l i t y ' seems to be largely synonymoias with work: the 'iinreality' of 
Angria had been rejected, because of the pressing exigencies of 'reality' 
(in her work situation) , and was replaced by a new r e a l i s t i c cognitive 
s t y l e which was, of course, to concentrate on the very ' r e a l i t y ' (the r e a l 
necessity of earning a living) which had led her to abandon Angria in the 
f i r s t place. We thus see the l i n k between the predominant themes and 
expressive s t y l e of "The Professor'. 
We have already noted that 'The Professor' i s not to be taken as 
representing the whole of Charlotte's world view: through i t s r i g i d 
formative p r i n c i p l e s , i t s narrow c r i t e r i a of selection, 'The Professor' 
achieves greater consistency of world view than any of Charlotte's othex 
novels. The influence of Charlotte's l i t e r a r y role upon this world view 
i s d i f f i c u l t to ascertain: on the one hand, we find warnings to the 
reader to expect realism, with for example a suitable mixture of the 
pleasant and unpleasant: 
'Now, reader, during the l a s t two pages I have been 
giving you honey fresh from flowers, but you must not 
l i v e entirely on food so luscious; taste then a l i t t l e 
g a l l r- j u s t a drop, by way of change.' (p 320) 
That Charlotte f e l t i t necessary to give such warnings implies that she 
was aware that the public might expect something more cheerful or 
exciting than realism could offer. On the other hand, she clearly 
thought that the more discerning public, the c r i t i c s , and perhaps even 
the publishers, would prefer a r e a l i s t i c setting and development to 
anything more high-flown. Here Charlotte's expectations of the response 
to the novel would thus have furthered the already existent tendency 
See Barthes, 1973: 137. 
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towards realism, and would have confirmed her avowal to eschew the wild 
dramatic myths she had once entertained. I f the role of expectation of 
response was thus on balance confirmatory, t h i s i s certainly not to say 
that i t had no eff e c t : the strength of i t s influence may be seen when 
Charlotte r e a l i s e s that the pijblishers on behalf of the public require: 
"... something more imaginative and poetical - something 
more consohent with a highly wrought fancy, with a taste 
for pathos, with sentiments more tender, elevated, 
unwordly." 
(Charlotte"s preface to 'The Professor", page x.) 
The r e s u l t of t h i s r e a l i s a t i o n can be seen i n the contrasting form of 
her next novel: "Jane Eyre". 
(x) 'Jane Eyre' 
S u p e r f i c i a l l y the plot of 'Jane Eyre' closely resembles that of 'The 
Professor": a story of economic necessity, work and progress. Jane Eyre 
i s a single woman under the necessity of earning her l i v i n g , who makes 
her own way i n the world, helped and hindered i n many ways by fate, u n t i l 
eventually the legacy puts a stop to the problem. Jane"s story begins 
with her mhappy childhood, i n degrading dependence upon her aunt, and 
s\]bsequently at the unhealthy Lowood School. When this school i s reformed, 
Jane benefits from her studies, and eventually becomes a teacher at the 
school. (Vol I , p 136) When she wishes to break out of the narrow world 
of Lowood,,. however, she recognises that she w i l l have to work i n the sort 
of position iinappealing to her independent s p i r i t : 
"But Servitude] That must be a matter of fact.' 
(Vol I , p 140) 
Her desire for s o c i a l independence i n the work situation leads her la t e r 
to adopt a humble position rather than a dependent one: 
"In truth i t was humble ... but then, compared with 
that of governess i n a r i c h house, i t was independent; 
and the fear of servitude with strangers entered my 
soul l i k e iron: i t was not ignoble - not unworthy -
not mentally degrading." (Vol I I , p 201) 
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However, her ultimate wish would of course be economic independence: 
' I t would, indeed, be a r e l i e f ... i f I had ever so 
small an independency.' (Vol I I , pp 49-50) 
'... independence would be glorious - yes, I f e l t 
that - that thought swelled my heart." 
( v o l I I , p 249) 
R e a l i s t i c a l l y , however, the most she can hope for i s to work independently, 
which i n her situation means a preference for the same economic action as 
was chosen in "The Professor": 
"The utmost I hope i s to save money enough out of my 
earnings to set up a school some day i n a l i t t l e 
house rented by myself." (Vol I , p 332) 
Yet to a t t a i n t h i s end,"*" Jane has to work within the means at present 
available to her, means that are considered too r e s t r i c t e d ; and t h i s 
attitude i s extended, as i n "The Professor" , to a general complaint about 
the constraints upon women's employment: 
"Women are supposed to be very calm generally: but 
women f e e l j u s t as men f e e l ; they need exercise for 
t h e i r f a c u l t i e s , and f i e l d for t h e i r efforts as much 
as t h e i r brothers do; they suffer from too r i g i d a 
r e s t r a i n t , too absolute a stagnation, precisely as 
men would suffer; and i t i s narrow-minded i n their 
more privileged fellow-creatures to say that they 
ought to confine themselves to making puddings and 
knitting stockings, to playing on the piano and 
embroidering bags. I t i s thoughtless to condemn 
them, or laugh at them, i f they seek to do more or 
learn more than custom has pronounced necessary for 
t h e i r sex. " (Vol I , p 182) 
As i n 'The Professor', there i s a stress upon not being a burden, 
seen p a r t i c u l a r l y where fene wishes to avoid relying any longer upon the 
charity and benevolence of the Rivers family, and i s thus w i l l i n g to 
undertake any honest type of employment, no matter how hxmible: 
1 More precisely, t h i s end i s i n fac t 'further means'. Jane 
recognises that her present earnings may one day amount to a 
new economic situation, which w i l l alter the conditions of 
her economic action, and so enable her to earn her l i v i n g by 
more agreeable means. Thus her action i s conceived i n terms 
of means to further means: see above. Chapter 5, pl23. 
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you d e s i r e to be independent of us?" 
" I do: I have a l r e a d y s a i d so. Show me how to work 
or how to seek work: ... I w i l l be a dressmaker; I 
w i l l be a p l a i n workwoman: I w i l l be a s e r v a n t , a 
n u r s e - g i r l , i f I can be no.better," I answered." 
(Vol I I , pp 188-9) 
She even wishes to be f i n a n c i a l l y independent of her future husband, 
Mr. Rochester, which strengthens her longing f o r an independency: i n 
p r a c t i c e , however, she r e s o l v e s to -
"... continue to a c t as Adele' s governess j by t h a t I 
s h a l l earn my board and lodging, and t h i r t y pounds 
a y e a r b e s i d e s . I ' l l f u r n i s h my own wardrobe out of 
t h a t money, and you s h a l l g i v e me nothing but ... your 
regard:' (Vol I I , p 52) 
The work e t h i c i s again apparent i n 'Jane E y r e ' , w i t h a s t r e s s on joy 
i n a c t i v i t y , and misery i n p a s s i v i t y and stagnation: 
"... I was weary o f an e x i s t e n c e a l l p a s s i v e . ... To 
p a s s i t s t h r e s h o l d wais to r e t u r n to stagnation; ... 
to s l i p again over my f a c u l t i e s the v i e w l e s s f e t t e r s 
of a laniform and too s t i l l e x i s t e n c e ; ' 
(Vol I , pp 192-3) 
'... my l i f e was \jniform, but not unhappy, because i t 
was not i n a c t i v e . ' (Vol I , p 136) 
Y e t , d e s p i t e s i m i l a r i t i e s to 'The P r o f e s s o r ' , one f e e l s t h a t i n 'Jane 
E y r e ' the work e t h i c i s l e s s c e n t r a l : f o r example, when Jane becomes 
economicallyiindependent through the legacy, her c h a r i t y work i s v a s t l y 
reduced; and there i s not the same vigour i n the sense of duty with 
which i t i s performed; w h i l s t i t i s t r u e that she remains a c t i v e , the 
form the a c t i v i t y takes i s t h a t of -
'... domestic endearments and household j o y s ... 
The b e s t things the world has!' 
(Vol I I , p 264) 
N e i t h e r t h i s p e r i o d of Jane's 'household j o y s ' w i t h the R i v e r s f a m i l y , 
nor the l a t e r ten y e a r s of b l i s s f u l married l i f e performing s i m i l a r 
womanly d u t i e s f o r her husband, Mr. Rochester, s t r i k e one as being empty 
i n the same way as the s t a t e of achieved independence a t the end of 
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'The P r o f e s s o r " : household d u t i e s , love and a f f e c t i o n a re portrayed i n 
such a p o s i t i v e l i g h t t h a t t h e r e i s no n e c e s s i t y to i n v e n t a ' V i c t o r ' 
and thereby prolong the theme o f hard work and economic progress. 
I 
The favourable a t t i t u d e towards household d u t i e s e t c . c o n t r a s t s with 
the view of them as o v e r - c o n f i n i n g such as the author presents i n the above 
quotation on women's employment. I t seems p l a u s i b l e to suggest t h a t , when 
employment has to be imdertaken to earn one's l i v i n g , C h a r l o t t e i s con-
cerned t h a t the s o r t o f work a v a i l a b l e to women does not o f f e r much room 
f o r c o n t r o l , r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i n i t i a t i v e and mental l i b e r t y ; but t h a t , when 
one i s economically independent, and when one has warmth and s e c u r i t y 
through the presence o f those one l o v e s , so t h a t t h e r e i s no need to 
undertake t a x i n g work to occupy one's mind a g a i n s t l o n e l i n e s s and bore-
dom, then household t a s k s become household j o y s . T h i s tends to confirm 
the suggestion, made i n the a n a l y s i s of 'The P r o f e s s o r ' , t h a t C h a r l o t t e ' s 
h a r s h work e t h i c i s l a r g e l y a 'promotion' which may be a t l e a s t slackened 
as soon as economic independence makes i t redundant. 
The theme of hard work and economic progress i s n e a t l y c u r t a i l e d i n 
'Jane E y r e ' as a r e s u l t o f the legacy, a device t h a t would have been 
t o t a l l y out of p l a c e i n 'The P r o f e s s o r ' . The legacy i n 'Jane E y r e ' i s 
an ' i d e o l o g i c a l device'•*• t h a t modifies the otherwise i n e v i t a b l e course 
of events, and thereby f u l f i l l s c e r t a i n d i s t i n c t functions i n the p r e s -
e n t a t i o n of the..'Jane E y r e ' world view. I t s e r v e s the purpose of showing 
Jane's g e n e r o s i t y and of enabling her to achieve her economic independence; 
ou t s i d e o f marriage, thus avoiding her becoming i n t o l e r a b l y ( i n the 
author's eyes) dependent upon h e r husband. I f the legacy were not i n t r o -
duced, and i f C h a r l o t t e were s t i l l u n w i l l i n g to allow her heroine to 
b r i n g no money to a marriage from which she would g r e a t l y b e n e f i t i n 
See above, Chapter 10, p 247 
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economic terms, then only two s o l u t i o n s would remain: the ending might 
be a l t e r e d , so t h a t Jane's b l i n d husband would not demand a l l of her 
time, and she would be a b l e to c o n t r i b u t e f i n a n c i a l l y to the marriage by 
working: but such an ending would r a t h e r s p o i l the b l i s s f u l harmony of 
the concluding scenes i n which an i d e a l o f intimacy and concord i s rep-
resented. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , Jane could earn her independency before marriage, 
which would over-burden the book with tiresome economic r e a l i t i e s , which 
C h a r l o t t e wanted t o avoid, s i n c e , and t h i s i s the c r u c i a l p o i n t , economic 
r e a l i t i e s do not c o n s t i t u t e the c e n t r a l thane of the novel. W h i l s t 
r e t a i n i n g as the backbone of the n a r r a t i v e the economic progress of the 
p r i n c i p a l c h a r a c t e r , C h a r l o t t e ' s second novel, u n l i k e 'The P r o f e s s o r ' , 
i s dominated by a non-economic theme: the main i n t e r e s t focuses upon the 
l o n e l i n e s s of a s i n g l e woman and her stormy l o v e - r e l a t i o n s h i p with her 
employer. The economic as p e c t i s l e s s h i g h l y s t r e s s e d , and there i s l e s s 
g l o r i f i c a t i o n of the economic v i r t u e s t h a t permeate 'The P r o f e s s o r ' . T h i s 
i s not to say t h a t the work e t h i c , the aim o f economic independence, or 
the value o f s o c i a l independence i n the work sit\aation, have been dropped: 
f a r from i t . Indeed s o c i a l independence i s perhaps an even stronger theme 
i n 'Jane E y r e ' , d e a l i n g as i t does w i t h the p o s i t i o n of a governess i n 
a V i c t o r i a n household. And the p o t e n t i a l strength of the work e t h i c i s 
f e l t i n the background even when l e s s evident on the s u r f a c e : f o r example, 
Roches t e r ' s b l i n d n e s s , a p a r t from a c t i n g as d i v i n e r e t r i b u t i o n , may be 
seen, as the legacy, as a device to overcome the s t i l l so powerful work 
e t h i c . Rochester's b l i n d n e s s allows Jane to escape S t . John R i v e r s ' 
c a l l f o r a s s i s t a n c e i n h i s missionary p r o j e c t s , and to avoid any d u t i e s 
i n marriage (e.g., of a c t i n g as Adele's governess) other than those of 
looking a f t e r h e r husband. The need to use such d e v i c e s t e s t i f i e s both 
t o the continuing s t r e n g t h of the work e t h i c , and to the n e v e r t h e l e s s 
o v e r r i d i n g concern w i t h the love theme. 
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The transformation of world view from 'The P r o f e s s o r ' to 'Jane 
Ey r e ' cannot be a t t r i b u t e d to a change i n C h a r l o t t e ' s own world view: 
one must take account of elements of her l i t e r a r y r o l e , and, i n p a r t i c -
u l a r , of h e r i n c r e a s i n g awareness of the expectations of the p u b l i c , 
through her c o n t a c t w i t h p u b l i s h e r s . She r e a l i s e d t h a t the l a t t e r would 
be more l i k e l y to accept a r a t h e r more s e n s a t i o n a l novel, and t h i s l e d to 
the r e l e a s e of c e r t a i n thematic p o s s i b i l i t i e s t h a t she had kept r e s t r a i n e d 
i n her former novel. C l e a r l y C h a r l o t t e was not 61ow i n allowing h e r s e l f 
to indulge once more i n the s o r t of imaginative c r e a t i v i t y t h a t .she had 
abandoned w i t h Angria, f o r she began w r i t i n g 'Jane E y r e ' w h i l e 'The 
P r o f e s s o r ' was s t i l l going the rounds of the p u b l i s h e r s . ( G a s k e l l j 282-3) 
I n t h i s second novel, the a t t i t u d e s r e l e v a i i t to her economic a c t i o n and 
work s i t u a t i o n a r e not f o r g o t t e n , but become l e s s r e l e v a n t ; and her work 
e t h i c , though s t i l l e vident, i s diminished i n strength, c e n t r a i l t y and 
wider e x t e n s i o n . At the same time, f r e e d from the r e s t r i c t i o n s p l a c e d 
upon imaginative development by C h a r l o t t e ' s self-imposed 'realism' i n 
'The P r o f e s s o r ' , a love theme comes t o predominate, of the type t h a t 
p r e v a i l e d i n C h a r l o t t e ' s former Angrian myths, comprising the heroine's 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a strong, mysterious, dominating male w i t h h i n t s of e v i l 
about him. 
The s i g n i f i c a n t change, then, from 'The P r o f e s s o r ' to 'Jane E y r e ' , 
i s i n terms of the form"'" of the novel: the formative p r i n c i p l e s i n 
C h a r l o t t e ' s second novel no longer included a narrow conception of the 
' r e a l i t y ' she was to p o r t r a y , nor a r e s t r i c t i v e e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e of 
r e a l i s m . The e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e of 'Jane Eyre', c l o s e r t o t h a t of C h a r l o t t e ' s 
Angrian f a n t a s i e s , allows the v a r i o u s melodramatic elements of the p l o t : 
•"" See above. Chapter 10, p 228 f f 
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the mad w i f e ; the l a s t minute i n t e r r u p t i o n of the wedding ceremony; the 
c o l l a p s e of Jane a t the p o i n t of death on the doorstep of st r a n g e r s who 
t u r n out t o be her cousins; the legacy; the vo i c e of Rochester c a l l i n g 
h e r many m i l e s away; Rochester's b l i n d n e s s , t r e a t e d somewhat as d i v i n e 
r e t r i b u t i o n ; Rochester's p a r t i a l recovery from s i g h t , t r e a t e d as a case 
where 'God had tempered judgement w i t h mercy.' (Vol I I , p 370) Wild and 
p a s s i o n a t e scenes would not be a t home i n theirneatly ordered world created 
by the e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e and p r e v a i l i n g a t t i t u d e s of 'The Pr o f e s s o r ' ; and 
i t i s t h i s n e a t l y ordered world t h a t recedes c o n s i d e r a b l y i n t o the back-
ground i n 'Jane E y r e " . The c h a r a c t e r of Rochester, however, i s perhaps 
the most s t r i k i n g departure from the world view of 'The P r o f e s s o r ' : 
Rochester f o r the major p a r t of ,the novel resembles a Gothic hero, with 
s c a r c e l y any c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of h i s own save w i t h r e l e v a n c e to Jane's 
d e s i r e f o r a strong and mysterious master whom she can re v e r e . I t i s 
i n the p o r t r a y a l of Rochester t h a t the cog n i t i v e s t y l e of C h a r l o t t e ' s 
Angrian myths i s most ev i d e n t . 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n we have noted the important s i m i l a r i t i e s i n s p e c i f i c 
a s p e c t s o f the w o i l d views of 'The Prof e s s o r ' and 'Jane E y r e ' , and the 
nonetheless s t r i k i n g t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the gen e r a l f^rm of the novel, 
together w i t h the i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s transformation f o r p a r t i c u l a r 
elements of the l i t e r a r y u n i v e r s e , i n c l u d i n g the employment of i d e o l o g i c a l 
d e v i c e s . We have a l s o noted the i n f l u e n c e of C h a r l o t t e ' s a l t e r e d con-
c e p t i o n o f the expe c t a t i o n s of her readers. I t i s c l e a r t h a t the changed 
form of C h a r l o t t e ' s second novel should be seen as a d e l i b e r a t e move on 
her p a r t t o achieve g r e a t e r s u c c e s s than with her f i r s t novel, which had 
f a i l e d t o a t t r a c t p u b l i s h e r s : y e t i t seems l i k e l y t h a t such a move would 
not be f e l t by her as f a l s e and c o n t r i v e d , but r a t h e r as l i b e r a t i n g . The 
i n f l u e n c e of her ex p e c t a t i o n of reader-response to the novel thus a l t e r s 
from the , on balance, confirmatory r o l e i n 'The P r o f e s s o r ' , to I t s HBer-^ 
a t i n g r o l e i n 'Jane E y r e ' . 
t 
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A f t e r the p i a b l i c a t i o n of 'Jane E y r e " , C h a r l o t t e n a t u r a l l y r e c e i v e d 
g r e a t e r feedback from the l i t e r a r y world, both i n terms of s a l e s , and, 
most s i g n i f i c a n t l y f o r her, from c r i t i c s . We s h a l l see the i n f l u e n c e of 
these new l i t e r a r y c o n t a c t s upon the form of C h a r l o t t e ' s next novel: 
' S h i r l e y ' . 
( x i ) ' S h i r l e y ' 
' S h i r l e y ' has a c o n s i d e r a b l y broader compass than C h a r l o t t e ' s other 
n o v e l s , and e x p l o r e s a f a r wider range of themes. To serve as a p r e l i m -
i n a r y comparison w i t h h e r o t h e r novels i however, i t i s usieful to begin by 
examining the q u a l i t i e s , s i t u a t i o n and development of the four c e n t r a l 
c h a r a c t e r s , around whom the p l o t r e v o l v e s . 
N e i t h e r of the two h e r o i n e s has to earn her own l i v i n g , but C a r o l i n e 
Helstone i s c l o s e r than S h i r l e y K e e lder to the heroines of C h a r l o t t e ' s 
other novels. C a r o l i n e i s economically dependent upon her uncle, Rev. 
Helstone, and she f e e l s t h a t i t i s her duty t o earn her l i v i n g . She 
suggests to her u n c l e t h a t she should take a p o s i t i o n as a governess, but 
he r e f u s e s to allow t h i s , and a s s u r e s her t h a t he w i l l s e t t l e an annuity 
upon her. (Vol I , pp 276-7) Even though a l l around her proclaim t h a t i t i s 
b e s t f o r her to remain i n t h i s dependent s i t u a t i o n , C a r o l i n e s t i l l wishes 
t o g a i n an occupation merely f o r the a c t i v i t y involved, so t h a t she w i l l 
be able to take her mind o f f the p a i n of her l o n e l y e x i s t e n c e : 
' I long to have something absorbing and compulsory 
to f i l l my head,and hands, and to occupy my thoughts. 
... s u c c e s s f u l labour has i t s recompenge; a vacant, 
weary, l o n e l y , hopeless l i f e has none.' • 
(Vol I , p 326) 
C a r o l i n e i s e v e n t u a l l y dissuaded from f u r t h e r thoughts of being a governess 
by Mrs. Pryor, who g i v e s a v i v i d p i c t u r e of the h o r r o r s of t h i s s o c i a l l y 
dependent work s i t u a t i o n , and i n v e i g h s p a r t i c u l a r l y a g a i n s t the s o c i a l 
f -
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d i s t a n c e and indeed h u m i l i a t i o n i n v o l v e d . (Vol I I , pp 84-88) C a r o l i n e 
thus s e t t l e s on charity-work as an a l t e r n a t i v e to employment (Vol I , p 
425) ; but she complains of the l a c k of opportunities of ' i n t e r e s t i n g and 
p r o f i t a b l e occupation' f o r s i n g l e women. (Vol I I , p 107) She notes t h a t 
the b r o t h e r s of the s i n g l e g i r l s i n the neighbourhood -
'... are every one i n b u s i n e s s or i n p r o f e s s i o n s : they 
have scanething to do: t h e i r s i s t e r s have no e a r t h l y 
employment, but household work and sewing; ... The g r e a t 
w i s h - the s o l e aim of every one of them i s to be married, 
but the m a j o r i t y w i l l never marry; they w i l l die as they 
now l i v e . ' (Vol I I , p 107-8) 
T h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s thus l e a d s to the depressing s i t u a t i o n of t h a t 'very 
unhappy r a c e ' of 'old maids'. (Vol I , p 255) . C a r o l i n e however e v e n t u a l l y 
does marry, though of course f o r love r a t h e r than f i n a n c i a l g ain - and i n 
any case she presumably b r i n g s to the marriage the money from her annuity. 
Her c h a r i t y work, however, does not diminish a f t e r marriage: she i s 
indeed provided w i t h e x t r a o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r such work through the i n c r e a -
s i n g w e a l t h of h e r husband. 
C a r o l i n e thus i l l u s t r a t e s C h a r l o t t e ' s continuing concern with the 
v a l u e s of not depending on others f o r f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e , and of 
g a i n i n g a s o c i a l l y independent work s i t u a t i o n i f one has to work f o r a 
l i v i n g . Through C a r o l i n e , we r e c e i v e a stronger p r o t e s t than h i t h e r t o 
concerning the l a c k of o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r female employment; and f o r the 
f i r s t time i n C h a r l o t t e ' s novels a non-economic motivation f o r work comes 
to the f o r e : i . e . , work as occupying the mind, and a l l e v i a t i n g l o n e l i n e s s 
and d e s p a i r . T h i s view of work was of only siJbordinate s i g n i f i c a n c e i n 
C h a r l o t t e ' s p r e v i o u s novels, and i s c l e a r l y relalted to the circumstances 
under which ' S h i r l e y ' was w r i t t e n , i . e . the death of C h a r l o t t e ' s two 
s i s t e r s : 
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'... g r e a t p a r t of i t was w r i t t e n \inder the shadow of 
impending calamity; and the l a s t volume, I cannot deny, 
was composed i n the eager, r e s t l e s s endeavour t o combat 
mental s u f f e r i n g s t h a t were s c a r c e l y t o l e r a b l e . ' 
( G a s k e l l : 413) 
L o u i s Moore e x e m p l i f i e s a l l the horrors of governess dependency i n 
a man, f o r he i s a t u t o r w i t h S h i r l e y ' s r e l a t i o n s . He i s even w i l l i n g to 
undertake the economically i n s e c u r e venture of being a pioneer i n the New 
World i n order to escape the s o c i a l dependence of h i s p r e s e n t work s i t u a t i o n . 
(Vol I I , pp 422-3) He e v e n t u a l l y gains economic independence through marry-
in g S h i r l e y , but t h i s i s not h i s motive - otherwise, l i k e h i s brother Robert, 
he would not have succeeded (Vol I I , p 306 f f ) ; nor i s i t the p o i n t of the 
marriage i n the novel, which i s r a t h e r to show the power of love to break 
down s t a t u s b a r r i e r s , more g e n e r a l l y to advocate t r e a t i n g people as i n d i -
v i d u a l s r a t h e r than members of status-gro\;ps, and to b r i n g to f r u i t i o n 
C h a r l o t t e ' s a r c h e t y p a l love r e l a t i o n s h i p of dominant male and submitting 
female tamed of h e r own f r e e w i l l by the master of h e r choice: 
•Did I not say I p r e f e r a^jnaster? ... A man whose appro-
b a t i o n can reward - whose d i s p l e a s u r e punish me. A man 
I s h a l l f e e l i t impossible not. t o love, and very p o s s i b l e 
t o f e a r . ' . (Vol I I , p 333) 
Any h i n t t h a t L o u i s might f e e l dependent upon h i s w i f e ' s money a f t e r 
marriage i s e r a d i c a t e d by the account of h i s hard work as master of 
F i e l d h e a d , S h i r l e y ' s e s t a t e , which has of course become h i s property, 
and f o r which he has taken over f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y : 
'*Never was wooer of wealthy b r i d e so thoroughly 
absolved from the s u b a l t e r n p a r t ; so i n e v i t a b l y 
compelled to assume a paramovint c h a r a c t e r ; ' 
(Vol I I , p 459.) 
T h i s a c t i v e p i c t u r e i s completed by h i s working s t e a d i l y a t benevolent 
t a s k s , e.g. as a m a g i s t r a t e . (Vol I I , p 467) 
S h i r l e y h e r s e l f d i f f e r s from C h a r l o t t e ' s other heroines i n t h a t she 
i s a l r e a d y ' r i c h - very r i c h ' (Vol I , p 318), and thus already enjoys 
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economic independence. I t i s indeed p r e c i s e l y f o r t h i s independence t h a t 
i t g r a n t s her, r a t h e r than f©r s t a t u s or m a t e r i a l p o s s e s s i o n s , t h a t her 
money i s valued: 
'... S h i r l e y ' s head ran on other t h i n g s than money and 
p o s i t i o n . She was g l a d to be independent as to property:' 
(Vol I , p 318) 
Although the work e t h i c i s by no means manifest i n S h i r l e y , she does devote 
c o n s i d e r a b l e time and money to c h a r i t y , which i s j u s t i f i e d from both moral 
and s e l f - i n t e r e s t s t a n d p o i n t s . (Vol I , pp 381-2) 
Robert Moore i s the c h a r a c t e r i n the novel who most f u l l y represents 
the work e t h i c ; and i n so f a r as he works hard i n order to c l e a r h i s family 
name from the debts t h a t he i n h e r i t e d (Vol I , p 36) , he i s seen l a r g e l y i n 
h e r o i c terms. However, the author c l e a r l y does not favour him when he 
ignores love f o r the sake of b u s i n e s s (e.g.. V o l I , pp 28-29), nor when he 
proposes to S h i r l e y f o r the sake o f her fortune. (Vol I I , p 306 f f ) Never-
t h e l e s s , although h i s money-making z e a l i s not valued, i t i s f e l t t o be 
p r e f e r a b l e t o l e s s d i s c i p l i n e d a l t e r n a t i v e s : 
'... n e i t h e r was he the s l a v e of h i s a p p e t i t e s ; the a c t i v e 
l i f e t o which he has been born and bred had given him 
something e l s e t o do than to j o i n the f u t i l e chase of the 
pleasure-hunter; he was a man undegraded, the d i s c i p l e of 
Reason, not the v o t a r y of Sense.' ("Vol I , p 189) 
T h i s q u o t a t i o n i n d i c a t e s t h a t being a s l a v e to a d e s i r e f o r making money 
i s , i n the author's view, d i s t i n c t from and s u p e r i o r to being a s l a v e to 
the s e n s u a l a p p e t i t e s ; the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e i s Reason - a." l i f e 
ordered, d i s c i p l i n e d , c a l c u l a t e d j a l i f e f a l l i n g n e a t l y w i t h i n the extended 
a t t i t u d e s of the work e t h i c . Robert Moore thus i l l u s t r a t e s i n one charac-
t e r both C h a r l o t t e ' s p o s i t i v e e v a l u a t i o n of a w i l l i n g n e s s to work hard, 
and h e r d i s a p p r o v a l of a work motivation centred on the a c q u i s i t i o n of 
money f o r i t s own sake. Even Robert MoD»e comes to recognise the harmful 
e f f e c t s of h i s money-making upon h i m s e l f and others, and so decides to 
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become independent o f the c o n s t r a i n t s of c r e d i t and commerce, and make 
h i s own way wit h L o u i s i n the New World, where he w i l l -
'... work d i l i g e n t l y , w a i t p a t i e n t l y , bear 
s t e a d i l y . ' (Vol I I , p 312-3) 
The r e p e a l o f the Orders i n C o u n c i l , however, enables him to s t a y back 
and t u r n t o the t r u e love o f f e r e d him by C a r o l i n e , whom he m a r r i e s . 
(Vol I I , p 462) Through f u r t h e r d i l i g e n c e he i s to become r i c h , which 
w i l l i n a d d i t i o n augment the income of Louis and S h i r l e y (as landowners) 
(Vol I I , p 468); but the author expresses doubts about the somewhat 
m e r c i l e s s d e s t r u c t i o n i n v o l v e d i n achieving h i s manufacturer's dreams: 
the uprooting o f the copse t o be r e p l a c e d by ' s u b s t a n t i a l stone and 
b r i c k and ashes'. (Vol I I , p 470) He does, however, intend to do good 
w i t h h i s money, f o r i n s t a n c e through paying the s a l a r i e s of a master and 
m i s t r e s s f o r a day-school. (Vol I I , p 469) 
The novel concludes, then, i n happiness and p r o s p e r i t y , where love 
wins (with two marriages) ; none o f the heroes and heroines have to work 
f o r someone e l s e to earn a l i v i n g ; men work to maintain t h e i r incomes or 
property; women work f o r p h i l a n t h r o p i c purposes i n a d d i t i o n to the house-
hold d u t i e s . 
The above a n a l y s i s of the p r i n c i p a l c h a r a c t e r s of ' S h i r l e y ' 
demonstrates C h a r l o t t e ' s continuing concern w i t h the themes o f work and 
independence. There a r e , however, two s i g n i f i c a n t developments i n the 
world view of ' S h i r l e y ' : one, which we have al r e a d y noted, i s the 
i n c r e a s i n g emphasis upon work as occupying the mind, as a l l e v i a t i n g 
p s y c h i c d i s t r e s s . T h i s seems t o be a genuine development i n C h a r l o t t e ' s 
own world view, as t h i s very motivation f o r work was pre s e n t during 
the w r i t i n g of ' S h i r l e y ' . The other development i s the i n c r e a s i n g 
evidence o f a stronger feminism. T h i s seems e q u a l l y to be a develop-
ment i n C h a r l o t t e ' s own world view, but one t h a t r e l a t e s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
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to her experience as an author. A f t e r the p u b l i c a t i o n o f 'Jane E y r e ' , 
c e r t a i n reviews a f f e c t e d her deeply; she was p a r t i c u l a r l y h u r t when 
she was judged by the standards o f a s p e c i a l category of 'female 
l i t e r a t u r e ' . I t was indeed f o r f e a r o f such judgements t h a t she had 
o r i g i n a l l y , w i t h h e r s i s t e r s , adopted pseudonyms o f ambiguous gender. 
( G a s k e l l : 265) W h i l s t she was w r i t i n g ' S h i r l e y ' she was aware t h a t 
she would be deemed by many to be going beyond the bounds considered f i t 
f o r a novel by an authoress: thus she w r i t e s to G. H. Lewes, before he 
has read ' S h i r l e y ' : 
' I wish you d i d not thi n k me a woman, I wish a l l reviewers 
b e l i e v e d 'Currer B e l l ' to be a man; they would be more, j u s t 
to him. You w i l l , I know, keep measuring me by some s t a n -
dard of what you deem becoming to my sex; where I am not 
what you c o n s i d e r g r a c e f u l , you w i l l condemn me ... Come 
what w i l l , I cannot, when I w r i t e , think always o f myself 
and o f what i s e l e g a n t and charming i n feminity; i t i s not 
on those terms, o r w i t h such i d e a s , I ever took pen i n hand:' 
(Nov. 1 s t . 1849, quoted i n G a s k e l l : 372) 
I n f a c t C h a r l o t t e ' s p l e a f a i l e d : Lewes, i n reviewing ' S h i r l e y ' f o r the 
Edinburgh Review, took as h i s s t a r t i n g p o i n t a conceptual scheme i n which 
'female l i t e r a t u r e ' was awarded a s p e c i a l category, and according to 
which ' S h i r l e y ' was thus l a b e l l e d and c r i t i c i s e d . ( G a s k e l l : 384) C h a r l o t t e ' s 
e x p e c t a t i o n of such treatment, a f t e r the reviews of 'Jane E y r e ' , c l e a r l y 
i n f l u e n c e d her own world view and t h a t expressed i n ' S h i r l e y ' . The one 
f i e l d i n which she, as a woman, had been able to f i n d work w i t h s o c i a l 
independence and the e x e r c i s e of her f a c u l t i e s was, i n such a t t i t u d e s as 
Lewes evinced, s u b j e c t to attempts a t regaining i t s s t a t u s as a male 
stronghold. C h a r l o t t e ' s response to t h i s i s i n the form o f a confirmation 
and development of the moderate feminism t h a t had a r i s e n from her exper-
i e n c e of the narrow o c c u p a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r women. Thus i n 'Shirley ' 
we f i n d a wider extension o f f e m i n i s t a t t i t u d e s , not only i n C a r o l i n e ' s 
s u s t a i n e d p l e a f o r i n c r e a s e d o c c u p a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r women (Vol I I , 
pp 107-110) , but a l s o through the exposure o f the more general views h e l d 
by the unsympathetic Mr. Helstone: 
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'He made no pretence of.comprehending women, or comparing 
them w i t h men: they were a d i f f e r e n t , probably a very 
i n f e r i o r order o f e x i s t e n c e ; a w i f e could not be her 
husband's companion, much l e s s h i s confidante, much l e s s 
h i s s t a y . ' (Vol I , p 71) 
'At h e a r t , he could not abide sense i n women; he l i k e d to 
see them as s i l l y , as light-headed, as v a i n , as open to 
r i d i c u l e as p o s s i b l e ; because they were then i n r e a l i t y 
what he h e l d them to be, and wished them to be - i n f e r i o r : 
toys to p l a y w i t h , to amuse a vacant hour and to be thrown 
away. ' (Vol I , p 166) 
Although ' S h i r l e y ' bears w i t n e s s to an extension of f e m i n i s t a t t i t u d e s i n 
C h a r l o t t e ' s world view, the ex t e n s i o n stops s h o r t a t her i d e a l o f romantic 
l o v e , which takes on the q u a l i t i e s of a master-pupil r e l a t i o n s h i p , where 
the s u p e r i o r i t y o f the male i s unquestioned, as i n L o u i s ' f e e l i n g s f o r 
S h i r l e y : 
'. .. i t was unutte r a b l y sweet to f e e l myself a t once near 
her and above hers to be conscious of a n a t u r a l r i g h t and 
power to s u s t a i n her, as a husband should s u s t a i n h i s 
w i f e . ... i t i s her f a u l t s ... t h a t bring her near to me 
... f o r a most s e l f i s h , but deeply-natural reason: these 
f a u l t s are the steps by which I mount to ascendancy over 
her.' (Vol I I , p 290) 
The sphere of male-female love thus appears to be a r e l a t i v e l y autono-
mous p r o v i n c e o f meaning''' f o r C h a r l o t t e , compartmentalised from the 
wider extension of h er feminism. 
A p a r t fron the two developments i n the world view o f ' S h i r l e y * t h a t 
appear to stem from C h a r l o t t e ' s own developing consciousness, other 
d i f f e r e n c e s i n the u n i v e r s e o f 'Shirley'^ i n comparison w i t h C h a r l o t t e ' s 
e a r l i e r n o v e l s , cannot be a t t r i b u t e d t o C h a r l o t t e ' s world view beyond 
the sphere of l i t e r a r y e x p r e s s i o n . I n addit i o n to the themes of work, 
independence and love, ' S h i r l e y ' d e a l s with a much wider range of s u b j e c t -
matter and a t t i t u d e s than C h a r l o t t e ' s previous novels; and t h i s i n c r e a s e 
i n scope must be understood i n r e l a t i o n to the formative p r i n c i p l e s of 
' S h i r l e y ' , which themselves must be seen i n the context of C h a r l o t t e ' s 
a u t h o r s h i p r o l e and l i t e r a r y c o n t a c t s . 
•'• See above. Chapter 8, p 188 
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With the p u b l i c a t i o n o f 'Jane E y r e ' , C h a r l o t t e became s u s c e p t i b l e 
to i n f l u e n c e from th r e e p r i n c i p a l l i t e r a r y s o u r c e s : her readers, mainly 
i n terms o f the number of copies s o l d ; her p u b l i s h e r s , communicating 
w i t h her on the progress o f her next novel; and the c r i t i c s , through 
t h e i r reviews of 'Jane E y r e ' , and through personal correspondence with 
C h a r l o t t e on aspects of l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m . C h a r l o t t e ' s success w i t h 
'Jane E y r e ' , a t l e a s t i n terms of s a l e s , must have to some extent 
v i n d i c a t e d her move away from the narrow r e a l i s m of 'The P r o f e s s o r ' , 
and probably encouraged a degree of commitment•'" to the a l t e r e d expres-
s i v e s t y l e p a r t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r her s u c c e s s . The contact with her 
p u b l i s h e r s would have strengthened t h i s commitment, s i n c e they hoped f o r 
another s u c c e s s on the s c a l e of 'Jane Eyre'; but i t appears t h a t the most 
2 
s a l i e n t r o l e c o n t a c t s f o r C h a r l o t t e were the c r i t i c s , perhaps through 
t h e i r g r e a t e r l e g i t i m a c y i n c o n f e r r i n g 'success'. C h a r l o t t e was c e r -
t a i n l y very c o n s c i e n t i o u s i n t a k i n g account of the judgements of her work: 
'She c a r e f u l l y s t u d i e d the d i f f e r e n t reviews and 
c r i t i c i s m s t h a t had appeared on 'Jane E y r e ' , i n 
hopes of e x t r a c t i n g p r e c e p t s and advice from which 
to p r o f i t . ' ( G a s k e l l : 365) 
The most notable c r i t i c i s m s , a p a r t from those r e l a t i n g to 'female l i t e r -
a t u r e ' as noted above, concerned d e f i c i e n c i e s of 'realism' i n 'Jane E y r e ' : 
'You warn me to beware of melodrama, and you exhort 
me to adhere to the r e a l ' . - she w r i t e s to G. H. Lewgs 
Nov. 6th., 1847; quoted i n G a s k e l l : 309 
C h a r l o t t e thus intended to avoid i n ' S h i r l e y ' the melodramatic tendencies 
o f 'Jane Eyre', and c l e a r l y f e l t t h a t censure would be deserved i f , 
now t h a t she could g a i n p u b l i c a t i o n f o r a second novel on the s t r e n g t h of 
'Jane E y r e ' s ' s u c c e s s , she departed so r a d i c a l l y from the r e a l i s m of 
'The P r o f e s s o r ' . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the p i J b l i c s t i l l would not be happy with 
the r a t h e r dry r e a l i t y o f 'The P r o f e s s o r ' , and C h a r l o t t e was by now 
committed to p r e s e r v e the elements of strong imaginative ' t r u t h ' t h a t had 
•'• See above. Chapter 9, p 215 
2 
See above. Chapter 8, p 193 
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so i n t e n s i f i e d 'Jane E y r e ' : i n communication w i t h George Lewes, she 
defended her s t a n d f o r ' t r u t h ' and 'poetry', i n a d d i t i o n to the mere 
r e a l i s m which, she contended, c h a r a c t e r i s e d the work of Jane Austen: 
'Miss Austen being, as you say, without 'sentiment', 
without poetry, maybe Is^ s e n s i b l e , r e a l (more r e a l 
than t r u e ) , but she cannot be great." 
(January 18th., 1848, quoted i n G a s k e l l : 320) 
Out of these contending l i t e r a r y aims, " S h i r l e y " emerges as some-
thin g of an experiment and something of a compromise: i t may be seen 
as a m o d i f i c a t i o n of a l i t e r a r y form c u r r e n t l y available''' to C h a r l o t t e , 
i . e . s o c i a l r e a l i s m . The e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e i s l e s s melodramatic than 
"Jane E y r e " , but a l l o w s more room f o r the imaginative e x p l o r a t i o n of 
'poetic t r u t h ' than "The P r o f e s s o r " . Perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t 
development i n e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e i s the i n c r e a s i n g evidence of e x p l i c i t 
statements of the author "s i n t e n t i o n s i n the t e x t i t s e l f , together with 
attempted j u s t i f i c a t i o n s o f these i n t e n t i o n s . There are t r a c e s of such 
an e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e i n "Jane E y r e " , where C h a r l o t t e supposed the reader 
would not accept unpleasant ' t r u t h s " j 
'.,. oh, romantic reader, f o r g i v e me f o r t e l l i n g the 
p l a i n t r u t h ...' (Vol I , p 182) 
2 
but an e x p l i c i t and s e l f - j u s t i f y i n g e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e i s f a r more appar-
ent i n ' S h i r l e y ' , and i s d i r e c t e d more towards warning the reader to 
expect a c o o l r e a l i s m than towards begging h i s f o r g i v e n e s s f o r the 
p o r t r a y a l of h o r r o r s : 
' I f you t h i n k ... t h a t anything l i k e a romance i s pre-
p a r i n g f o r you, reader, you never were more mistaken. 
Do you a n t i c i p a t e sentiment, and poetry, and r e v e r i e ? 
Do you expect p a s s i o n , and s t i m u l u s , and melodrama? 
Calm your e x p e c t a t i o n s ; reduce them to a lowly standard. 
Something r e a l , c o o l , and s o l i d , l i e s before you; 
something unromantic as Monday morning, ... 
(Vol I , pp 1-2) 
1 
2 
See above. Chapter 10, p 239 f f , f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of the concept 
of ' a v a i l a b l e forms', 
F o r a d i s c u s s i o n of the way the s o c i a l d e f i n i t i o n of a w r i t e r ' s 
work may induce an e x p l i c i t e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e , see above. 
Chapter 9, p 215 
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Y e t ' s o c i a l r e a l i s m ' i s not merely a matter of an e x p r e s s i v e 
s t y l e : i t i s a form t h a t demands the treatment of broad s o c i a l i s s u e s , 
o f c h a r a c t e r s r e p r e s e n t i n g v a r i o u s s e c t i o n s o f s o c i e t y . The s e t t i n g 
chosen. West Y o r k s h i r e a t the time o f the Luddites, both s a t i s f i e s these 
demands of s o c i a l r e a l i s m and, i n her knowledge of the l o c a l c h a r a c t e r , 
of the area^ and of the sediment of l o c a l h i s t o r y , f u l f i l s the require-^-
ment of being w i t h i n the range of C h a r l o t t e ' s personal experience. 
( G a s k e l l : 363) I t i s more l i k e l y to have been f o r these reasons t h a t 
the Luddite s o c i a l s e t t i n g was chosen, r a t h e r than f o r the sake of 
f o c u s i n g upon a major h i s t o r i c a l c o n f l i c t , as Eagleton would suggest, 
(1975! 8) The s e t t i n g does not n e c e s s a r i l y d i c t a t e the focus of the 
novel; and C h a r l o t t e seems to use the Luddite s i t u a t i o n to r e f l e c t and 
encourage a con t i n u i n g concern, on h e r p a r t , w i t h the r e a l i t i e s of 
economic a c t i o n , and i n p a r t i c u l a r w i t h the h e r o i c s t r u g g l e of an i n d i -
v i d u a l f o r economic advancement; Robert Moore's s t r u g g l e s , w h i l s t 
d i s t i n c t from C h a r l o t t e ' s i n motivation^ s i t u a t i o n and consequences, 
n e v e r t h e l e s s run p a r a l l e l i n c e r t a i n aspects to those t h a t C h a r l o t t e 
underwent h e r s e l f . The other major c h a r a c t e r s are more marginal to the 
Luddite s e t t i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y L o u i s , the t u t o r , and C a r o l i n e , the 
Reverend's n i e c e : t h i s suggests t h a t , d e s p i t e the h i s t o r i c a l and geo-
g r a p h i c a l s p e c i f i c i t y , the thematic range i s wide. 
I t i s the g e n e r a l form of s o c i a l r e a l i s m , w i t h i t s broader s o c i a l 
scope and the dropping o f the f i r s t - p e r s o n narrative"*", t h a t a l l o w s the 
g r e a t e r v a r i e t y of themes: these break through the l i m i t s of the t i g h t , 
coherent world view of 'The P r o f e s s o r ' , and y e t can i n c o r p o r a t e , as a 
major p a r t of the s u b j e c t - m a t t e r , the economic r e a l i t i e s t h a t faded i n 
'Jane E y r e ' , where the p r i n c i p a l focus r e s t e d f i r m l y on the theme of 
l o v e and l o n e l i n e s s . I t was, of course, p r e c i s e l y t h i s e x p l o r a t i o n of 
s e v e r a l themes t h a t d i s t u r b e d many c r i t i c s of ' S h i r l e y ' , who complained 
"^  Third-person n a r r a t i v e may be seen as a l i t e r a r y device employed to 
both a i d and i n d i c a t e a g e n e r a l form of s o c i a l r e a l i s m . C f . 
Chapter 10, p 246 above. 
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of a l a c k of u n i t y . C e r t a i n l y one cannot f i n d i n ' S h i r l e y ' the u n i t y 
o f C h a r l o t t e ' s oth^er n o v e l s , w r i t t e n as autobiographies of i n d i v i d u a l s ' 
p r o g r e s s through l i f e : ' S h i r l e y ' i s not a novel w i t h a s i n g l e p l o t t h a t 
we f o l l o w from beginning to end. I t i s much more a p i c t u r e , w i t h many 
themes and s e v e r a l p l o t s , p a i n t e d from the p e r s p e c t i v e s t h a t we have 
found to dominate C h a r l o t t e ' s world view. I t i s i n t h i s world view 
t h a t we d e t e c t the u n i t y of the novel, as Korg p o i n t s out: the char-
a c t e r s r a d i a t e out i n a s e r i e s o f c o n c e n t r i c c i r c l e s o f v a l u a t i o n 
according to t h e i r proximity to the core values of C h a r l o t t e ' s world 
view. (Korg, 1957: 126-7) 
I t i s , however, a l s o i n t h i s world view t h a t we f i n d the most 
oustanding disharmony, the unresolved c o n t r a d i c t i o n , namely between 
the themes of work and 'poetry'. The work e t h i c r e t u r n s , a f t e r i t s 
p a r t i a l e c l i p s e - i n 'Jane E y r e ' , t o be a c e n t r a l concern; but the form 
and s e t t i n g of ' S h i r l e y ' a l l o w s g r e a t e r room t h a t h i t h e r t o f o r the 
e x p l o r a t i o n o f v a r i e t i e s o f deep p e r s o n a l emotion, not only i n the sphere 
of love, but a l s o i n a p o e t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h nature. Y e t i f b l i s s 
i n the n o v e l o f t e n appears i n t h e form of contemplation of n a t u r a l 
or v i s i o n a r y scenes (e.g., Vol I I , p 102), the conclusion of the novel, 
i n the conventional happy ending o f a double wedding, pr e s e n t s a p i c t u r e 
o f t h e f u t u r e m a r r i e d l i f e o f the couples t h a t seems f a r too busy w i t h 
v a r i o u s kinds of economic and c h a r i t a b l e a c t i v i t y to allow room f o r such 
contemplation. C h a r l o t t e i s probably aware of the d i f f i c u l t y of 
making her strong work e t h i c compatible with the i d e a l of the s o r t of 
l i f e t h a t could be l e d g i v e n economic independence - and of course we 
" S h i r l e y " i s the only novel by C h a r l o t t e i n which p r i n c i p a l 
c h a r a c t e r s ( i n t h i s case the two heroines) have the time (because 
o f t h e i r economic s i t u a t i o n ) f o r p o e t i c f e e l i n g s to any g r e a t 
e x t e n t . The f u l l e r e x p l o r a t i o n of such f e e l i n g s i n ' S h i r l e y ' 
must be a t t r i b u t e d to the s t r u c t u r e of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r novel, 
r a t h e r than t o any a l t e r a t i o n i n C h a r l o t t e ' s own world view. 
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contend t h a t the very s t r e n g t h o f the work e t h i c d e r i v e s from C h a r l o t t e ' s 
i n c l i n a t i o n towards a more contemplative, p o e t i c e x i s t e n c e , combined 
w i t h her duty to earn her l i v i n g . The c o n f l i c t i s thus b u i l t i n t o 
C h a r l o t t e ' s own world view; and her awareness thereof appears to be 
expressed i n her doiibts about the s u c c e s s f u l l y achieved embodiments of 
t h e work e t h i c a t the end of the novel - though some of these misgivings 
may concern the products of manufacturing work r a t h e r than work as such. 
I f C h a r l o t t e is_ aware of t h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n her world view, the 
r e c o g n i t i o n may w e l l be a development of consciousness t h a t i s due to 
the f o m o f " S h i r l e y ' : l i k e any novel, ' S h i r l e y ' w i l l encourage aware-
ness of i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s through i t s nature as a p u b l i c w r i t t e n statement'''; 
but i n ' S h i r l e y ' the i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s themselves are encouraged through 
the g e n e r a l form of the novel, which allows the e x p l o r a t i o n of d i v e r s e 
themes, and excludes the widespread operation of melodramatic devices. 
Thus the c o n t r a d i c t i o n between work and 'poetry' j which i s r e s o l v e d i n 
'The P r o f e s s o r ' through an attempt, a t the end of the novel, to preserve 
i t s narrow u n i v e r s e by r e k i n d l i n g the work theme i n the p i c t u r e of 
V i c t o r ' s f u t u r e ; and which i s r e s o l v e d i n 'Jane E y r e ' by the use of 
melodramatic d e v i c e s , such as Rochester's b l i n d n e s s f o r c i n g Jane to 
look a f t e r him f u l l - t i m e ; remains unresolved a t the end of ' S h i r l e y ' , 
w i t h C h a r l o t t e handing over the quest f o r the moral i n t o the hands of 
the reader. 
The above a n a l y s i s o f ' S h i r l e y ' has r e v e a l e d the following; the 
c o n t i n u a t i o n of the themes of work and independence; the expression i n 
the novel of two developments i n C h a r l o t t e ' s own world view, both of 
which are r e l a t e d to her l i t e r a r y occupation; the i n f l u e n c e of l i t e r a i y 
•'" See above, Chapter lO, p 247 
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c o n t a c t s upon the g e n e r a l form of the novel, and i n t u r n , the e f f e c t s 
o f t h i s form upon the world view of ' S h i r l e y ' i n comparison w i t h 
C h a r l o t t e ' s e a r l i e r n o v e l s , w i t h p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e to the work 
e t h i c . I n the next s e c t i o n , many of the above i s s u e s are t a c k l e d i n 
r e l a t i o n t o C h a r l o t t e ' s l a s t n ovelj " V i l l e t t e * . 
( x i i ) ' V i l l e t t e ' 
The g e n e s i s of ' V i l l e t t e ' must be seen i n the context of the piablic 
r e a c t i o n to ' S h i r l e y " . To C h a r l o t t e ' s s u r p r i s e , the c r i t i c s g e n e r a l l y 
r a t e d ' S h i r l e y ' i n f e r i o r t o Jane E y r e : 
"... ' S h i r l e y ' i s disparaged i n comparison w i t h 'Jane E y r e " ; 
and y e t I took g r e a t p a i n s w i t h ' S h i r l e y ' . I d i d not 
hurry; I t r i e d to do my b e s t , and my own impression was 
t h a t i t was not i n f e r i o r to the former work;' 
( C h a r l o t t e : l e t t e r Sept. 5th., 1850, quoted i n G a s k e l l : 413) 
When C h a r l o t t e wrote of ' S h i r l e y ' being "disparaged", she was r e f e r r i n g 
t o the c r i t i c s , f o r the g e n e r a l p u b l i c had shown a p p r e c i a t i o n of the 
book, and i t had s o l d w e l l : the l o c a l r e a c t i o n had been p a r t i c u l a r l y 
f avourable. ( G a s k e l l ; 384) But i t was the c r i t i c s who were the s a l i e n t 
judges f o r charlotte,''' an^^ as noted above, they had p a r t i c u l a r l y 
s t r e s s e d the l a c k of u n i t y i n comparison w i t h 'Jane Eyre' . C h a r l o t t e 
thus came to the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t her g r e a t e s t power l a y i n w r i t i n g w i t h i n 
the sphere of p e r s o n a l experience> which included only a narrow range 
of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s ; and of p o e t i c t r u t h , i . e . i n t e n s e l y f e l t emotion 
i m a g i n a t i v e l y conceived o r r e c o n s t r u c t e d . She j u s t i f i e s t h i s approach 
i n a l e t t e r to h e r p u b l i s h e r : 
'You w i l l see t h a t ' V i l l e t e ' touches on no matter of 
p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , I cannot w r i t e books handling the 
t o p i c s of the day; i t i s of no use t r y i n g . Nor can 
I w r i t e a book f o r i t s moral. Nor can I take up a 
p h i l a n t h r o p i c scheme, though I honour philanthropy;" 
( C h a r l o t t e : l e t t e r t o G. Smith, October 30th., 1852, 
quoted i n G a s k e l l : 477) 
See above, p 350 
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' V i l l e t t e ' thus moves from the attempt a t s o c i a l r e a l i s m ±n ' S h i r l e y ' 
to what has been termed ' p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a l i s m ' . (Ewbank, 1966: 174) 
. What does t h i s r e a l i s m encompass? 
' V i l l e t t e ' , l i k e 'The Professor«, i s s e t i n B r u s s e l s , and much of 
both of these novels c o n s i s t s of an imaginative r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of 
C h a r l o t t e ' s experience a t the school of M. and Mme. Heger. Super-
f i c i a l l y the p l o t of " V i l l e t t e ' thus once more hinges on the economic 
s t r u g g l e s of an i n d i v i d u a l , the autobiographical hero of "The 
P r o f e s s o r ' becoming a heroine i n ' V i l l e t t e ' . T h i s heroine, Lucy Snowe, 
has to work f o r a l i v i n g i n order to a v o i d d e s t i t u t i o n . (Vol. I , p 90) 
She e v e n t u a l l y a t t a i n s a post as E n g l i s h teacher, which o f f e r s her more 
independence than she would have as a p r i v a t e governess or companion: 
'Mr Home h i m s e l f o f f e r e d me a handsome sum - t h r i c e my 
p r e s e n t s a l a r y - i f I would accept the o f f i c e of compan-
ion to h i s daughter. I d e c l i n e d . I t h i n k I should have 
d e c l i n e d had I been poorer than I was, ... I could 
teach; I could g i v e l e s s o n s ; but t o be e i t h e r a p r i v a t e 
governess or a companion was unnatural t o me. Rather than 
f i l l the former p o s t i n any g r e a t house, I would d e l i b e r -
a t e l y have taken a housemaid's p l a c e ... i n peace and 
independence. Rather than be a companion, I would have 
made s h i r t s and s t a r v e d . ' (Vol I I , p 77) 
Lucy's aim i s to o b t a i n a s o c i a l l y independent work s i t u a t i o n , and, 
i d e a l l y , the e v e n t u a l competency: 
'.., I had pondered .,. how I should make some advance 
i n l i f e , take another step towards an independent 
p o s i t i o n ; when I s h a l l have saved one thousand 
f r a n c s , I w i l l take a tenement ... begin w i t h taking 
day-pupils, and so work my way upwards ... ( l i k e Mme. 
Beck, who) ,.. has a competency already secured f o r 
o l d age .., With s e l f - d e n i a l and economy now, and 
steady e x e r t i o n by-and-by, an o b j e c t i n l i f e need not 
f a i l you, ...be content to labour f o r independence 
i m t i l you have proved^ by winning t h a t p r i z e , your 
r i g h t to look higher.'. (Vol I I , p 181) 
Lucy i s most concerned to work f o r her economic independence: she v a l u e s 
the c a p a c i t y t o save (Vol I I , p 395), but not where t h i s i n v o l v e s an 
a v a r i c i o u s hoarding, a 'love o f money f o r i t s own sake' (Vol I , pp 206-7) 
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By s a v i n g she can help h e r s e l f to progress without becoming dependent 
upon othe r s through debt, u n l i k e the epicurean P a r i s i e n n e , Mile S t . 
P i e r r e . (Vol I , p 207). T h i s l a t t e r would l i k e t o a t t a i n economic 
independence through marriage, and have her debts p a i d by a r i c h or 
hard-working husband, a notion of which Lucy c l e a r l y disapproves. 
(Vol I I , p 139) I n c o n t r a s t , Lucy i s committed to working so t h a t 
she can avoid being a burden t o o t h e r s : 
"... w h i l e I can work f o r myself, I am spared the p a i n 
of being a burden t o anybody." (Vol I I , p 56) 
C h a r l o t t e makes i t c l e a r t h a t she v a l u e s Lucy's s e l f - r e l i a n c e , which 
i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h her P r o t e s t a n t i s m (Vol I I , p 276); and Paul Emanuel's 
'sturdy independence' (Vol I I , p 100), despite h i s C a t h o l i c f a i t h . 
Lucy's hard work i s rewarded a t the end of the novel: P a u l has come to 
admire h e r so much t h a t he has arranged the s e t t i n g up of a school t h a t 
she w i l l run, paying the r e n t o f the tenement out of her sa v i n g s . (Vol 
I I , p 395) Paul i s absent f o r t h r e e y e a r s , but these are the happiest 
y e a r s of Lucy's l i f e : she enjoys working hard i n her s o c i a l l y independent 
s i t u a t i o n , achieves gradual economic progress, and puts to use an i n d i r e c t 
i n h e r i t a n c e o f a hundred pounds i n expanding her s c h o o l . (Vol I I , 
pp 401-2) 
As can be expected from the above, the work e t h i c i s s t i l l very 
s t r o n g i n " V i l l e t t e " , and i s p a r t i c u l a r l y manifested i n p o i n t s of 
c o n t r a s t ; s l o t h v e r sus a c t i o n , energy and p r a c t i c a l ambition (Vol I , 
pp 56 & 121); the c i t y v e r s u s the West End: 
'The c i t y seems so much more i n earnest: i t s b u s i n e s s , 
i t s r u sh, i t s r o a r , are s e r i o u s things, s i g h t s , and 
sounds. The c i t y i s g e t t i n g i t s l i v i n g - the West 
End but enjoys i t s p l e a s u r e . ' (Vol I , p 74) ; 
work v e r s u s p l e a s u r e and time-wasting: 
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'She m o r t a l l y hated work, and loved what she c a l l e d 
p l e a s u r e ; being an i n s i p i d , h e a r t l e s s ^ b r a i n l e s s , 
d i s s i p a t i o n o f time.' (Vol I , p 208) 
Even Lucy" s admittedly tongue-?in-cheek o b j e c t i o n s t o a p a i n t i n g of a 
large- recumbent nude a r e taken from the standpoint o f the work e t h i c : 
'She l a y h a l f - r e c l i n e d on a couch; why, i t would be 
d i f f i c u l t t o say; broad d a y l i g h t blazed around her; 
she appeared i n h e a r t y h e a l t h , strong enough to do 
the work o f two p l a i n cooks; ... she has no bus i n e s s 
to lounge away the noon on a s o f a . ... Then, f o r the 
wretched u n t i d i n e s s surrovinding her, t h e r e could be 
no excuse." (Vol I , pp 333v4) 
The emphasis upon the work e t h i c i n ' V i l l e t t e " may be merely a 
r e t e n t i o n o f the work e t h i c t h a t C h a r l o t t e o r i g i n a l l y adopted to help 
h e r to continue w i t h employment i n s o c i a l l y dependent work situations;''' 
b u t i t seems l i k e l y t h a t i t s r e t e n t i o n i s encouraged by a motivation 
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f o r work t h a t became evi d e n t i n the world view of " S h i r l e y " , i . e . 
working f o r the sake o f occupying the mind and overcoming l o n e l i n e s s 
and d e s p a i r : we have a l r e a d y noted t h a t t h i s motivation was p r e s e n t 
during the w r i t i n g of " S h i r l e y " and ' V i l l e t t e ' • ^ , I n s e v e r a l of 
C h a r l o t t e ' s l e t t e r s we f i n d r e f e r e n c e s to the d i f f i c u l t y she f i n d s i n 
w r i t i n g a t t h i s time: 
' I thought to f i n d occupation and i n t e r e s t an w r i t i n g , 
when alone a t home, but h i t h e r t o my e f f o r t s have been 
v a i n ; the d e f i c i e n c y of every stimulus i s so complete. 
... I cannot d e s c r i b e what a time of i t I had a f t e r my 
r e t u r n from London, Sc o t l a n d , e t c . There was a r e a c t i o n 
t h a t sunk me to the e a r t h ; the deadly s i l e n c e , s o l i t u d e , 
d e s o l a t i o n , were awful; the c r a v i n g f o r companionship, 
the hopelessness o f r e l i e f ..,' 
(C h a r l o t t e : l e t t e r to E l l e n Nussey, quoted i n G a s k e l l : 416-7); 
and to the way her conscience goads her to work a t the novel: 
"... I ought t o be put i n p r i s o n , and kept on bread and 
water i n s o l i t a r y confinement without even a l e t t e r 
from C o r n h i l l - t i l l I had w r i t t e n a book. ' 
(C h a r l o t t e : l e t t e r to G Smith, February 1851, quoted i n 




See above, p 330 f f 
See above, p 344 
See above, p 322 
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The circumstances o f the w r i t i n g o f ' V i l l e t t e ' may help us to 
understand why the work theme, though s t i l l strong i n t h i s novel, i s 
giv e n such a d i f f e r e n t treatment from t h a t i n 'The P r o f e s s o r ' . I n 
the quotations c i t e d from ' V i l l e t t e " above, i t would seem t h a t the work 
theme and the work e t h i c are e s s e n t i a l l y the same i n these two novels; 
but the more s u b j e c t i v e r e a l i s m o f ' V i l l e t t e ' a llows r e c o g n i t i o n o f the 
d i f f i c u l t y the heroine has i n p e r s i s t i n g i n h er work s i t u a t i o n . F a r more 
than C h a r l o t t e ' s other n o v e l s , ' V i l l e t t e ' admits of e x t r e m i t i e s of personal 
d i s t r e s s , o f l o n e l i n e s s (e.g. V o l I I , pp 25-27), of u t t e r d e s p a i r :(e,g., 
V o l I , pp 259-260), And although the work e t h i c i s c e r t a i n l y emphasised, 
the opposing sentiments a r e granted equal r e c o g n i t i o n . The b a t t l e i s 
conceived i n terms o f Reason versus Imagination: 
'According t o (Reason) , I was born only t o work f o r a 
p i e c e of bread, to await the p a i n s of death, and s t e a d i l y 
through a l l l i f e t o despond. Reason might be r i g h t ; 
y e t no wonder we are g l a d a t times to defy her, to rush 
from under h e r rod and g i v e a t r u a n t hour to imagination 
... Reason i s v i n d i c t i v e as a d e v i l : f o r me she was always 
envenomed as a step-mother. I f I have obeyed h er i t has 
c h i e f l y been w i t h the obedience o f f e a r , not of love. 
Long ago I should have d i e d of i l l - u s a g e . ,. but f o r t h a t 
k i n d e r Power who holds my s e c r e t and sworn a l l e g i a n c e ' . 
(Vol I , pp 383 -^4) 
T h i s passage tends to confirm our s u s p i c i o n t h a t C h a r l o t t e ' s work e t h i c 
i s a 'promotion'"''; i t i n d i c a t e s t h a t the 'psychological r e a l i s m ' of 
' V i l l e t t e " allows the r e c o g n i t i o n o f dovibts and d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t would 
have been impossible i n the neat and s e l f - c o n f i d e n t world view of 
"The P r o f e s s o r ' ; and i t le a d s us t o compare the circumstances i n which 
these two novels were w r i t t e n . 'The Professor' was w r i t t e n i n an atmosphere 
more congenial t o optimism; C h a r l o t t e ' s s i s t e r s were s t i l l a l i v e , and a l l 
t h r e e were about to embark upon t h e i r f i r s t attempt a t p u b l i s h i n g a novel: 
the work theme i s strong and s e l f - c o n f i d e n t l y o p t i m i s t i c . I n w r i t i n g 
" V i l l e t t e ' , C h a r l o t t e no longer needs to work f o r her l i v i n g , but r a t h e r 
See above, p 331 
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to occupy h e r mind a g a i n s t l o n e l i n e s s and despair; economic progress 
towards independence can no longer be conceived so simply as a path to 
e a r t h l y p a r a d i s e : i n the work of t r a n s c r i b i n g her p e r s o n a l experiences, 
C h a r l o t t e was now encouraged to g i v e f u l l r e c o g n i t i o n to those t h a t she 
had undergone i n h e r l o n e l y , s o c i a l l y dependent work s i t u a t i o n s - exper-
i e n c e s so c l o s e i n c h a r a c t e r to the ones t h a t she was now s u f f e r i n g . 
I n a d d i t i o n t o a l l o w i n g the f u l l e x p l o r a t i o n of f e e l i n g s opposed 
to the work e t h i c , the p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a l i s m of ' V i l l e t t e ' g i v e s room to 
v a r i o u s other themes t h a t could occupy only the background i n 'The 
P r o f e s s o r " . The love theme i s as strong as i n "Jane Eyre" and " S h i r l e y " , 
w i t h P a u l Emanuel as a somewhat Angrian hero, an i r a s c i b l e but f i r m 
master."'' Beyond the love theme, the form of ' V i l l e t t e " encourages the 
e x p o s i t i o n of s e v e r a l other deeply f e l t a t t i t u d e s : e.g.j towards r e l i g i o n -
there are s e v e r a l severe a t t a c k s on Roman C a t h o l i c i s m i n the novel 
( e s p e c i a l l y Chapter 36); and towards f o r e i g n lands and peoples witnessed 
even i n the d e r i s o r y names given t o Belgivmi and i t s towns: " V i l l e t t e " 
i t s e l f stands f o r Brussels." There are a l s o s i g n s i n ' V i l l e t t e " of 
C h a r l o t t e ' s experience o f London l i f e , a world of p a r t i e s and concerts to 
which she had been introduced s i n c e her success as an author; Chapters 20 
and 23 of " V i l l e t t e " are p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned with the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
of t h i s , f o r C h a r l o t t e , new world. But the major development of the novel's 
world view i n terms of subject-matter, apart from the theme of l o n e l i n e s s 
and d e s p a i r d i s c u s s e d above, i s i n i t s ending: although Lucy has achieved 
a c o n s i d e r a b l e degree o f economic s u c c e s s , the outlook i s bleak because • 
of the l i k e l y shipwreck of her f u t u r e husband P a u l . C h a r l o t t e modified 
the ending f o r her f a t h e r ' s sake so t h a t a happy ending might be inter-^ 
p r e t e d -
But I>aul Emanuel i s f a r more r e a l i s t i c a l l y drawn thah Rochester 
i n "Jane E y r e " : although P a u l p o s s e s s e s some elements of an Angrian 
c h a r a c t e r , he i s not C h a r l o t t e ' s a r c h t y p a l dark, mysterious Gothic 
hero - " V i l l e t t e ' s " r e a l i s m would not allow t h a t . 
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'But the id e a of M. P a u l Emanuel's death a t se a was stamped 
on her imagination, t i l l i t assumed the d i s t i n c t f o r c e o f 
r e a l i t y ; and she could no more a l t e r her f i c t i t i o u s ending 
than i f they had been f a c t s which she was r e l a t i n g . A l l 
she could do i n compliance w i t h her f a t h e r ' s wish was so 
to v e i l the f a t e i n o r a c u l a r words, as to leave i t to the 
c h a r a c t e r and discernment o f h er readers to i n t e r p r e t her 
meaning.' ( G a s k e l l : 479) 
Eagl e t o n blames t h i s ambiguous ending on the novel i t s e l f , and u l t i m a t e l y 
on C h a r l o t t e ' s own world view -
'.. . unable to opt f o r e i t h e r p o s s i b i l i t y . ' 
(1975t 73); 
but t h i s i s g r o s s l y u n f a i r , i g n o r i n g the b i o g r a p h i c a l evidence t h a t we 
have quoted from Mrs. G a s k e l l . I n any case, a c a r e f u l reading o f the 
l a s t paragraphs of the novel r e v e a l s t h a t there i s l e s s ambiguity than 
Ea g l e t o n and the Reverend P a t r i c k Brontfi would l i k e t o b e l i e v e : t h e r e i s 
a s t r o n g i m p l i c a t i o n o f P a u l ' s death a t sea. We are l e f t a t the end of 
the novel w i t h an impression of b i t t e r n e s s a g a i n s t f a t e , which i s able 
thus t o punish the good and d i l i g e n t , w h i l s t f a i l i n g to mete out p o e t i c 
j u s t i c e t o , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e t h r e e C a t h o l i c s e m i - v i l l a i n s : 
'Madame Beck prospered a l l the days of her l i f e ; so d i d 
Pere S i l a s ; Madame Walravens f u l f i l l e d h e r n i n e t i e t h year 
b e f o r e she died. F a r e w e l l , ' (Vol I I , p 406) 
So ends the novel, on a note which would have been inadmissable i n 
C h a r l o t t e ' s other works, but which i s p e r f e c t l y appropriate w i t h i n the 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a l i s m of " V i l l e t t e " . T h i s ending must have p l e a s e d 
t h e c r i t i c s more than C h a r l o t t e ' s p u b l i s h e r s or h e r r e a d e r s : i t may be 
t h a t h e r su c c e s s gave her the freedom to be " t r u t h f u l ' . 
The form of ' V i l l e t t e ' , w h i l s t allowing a c e r t a i n v a r i e t y of 
si i b j e c t - m a t t e r , a c e r t a i n manner o f treatment of the work and independ-
ence themes, and the unconventional ending, a l s o i n v o l v e s an a l t e r a t i o n 
of e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e i n comparison w i t h C h a r l o t t e ' s e a r l i e r novels. The 
e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e could not be c a l l e d melodramatic, as i n 'Jane E y r e ' , 
as the elements of melodrama i n ' V i l l e t t e " are l e s s p a r t o f an Angrian 
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world view''', and are r a t h e r d e v i c e s t h a t a i d the p l o t . They a r e , f u r t h e r -
more, l e s s i d e o l o g i c a l d e v i c e s ( l i k e Rochester's b l i n d n e s s and Jane"s 
legacy) than l i t e r a r y d e v i c e s t h a t are g e n e r a l l y used to br i n g together 
the key c h a r a c t e r s i n the novels so t h a t t h e i r s t o r y can be t o l d through 
the eyes o f the f i r s t - p e r s o n n a r r a t o r ; the f i r e t h a t b r i n g s together 
Dr. John and P a u l i n a Home, a f t e r y e a r s o f se p a r a t i o n , i s an example of 
t h i s . (Vol 11^ p 14 f f ) The e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e of ' V i l l e t t e ' a l s o d i f f e r s 
from the cold, s e l f - j u s t i f y i n g r e a l i s m of 'The P r o f e s s o r " , and from the 
attempt a t s o c i a l r e a l i s m i n " S h i r l e y " an attempt t h a t t r i e d to combine 
o b j e c t i v e s o c i a l a n a l y s i s and the imaginative e x p l o r a t i o n of p o e t i c 
t r u t h ; i n " V i l l e t t e " we have r a t h e r an ex p r e s s i v e s t y l e of intimate 
r e v e l a t i o n , i n which the ' r e a l i s m ' i s d i r e c t e d a t the heroine's own 
f e e l i n g s i n a s p i r i t o f open autobiographical e x p l o r a t i o n , and i n which 
the reader i s o f t e n t r e a t e d as a confidant. (E.g. the re f e r e n c e s to the 
reader on pp 315^ 320 & 349 of V o l I ) , There a r e S t i l l p l e n t y of e x p l i c i t 
c l a i m s to r e a l i s m , w i t h C h a r l o t t e as the " f a i t h f u l n a r r a t o r ' (Vol I , 
p 329) c u t t i n g from the 'homely web of t r u t h " (Vol I I ; p 355); and a 
s e l f - j u s t i f y i n g e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e i s s t i l l i n evidence (e.g.. V ol I I , p 6) 
b u t n e i t h e r are so common as i n " S h i r l e y " . W r i t i n g i n the f i r s t - p e r s o n 
and t r e a t i n g the reader as a confidant means t h a t there i s l e s s c a l l to 
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e s t a b l i s h the a u t h e n t i c i t y and l e g i t i m a c y of the universe portrayed. 
Thus i n ' V i l l e t t e " we again encounter the s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u e n c e of 
a predominant e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e i n l i t e r a t u r e . Y e t why d i d C h a r l o t t e 
adopt a t t h i s time an e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e implying a c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s h i p 
w i t h her read e r s ? I t may be t h a t her i n c r e a s i n g contact w i t h c r i t i c s 
and p u b l i s h e r s gave h e r g r e a t e r confidence; or t h a t the s u c c e s s of 
^ See the comparison o f Rochester and Paul Emanuel above p 360 
2 
Ewbank i n d i c a t e s t h a t the f i c t i o n of autobiography has no need 
f o r s e l f - c o n s c i o u s c l a i m s to a u t h e n t i c i t y i n the f o m of 
e x p l i c i t appeals to the reader. (1966: 166 &176) 
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' S h i r l e y ' as w e l l as 'Jane E y r e ' with the p u b l i c made her f e ^ l more 
assured of the ' b e n e f i t of the doubt' with her r e a d e r s ; or i t may be 
t h a t she r e a l i s e d t h a t , to explore f u l l y her B r u s s e l s experiences, she 
would have t o adopt a c o g n i t i v e s t y l e t h a t would not exclude the psycho-
l o g i c a l t r u t h s t h a t were the most important p a r t of the subject-matter. 
I n ' V i l l e t t e ' we have y e t again seen the importance of the general 
form of the novel upon the treatment of the subject-matter portrayed 
t h e r e i n . W h i l s t the themes of work and independence, and the presence 
of the work e t h i c , a re s t i l l strong i n ' V i l l e t t e ' , the general form of the 
novel a l l o w s the development of new themes: i n p a r t i c u l a r , of l o n e l i n e s s 
and d e s p a i r , of f e e l i n g s t h a t oppose the r i g i d d i s c i p l i n e of the work 
e t h i c , and of the unhappy f a t e of the heroine a t the end of the novel. 
I t was suggested t h a t such themes were r e l a t e d to the circumstances under 
which C h a r l o t t e h e r s e l f worked a t the c o n s t r u c t i o n of ' V i l l e t t e " , and 
were encouraged by the predominant e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e of the. novel, a s t y l e 
t h a t i s one of i t s c r u c i a l formative p r i n c i p l e s . The g e n e r a l form of the 
novel, i n c l u d i n g i t s predominant focus and e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e , i s seen i n 
r e l a t i o n t o C h a r l o t t e ' s r o l e as an author: her pioblic success w i t h 'Jane 
E y r e ' and ' S h i r l e y ' , her r e l a t i o n s h i p s with c r i t i c s and p u b l i s h e r s , and 
the s a l i e n c e f o r her of the c r i t i c a l response to ' S h i r l e y ' . 
I n the f i n a l sections of t h i s chapter we s h a l l explore four elements, 
t h a t have not been d i r e c t l y analysed i n the preceding study of the themes 
of work and independence!, but t h a t are common to the world views of 
C h a r l o t t e ' s n o v e l s , and t h a t are r e l a t e d to her economic a c t i o n , work 
s i t u a t i o n o r l i t e r a r y r o l e . These elements are: the range of occupations 
portrayed; s t a t u s - c o n s c i o u s n e s s ; i n d i v i d u a l i s m ; moralism. 
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( x i i i ) The Range of Occupations Portrayed 
I n Section ( i i ) of t h i s chapter we saw that one of the most striking 
effects of Emily Brontfe's economic action was the lack of portrayal of 
work i n her novel. Charlotte's economic action brought her into contact 
with a wider range of occupational groups, but the l i m i t s of t h i s range 
are c l e a r l y v i s i b l e i n the portrayal of work a c t i v i t y in her novels. We 
see teaching, book-keeping, the work of a governess or tutor, domestic, 
medical and religious work; there i s no picture of manual labour i n the 
sphere of industry or agriculture. There also seems to be a d i s t i n c t lower 
l i m i t of s o c i a l status below which individuals cannot play a major role in 
the novels: the aristrocracy, bourgeoisie, and p a r t i c u l a r l y professional 
workers are portrayed, and the heroes and heroines themselves may be 
destitute, as long as respectably so; but servants are kept very much in 
2 
the background , and the only sizable picture of an individual worker i s 
that of William Farren i n 'ShirAey', who i s given a job as a gardener to 
save him from unemployment , which i s the fate of the mass of those who are 
not portrayed individually. (Vol I , pp 234-6) I t does seem that Charlotte's 
work experience has limited her knowledge of various groups of people and 
t h e i r work, and t h i s i l l u s t r a t e s , as with Emily Bront6"^, the significance 
of work i n broadening or narrowing the range of one's s o c i a l contacts. 
But i n addition to Charlotte's work experience, i t would appear that an 
element of status-consciousness i s partly responsible for keeping in the 
background those characters (the obvious example being servants) whose 
s o c i a l status i s below a certain l i m i t . 
See above, p 296 f f 
2 
Compare 'Wuthering Heights' i n the s i g n i f i c a n t characters of Nelly 
Dean (who i s also the p r i n c i p a l narrator) and Joseph. 
^ See above, Section (v) , p 309 f f 
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( x i v ) S tatus-cons c i o u s n e s s 
C h a r l o t t e was from an e a r l y age imbued with a sta t u s - c o n s c i o u s n e s s 
t h a t probably d e r i v e d from her f a t h e r and aiont, and t h a t she neyer q u i t e 
abandoned. The main s i g n s o f t h i s a t t i t u d e i n her novels are i n the 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h the "lower o r d e r s ' , where, e.g., 
one may communicate l i b e r a l l y w i t h one's servants e t c . as long as they 
do not 'presume' ( " S h i r l e y " , V o l I I , p 179): the disapproved "presumption" 
here seems to be t h a t o f e q u a l i t y . S i m i l a r l y , a l a c k of fonnal deference 
by a w a i t e r or chambermaid i s found d i s t u r b i n g . ( " V i l l e t t e " , Vol I , p 70) 
A t the other end of the s t a t u s - h i e r a r c h y , C h a r l o t t e o c c a s i o n a l l y g i v e s 
i n d i c a t i o n s of a k i n d o f c u l t o f the gentleman, e s p e c i a l l y , as Faber 
p o i n t s out (1971: 37 -38) , i n terms of p h y s i c a l type^ manners e t c . (e.g., 
t h e f i r s t d e s c r i p t i o n o f Dr. John i n ' V i l l e t t e " : Vol I , pp 97-99), 
C h a r l o t t e ' s o r i g i n a l s t a t u s - c o n s e r v a t i s m i s , however, p a r t i a l l y 
broken down by two f a c t o r s ; her a t t i t u d e towards love, t h a t transcends 
s t a t u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ; and her experience of working as a governess. We 
have a l r e a d y seen i n C h a r l o t t e ' s novels how love i s capable o f breaking 
through conventional s t a t u s b a r r i e r s , so t h a t a governess (Jane Eyre) 
m a r r i e s her employer, and, more outrageously, a t u t o r marries a wealthy 
landowner ( S h i r l e y ) . Of more r e l e v a n c e for our i n t e r e s t i n C h a r l o t t e ' s 
work s i t u a t i o n i s the i n f l u e n c e of her experience as a governess upon her 
a t t i t u d e s towards s t a t u s : her o r i g i n a l romantic view of the a r i s t o c r a c y , 
as manifested i n her Angrian c h r o n i c l e s , was n e c e s s a r i l y modified by 
encounters w i t h both a r i s t o c r a c y and haute bourgeoisie i n the two house-
holds i n which she worked as governess. She had never before f e l t 
i n s u p e r a b l e b a r r i e r s between h e r s e l f and those of higher s o c i a l s t a t u s 
e.g. the two l i f e l o n g f r i e n d s she made a t Roe Head, E l l e n Nussey and 
Mary T a y l o r ; but as a governess she found h e r s e l f kept c a r e f u l l y o u t s i d e 
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of the s o c i a l l i f e o f the f a m i l i e s w i t h which she l i v e d : she was main-
t a i n e d a t a s o c i a l d i s t a n c e f a r enough t o prevent any degree of intimacy, 
even w i t h the c h i l d r e n she was i n c a r e o f . The memorable scenes of s o c i a l 
g a t h e r i n g s i n 'Jane E y r e ' ( e s p e c i a l l y Ch. 17) where Jane, the governess, 
i s ignored or even snvibbed, are l i k e l y to have stemmed from p e r s o n a l 
experience, and c a r r y a strong indictment - as does the conversation i n 
' S h i r l e y ' between C a r o l i n e and Mrs. Pryor, where the l a t t e r , though h i g h l y 
c o n s e r v a t i v e , speaks of the h o r r o r s of being a governess, i s o l a t e d by the 
b a r r i e r s of s o c i a l s t a t u s . (Vol I I , pp 84-88) C h a r l o t t e ' s former e a s i e r 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h those of a higher s o c i a l s t a t u s meant t h a t she saw no 
reason to avoid extending her g e n e r a l e v a l u a t i v e c r i t e r i a of i n d i v i d u a l s 
to those s o c i a l l y s u p e r i o r t o her; and the r e s u l t , i n her encounters through 
her work s i t u a t i o n as governess, i s t h a t she found them on the whole super-
f i c i a l and p r e t e n t i o u s . C h a r l o t t e ' s negative view of the a r i s t o c r a c y , 
h e r condemnation o f t h e i r tendencies to t r i v i a l i t y and s t a t u s - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , 
i s r e v e a l e d i n her n o v e l s through the p o r t r a y a l of c e r t a i n t y p e - c h a r a c t e r s 
who m a n i f e s t these tendencies: e.g., the Sympsons i n ' S h i r l e y ' , or Ginevra 
Fanshawe i n ' V i l l e t t e ' ; and the bourgeoisie f a r e s no b e t t e r , w i t h C h a r l o t t e 
emphasising the narrowness of mercenary va l u e s : e.g., i n the c h a r a c t e r s of 
Edward Crimsworth i n 'The P r o f e s s o r ' and (for the f i r s t p a r t of the book) 
Robert Moore i n ' S h i r l e y ' } and to a l e s s e r e x t ent i n the c h a r a c t e r s of 
Yorke Hunsden i n 'The P r o f e s s o r ' and Hiram Yorke i n ' S h i r l e y ' . C h a r l o t t e ' s 
a r i s t o c r a c t i c or bourgeois heroes are portrayed c l e a r l y as deviants 
w i t h i n t h e i r s o c i a l group: f o r i n s t a n c e , i n ' S h i r l e y ' , S h i r l e y h e r s e l f 
stands o u t s i d e her a r i s t o c r a t i c s t a t u s group, as represented by the 
Sympsons, w i t h whom she canpares favourably; and Robert Moore becomes 
t r u l y s u i t a b l e as a hero only when he p a r t i a l l y r e l i n q u i s h e s the narrow 
money-seeking nature of the b o u r g e o i s i e . I t i s perhaps s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t 
i n " V i l l e t t e " the two heroes a r e , l i k e C h a r l o t t e h e r s e l f , p r o f e s s i o n a l s ; 
a doctor and a t e a c h e r . 
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I n the m o d i f i c a t i o n of C h a r l o t t e ' s s t a t u s - c o n s c i o u s n e s s we have seen 
once more the i n f l u e n c e of her work s i t u a t i o n experience. C h a r l o t t e 
recognised the a t y p i c a l i t y of her views on s t a t u s , and t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n 
r e s u l t s i n the adoption of c e r t a i n e x p r e s s i v e s t y l e s , as we s h a l l see 
i n the s e c t i o n below on moralism. F i r s t l y , however, we s h a l l look a t 
an a t t i t u d e t h a t seems to have been extended from C h a r l o t t e ' s economic 
a c t i o n : i n d i v i d u a l i s m . 
(xv) I n d i v i d u a l i s m 
One o f the most s t r i k i n g elements of C h a r l o t t e ' s world view i s her 
i n d i v i d u a l i s m , and t h i s appears to be a t l e a s t p a r t l y developed from the 
consciousness i n v o l v e d i n her economic a c t i o n . C h a r l o t t e ' s means of 
earning her l i v i n g p r ovides no c l e a r grouping w i t h which she could j o i n 
to maintain or improve her economic s i t u a t i o n : •'' she worked as a r e l a t i v e l y 
i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l , and the path to economic advancement was through 
"making her own way i n the world", alone and without h e l p , working her 
way g r a d u a l l y and i n d i v i d u a l l y upwards, with the ultimate aim of the com-
petency. Thus the c o n d i t i o n s of C h a r l o t t e ' s economic a c t i o n would have 
a t l e a s t confirmed th e i n d i v i d u a l i s m t h a t was doubtless p a r t of the 
c u l t u r e i n which she grew up: her f a t h e r was a prime example of the 
self-made man - I r i s h peasant"s son to Rector of Haworth; and I n d i v i d - i 
ualism was an important element i n the world view of C h a r l o t t e "s 
m i d d l e - c l a s s r e a d e r s . I n her n o v e l s , C h a r l o t t e ' s econorai,c i n d i v i d u a l i s m | 
i s manifested i n the treatment of i n d i v i d u a l economic progress i n h e r o i c 
terms; though the element of heroism doubtless d e r i v e s p a r t l y from the 
heroes and h e r o i n e s having to endure h i g h l y r e s t r i c t i v e work s i t u a t i o n s 
on t h e i r way to s u c c e s s . 
^ The q u e s t i o n of p o s s i b l e groupings, t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l could 
j o i n to promote h i s economic advancement, i s d i s c u s s e d i n 
Chapter 7, p 149 above. 
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T h i s economic i n d i v i d u a l i s m may already be seen as a development 
beyond the narrow c o n f i n e s of C h a r l o t t e ' s economic a c t i o n ; but more 
i n t e r e s t i n g are the wider extensions of t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e . One such 
ex t e n s i o n i s the i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c view o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n t h a t i s apparent 
i n C h a r l o t t e ' s novels. S e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , f o r i n s t a n c e , apart from such 
r a r e p o s s i b i l i t i e s as the use of parliamentaory means (e.g., ' S h i r l e y ' , 
V o l I , p 243), i s seen i n i n d i v i d u a l terras; wherever group a c t i o n i s the 
only a l t e r n a t i v e , r e s i g n a t i o n or p a t i e n c e i s the author's message, (e.g., 
' S h i r l e y ' , V o l I , p 199) The p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r group determination by the 
L u d d i t e s i n ' S h i r l e y ' are d i s m i s s e d as 'presumption' (Vol I , p 382), and 
the workers who do thus presume a r e viewed as many f o o l s being l e d by a 
few mad l e v e l l e r s , 
'... whose c h i e f m o t i v e - p r i n c i p l e i s a s e l f i s h ambition, 
as dangerous as i t i s p u e r i l e . ' (Vol I , p 195) 
I n comparison, Robert Moore,is t r e a t e d as a "heroic tradesman" (Vol I , 
p 295) ; h i s defence of the m i l l a g a i n s t the workers i s a courageous a c t 
of a few i n d i v i d u a l s a g a i n s t a mob (Vol I I , p 38 f f ) ; and h i s l a t e r 
schemes f o r improvement l i k e w i s e do not take the p o s s i b i l i t y of group 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n i n t o account. (Vol I I , pp 466 & 468-9) Thus the problems 
o f s o c i e t y , which seem to d e r i v e from man's n a t u r a l s e l f i s h n e s s ( w h i c h 
i s only i n c r e a s e d when they form together i n t o groups: S h i r l e y , Vol I , 
p 241) , may be overcone only through i n d i v i d u a l c h a r i t y . What i s more, 
c h a r i t y i s not only recommended but i s seen to be e f f i c a c i o u s . I n 'The 
P r o f e s s o r " , M. Vandenhuten"s recommendation comes t o the r e s c u e of 
W i l l i a m Crimsworth. I n "Jane E y r e " , the R i v e r s f a m i l y " s c h a r i t y saves 
Jane from d e s t i t u t i o n and probable death. I n ' S h i r l e y ' we see none of 
the i n d i v i d u a l s i n r e a l f i n a n c i a l d i s t r e s s , except William F a r r e n , who 
i s again p e r s o n a l l y helped by Mr. H a l l , Robert Moore, Mr. Yorke and 
S h i r l e y . Thus the h o r r o r i s kept i n the background and t r e a t e d as a 
mass phenomenon, w h i l s t C h a r l o t t e ' s emphasis on i n d i v i d u a l a i d as the 
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only worthwhile form of s o c i a l a m e l i o r a t i o n i s r e i n f o r c e d by showing 
i t s e f f i c a c y i n these v a r i o u s c a s e s : we have no p i c t u r e of i n d i v i d u a l 
d e s t i t u t i o n untouched by p e r s o n a l c h a r i t y or o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r s e l f -
h e l p . 
A t i t s broadest, C h a r l o t t e ' s i n d i v i d u a l i s m i s extended to i n v e i g h 
a g a i n s t t r e a t i n g people as c l a s s e s r a t h e r than i n d i v i d u a l s : thus S h i r l e y 
d e c r i e s c l a s s p r e j u d i c e s 
''All r i d i c u l o u s , i r r a t i o n a l c r y i n g up of one c l a s s , 
whether the same be a r i s t o c r a t o r democrat - a l l 
howling down o f another c l a s s , whether c l e r i c a l or 
m i l i t a r y - a l l e x a c t i n g i n j u s t i c e to i n d i v i d u a l s , 
whether monarch or mendicant - i s r e a l l y s i c k e n i n g 
tome:'' (Vol I I , p 73); 
and Lucy Snowe, i n ' V i l l e t t e ' , deprecates the l a c k of f e e l i n g , where one 
g i v e s generously to good causes, but r e f u s e s t o h e l p the i n d i v i d u a l i n 
need; 
' ,,, she had no h e a r t t o be touched .,. While devoid 
of sympathy, she had a s u f f i c i e n c y of r a t i o n a l benev-
olence: she would g i v e i n the r e a d i e s t manner to people 
she had never seen •«^  r a t h e r ; however, t o c l a s s e s than 
to i n d i v i d u a l s , ' (Vol I , p 117) 
1 
Once again i t i s worth emphasising t h a t t h i s i n d i v i d u a l i s m was a per-
s p e c t i v e c u r r e n t amongst Charlotte'-s contemporaries; but her s e l e c t i o n * 
and emphasis th e r e o f may be seen as i n p a r t an extension of the conscious-
n ess i n v o l v e d i n heir economic a c t i o n , 
t x v i ) Moralism 
Thfi f i n a l s e c t i o n i n t h i s chapter looks a t C h a r l o t t e ' s moralism, 
both as a c o g n i t i v e s t y l e i n her own world view, and as an e x p r e s s i v e 
2 
s t y l e i n her l i t e r a r y works. U n l i k e Emily , C h a r l o t t e ' s work s i t u a t i o n 
d i d not provide an extreme i s o l a t i o n from the m o r a l i s t i c view of her 
''' Through a p r o c e s s o f e l e c t i v e a f f i n i t y : see above. Chapter 7 ,p 172 
^ See above, pp 309-310 
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contemporaries; and moreover she recognised that her readers would expect 
a moralistic expressive s t y l e . This recognition must have been confirmed 
by those reviewers who were shocked by the coarseness' (Gaskell: 282) 
of her writing, and would have liked even more moral signposts. But, 
although we have noted elements of a moralistic expressive s t y l e i n 
a l l of Charlotte's novels, Charlotte was unwilling to adopt the degree 
of e x p l i c i t moralism expected by some of her readers: 
'The story i s told. I think I now see the judicious 
reader putting on h i s spectacles to look for the moral. 
I t would be an i n s u l t to his sagacity to offer direc-
tions. I only say, God speed him i n the questI" 
('Shirley'', Vol I I , p 471) 
The moralism that we do find i n Charlotte's novels seems partly to be her 
own cognitive s t y l e , doubtless adopted from her contemporaries, but also 
reinforced through extension fron her own strong work ethic, whose 
development was traced above.''^  Yet we also find a particular kind of 
m o r a l i s t i c expressive s t y l e in Charlotte's novels, i . e . the s e l f - j u s t i f i -
cation that we have already noted several times above. 
The expressive s t y l e of self-?-justification has to be seen in relation 
to Charlotte's conception of her readers. Her frequent invocations to the 
'Reader 1' suggest that she was well aware of her readers whilst writing. 
She c l e a r l y expects her readers to be of the 'Middle Rank', as i s shown 
by the following quotation from 'Shirley': 
'... a r i o t e r s ' y e l l ... You never heard that sound, 
perhaps, reader? So much the better for your ears -
perhaps for your heart; since, i f i t rends the a i r 
i n hate to yourself, or to the men or principles you:, 
approve, the interests to which you wish well, Wrath 
wakens to the cry of Hate: the Lion shakes his mane, 
r i s e s to the howl of the Hyena: Caste stands up, i r e f u l , 
against Caste; and the indignant, wronged s p i r i t of the 
Middle Rank bears down i n zeal and scorn on the famished 
and furious mass of the Operative Class. I t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to be tolerant - d i f f i c u l t to be j u s t - i n such moments. ' 
(vol I I , p 37) 
See above, p 330 f f 
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The e f f e c t of t h i s expectation i s that certain assumptions common to 
Charlotte and her expected readers are allowed to remain assmptions: 
w h i l s t , where Charlotte suspects that there may be ideological d i f f e r -
ences, she i s quick to attempt to explain and j u s t i f y , to persuade of 
the truth, realism or morality of what she describes, or even to j u s t i f y 
i t s portrayal,"'' 
After the p\jblication of 'Jane Eyre", Charlotte became highly aware 
that her morality and conventional morality were not the same. Thus 
she writes i n a preface to the second edition of 'Jane Eyre': 
' I mean the timorous or carping few who doubt the 
tendency of such books as ' Jane Eyre' s i n whose 
eyes whatever i s unusual i s wrong; ... Conventions 
a l i t y i s not morality. ' (pp vii i - ^ i x ) 
I t i s the recognition of the potential divergence between herself and her 
readers on questions of morality that leads Charlotte frequently to adopt 
her expressive s t y l e of s e l f - j u s t i f i c a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the spheres 
of status-consciousness and passionate love. With respect to status^ 
consciousness, we find i n 'Shirley', for instance, an assumption of easy 
empathy with Robert Moore: we need no j u s t i f i c a t i o n of his presence i n 
the novel, of our seeing h i s factory largely from h i s point of view, 
of the portrayal of h i s work i n the counting-house, etc.; we are even 
expected to identify with him i n h i s anger against the workers"^ threat 
against h i s propertyw I n contrast, when William Farren, a 'decent' 
worker, i s introduced, the chapter i s headed, with tongue in cheek, 
'Which the genteel reader i s recommended to skip, 
low persons being here introduced,' 
(Vol I I , p 1) ; 
For a general discussion of t h i s issue, see Chapter 9^ p 214 
above. 
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and i n the chapter i t s e l f William's decency i s much stressed, as i f he 
were p u r i f i e d for the reader's sake. Caroline Helstone, moreover, presents 
a strong case for communicating with William, which thus acts as an 
i n d i r e c t j u s t i f i c a t i o n of h i s presence in the novel. 
Charlotte's s e l f - j u s t i f y i n g expressive s t y l e i s , however, found most 
frequently i n relation to passionate love. Certain c r i t i c s , notably 
Miss Rigby i n the 'Quarterly Review', had faulted her for dealing with 
such a svibject in 'Jane Eyre': a woman should not admit to passionate 
feelings. Charlotte responds to such c r i t i c i s m i n 'Shirley', by giving 
to her two heroines a dialogue that presents a strong j u s t i f i c a t i o n of 
the discussion and experience of loves 
'Obtrusiveness i s a crime; forwardness i s a crime; 
and both disgust: but love! - no purest angel need 
blush to loveI And when I see or hear either man 
or woman couple shame with love, I know their minds 
are coarse, the i r association debased. Many who 
think themselves refined ladies and gentlemen, and 
on whose l i p s the word 'vulgarity' i s for ever 
hovering, cannot mention 'love' without betraying 
t h e i r own innate and imbecile degradation; i t i s a 
low feeling i n t h e i r estimation, connected only with 
low ideas for them.' 
The expressive s t y l e here goes beyond mere s e l f - j u s t i f i c a t i o n , to 
defiance. 
In concluding t h i s section, i t may be noted that Charlotte's 
moralism, whether i n the form of her own cognitive s t y l e , of the 
general expressive s t y l e of her novels, or of the particular expressive 
s t y l e of s e l f - j u s t i f i c a t i o n , provides the most s t r i k i n g contrast with 
the world view of her s i s t e r Emily and of 'Wuthering Heights', and 
i l l u s t r a t e s the s i g n i f i c a n t differences between the two s i s t e r s i n 
terms of work situation and authorship role. Emily's work situation 
i s o l a t e d her from the predominant moralistic cognitive style of her 
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contemporaries, unlike Charlotte's work, which forced her into greater 
s o c i a l contact away from Haworth. Emily's work situation also meant 
that she did not find i t necessary to adopt the strong work ethic which 
Charlotte extended into a more general moralism. F i n a l l y , Emily's 
i s o l a t i o n meant that she was le s s l i k e l y than Charlotte to recognize 
her reader's expectations of a moralistic expressive s t y l e ; was le s s 
l i k e l y to be aware of divergencies between her world view and the i r s ; 
and, with her authorship encompassing the publication of only one novels 
was unable to develop (through l i t e r a r y feedback) a s e l f - j u s t i f y i n g or 
even defiant expressive s t y l e i n a second novel. 
(xvii) Conclusion 
2 
I n t h i s chapter a case study, as advocated i n Chapter 11, has been 
undertaken for each of our two authors. Description and explanation has 
been i n terms of methodological individualsm, as outlined i n Chapter 7.^ 
The value-relevance of the study has been recognised, without ignoring the 
4 
value-reference of the novels. These features of our methodology 
contrast with a recent approach by Eagleton to the BrontS novels, an 
approach which follows a modified version of the Goldmann method that 
we c r i t i c i s e d i n Chapter 11.^ Eagleton, in a deliberately free usage 
of the concept of 'categorial structure' (1975: 4) , attempts by means 
of t h i s concept to bring together: 
'Text, author, ideology, s o c i a l c l a s s , productive 
feces!' (1975: 13). 
Indeed he i s able to bring together these elements, but only by reading 
h i s presuppositions into the novels, and by correlating h i s t o r i c a l 
factors instead of demonstrating the connections between them. He 
continually attempts to interpret the Brontfi s i s t e r s and their novels 
Like Charlotte, Emily diverged frcan her readers in the portrayal of 
passionate love and i n not accepting certain status conventions: 
see above, 305 f f 
2 3 
See above. Chapter 11, pp 264-265 See above. Chapter 7, p 148 f f 
^ See above. Chapter 11, p 274 ^ See above, Chapter 11, p 250 f f 
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in terms of grand h i s t o r i c a l forces, s o c i a l classes whose clashes and 
compromises he claims are 'enacted' (1975: 119) or 'embodied' (1975; 13) 
i n the novels. In claiming to 'decipher' (1975: 4) or 'detect' (1975: 9) 
i n the l i v e s and novels of the Brontfe s i s t e r s the 'unfolding of a general 
grammar' (1975: 9 ) , Eagleton i s in practice imposing upon the analysis 
h i s pre-given schema, and thus ignoring the value-reference of his 
subject-matter. I n the present chapter several c r i t i c a l references have 
been made to Eagleton's work, e.g. i n relation to the selection of the 
Luddite setting i n • Shirley'•"•, or the ending of " V i l l e t t e ' ^ : i n both 
these cases Eagleton's preconceptions appear to d i s t o r t h i s account of 
Charlotte's intentions. A similar distortion can be found i n Eagleton's 
claim that the major clash of values i n Charlotte's world view consists 
i n the c o n f l i c t between, on the one hand, rat i o n a l i t y and energetic 
individualism, and, on the other hand, sidamission and conservatism - this 
c o n f l i c t , of course, conveniently embodying the antagonism between the 
i n d u s t r i a l bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy, (1975: 4) Yet we 
have seen how Charlotte's work ethic encourages both rational individual-
ism and submission (to an unpleasant work situation) , and that both the 
sets of values which Eagleton distinguishes are opposed to 'poetry';, the 
force of which i n Charlotte's world view Eagleton i s unable to recognise, 
since 'poetry' does not correspond to the world views he wishes to read 
into Charlotte's works. Where Eagleton finds botirgeois values 'embodied' 
i n Charlotte's novels, he appears to see these values as steimning from 
the bourgeoisie, without investigating the p o s s i b i l i t y that Charlotte, 
through her economic action, developed some values that she shares with 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s (such as individualism), whilst she retained a sharp 
awareness of the points of divergence - e.g. where the work ethic or 
See above, p 352 
2 See above, p 361 
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the desire for independence i s narrowed to monetary zeal in i t s own 
right. I t i s f i n a l l y worth noting that Eagleton's approach i s unable 
to differentiate adequately between the works of Emily and Charlotte: 
since he wishes to read into both the working of the same broad histor-
i c a l forces, h is major d i s t i n c t i o n between the work of the two s i s t e r s 
i s i n terms of l i t e r a r y 'subtlety' (1975: 119), which of course can be 
used to account for and excuse any apparent divergencies from his pre-^ 
conceived model. 
Having contrasted our approach with that of Eagleton, we may now 
summarise the major points that have emerged through our study of 
Charlotte Brontfe.''" We f i r s t presented an outline of Charlotte's 
biography i n terms of sociological r a t i o n a l i t y , focusing upon her economic 
ends and means in re l a t i o n to her values. We then attempted to relate 
wherever possible to her 'class' ( in particular her economic action and 
work situation) those elements of her world view that we found expressed 
i n her novels. This attempt was undertaken pr i n c i p a l l y through the exam-
ination of two predominant themes to be found i n a l l of Charlotte's novels, 
i . e . work and independence. Hardly surprisingly, i t was discovered that 
the economic cognitions and evaluations that were manifested i n Charlotte's 
novels were those that were central to her own economic consciousness. 
More interestingly, however, her work situation was found to be s i g n i f i -
cant i n accounting for: (a) the predominance of the work and independ«-
ence themes; (b) the range of occupations portrayed i n her novels 
(suggesting the importance of work i n broadening or narrowing the range 
of one's s o c i a l contacts) ; (c) the development in her attitudes towards 
s o c i a l status. Other developments i n Charlotte's world view were con" 
The summary of our work on Emily Brontfe was presented i n 
Section (vi) p 314 above. 
376 
sidered to be extensions, from the consciousness involved i n her econ-
omic action or work situation, such as feminism and individualism; or 
were thought to be promotions, to aid her i n her work, such as the 
strong work ethic ( i t s e l f extended to related values and a more general 
mora l i s t i c cognitive s t y l e ) , and the r e a l i s t i c cognitive s t y l e , as 
expressed p a r t i c u l a t l y i n 'The Professor', 
Despite the predominance of the themes of work and independence, 
much variation was found i n th e i r treatment, and though this variation 
could at times be partly accounted for by developments i n Charlotte's 
own world view (as i n the atmosphere of loneliness and despair i n which 
she wrote her l a s t two novels) , i t was always necessary to see Charlotte's 
developing l i t e r a r y universes i n rel a t i o n to her l i t e r a r y contacts and 
her definition of her role as author. Thus we examined the d i f f e r e n t i a l 
significance for Charlotte of various forms of l i t e r a r y contact and of 
several kinds of 'success', and noted the particular salience of 
Charlotte's contact with l i t e r a r y c r i t i c s . Her expectations and acknow-
ledgements of the response to her novels were seen to influence the 
general form of her works, both i n terms of focus and expressive s t y l e . 
The formative principles that were posited for each novel were consid-
ered to be of great importance i n structuring the elements of i t s l i t e r a r y 
universe, from the broad l e v e l of the general structure of the novel (e.g. 
the allowance or exclusion of inconsistencies) , through the u t i l i s a t i o n 
of various l i t e r a r y and ideological devices, to the treatment of particular 
subject-matter and attitudes, e.g. the work ethic. 
Throughout the analysis of Charlotte's novels, the u t i l i t y of the 
concept of 'expressive s t y l e ' was apparent; and i t s significance was not 
r e s t r i c t e d to the general formative principles of the works: various 
siabsidiary expressive s t y l e s were detected, generally related to moralism. 
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whether as the expression of a general cognitive s t y l e (a possible 
extension from the work e t h i c ) , or, as a reaction to expected or 
acknowledged reader-response, i n the form of s e l f - j u s t i f i c a t i o n or even 
defiance. I t was i n the area of moralism, and of cognitive st y l e more 
generally (Charlotte having to abandon much of her Angrian cognitive 
s t y l e , w hilst Emily was able to retain Gondal) , that the contrast with 
Emily Bronte was most f r u i t f u l . I t i s suggested that, i n attempting to 
account for the divergent l i t e r a r y universes of Emily and Charlotte 
Bronte, one of the most s i g n i f i c a n t contributions may be made through a 
careful comparison of their respective courses of economic action, their 
work situations and t h e i r l i t e r a r y roles. 
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CONCLUSION TO PART IV 
This i s a suitable point to review the argument of the thesis as 
a whole, which encompasses the development of general models i n the 
sociology of knowledge and l i t e r a t u r e , and their application to the 
analysis of the novels of Charlotte and Emily BrontS, 
I n Part I , some widely differing theories i n the sociology of know-
ledge were examined i n the l i g h t of an analytical substructure-super-
structiiire d i s t i n c t i o n , i n order to esablish the kinds of relationship 
th^it may be posited between a substructure of s o c i a l factors and a 
superstructure of thought. This study was carried out i n order to develop 
a general approach to the sociology of knowledge that could be applied to 
the l a t e r (Part I I ) ; s p e c i f i c investigation of the development of conscious-
ness from class factors. The analysis of theories i n the sociology of 
knowledge with respect to the s\abstructure (Chapter 2) revealed the 
necessity: (a) of including meaningful elements i n the substructure; 
(b) of avoiding naive conceptions of group consciousness (here the 
cri t i q u e of Goldmann was especially relevant) ; and (c) of refining the 
models of the relationships between motivation and b e l i e f , and between 
situation and consciousness (the theories of Pareto and Mannheim, and 
in p a r t i c u l a r the concepts of ' u t i l i t y ' ' and 'commitment', were found to 
be esp e c i a l l y useful here). 
I n Chapter 3, several perspectives on the superstructure i n the 
sociology of knowledge were discussed. Overarching conceptions of 
superstructure i n terms of 'world view'' were exmained, and assumptions 
of consistency and coherence c r i t i c i s e d . (This theme was l a t e r taken 
up i n the analysis of the concept of 'world view' i n Chapter 6) . 
Sugges-ted differentiations of the superstructure were reviewed, such as 
Parsons' d i s t i n c t i o n between cognitive and evaluative elements (a d i s -
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t i n c t i o n that was found to be of greater use i n the analysis of 
svibstructural than of super s t r u c t u r a l consciousness) , and Scheler's 
delineation of discrete 'modes of knowledge' (which prefigures the 
concern with ' l i t e r a t u r e as a sp e c i a l case' i n Part I I I ) . The most 
important contribution of Chapter 3, however, was the suggestion of 
four principal elements of consciousness that may be developed from a 
substructural action or situation: (a) pragmatic knolwedge; (b) l e g i t -
imations; (c) promations; (d) extensions. 
In Chapter 4, various suggested relationships between substructure 
and siiperstructure were examined. Motivational theories for the 
development of consciousness were reviewed, i n pa r t i c u l a r the pragmatic 
conception of consciousness, and the significance of the concepts of 
' salience' and ' commitment for an explanation of ' extensions' . The 
h i s t o r i c a l and structural context of consciousness development was 
recognised, and naive determinism was rejected i n various forms, while 
emphasis was placed upon the contribution made by the theory of elective 
a f f i n i t y . 
I n Part I I , the general approach to the sociology of knowledge 
that had been put forward i n Part I was applied to the analysis of the 
modes of development of 'world view' from elements substaned under the 
concept of 'c l a s s ' . This l a t t e r concept was examined i n Chapter 5, 
taking from Weber the emphasis on the interplay of subjective factors 
with the conditioning role of economic elements, and the methodological 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t approach to c l a s s i n meansrend terms, For our purposes 
a broader conception of ^class* was advocated, including economic si t u a -
tion (and what i t a t t a i n s ) , economic action (and conditions thereof) 
and work situation. 
In Chapter 6, various conceptions of 'Weltanschauung' were discussed. 
Rather than the t r a d i t i o n a l idea of ''Weltanschauung' , which involved the 
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assumption of actual or i d e a l - t y p i c a l consistency and coherence, a 
'rag-bag' concept of world view was advocated, whose p r i n c i p a l u t i l i t y 
would l i e i n i t s capacity to reveal interrelations between the various 
elements of an individual's consciousness over a certain period of time. 
I t was suggested that a world view has meaningful, s t y l i s t i c and struc-
t u r a l properties, and that these are best described i n terms of attitudes, 
cognitive s t y l e s and cognitive structure. 
I n Chapter 7, the conceptualisations of class and world view were 
brought together i n a model that applied the general sociology of know-
ledge approach (Part I ) to the analysis of the development of aspects of 
world view from elements of c l a s s . An ideal-atypical actor model was 
advocated, which did not neglect system or group analysis; e.g. various 
foims of 'class contact' were suggested - 'face-to-face', 'taking account' 
and 'identification', A comparison was made of the concepts of conscious-
ness put forward i n Chapters 3 and 6, recognising the different purposes 
of each c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , i . e . for tracing modes of development of con-
sciousness CChapter 3) and for engendering concepts of consciousness at 
a suitable l e v e l of generality (Chapter 6) . The development of world 
view was further analysed with respect to certain key 'points of develop-
ment' i n r e l a t i o n to cl a s s elements; i . e . the experience or,evaluation 
of economic or work situation, and the cognitions and evaluations involved 
i n economic action. The development of consciousness from class was 
considered to be most l i k e l y when economic situation/action or work 
situation were particuarly s a l i e n t for the actor. F i n a l l y , i n accordance 
with -the perspective put forward i n Chapter 4, i t was suggested that the 
individual's c l a s s ^ r e l a t e d consciousness, and more generally his world 
view, should be seen i n a broader context, that might however be limited 
by compartmentalisation. 
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I n Part I I I , the general model of the development of world view 
from c l a s s elements was applied to the special case of l i t e r a r y world 
views. Thus i n Chapter 8 an attempt was made to analyse authorship as 
a c l a s s r o l e . I t was, however, found necessary to take into account 
the non-i-economic aspects of the author role, aspects that may mediate 
the influence of c l a s s elements: i n particular, there was recognition of 
the various meanings of 'success' for the author, and of the d i f f e r e n t i a l 
salience of his several 'role contacts', Nevertheless, the same approach 
of sociological r a t i o n a l i t y was advocated for the analysis of the author 
role as had been applied to the examination of c l a s s . 
I n Chapter 9, the enquiiry into the nature of the author's l i t e r a r y 
act was pursued through the predominant conceptions of a r t as communica-
tion and expression. The sociology of expression was considered to be an 
important adjunct to the sociology of knowledge, and, when applied to 
literature,, indicated; the potential c r e a t i v i t y and r e l a t i v e autonomy 
of l i t e r a r y expression; i t s various degrees of selection and fabrication, 
including the development of explications, legitimations, cognitive 
s t y l e s and u t i l i t a r i a n expressions i n the text; and the author's taking 
account of both the world view of h i s audience and their s o c i a l definition 
of h i s work. 
The theory of l i t e r a t u r e as expression was further explored i n 
Chapter 10, where the analysis of the meanings 'expressed' i n l i t e r a - . 
ture was seen to require the recognition of certain aspects of l i t e r a r y 
form; symbolic form (and the consequent problem of 'translation'); 
formative p r i n c i p l e s , and t h e i r relationship to themes, l i t e r a r y s t y l e s 
and expressive s t y l e s ; the forms available to the author; and the general 
form of f i c t i o n as a public written statement, i n whose creation the 
importance of -values and l i t e r a r y and ideological devices must be noted. 
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The methodological debate i n Chapter 11 centred around three 
issues that arose out of a c r i t i q u e of Goldmann's sociology of l i t e r -
ature: the comparison of macro- and micro-analysis led to the recomm-
endation of micro-structiiral case studies that would focus upon the 
author, h i s orientations and relationships, within a broader s o c i a l 
context; the interpretation of l i t e r a t u r e i n terms of 'world view' was 
defended, whilst rejecting assumptions of 'coherence' and 'totality'; 
the role of values i n l i t e r a r y interpretation was recognised, both i n 
terms of value'^reference and value-rrelevance. To aid the elucidation 
of the general aspects of the world view of a novel, a l i s t of questions 
was proposed, suggesting topics considered worthwhile bearing i n mind 
during the analysis of the work. 
In Part IV, the general model, whose construction occupied Parts I 
& I I , and which traced potential developments of world view from class 
elements, was combined wi-th the recognition of those factors seen in 
Part I I I to be relevant to an analysis of l i t e r a r y expression, and was 
applied to the undertaking of two case studies, focusing upon Charlotte 
and Emily BrontS and t h e i r novels, For each novel 'the formative 
p r i n c i p l e s were recognised, both i n terms of predominant themes and 
expressive s t y l e s , and were wherever possible related both to the 
author's l i t e r a r y role and, through her own world view, to the elements 
of her c l a s s (especially her economic action and work si t u a t i o n ) . These 
•two case studies, apart from suggesting certain s p e c i f i c hypotheses 
(such as Charlotte BrontS's u t i l i t a r i a n adoption of her strong work 
ethic as a 'promotion') , and besides supporting the general approach 
to the sociology of knowledge and lit e r a t u r e expounded i n previous 
chapters, provided an extensive demonstration of the u t i l i t y of certain 
key concepts that were either adopted or in-troduced e a r l i e r i n the 
thesis, i . e . ; economic action and work situation; c l a s s contacts. 
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l i t e r a r y role contacts, and the author's 'taking account' of the 
l a t t e r ; commitment and salience? the author's world view, including 
especially extensions, promotions and cognitive s t y l e s ; the work's 
world view, including especially i t s formative principles, predominant 
themes, expressive s t y l e s , assumptions and legitimations; l i t e r a r y and 
ideological devices; available forms; value-reference and value-relevance. 
Of a l l these concepts, those that emerged most strongly i n the study of 
Charlotte Brontfe and her novels were economic action and work situation, 
l i t e r a r y role, formative principles and expressive s t y l e ; and much of 
the weight of the iccmparlson with Emily Brontfe was carried by j u s t three 
of these conceptsj work situation, l i t e r a r y role and expressive s t y l e . 
Overall, Part IV has consolidated the general argianent of the thesis, 
i . e . that a coordinated sociology of knowledge and l i t e r a t u r e i s viable 
at the l e v e l of p a r t i c u l a r authors and their l i t e r a r y works; and,more 
pa r t i c u l a r l y , that a careful a n a l y t i c a l model of the potential develop-
ments of world view from c l a s s elements, may be combined with a model 
of the factors to be recognised i n the interpretation and explanation 
of l i t e r a r y expressions, to suggest si g n i f i c a n t points of analysis that 
should be born i n mind when considering the influence of class upon the 
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